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ABSTRACT 
 
Nigeria and India are former British colonies. Both countries have similar constitutional 
framework on fundamental rights and directive principles of state policy. South Africa, 
with Dutch and British colonial legacies, on the other hand, is arguably, the most 
advanced constitutional democracy in Africa, and perhaps, in the world today. Nigeria, 
India and South Africa are developing countries in the Global South. They all lean 
strongly towards patriarchal and socio-religious mythology. These three countries 
belong to the same common law family of mixed legal systems. Legal transplant is, 
therefore, possible between them. Strategically speaking, Nigeria and India are the 
largest democracies in Africa and Asia respectively. Statistically, women outnumber 
men in South Africa while in Nigeria and India they constitute nearly half of the 
population. These women unfortunately are vulnerable. They suffer similar indignity of 
rape, marital rape, sexual harassment and other humiliation arising typically from 
patriarchal mind-sets, beliefs in certain socio-religious mythologies or ancient 
customary practices including castes, dowry and bride price, widowhood rites and son 
preference, which diminish the self-worth and dignity of women. On the basis of some 
of these abuses only, these countries have been derided as dangerous places for women 
to live in. Nigeria, in particular, is further ridiculed as being “notorious for violating 
international agreements”. The Nigerian legal framework, comprising constitutional 
guarantees, law and policy formulations as well as judicial responses, for the protection 
of the right to dignity of women, has been vigorously criticized for falling short of 
international law, unsustainable and incapable of supporting the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goal No. 3 on gender equality and empowerment of women. 
In South Africa, things are however different. The pragmatism of the Constitutional 
Court and the superior Bill of Rights provisions in the Constitution are legendary. They 
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easily rank among the best in the Global South as well as the Global North. India is also 
forward-looking. With basic legal and policy protection of women’s right to dignity and 
sexual safety, coupled with judicial independence, creativity and activism in the 
interpretation of both positive and negative constitutional rights, India, too, is 
exemplary. It showcases and distinguishes the Indian Supreme Court, alongside the 
more outstanding Constitutional Court of South Africa, as consequential courts and 
activist tribunals in the Global South in the 21st Century. This thesis highlights certain 
abuses of the right to dignity of women in Nigeria, India and South Africa (as mirror of 
the most African and Asian women). It explores international law, as well as the 
transformational advances in the legal framework (constitutional, judicial, legislative 
and policy) governing the protection of women’s right to dignity in India and South 
Africa, from which valuable lessons may reasonably be applied to bridge the inherent 
fundamental gaps in the existing Nigerian framework. Finally, it recommends reforms 
in the quest for a sustainable legal framework for the protection of the right to dignity of 
women in Nigeria. Incidentally those recommendations may also be useful to other 
developing common law jurisdictions in similar circumstances. This research is 
qualitative and doctrinal. It is based purely on library and desktop research including 
analysis and valuable information from legal provisions, case-law, as well as writings 
and opinions of eminent scholars and jurists.   
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ABSTRAK 
 
Nigeria dan India adalah bekas tanah jajahan British. Kedua-dua negara tersebut 
mempunyai rangka perlembagaan yang serupa mengenai hak-hak asasi dan prinsip-
prinsip arahan dasar negara. Afrika Selatan, dengan pusaka jajahan Belanda dan British, 
di sebaliknya, adalah demokrasi perlembagaan yang paling maju di Afrika dan mungkin 
di dunia pada masa kini. Nigeria, India dan Afrika Selatan adalah negara-negara 
membangun di Selatan Global. Mereka semuanya bersandar kuat kepada mitologi 
patriarki dan sosio-agama. Ketiga-tiga negara tersebut tergolong dalam keluarga 
common law yang sama yang bersifat sistem perundangan campuran. Maka 
pemindahan undang-undang mungkin boleh dilakukan di antara mereka. Secara 
strategik, Nigeria dan India adalah negara demokrasi terbesar di benua Afrika dan Asia 
masing-masing. Secara statistiks pula, wanita melebihi lelaki di Afrika Selatan 
manakala di Nigeria dan India pula mereka terjumlah hampir separuh daripada 
penduduk negara masing-masing. Wanita-wanita ini malangnya terdedah kepada 
pelbagai penganiayaan. Mereka menghadapi penghinaan sama ada berbentuk rogol, 
rogol perkahwinan, gangguan seksual dan penghinaan lain yang timbul selalunya 
daripada pemikiran patriarki, kepercayaan dalam mithologi sosio-agama tertentu atau 
amalan adat kuno termasuk kasta, mas kahwin dan ‘bride price’, upacara perjandaan dan 
keutamaan kepada anak lelaki yang mengurangkan harga diri dan maruah kaum wanita. 
Berdasarkan beberapa penganiayaan ini sahaja, negara-negara tersebut telah diejek 
sebagai tempat berbahaya untuk diduduki oleh kaum wanita. Nigeria, khususnya, diejek 
lagi sebagai "terkenal kerana melanggar perjanjian antarabangsa". Rangka undang-
undang Nigeria, yang terdiri daripada jaminan perlembagaan, undang-undang dan 
rumusan dasar serta keputusan kehakiman, untuk melindungi hak maruah wanita, telah 
bersungguh-sungguh dikritik kerana kegagalan dari segi undang-undang antarabangsa, 
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tidak bersifat mampan dan tidak mampu menyokong Matlamat Pembangunan Milenium 
No. 3 Pertubuhan Bangsa-Bangsa Bersatu mengenai kesaksamaan gender dan 
memperkasakan kaum wanita. Di Afrika Selatan, disebaliknya, kedudukan mengenai 
perkara yang sama berbeza. Pragmatisme Mahkamah Perlembagaannya dan peruntukan 
‘Bill of Rights’ dalam Perlembagaan yang perkasa adalah legendari. Mereka dengan 
mudahnya menduduki tempat yang terbaik di Selatan Global serta di Utara Global. 
India juga berpandangan ke hadapan. Dengan perlindungan asas undang-undang dan 
dasar terhadap hak wanita untuk melindungi maruah dan keselamatan seksual mereka, 
ditambah pula dengan kebebasan, kreativiti dan aktivisme kehakiman dalam 
mengtafsirkan kedua-dua hak perlembagaan positif dan negatif, India, juga, adalah 
berteladan. Ia mempamerkan dan membezakan Mahkamah Agung India, di samping 
Mahkamah Perlembagaan Afrika Selatan yang lebih cemerlang, sebagai ‘gelanggang 
konsekuansial’ dan tribunal aktivis di Selatan Global pada Abad Ke-21. Tesis ini 
menumpukan perhatian pada dan menekankan penyalahgunaan tertentu mengenai hak 
maruah wanita tertentu di Nigeria, India dan Afrika Selatan sebagai mencerminkan 
wanita majoriti Afrika dan Asia. Ia menerokai undang-undang antarabangsa, serta 
kemajuan transformasi dalam rangka undang-undang (perlembagaan, kehakiman, 
perundangan dan polisi) yang mengawal perlindungan hak maruah wanita di India dan 
Afrika Selatan, dari mana pelajaran yang bernilai boleh dengan munasabah diperolehi 
untuk merapatkan semula jurang perbezaan asas dalam rangka undang-undang Nigeria 
yang sedia ada. Akhirnya, ia mengesyorkan pembaharuan dalam usaha untuk mencapai 
suatu rangka undang-undang yang mampan bagi melindungi hak maruah wanita di 
Nigeria. Secara kebetulan pula, cadangan tersebut adalah juga mungkin berguna untuk 
wilayah-wilayah membangun yang lain dalam keadaan yang serupa. Penyelidikan ini 
bersifat qualitatif dan doktrinal. Ia berdasarkan suatu penyelidikan perpustakaan dan 
destop semata-mata, termasuk analisa dan maklumat bernilai daripada peruntukan 
   vii 
perundangan, undang-undang kes, serta penulisan dan pendapat sarjana dan juris yang 
terkemuka.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   viii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
In the course of this research, God was so faithful and gracious to me in exceeding ways 
too numerous to mention. I am ever so grateful. 
I am sincerely most humbly and most respectfully grateful to my supervisor Dr. C. C. 
Gan, for being so generous with his time and vast knowledge, and for showing 
dedicated interest in my research and keeping me up and doing from the start of this 
research up till the very last moment. He was a supervisor’s supervisor, humble to a 
fault, a research support partner and a spiritual guide. I learnt so much from him and I 
will forever remain indebted to him. I am also grateful to Prof. Norbani Binti Mohamed 
Nazeri, Deputy Dean (Postgraduate), Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, for her very 
kind heart. 
My family stood by me and believed very strongly in me. I am most humbled by their 
unalloyed love, encouragement and affection and I am so glad that by the special grace 
of God, I have made them proud and not disappointed them in any way. I am 
particularly grateful to my dear wife Ijeoma, and my beautiful daughters, who had no 
option than to endure my absence and keep the faith, knowing that my sojourn was 
temporary and worthwhile.  
I am also grateful to my friends and colleagues: Hon. Simeon Iwunze, Sir. Nnamdi 
Anyaehie, Prof. Nnamdi Obiaraeri, Prof. Uba Nnabue, Dr. Ine Nnadi, Prof. Iyk Dozie, 
Dr. Reginald Onuoha, Dr. Mubarak Adekilekun, Dr. Lukman Abdulrau’f, Messrs 
Innocent Habro Okoro, Amarachi Ogu, Kennedy Ekwurundu, Chris Madu, Ashis 
Tripathy, and particularly Prof. Uchefula Chukwumaeze, now Dean, Faculty of Law, 
Imo State University Owerri, for their kind words, encouragements and support at 
various times in the course of this research. 
Above all, I am most grateful and thankful to Almighty God for life and good health!  
   ix 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
To the Glory of God, this thesis is dedicated to my wife and children, to my father           
Mr. Hyginus U.K. Ojilere and to the memory of my mother, Mrs. Agatha E. Ojilere.       
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   x 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
                                                        
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………….iii 
ABSTRAK……………………………………………………………………………….v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………….……………..viii 
DEDICATION………………………………………………….………...…………….ix 
LIST OF CASES………………………………………………………….……………xx 
LIST OF STATUTES……………………………………………………………….xxvii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS………………………………...xxxiii 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………..1 
1.1  Background of the Study……………………………………………………………1 
1.2  Statement of the Problem…………………………………………………………...4  
1.3  Objective of the Research…………………………………………………………...5 
1.4  Research Questions………………………………………………………………….5 
1.5  Methodology of the Research……………………………………………………….6  
1.6  Significance of the Study……………………………………………………………8  
1.7  Choice of Jurisdictions…………………………………………………………….10 
1.8  Scope and Limitation of the Research……………………………………………..13  
1.9  Definition of Terms………………………………………………………………..13 
1.10 Structure of the Thesis………………………………………………………….29  
1.11 Literature Review………………………………………………………………30  
 
 
 
   xi 
CHAPTER 2 
THE INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO DIGNITY OF WOMEN IN NIGERIA, 
INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA………………………………………………………62 
2.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………..………...62 
2.2 Basic Human Rights Documents……………………………………………….63 
2.2.1 Charter of the United Nations…………………………………………..64 
2.2.2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)………………...67 
2.2.3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights…………………..73  
2.2.4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights……..77 
2.2.5 Convention Against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment……………………………………………….79  
2.3 Thematic Human Rights Documents …………………………….…………….83 
2.3.1 Convention on the Rights of the Child…………………………………84 
2.3.2 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, (CEDAW) (With General Recommendation19 of 1992 and 
Optional Protocol of 2000)……………………………………………..88 
2.3.2.1 CEDAW General Recommendation19 of 1992………………...95 
2.3.2.2 CEDAW Optional Protocol of 2000……………………………98 
2.3.2.3 Substantive Commitment of States to CEDAW………………101 
 
2.3.3 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
(DEVAW)..............................................................................................102 
2.3.3.1 The Vienna Declaration and Platform for Action, 1993……....105  
2.3.4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court…………………….107 
2.3.5 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995………………..…108  
2.3.6 Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)………………………...109 
   xii 
2.4 Substantive Obligation of States to International Human Rights Law………..111 
2.5 Critique of the International Framework for the Protection of Women’s Right to 
Dignity………………………………………………………………………...113 
2.5.1 The Way Forward……………………………………………………..114 
2.6 Regional Protection of Women’s Right To Dignity in Nigeria and South 
Africa………………………………………………………………………….118 
2.6.1 Human Rights in India and ASEAN Member States…………………118 
2.6.2 The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1981…………..119  
2.6.2.1 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights…....123 
2.6.2.2 The African Human Rights Court…………………..…….…...123  
2.6.2.3 Women Protocol to the African Charter……………………....130 
2.6.2.4 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child…134  
2.6.2.5 Commitment of States to the African Regional Framework….135  
2.6.2.6 Critique of the African Regional Framework and the Way 
Forward………………………………………………..………137 
2.7 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….139 
 
CHAPTER 3 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE 
RIGHT TO DIGNITY OF WOMEN IN NIGERIA, INDIA AND SOUTH 
AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE CRITIQUE……………………………………….141  
3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………...141 
3.2 Constitutional Framework: Nigeria……………………………………….......141 
3.2.1 The Right to Dignity of Women Vis-a-vis the Fundamental Objectives 
and Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution of Nigeria, 
1999…………………………………………………………………...142 
   xiii 
3.2.2 The Supreme Court of Nigeria, Locus Standi and Access to Justice for 
the Enforcement of Fundamental Rights……………………………...145 
3.2.2.1 Locus Standi…..………………………………………………...145 
3.2.2.2 Enforcement of Fundamental Rights……………………….....148 
3.2.3 Limitation of Rights in the Nigerian Constitution…………………….152  
3.2.4 Application of International Law……………………………………..155 
3.2.5 Legal Aid……………………………………………………………...158 
3.2.6 Critique of the Nigerian Constitutional Framework and the Way  
Forward………………………………………………………………..161  
3.3 Constitutional Framework: India……………………………………………...162 
3.3.1 The Right to Dignity of Women Vis-a-vis the Fundamental Objectives    
 and Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution of India,    
 1950…………………………………………………………………..163 
3.3.2 The Supreme Court of India Vis-a-vis Access to Justice for the 
Enforcement of Writ Petitions………………………………………...164 
3.3.3 The Right to Equality: Article 14……………………………………..166 
3.3.4 Right to Legal Aid…………………………………………………….168 
3.3.5 Limitation of Rights in the Indian Constitution……………………….170  
3.3.6 Application of International Law……………………………………..171 
3.3.7 Critique of the Indian Constitutional Framework……………………..173  
3.3.8 The Way Forward……………………………………………………..174 
3.4 Constitutional Framework: South Africa……………………………………..176 
3.4.1 The Right to Dignity of Women in the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996…………………………………………………….176 
3.4.2 The Constitution of South Africa Vis-a-vis Access to Justice for the 
 Enforcement of the Right to Dignity in the Constitutional Court……179  
   xiv 
3.4.3 Limitation of Rights in the South African Constitution………………182  
3.4.4 Application of International Law……………………………………..183  
3.4.5 The South African Constitutional Court…………………  …………..185 
3.4.6 Critique of the South African Constitutional Framework and the Way 
 Forward……………………………………………………………….187 
3.5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….189 
 
CHAPTER 4 
LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING THE 
RIGHT TO DIGNITY OF WOMEN IN NIGERIA, INDIA AND SOUTH 
AFRICA……………………………………………………………………………....191 
4.1 Introduction………………………………………………..………………….191 
4.2 Legislative and Policy Framework: Nigeria…………………………………..192 
4.2.1 The National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria………………...193 
4.2.2 The Criminal Jurisprudence on Rape…………………………………195 
4.2.3 National Legislation on Domestic Violence…………………………..204  
4.2.4 National Gender Policy, 2006………………………………………...206 
4.2.5 The Child Rights Act, 2003…………………………………………...209 
4.2.6 Critique of the Nigerian Legislative and Policy Framework………….211 
4.2.6.1 The Way Forward……………………………………………..214 
4.3 Legislative and Policy Framework: India……………………………………..215 
4.3.1 Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 [As amended by the Protection     
 of Human Rights (Amendment) Act, 2006]: The National  
 Human Rights Commission, State Human Rights Commission                
 and the Human Rights Courts………………………………………...216  
4.3.2 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005…………...219 
   xv 
4.3.3 Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,  No. 13 of 2013…………...………223 
4.3.3.1 The Justice J.S.  Verma   Committee Report: Prelude to the          
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013……………….……....229 
4.3.3.2 Critique of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013……….231 
4.3.4 The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Specific Penal Code Protections    
 against Dowry…………………………………………………………233 
4.3.5 The Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques  
 (Prohibition of   Sex Selection) Act, 1994……………………………234 
4.3.6 The Vishaka Guidelines/ Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace 
 (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013…………………..236 
4.3.7 The Rule in Sheela Barse for the Protection of Women in Custody….241  
4.3.8 Unique Pro-Active Political Actions to Protect Women’s Safety and 
 Sexual Dignity………………………………………………………..242  
4.3.8.1 Bharatiya Mahila Bank [BMB]: India’s First All-Women 
Bank………………………………………………………….242  
4.3.8.2 Direct Access to Prime Minister for Public Complaints….….243  
4.3.8.3 Banning of Uber Online-Hailing Taxi in India……………...243 
4.3.8.4 Introduction of New “Social Justice Bench” at the Supreme 
Court........................................................................................244  
4.3.8.5 Comprehensive Legal and Counselling Centres and 181 Mobile 
Helpline Services for Women in Distress……………………245 
4.3.8.6 Opening of 24-Hours Gender Help-Desk Centres for Women 
and Children………………………………..………………...245 
4.3.8.7 Launching of SOTERIA Free Emergency Android Application 
for Women’s Safety and Crime Control……………...……...246 
   xvi 
4.3.8.8 Setting Up of a Special NIRBHAYA (“Fearless” or “No Fear”) 
Fund for Women's Safety………………………...………….247 
4.3.9 Critique of the Indian Legislative and Policy Framework……………247 
4.3.10 The Way Forward……………………………………………………..249 
4.4 Legislative and Policy Framework: South Africa…………………………….254 
4.4.1 Domestic Violence Act No. 116 of 1998……………………………..255 
4.4.2 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 
 No. 32 of 2007………………………………………………………..257  
4.5 Critique of the South African Legislative and Policy Framework and the Way 
 Forward……………………………………………………………………….262 
4.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….263 
 
CHAPTER 5 
FUNDAMENTAL GAPS IN THE NIGERIAN FRAMEWORK VIS-A-VIS 
LESSONS FROM ADVANCES IN INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA…………….265  
5.1 Introduction…………………………………………………..…………………...265  
5.2 Fundamental Constitutional Gaps in the Nigerian Framework…………………...266  
5.2.1 Non-Justiciability of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles….267 
5.2.2 Non-compelling Application of International Law…………………………...267 
5.2.3 Limited Right of Access to Justice……………………………………………268  
5.2.4 Inherent Lapses in the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 
2009…………………………………………………………………………...269 
5.2.5 Absence of Specific Constitutional Rights Court……………………………..271 
5.2.6 Weak Legal Aid Scheme……………………………………………………...272 
5.2.7 Constitutional Limitation of Rights…………………………………………...273 
5.2.8 Absence of Constitutional Role for NGOs……………………………………274 
   xvii 
5.3 Fundamental Legislative and Policy Gaps in the Nigerian Framework…………..275 
5.3.1 Weak Commitment to International and Regional Human Rights Charter…...275  
5.3.2 Non-Implementation of the National Gender Policy………………………….275 
5.3.3 Narrow Definition of Rape and Non-Criminalization of Marital Rape……….276 
5.3.4 Onerous Burden of Proof of Sexual Offenses………………………………...277 
5.3.5 Justification of Wife ‘beating’ under the Penal Code…………………………278 
5.3.6 Denial of Women’s Right to Inheritance under Customary Law……………..279 
5.3.7 Absence of National Legislation on Domestic Violence……………………...279 
5.3.8 Contradictory Definition of “a Child” in the New Sexual Offences Bill, 
2015…………………………………………………………………………...280 
5.4 Fundamental Judicial Gaps in the Nigerian Framework………………………….280  
5.4.1 Judicial Attitude to Locus Standi and Stare Decisis……………………...280 
5.4.2 Non-Judicialization of Socio-Economic Rights……………………….…282   
5.5 Advances in the Legal Framework for Protection of the Right To Dignity of Women 
in India and South Africa: Lessons For Nigeria…………………………………..282 
5.5.1 Lessons From the Advances in India……………………………………..282  
5.5.1.1 Judicial Creativity and Activism in the Interpretation of 
Constitutional Rights……………………………………………..283 
5.5.1.2 Judicial Creativity and Activism in Making Quasi-Legislation: 
Formulating Guidelines and Issuing General Directions for the 
Protection of the Sexual Dignity of Women…..………………….288 
5.5.1.3 Innovation in the Right of Access to Justice for Writ 
Petitions………………………………………………………...…291 
5.5.1.4 Lessons on Proactive Legislating and Legislative Advancement on 
Broad and Specific Protection of Women’s Dignity and Sexual 
Independence……………………………………………………..300 
   xviii 
5.5.1.5 Unique Pro-Active Political Actions for Women’s Dignity and 
Safety……………….…………………………………………….306  
5.5.2 Lessons From The Advances in South Africa…………………………....310 
5.5.2.1 Constitutional Guarantee of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights……………………………………………………………..310 
5.5.2.2 Right of Access to the South African Constitutional Court for 
Enforcement of the Bill of Rights………………………………...310 
5.5.2.3 Constitutional Non-Derogation of the Rights to Human Dignity and 
Life………………………………………………………………..311  
5.5.2.4 Constitutional Guarantee of Women’s Reproductive Rights…….312 
5.5.2.5 Application of International Law………………………………....312  
5.5.2.6 Constitutional Provision for NGO Participation………..………...312 
5.5.2.7 Independence and Pragmatism of the South African Constitutional 
Court……………………………………………………………...313  
5.6 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………...320 
 
CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION…………………...321 
6.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………….....321 
6.2 Summary of the Chapters…………………………………………………………323 
6.3 Findings on Adequacy of the Existing National, Regional and International 
Frameworks……………………………………………………………………….326 
6.3.1 Findings on Adequacy of the Existing Framework in Nigeria…………...327 
6.3.2 Findings on Adequacy of the Existing Framework in India……………...329 
6.3.3 Findings on Adequacy of the Existing Framework in South Africa……..330 
6.3.4 Findings on Adequacy of the African Regional Framework……………..331  
   xix 
6.3.5 Findings on Adequacy of the Existing International Framework………...332  
6.4 Recommendations for Bridging the Existing Fundamental Gaps and advancing 
the Quest for a Sustainable Legal Framework for Protecting the Right to Dignity 
of Women in Nigeria…………………………………………………………...333 
6.4.1 Recommendations for Constitutional Reform in Nigeria……………….333 
6.4.2 Recommendations for Law and Policy Reform in Nigeria………...…...346 
6.4.3 Recommendations for Judicial Reform for Creativity and Activism in 
Nigeria……………………………….…………………..……………...356 
6.4.4 Challenges Imminent to Implementing the Recommendations………...357 
6.4.4.1 Socio-Cultural and Religious Challenges.....................................358 
6.4.4.2 Political and Administrative Challenges………………………..360 
                     6.4.4.3 Legal (Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial) Challenges…....362 
6.5 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………...368 
 
REFERENCES ………………………………………………………………….……371 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS AND PAPERS PRESENTED…………………………..415 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   xx 
LIST OF CASES 
 
ARA v. Sweden, Communication No: CAT/C/38/D/305/2006 of May 1, 2007 (initial 
submission on 25 September 2006). 
 
“F” (Applicant) v. Minister of Safety and Security & 5 Ors, (The ‘F’ Case) CCT 30/11 
[2011] ZACC 37 (Heard on 4 Aug 2011, Decided on 15 Dec 2011). 
 
“In Re: Indian Woman Says gang raped on orders of village court published in 
Business & Financial News dated 23.01.2014” Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 
24 of 2014, [Decided 28 March, 2014]. 
 
“Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni Nine” (International Pen & Ors (on behalf of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa) v. Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 212 (ACHPR 1998). 
 
A.K.Gopalan v. State of Madras, A.I.R 1950 SC p.27.    
 
Abacha v. Fawehinmi (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228. 
 
Adefalu & Ors v. Governor of Kwara State & Ors (1984) 5 NCLR 766. 
 
Adesanya v. The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1981) All NLR 1 SC. 
 
Aiki v. Idowu (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 239) 361. 
 
Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829. 
 
Akinbuwa v. Akinbuwa, (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt 564)100. 
 
Akinnubi v. Akinnubi (1997) 46 LRCN 137.   
 
Attorney General (Ondo State) v. Attorney General (Federation) (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt 
772), 222. 
 
Attorney General of Kaduna State v. Hassan, 2 NWLR (Pt 8) 483. 
   xxi 
Aydin v. Turkey, 23178/9 (1997) ECHR, 75. 
 
Bamidele Aturu v. Minister of Petroleum Resources, Suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/591/09. 
 
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Ors (The Bonded Labour Case) AIR 
1984 SC 802. 
 
Beko Ransome Kuti & Ors v. Attorney-General of the Federation (Unreported) Suit 
No. M/287/92. 
 
Centre for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes (CEHAT) & Ors v. Union of India 
& Ors, Writ Petition (civil) 301 0f 2000 (Judgement delivered on 10/9/2003). 
http://nlrd.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/CEHAT-VS-UNION-OF-INDIA.pdf. 
 
Centre for Legal Research v. State of Kerala 3 SCJ 1986 SC 17.  
 
Chairman, Railway Board v. Mr. Chandrama Das, AIR 2000 988. 
 
Chief Gani Fawehinmi v. Gen. Sani Abacha, (2000) 4 SC (part II) 1. 
 
Chintaman Rao v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1950] SCR 759.  
 
Chuba Egolum v. Olusegun Obasanjo (1999) 7 NWLR Part 611, p. 355. 
 
Constitutional Rights Project and Others v. Nigeria, (2000) AHRLR 227 (ACHPR 
1999). 
 
D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416. 
 
Edet v. Essien (1932) 11 NLR 47 (SC). 
 
Edet Okon Iko v. The State (200) 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 221. 
 
Elizabeth Gumede v. President of the Republic of South Africa & Ors (2008) ZACC 
23. 
   xxii 
Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering Government of Southern Nigeria, (Appeal 
No 42 of 1930, judgment delivered on Tuesday, 24 March, 1931). 
 
Femi Falana v. The African Union, Application No. 001/2011 http://www.africaunion.
org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/africancourt-humanrights.pdf (12/10/2013) 
 
Fawehinmi v. Akilu & Anor (1987) 1 NWLR Part 67, p.797 SC.  
 
Fawehinmi v. Inspector General of Police (2002) 7 NWLR Part 767, p.606 SC.  
 
Ferreira & Ors v. The State (2004) JOL 13027 (SCA).  
 
Frances Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors, AIR 
1981 SC 746. 
 
Fred Egbe v. Honourable Justice Adefarasin (2003) 14 WRN 57. 
 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom [2000] ZACC 19. 
 
Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu, [1986] 1 NWLR 621. 
 
Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1369. 
 
Idris Rai v. The State (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 925) 491. 
 
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477. 
 
J v. National Director of Public Prosecutions & Anor (Childline South Africa & Ors as 
amici curiae) 2014 (7) BCLR 764 (CC). 
 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts 197 US 11 (1905). 
 
Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 SC 217. 
 
Janatan Dal v. H.S. Chowdry, AIR 1993 SC 892. 
   xxiii 
Jegede v. The State (2000) 7 SCNJ 135. 
 
Kalpana W/o Santosh Jadhav v. Hanma & Ors, 2013 Indlaw MUM 908; Criminal 
W.P. No. 63 of 2013, delivered on 27 September, 2013. 
 
Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461.  Suo Motu Writ Petition 
(Criminal) No. 24 of 2014, [Decided 28 March, 2014].  
 
Keyamo v. Lagos State House of Assembly (2000) 12 NWLR Part 680, p.196 CA. 
 
Khatri v. State of Bihar AIR 1981 SC 928. 
 
Khedat Majdoor Chetna Sanghat v. State of M.P. (1994) 6 SCC 260: AIR 1995 SC 31. 
 
MC Mehta v. Union of India (Ganga Water Pollution Case) (1987) 4 SCC 463; AIR 
198 SC. 
 
M.H. Hoscot v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 1548. 
 
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 215. 
 
Mazibuko & Ors v. City of Johannesburg & Ors, 2010 (3) BCLR 239 (CC). 
 
Medha Kotwal Lele & Ors v. Union of India & Ors, (2013) 1 SCC 297 (Judgement 
delivered on 19 October, 2012). 
 
Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v. Emewulu & Anor, [2001] 3 
S.C.N.J. 106. 
 
Mike Ozekhome & Ors v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor (1990) 
2 WBRN 58. 
 
Minerva Mills Ltd v. Union of India (1990) AIR SC 1987. 
 
   xxiv 
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign Case No. CCT/8/02, Heard on 2, 3 
and 6 May 2002, Decided on 5 July 2002. 
 
Mojekwu v. Mojekwu (1997) 7 NWLR Pt 512, p.283. 
 
Mrs. Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar & Ors AIR 1983 SC 339.  
 
MS v. S, 2011 (2) SACR 88 (CC).   
 
Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India & Ors, AIR 2000 SC 1401. 
 
Naz Foundation v. Union of India CWP 7455 of 2001. 
 
Nnayelugo v. Nnayelugo (2008) All FWLR (Pt 401) 97. 
 
Oguegbe v. Inspector-General of Police (1999) 1 FHCLR 59. 
 
Olawoyin v. Attorney-General of Northern Nigeria (1961) 2 SCNLR 5. 
 
Om Kumar & Ors v. Union of India in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper 
Construction & Anor, [2001] 4 LRI 1049. 
 
P Rathinam v. S of Gujarat (1993) 2 Scale 631. 
 
Peoples’ Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 1473; (1982) 3 
SCC 235. 
 
Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Admin (1980) 3 SCR 855. 
 
Ram Kumar v. S H Pradesh AIR 1995 SC 1995. 
 
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, AIR 2002 SC 1771.   
 
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India & Ors, AIR 1982 SC 149. 
 
   xxv 
Sakshi v. Union of India, (1999) Cr LJ 5025 (SC). 
 
Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade & Ors, 2011(3) Mh.L.J. 
(Cri.) 73; 2011 Indlaw SC 94.  
 
Sani Abacha v. Gani Fawehinmi (2000) 6 NWLR 228. 
 
Shantistar Builders v. Narayan K Totame, (Shanti Star Builders case) (1990) 1 SCC 
520. 
 
Sheela Barse v. Union of India, AIR 1987 (1) 153. 
 
Shilubana & Ors v. Nwamitwa (2008) ZACC 9. 
 
Shri Bodhisattwa Guatam v. Ms. Subhra Chakraborty AIR 1996 SC 922; 1996 1 SCC 
490.  
 
Simon v. Police (1951) WLNLR 23 
 
Sivarasa Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malaysia [2010] 2 MLJ 333, (FC). 
 
Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) & Anor v. Nigeria, 
Communication No. 155/95 
 
Solomon v. Ogbodo (1974) 4UILR 396. 
 
State of AP v. Mc Dowell & Co (1996) 3 SCC 709. 
 
State of Madras v. Row [1952] SCR 597. 
 
State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, AIR 1991 SC 207.   
 
State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh AIR 2004 SC 1290. 
 
State of Rajasthan v. Darshan Singh, (2012) 5 SCC789. 
   xxvi 
State through District Appropriate Authority-cum-Civil Surgeon, Faridabad 
(Complainant) v. Dr. Anil Sabhani, Prop. M/s Dr. Anil’s Ultrasound Opp. G.H. 
Palwal, Faridabad & 2 Ors,  Case No. 295/2 of 2001; Date of Institution: 
5.11.2001/20.7.2004; Date of Decision: 28.3.2006.  
 
State v. Makwanyane [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
 
State v. Ogiondiegion (1968) 1 NMLR 117. 
 
Suchitra Srivastva v. Chandigarh Administration, AIR 2010 SC 235 (Civil Appeal No. 
5845/2009, judgment delivered 28 August 2009). 
 
Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, Civil Appeal 10972 of 2013. 
 
Szijjarto v. Hungary Communication No. 4/2004, submitted on 12 February 2004. 
 
Tara Singh v. State, AIR 1951 SC 441. 
 
Thomas v. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR Part 18, p.669 SC. 
 
Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 185. 
 
Ukut v. The State (1965) 1 NRNLR 306.  
 
Unity Dow v. Attorney-General of Botswana 1982 LRC (const) 623. 
 
Upahar v. The State, (2003) 6 NWLR (Pt. 816) 230. 
 
V.D. Bhanot v. Savita   Bhanot, (2012) 3 SCC 183.  
 
Van Eeden v. Minister of Safety and Security (Women’s Legal Centre Trust as Amicus 
Curiae) 2003 (1) SA 389(SCA). 
 
Vishaka & Ors v. State of Rajasthan & Ors (JT 1997 (7) SC 384); AIR 1997 SC 3011. 
 
   xxvii 
LIST OF STATUTES 
 
  Nigeria 
 
Age of Customary Marriage Law, 1956. 
Child Rights Act, 1993. 
Child Rights Act, 2003. 
Children and Young Persons Law, 1958. 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.  
 
Criminal Code Act, Cap 77, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990    (applicable in 
the Southern part of Nigeria).  
 
Ekiti State Gender-Based Violence (Prohibition) Law, 2011. 
 
Female Genital Mutilation (Prohibition) Law, Bayelsa State, 2000. 
 
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979.  
 
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009. 
 
Imo State Free, Compulsory Qualitative Education Law, 2011. 
 
Law for the Monitoring of Maternal Mortality in Edo State and other Matters 
Connected Thereto, 2001. 
 
Law to Amend Some of the Provisions of the Criminal Code Law Cap. 48 Laws of 
Bendel State 1976 as applicable to Edo State, 2000. 
 
 
Law to Make it Unlawful to Infringe the Fundamental Rights of Widows and 
Widowers, and for other Related Matters, Enugu State, 2001. 
 
 
Law to Prohibit Female Circumcision and Genital Mutilation, Edo State, 1999. 
 
   xxviii 
Law to Prohibit Girl Child Marriages and Female Circumcision or Genital Mutilation 
in Cross River State, 2000. 
 
Law to Provide Protection against Domestic Violence and for Connected Purposes 
(Lagos State), 2012. 
 
Legal Aid Act, Cap L9 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 
 
Legal Aid Council of Nigeria, established by Decree No. 56, 1976. 
 
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Act, 1995. 
 
National Human Rights Commission (Amendment) Act, 2010. 
 
Penal Code, Cap 345, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 (Applicable in 
Northern Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja). 
 
Penal Code, Cap 89 Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963. 
 
Rivers State Reproductive Health Service Law, No. 3, 2003. 
 
Rivers State Schools Rights (Parents, Children and Teachers) Law No. 2, 2005. 
 
Second Schedule to the Legal Aid Act, Cap L9 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
2004. 
 
Sexual Offences Bill (SB. 279), 3 June 2015. 
 
 
The Supreme Court Ordinance No. 4, 1876. 
 
The Supreme Court Proclamation No. 6, 1900.  
 
The Supreme Court Ordinance No. 6, 1914. 
 
The Supreme Court Ordinance No. 23, 1943 (cap 211) Laws of Nigeria 1948.  
 
The Native Courts Proclamation No. 9, 1900.  
 
   xxix 
The Native Courts Ordinance (cap 142) Laws of Nigeria.  
 
Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration 
(Amendment) Act, 2005.  
 
Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law, National Agency for the Prohibition of 
Trafficking In Persons (NAPTIP) Act, 2003.   
 
Women's Reproductive Rights, Anambra State, 2005. 
 
 
India 
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (as amended by the Criminal Law (Amendment) 
Act, 2013. 
 
Constitution of India, 1950. 
 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (No. 13, 2013). 
 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act No. 32, 2007. 
 
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (No. 28, 1961). 
 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 
 
 
Indian Penal Code 1860 (as amended by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013. 
 
Limitation of Dowry Law Chapter L 15, 1956. 
 
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full 
Participation) Act, 1995 (also known as The Persons with Disability [PWD] Act). 
 
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) 
Act, 1994. 
 
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.  
 
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 
   xxx 
  South Africa 
 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act No. 32, 2007 
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act No. 38, 2007. 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act Amendment 
Act, 2013, Government Gazette No. 36645, 9 July, 2013. 
Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983 (commenced on 12 July, 1985). 
Human Tissue Amendment Act 51, 1989. 
Prevention of Family Violence Act 1993, No.133, 1993. 
 
England 
Sexual Offences Act of England and Wales, 2003. 
 
Rwanda 
Rwanda Constitution, 2003. 
 
Sri Lanka 
Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka Act, No. 21, 1996 
 
 
Regional and International Legislative Frameworks 
 
 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981.  
 
African Union Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990. 
 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) Optional Protocol, 22 December 2000. 
   xxxi 
 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) Recommendation 19 (11th session, 1992) 1992. .   
 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 10 December 1984, (entry into force 26 June 1987, in accordance with 
article 27 (1)). 
 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), 1979. 
 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 20 November, 1989  
(entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49). 
 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW), 20 December, 
1993. 
 
International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966 
(entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with Article 27). 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966 
(entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49).  
 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa.  Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the 
Union, Maputo. 11 July 2003. 
 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment 
of an African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, 9 June 1998. 
 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, (Done at Rome, 17 July 
1998). 
 
United Nations Declaration on Right to Mentally Retarded Persons, 1971.  
   xxxii 
United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action. (Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna on 25 June 1993).  
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   xxxiii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
A.I.R: All India Reporter 
AC: Appeal Cases 
ACHPR: African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
Afr. CHPR: African Charter on Human and People’s Rights  
Afr.J.Int.L: African Journal of International and Comparative Law 
AHRLR: African Human Rights Law Report 
All FWLR: All Federation Weekly Law Reports (Nigeria) 
All NLR: All Nigeria Law Reports 
ASEAN: Association of South East Asian Nations 
AU: African Union 
B.C.: Before Christ 
BCLR:  Butterworths Constitutional Law Reports (South Africa) 
BMB: Bharatiya Mahila Bank  
CA: Court of Appeal 
CAL: Class Action Litigation  
CAT: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment  
CC: Criminal Code 
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women 
CFRN: Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria 
CJI: Chief Justice of India 
CPA: Criminal Procedure Act 
CPC: Criminal Procedure Code 
   xxxiv 
Cr LJ: Criminal Law Journal of India 
CRA: Child Right Act 
CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Chid or Child Rights Convention 
CSA: Child Sexual Abuse 
CSW: Commission on the Status of Women  
DAW: Division for the Advancement of Women  
DEVAW: Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women  
DFID: The Department for International Development (UK) 
DVA: Domestic Violence Act 
ECHR or ECtHR: European Court of Human Rights 
ECOSOC: Economic and Social Council 
ESCR: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
EU: European Union 
Eur. J. Int'l L: European Journal of International Law 
FC: Federal Court 
FCJ: Federal Court Judge 
FGC: Female Genital Cutting 
FGM: Female Genital Mutilation 
FHC/ABJ/: Federal High Court Abuja (Nigeria) 
FHC: Federal High Court 
FSC: Federal Supreme Court 
GA Res.: General Assembly Resolution 
GB: Gender Budgeting 
GBC: Gender Budget Cells  
   xxxv 
GCM: Girl-Child Marriage 
HC: High Court 
HIV/AIDS: Human Immune-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
ICC: International Criminal Court  
ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
ICESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ICHR: Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, (also known as The ASEAN 
Charter) 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
Indlaw SC: Legal Research Database and guide to Indian Law (Supreme Court Case 
Reports)   
IPC: Indian Penal Code 
IPV: Intimate Partner Violence 
JCA: Justice of the Court of Appeal 
JLFPHR: Justiciable Legal Frameworks for the Protection of Human Rights  
JSC: Justice of the Supreme Court 
JT: Judgement Today (India) 
KJS: Kaduna Journal of Sociology  
LFN: Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
LRCN: Law Reports of Courts of Nigeria 
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals 
Mh.L.J. (Cri.): Maharashtra Law Journal (Criminal Cases) (India) 
MLJ: Malaysian Law Journal 
NAPTIP: Law-National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking In Persons  
NCLR: Nigerian Constitutional Law Reports 
   xxxvi 
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations 
NGP: National Gender Policy (Nigeria) 
NHRC: National Human Rights Commission  
NJFDHL: Nigerian Journal of Food, Drug and Health Law  
NLRD: National Legal Research Desk, India 
NMLR: Nigerian Monthly Law Report 
NWLR: Nigerian Weekly Law Reports 
NWP: National Women Policy (Nigeria) 
OAU: Organisation of African Unity (now African Union, AU) 
PC: Penal Code 
PIL: Public Interest Litigation 
PWD: Persons with Disability 
RSA: Republic of South Africa 
SACC or ZACC: South African Constitutional Court 
SAHRC: South African Human Rights Commission  
SAL: Social Action Litigations 
SCA: Supreme Court of Appeal 
SCC: Supreme Court Cases (India) 
SCJ: Supreme Court Journal (India) 
SCNJ: Supreme Court of Nigeria Judgements 
SCNLR: Supreme Court of Nigeria Law Report 
SCR: Supreme Court Reports 
SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals 
SSLMs: Support Structures for Legal Mobilisations  
   xxxvii 
TNC: Transnational Corporations 
UCC: Uniform Civil Code  
UCCL: Uniform Code of Customary Law  
UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UILR: University of Ife Law Report (Nigeria) 
UN: United Nations 
UNAIDS: Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS  
UNCRC: United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme  
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly 
UNICEF: United Nations Children Fund 
UNIFEM: United Nations Fund for Women 
UOI: Union of India 
VAW: Violence Against women 
VAWG: Violence Against Women and Girls 
VDPA: Vienna Declaration and Platform for Action  
WHO: World Health Organisation 
WIN: Women in Nigeria 
WRNLR: Western Region of Nigeria Law Reports 
WRN: Weekly Reports of Nigeria 
WUNRN: The Women's UN Report Program & Network 
   1 
 
  CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of The Study  
The right to human dignity, which of course includes the dignity of women, is 
guaranteed in Nigeria,1 India2 and South Africa.3 Nonetheless, women in these countries 
and elsewhere4 still suffer varying degrees and patterns of abuse, humiliations, 
discrimination and indignities ranging from physical and psychological assault,5 
trafficking,6 sexual abuse, rape and marital rape,7 Sati (self-immolation),8 dowry-related 
violations/death,9 intimate  femicide10, and domestic violence arising from inherent 
notions of patriarchy,11 traditional cultures/customary practices12 and belief in socio-
                                                          
1 Section 34 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution; Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1981 (Cap 10, Laws 
of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990). 
2 Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950. 
3 Section10, Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
4 Ortabag, T., Ozdemir, S., Bebis, H., & Ceylan, S. (2014). Perspectives of Young Adult Men Regarding Violence against Women: 
A Cross-sectional Study from Turkey. Journal of Family Violence, 1-10.  
5 Ojilere, A., & Chukwumaeze, U. U. (2010). CEDAW and Gender-Based Discriminations Against Women in Nigeria. Nigerian 
Journal of Food, Drug and Health Law (NJFDHL), 3(1), 95-105.  
6 Monde-Anumihe, C. (2013). Human Trafficking and Human Rights: The Movement of Women from Nigeria to Europe. (Bachelor 
of Arts Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects), Syracuse University, USA.   (47). 
7 Ray, S. (2014). To Violate with Impunity: Legal Constructions of Marital Rape’. Paper presented at the XVIII ISA World 
Congress of Sociology (July 13-19, 2014); Onyejekwe, C. J. (2013). Nigeria: The Dominance of Rape. Journal of International 
Women's Studies, 10(1), 48-63; Ghosh, B. (2013). How does the legal framework protect victims of dowry and domestic violence in 
India? A critical review. Aggression and violent behavior, 18(4), 409-416.; Chika, I. S. (2011). Legalization of marital rape in 
Nigeria: a gross violation of women's health and reproductive rights. Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law, 33(01), 39-46.  
8 An archaic Hindu practice which requires a widow to set themselves ablaze once her husband dies. 
9 PuruShotam, N. (2004). Bride pride and grooming prejudices: race matters in marriage. Untying the Knot: Marriage and Reality in 
Asian Marriage, edited by GW Jones and K. Ramdas, 192-232. 
10 This is the killing of women by their spouses and boyfriends. This is common in South Africa and the case of Oscar Pistorius, the 
internationally celebrated double amputee “blade runner”, who shot and killed his girlfriend Reeva Steenkamp on 14 February 2013 
is one of the latest world headlines. However, the judgement of Judge Thokozile Masipa which found on 12 September 2014 that 
the sprinter was not guilty of murder but manslaughter, (an offence which carries a maximum prison sentence of 15 years but can be 
reduced to community service) has been roundly criticized by the media, political actors and Women NGOs in South Africa. (See 
Alexander, H. and A. Laing (2014). Shadow of OJ Simpson falls over 
Oscar Pistorius after acquittal for murder. The Telegraph, UK, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/oscar pistorius/1109465
3/Shadow-of-OJ-Simpson-falls-over-Oscar-Pistorius-after-acquittal-for-murder.html (14/9/2014). The prosecution consequently 
appealed against this sentence and in December 2015, the South Africa's Supreme Court of Appeal found the Olympic athlete Oscar 
Pistorius guilty of murder and overturned the earlier manslaughter verdict, holding that the lower court did not correctly apply the 
rule of dolus eventualis, that is, whether Pistorius knew that a death would be a likely result of his actions. The court therefore 
ordered that the convict be sent back to the lower court for resentencing. The minimum sentence for murder in South Africa is 15 
years, but judges can apply some discretion. (See BBC News Africa of 3 December 2015 titled “Oscar Pistorius guilty of murdering 
Reeva Steenkamp”) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34993002 (4/12/2015). 
11 Gregg, M. R. (2014). An incomplete transition? Explaining the ongoing prevalence of violence against women in post-apartheid 
South Africa. (Master of Arts), Simon Fraser University, SFU Library, Bumaby, British Columbia, Canada;   Makama, G. A. (2013). 
Patriarchy and Gender Inequality in Nigeria: The Way Forward. European Scientific Journal, 9(17), 115-144. This includes son-
preference which often leads to the unlawful abortion of female foetuses (See Nnadi, I. (2013). Son Preference–A Violation of 
Women’s Human Rights: A Case Study of Igbo Custom in Nigeria. Journal of Politics and Law, 6(1), 134-141).  
12 Chika, I. S., & Nneka, U. (2014). Discriminatory Cultural Practices and Women’s Rights among the Igbos of South-East Nigeria: 
A Critique. Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, 25, 18-27.  
   2 
religious mythology13 including wife inheritance and other obnoxious widowhood 
rites,14 as well as caste-related discriminations which are not so common in Nigeria.15 
All these are a gross violation of the right to dignity of women guaranteed in the 
constitutions of these countries. Sometimes even Governments blame their failure to 
encourage gender equality or guarantee women’s right to dignity on intractable 
patriarchal culture.16 This research focussed on the protection of women’s dignity 
especially against rape and sexual harassment. 
The quality of fundamental rights protection available in a country or system can be 
examined in terms of its contribution of human rights guarantees and enforcement 
mechanisms established to protect individuals and communities against the breaches of 
those rights as well as conditions that threaten the full enjoyment of those rights.17 
Andrew Fagan18 argued that all human rights, (including the right to dignity of women) 
are universal ‘guarantees’ which are inherent in man qua man and that referring to 
‘these guarantees’ as ‘rights’ suggests that they attach to particular individuals who can 
invoke them, and that they are of high priority, and the compliance with them is 
mandatory rather than discretionary.   
This research is therefore an analytical evaluation of the legal framework for protecting 
the right to dignity of women, especially with respect to rape and breach of sexual 
independence, in Nigeria, India and South Africa. It finds that as between the three 
jurisdictions under review, the South African framework for the protection of the right 
to dignity of women is most elaborate because the guarantees enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights in its constitution combine with the independence, pragmatism and wide powers 
                                                          
13 Ojilere, A. (2008). The Customary Law and Socio-religious Mythology on the Rights of Women in Nigeria  Nigerian Journal of 
Public Law (NJPL), 1(1), 257-266; Ojilere, A., & Gan, C. C. (2015). Learning from the Indian Judiciary: New Directions for 
Securing Nigerian Women’s Right to Dignity. Asian Women, 31(1), 81-106.  
14 Durojaye, E., Okeke, B., & Adebanjo, A. (2014). Harmful cultural practices and gender equality in Nigeria. Gender and 
Behaviour, 12(1), 6169-6181.  
15 Leith-Ross, S. (1937). Notes on the Osu system among the Ibo of Owerri Province, Nigeria. Africa, 10(02), 206-220.  
16 Merry, S. E. (2003). Constructing a Global Law‐Violence against Women and the Human Rights System. Law & Social Inquiry, 
28(4), 941-977 at 947. 
17 Iyassu Menelik, G. Y. (2014). The Issue of Human Rights in Africa. Africa University (Institute of Peace and Governance), 
Mutare Zimbabwe., 8.  
18 Andrew Fagan (2006), Human Rights, internet encyclopaedia of philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/hum-rts/.  (19/8/2014). 
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of its Constitutional Court to promote the right to dignity of women and fundamental 
rights generally. It finds also that any constitutional or legislative defect in the Indian 
legal framework is effectively cured by the creativity and activism of its Supreme Court 
which has been described as ‘one of the most powerful Constitutional Courts in the 
world.’19 Lastly, it finds show that fundamental gaps exists in the constitutional 
guarantees, legislative provisions, right of access to justice, judicial attitude, as well as 
in the procedural rules for the enforcement of the right to dignity of women in 
Nigeria,20and the quest for valuable lessons which may be applied to bridge these gaps 
is the reason for this research. Accordingly, the research recommends that Nigeria 
should, in the long run, combine the “constitutional borrowing”21 from South Africa 
with the “judicial borrowing”22 from India to strengthen its framework for the 
protection of the right to dignity of women as a sine qua non for effective sustainability, 
globalization and democratization.23 
At the end of this research, it would have become certain that a consequential court24 
can exercise its inherent power of legisprudence25 to bridge the gaps in existing law 
and, even in the absence of an existing law and policy, and set the agenda for 
transformative structural and socio-political change for the protection of the right to 
                                                          
19 Manoj Mate (2013), “Public Interest Litigation and the Transformation of the Supreme Court of India” in Chapter 10, Diana 
Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A. Kagan (ed.) Consequential Courts: Judicial Roles in Global Perspective, 2013 
Cambridge University Press, USA., p.262. 
20 Kura, S. M., & Yero, B. U. (2013). An analysis of Gender inequality and National Gender Policy in Nigeria. International 
Journal of Scientific & Engineering Research, 4(1).; Sehinde, B. K. (2013). An Overview of Legal and Implementation Framework 
of Nigeria’s National Gender Policy. In R. I. Ako-Nai (Ed.), Gender and Power Relations in Nigeria (pp. 87-100). Plymouth, UK: 
Lexington Books. 
21 D.M. Davis, ”Constitutional Borrowing: The Influence of Legal Culture and Local History in The Reconstitution of Comparative 
Influence: The South African Experience,” (2003) 1 Int’l J. Const. L 181-195. It must also be noted that even the classical 
uniqueness of the South African Bill of Rights was a product of “constitutional borrowing.” (See Jermy Sarkin, ”The effect of 
Constitutional Borrowings on the Drafting of South Africa’s Bill of Rights and interpretation of Human Rights Provisions” (1998-
1999) 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L 176).   
22 Apart from the judicial advances in India, the Indian Constitution, alongside those of South Africa, Canada and Germany ranks 
among the best four ”especially influential as benchmarks for modern constitution-making.” (See Moseneke, D. (2012). 32nd 
Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: A Journey from the Heart of Apartheid Darkness towards a Just Society: Salient Features 
of the Budding Constitutionalism and Jurisprudence of South Africa, The. Geo. LJ, 101, 749, page 12, citing Prof David Law and 
Prof Mila Versteeg’s “The Declining Influence of the American Constitution” then to be published in New York University Law 
Review, Vol. 87, 2012.  
23  South Africa and India offer basic examples because “the independence and effectiveness of the Supreme Court of India and the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, especially with regards to democratization and structural transformation in public and private 
spheres of their respective countries are gradually creating what can be called a constitutionalism of the Global South.” (See Daniel 
Bonilla Maldonado (ed), “Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia.” 
2013, Cambridge University Press, New York, USA).  
24 This phrase is synonymous with “judicial activism” as evident in Kapiszewski, D., Silverstein, G., & Kagan, R. A. (2013). 
Consequential Court - Judicial Roles in Global Perspective. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
25 This word was explained to mean the power of courts to “make laws” in Roznai, Y. (2014).Legisprudence Limitations on 
Constitutional Amendments? Reflections on The Czech Constitutional Court's Declaration of Unconstitutional Constitutional Act 
(April 10, 2014), 8(1), 29-57. 
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dignity of women anywhere and especially for the constitutional development and 
democratization of the Global South.26  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
This research is premised on several findings27 which confirm the multi-faceted 
violation of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria and the fact that the available legal 
framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity is deficient, does not conform 
to international law and therefore cannot guarantee women’s dignity and human rights 
nor can it meet the Millennium Development Goal No. 3, that is, promoting gender 
equity and empowerment of women.28 It is therefore necessary to seek and apply new 
lessons in the quest for a sustainable legal framework for the protection of the right to 
dignity of women in Nigeria. 
 
 
                                                          
26 “Global South” describes third world/developing countries as opposed to developed/western countries of the “Global North”. (See 
Daniel Bonilla Maldonado (ed), “Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and 
Colombia.” 2013, Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, page 5).  
27 Ojilere, Aloy “The Customary Law and Socio-religious Mythology on the Rights of Women in Nigeria.” Nigerian Journal of 
Public Law (NJPL) Vol.1 No. 1 (2008), Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria, Enugu campus. Pages 257-266; Olong Mathew 
Adefi: ‘Cultural Practices and Traditional Beliefs as Impediments To The Enjoyment of Women’s Rights in Nigeria’, Journal of 
Contemporary Legal Issues JCLI Vol. 1, No. 1, 2009 (A publication of the Nigerian Bar Association, Idah branch, Kogi State, 
Nigeria) p.117-131; A.A. Idowu, Women’s Rights, Violence and Gender Discrimination-The Nigerian Circumstances in Gender and 
Power Relations in Nigeria, Ronke Iyabowale Ako-Nai (ed) 2013 Lexington Books, Plymouth, U.K., p. 31-45 esp p. 32; Adesina 
Coker: Critical Appraisal of Domestic Violence in Nigeria, in Chapter 6 of Gender and Power Relations in Nigeria, Ronke 
Iyabowale Ako-Nai (ed) 2013 Lexington Books, Plymouth, UK, p. 77-86; Akpo Offiong Bassey, Religion, Culture and tradition in 
Cross River State in Discrimination, Religion and Culture: A Theoretical Approach- Eliminating Discrimination Against Women- 
Constitutional Rights Project, 1995 pp 24-25; Chukwudum Okoli. “Gender relations: An Igbo cultural perspective” (2001) WOREC 
Journal of Gender studies, Maiden Edition. Vol. 1 No. 1, Imo State University, Owerri,         pp.39-4; E.N. Chegwe  Legalism And 
The Realization of the Right to Life, (2009) Nigerian Journal of Public Law (NJPL) Vol.2 No.1, Department of Public and Private 
Law, Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria. Pp. 226-243; Ezebuilo Ukwueze: “Bride Price: Another source of violence against 
women”, Published in Chapter 9 Joy Ngozi Ezeilo & Josephine Alumanah ed. Bride Price And The Implications For Women’s 
Rights in Nigeria, Women Aid Collective 2008 p.115 at 120; Erhum, M. O. (2013). An Appraisal of the Protection of Women’s 
Rights Under Nigerian Laws. In R. I. Ako-Nai (Ed.), Gender and Power Relations in Nigeria             (pp. 61-76). Plymouth, U.K: 
Lexington Books.; Dada J. A. (2013). Human Rights Protection in Nigeria: the Past, the Present and Goals for Role Actors for the 
Future. Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, 14, 1-13; DadaJ. A. (2012). Impediments to Human Rights Protection in Nigeria. 
Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L., 18, 67.  
28 Promoting gender equity and empowering women is item No. 3 of The Millennium Development Goals endorsed by the United 
Nations in September 2000, and declared to be actualised globally by 2015. However, with the September 25, 2015 adoption by the 
UN of a new sustainable development agenda consisting of 17 Sustainable Development Goals, “Gender Equality” becomes 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) No. 5. It is of interest to note that the protection of ‘women’ is now extended to include 
‘girls’. Cumulatively, these 17 SDGs comprise 169 targets which are set to end poverty, protect the planet (climate change) and 
ensure prosperity for all, on the premise that governments, civil society, the private sector and individuals plays their respective 
roles optimally (http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/).  The UN recommends that the specific 
targets of each SDG should be achieved over the next 15 years. One of the most remarkable features of the SDGs, according to 
Yonglong Lu, Nebojsa Nakicenovic, Martin Visbeck & Anne-Sophie Stevance is that “The SDGs place greater demand on the 
scientific community than did the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which they replace.” (See: Lu, Y., Nakicenovic, N., 
Visbeck, M., & Stevance, A. S. (2015). Policy: Five priorities for the UN Sustainable Development Goals-Comment. Nature, 
520(7548), 432-433). Jeffrey Sachs had expressed early support for the MDGs because they set the pace for the SDGs in the first 
instance (Sachs, Jeffrey D. "From millennium development goals to sustainable development goals." The Lancet 379.9832 (2012): 
2206-2211). 
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1.3 Objective of the Research 
The core objective of this research is to explore the fundamental gaps in the current 
legal framework for the protection of the right to dignity of women in Nigeria and seek 
useful lessons from India and South Africa with which to bridge them. 
To realise this objective, the researcher seeks to: 
1. Explore the international framework for the protection of the right to dignity of 
women.  
2. Critique the framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria 
India and South Africa. 
3. Highlight the fundamental gaps in the framework for the protection of women’s 
right to dignity in Nigeria vis-à-vis the advances in the legal framework of India 
and South Africa.  
4. Make recommendations, based on the advances in the other frameworks 
particularly India and South Africa, for bridging the existing fundamental gaps 
and advancing the quest for a sustainable legal framework for protecting the 
right to dignity of women in Nigeria.  
 
 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
This research will seek to answer the following questions: 
 
1. What is the legal framework for protecting the right to dignity of women in 
international law? 
2. What is the existing national framework for the same protection in Nigeria, India 
and South Africa? 
3. What fundamental gaps exists in the existing Nigerian framework vis-à-vis the 
advances in the other frameworks?  
   6 
4. Based on the lessons from India and South Africa, what recommendations need 
be suggested for bridging the existing fundamental gaps and advance the quest 
for a sustainable legal framework for the protection of the right to dignity of 
women in Nigeria? 
 
1.5 Methodology of the Research 
This research is qualitative, doctrinal and based on both library and desktop research 
including internet sources from renowned databases and websites. Data was collected 
from Primary and Secondary Sources. Most of the information for this research were 
obtained from books and materials from the Library and reliable internet databases 
[LexisNexis, Westlaw Malaysia, Westlaw international, HeinOnline, ProQuest, ebrary, 
Jstor, Ebsco] at the University of Malaya Law library and Main library. Other vital 
information were obtained from university libraries and offices of some NGOs and UN 
agencies in Nigeria.  
Google Chrome and Google Scholar were the main search engines because they provide 
quick search suggestions and authoritative academic literature respectively. Internet 
Explorer and Mozilla Firefox were also be used. Westlaw Malaysia has an India portal 
which provided access to every relevant constitutional and statutory provision 
(enactments, amendments and repeals), judgements of High Courts and the Supreme 
Court in India as well as commentaries and case analysis. Westlaw International 
provided similar information with respect to South Africa and Nigeria. Other 
information on South Africa were accessed from official websites of its Constitutional 
Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development. It also involved the use of data collected from official government 
reports, reports of Non-Governmental Organisations, reports of UN human rights bodies 
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(accessed from the official website of the United Nations), academic journals, expert 
opinions, as well as research, newspapers and media reports.  Additional relevant 
information were obtained from research results, data and vital information available 
from the publications and records of prominent Nigerian, Indian and South African 
activists and NGOs.  
Specifically, to answer the research questions and realise the set objective, the thesis 
highlights the gaps inherent in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (including the 
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, the National Gender Policy, 
the Nigerian Criminal jurisprudence and relevant legislation as well as judicial attitude 
to the protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria. It also explores the advances in 
the legal frameworks (constitutional guarantees and right of access to courts, law and 
policy, as well as the judicial attitude of creativity, activism and pragmatism) for the 
same protections in India and South Africa as well as in international law,29 including 
the African regional human rights mechanism. The thesis also recommends valuable 
lessons based on these advances, which may be reasonably and realistically transplanted 
to Nigeria (based on similarities in in constitutional framework on fundamental rights 
and directive principles between India and Nigeria, as well as similarities in plural or 
‘mixed’ legal systems between India, Nigeria and South Africa) to bridge the many 
fundamental gaps in the existing legal framework and set it on the path to globalization 
and sustainability.  
It is humbly believed that while Nigeria has many valuable lessons to learn from both 
India and South Africa, some of these lessons, especially on the constitutional advances 
                                                          
29 “The purpose of international law is to influence states to recognize and accept human rights, to reflect these rights in their 
national Constitutions and laws, to respect and ensure the enjoyment through national institutions, and to incorporate them into 
national ways of life.” See L Henkin, “International human rights and rights in the United States.”In T. Meron (ed) (1984) Human 
Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues 5. 
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in South Africa, will also be beneficial to India30 as well as other developing 
democracies in Asia and Africa. 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study  
The significance of this study includes:  
1. Human dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.31 The UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) also 
emphasise among member states, ‘the urgent need for the universal application 
to women of the rights and principles with regard to equality, security, liberty, 
integrity and dignity of all human beings’ and bearing in mind that ‘those rights 
and principles are enshrined in international instruments, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the  
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.’32 
 
2. The UN is increasingly focused on emerging threats to the rule of law and the 
root causes of conflict, including economic and social justice issues, particularly, 
since festering grievances based on violations of economic and social rights are 
increasingly recognised for their potential to spark violent conflict, which 
                                                          
30 There is need for India to codify the ESC Rights in the Directive Principles of State Policy in its Constitution which the courts 
currently apply as “implied” fundamental rights into positive fundamental rights, just as in the case of the Bill of Rights in  South 
Africa. 
31 See Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. 
32 United Nations General Assembly. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm. (15/3/2014). 
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suggests that “greater efforts are needed to ensure a unified approach to the rule 
of law.”33   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The existing legal framework for redressing the violation of women’s dignity in 
Nigeria, including the National Gender Policy of 2006, ‘has remained more 
theoretical and academic than practical,’34 and in comparison to India and South 
Africa,35 these protections, even against rape,36 are short of international 
standard37 and the least progressive in terms of adequacy38 and interpretation of 
constitutional guarantees,39 statutory provisions,40 access to justice, judicial 
activism,41 policy implementation42 and pro-active legislature,43 thus, justifying 
                                                          
33 French, D., & Samuel, K. (2015). Transitional Justice in Times of “Exponential Change”: Constructing Normative Frameworks 
Fit for Purpose—The Importance of General International Law Current Issues in Transitional Justice (pp. 185-208): Springer, at 
166, citing the 2011 UN Report on “Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies”  
34 Erhum, M. O. (2013). An Appraisal of the Protection of Women’s Rights under Nigerian Laws. In R. I. Ako-Nai (Ed.), Gender 
and Power Relations in Nigeria (pp. 61-76). Plymouth, U.K: Lexington Books. 
35 Ogunniran, I. (2010). Enforceability of Socio-Economic Rights: Seeing Nigeria through the Eyes of Other Jurisdictions. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence, 1(September 2010), 73-87.  
36 Adesina Coker: Critical Appraisal of Domestic Violence in Nigeria, in Chapter 6 of Gender and Power Relations in Nigeria, 
Ronke Iyabowale Ako-Nai (ed) 2013 Lexington Books, Plymouth, UK, Pp. 77-86; Ojilere, Aloy (2009): “Domestic Violence and 
the Law in Nigeria.” CWGS- Journal of Gender Studies Vol. 1 No.4 (June 2009), Centre for Women and Gender Studies, Imo State 
University, Owerri, pp. 75-87; Moore, A. J. (2005). Endangered species: Examining South Africa’s national rape crisis and its 
legislative attempt to protect its most vulnerable citizens. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 38, 1469-1498; D. A. Ijalaye: 
The Nigerian law of rape in the context of global development, Ibadan Bar Journal, Vol. 3 No. 1 (2004). P.6. 
37 Oby Nwankwo, Nigeria’s Representative on the CEDAW Committee has said that Nigeria is “‘notorious for violating 
international agreements.” See Nigerian vanguard Newspaper of 22 September, 2013, interview by Josephine Igbinovia, 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/09/nigeria-is-notorious-for-abandoning-international-treaties-oby-nwankwo/ (26/9/2013). 
38 NI Aniekwu ‘Legalising Cairo: Prospects and Opportunities for Reproductive Rights in Nigeria’ (2006) 1 & 2 CODESRIA 
Bulletin 49 (quoted in  Uju Peace Okeke “A Case For The Enforcement of Women’s Rights As Human Rights in Nigeria”; The 
Women's UN Report Program & Network (WUNRN) http://www.wunrn.com (16/7/2014). 
39 Mercy Onaodowan Erhum, (2013). “An Appraisal of The Protection of Women’s Rights Under Nigerian Laws.” In Ronke 
Iyabowale Ako-Nai (ed.) Gender and Power Relations in Nigeria, Lexington Books, Plymouth, U.K., p. 61-76. 
40 Adesina Coker, (2013) “Critical Appraisal of Domestic Violence in Nigeria.” In Chapter 6 of Ronke Iyabowale Ako-Nai (ed.) 
Gender and Power Relations in Nigeria, Lexington Books, Plymouth, UK, Pp. 77-86; 
Ojilere, Aloy  “A Comparative Critique of The Law on Rape in Nigeria and Malaysia,” Nigerian Journal of  
Food, Drug and Health Law (NJFDHL) Vol. 5 No.1 (2012) Faculty of Law, Kogi State University, Anyigba. Pp. 41-53. 
41 In Akinnubi v. Akinnubi (1997) 46 LRCN 137, the Nigerian Supreme Court endorsed the validity of a Yoruba customary law 
which denied women the right to obtain Letters of Administration or be appointed as co-administrators of the estate of their late 
husbands. However, in the latter cases of Nnayelugo v. Nnayelugo  (2008) All FWLR Pt 401 p.97 and Mojekwu v. Mojekwu (1997) 
7 NWLR Pt 512, p.283 where similar issues were raised, the Court of Appeal rightly gave a varied judgments which have been 
applauded as a locus classicus.  
42 Even the laudable provisions of the CEDAW and the National Gender Policy of Nigeria can hardly be implemented due to a 
number of constitutional and socio-political inhibitions including a defective and deficient legal framework. See Benson Kunle 
Sehinde: An Overview of Legal and Implementation Framework of Nigeria’s National Gender Policy. in Chapter 7 of Gender and 
Power Relations in Nigeria, Ronke Iyabowale Ako-Nai (ed) 2013 Lexington Books, Plymouth, UK, p. 87-100; Mercy Onaodowan 
Erhum, An Appraisal of The Protection of Women’s Rights Under Nigerian Laws in Gender and Power Relations in Nigeria, Ronke 
Iyabowale Ako-Nai (ed) 2013 Lexington Books, Plymouth, U.K., p. 61-76. 
43 In India, the Indian Penal Code 1860 (as amended by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013); The Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 (as amended by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013) creates new sexual offences, criminalizes marital rape 
and increased punishment for rape and sexual offences. And in South Africa, apart from Prevention of Family Violence Act 1993, 
No.133 of 1993 which had earlier criminalized marital rape, Section 60 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act No. 32 of 2007 now states that “Notwithstanding any other law, a court may not treat the evidence of a 
complainant in criminal proceedings involving the alleged commission of a sexual offence pending before the court, with caution, 
on account of the nature of the offence.” S.59 of the same Act also attempts to protect survivors stating that “In criminal proceedings 
involving the alleged commission of a sexual offence, the court may not draw an inference only from the length of any delay 
between the alleged commission of such offence and the reporting thereof.”  
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act No. 38 of 2007, which offered minimum sentencing guidelines for rape, along with 
unsatisfactory and prohibited reasons for justifying a lesser sentence in Section 3 (aA) states that “When imposing a sentence in 
respect of the offence of rape the following shall not constitute substantial and compelling circumstances justifying the imposition 
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the necessity for this research. 
 
4. Weak legislation and human rights violations may threaten political stability, 
economic development and mutual co-existence at home, international relations, 
as well as territorial and regional peace.44  
 
5. A globalized, realistic and sustainable legal framework is necessary to set 
Nigeria on the agenda to guarantee sustainable promotion of democracy and 
human rights, especially the protection of the right to dignity of women and the 
girl-child in furtherance Goal No 3 of the UN Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs).45 
 
1.7 Choice of Jurisdictions  
The choice of the jurisdictions for this research is justified thus:  
1. The three countries are patriarchal,46 multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-
religious and multi-ethnic societies (India has over two thousand ethnic 
groups)47 and nearly each one practices its own customary law and socio-
religious mythology alongside the regular legal system.48  
                                                                                                                                                                          
of a lesser sentence: (i) The complainants previous sexual history: (ii) an apparent lack of physical injury to the complainant (iii) an 
accused person’s cultural or religious beliefs about rape or (iv) any relationship between the accused person and the complainant 
prior to the offence being committed.” But in Nigeria, Marital rape is even justified by the combined interpretation of Section 357 of 
the Criminal Code Act Cap 77, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990    (applicable in the Southern part of Nigeria) defines rape 
as unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman or girl by any person without her consent, or with her consent, if it was obtained 
unlawfully, and by Section 6 of the same Code which defines unlawful carnal knowledge as “carnal connection which takes place 
otherwise than between husband and wife.” The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules is also fraught with a number 
of inherent hiccups and Parliament seems not to bother.  
44 Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2014). A social science of human rights. Journal of Peace Research, 51(2), 273-286.  
45 Promoting gender equity and empowering women is item No. 3 of The Millennium Development Goals endorsed by the United 
Nations in September 2000, and declared to be actualised globally by 2015. This is now Goal No. 5 of the new UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) which was launched on 25 September, 2015. It provides for the equality and empowerment of ‘women 
and girls.’ 
46 Reed, H. (2014, July). Race and Patriarchy: Gender and Migration in South Africa During and after Apartheid. In XVIII ISA 
World Congress of Sociology (July 13-19, 2014). Isaconf; Kanu, I. A. (2014). An Enquiry into the Religio-Cultural Experience of 
Women in Nigeria: Towards a Philosophy of Reciprocity. AFRREV LALIGENS: An International Journal of Language, Literature 
and Gender Studies, 1(2), 50-60; Karandikar, S., Frost, C., & Gezinski, L. (2014). Patriarchy and Gender-Based Violence: 
Experiences of Female Sex Workers in India. International Journal of Social Work, 1(1), 1-14. 
47 US Department of State (17 April 2012) “Background Note: India”; Nigeria is estimated to have nearly two hundred and fifty 
ethnic groups while Section 6(1) of South Africa’s Constitution recognizes eleven official languages, based on its ethnic diversity. 
48 The Nigerian Legal System is a British Common Law heritage comprising English statutes of general application subsequently 
enacted and incorporated into municipal law by the Nigerian legislature, Statutory Law, Islamic Law of the North and Customary 
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2. Nigeria and India are common law countries, former British colonies and with 
plural legal systems, and while Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, 
the largest democracy in Africa, the fourth largest democracy in the world and 
with 49.36 per cent female population,49 India is the largest democracy in the 
world, the second most populous country in Asia, after China and with 48.37 per 
cent female population.50 And in the South African population, women 
outnumber men.   It is therefore logical, that any advance or otherwise to the 
dignity of women in these countries affects a significant portion of Africa and 
Asia’s population, as well as the realization of the Millennium Development 
Goals. 
 
 
 
3. Nigeria and India have similar constitutional framework on fundamental rights 
and directive principles of state policy. South Africa, with Dutch and British 
colonial legacies, on the other hand, is the most advanced constitutional 
democracy in Africa and possibly in the world today.51 
 
 
4. South Africa is the most developed democracy in Africa52 and its Constitution of 
1996 is arguably one of the best in the world because it enshrines first, second 
and third generation rights and guarantees in the Bill of Rights, and the wide 
powers and independence of its Constitutional Court.53  
                                                                                                                                                                          
Law of the South. While Islamic Laws are religious prescriptions rooted in Holy Quran and the Hadith of the prophets, Customary 
Laws are the unwritten native laws, practices and customs of a people as inherited by subsequent generations from their ancestors.  
This similarity in colonial history and legal system is shared with India. South Africa practices a ‘mixed’ or 'hybrid' legal system 
which cuts across many traditions: The ‘civil law’ inherited from the Dutch, The ‘common law’ inherited from England and the 
‘customary law’ or ‘African Customary Law’ inherited from indigenous Africans of various tribal origins. 
49 2012 World Bank Report. 
50 (Source: UN Human Development Report 2013). 
51 Daniel Bonilla Maldonado (ed), “Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa a, and 
Colombia.” 2013, op.cit. 
52 Naudé, W. (2013). Development Progress in sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius and South Africa. 
Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, 284-292. 
53 Daniel Bonilla Maldonado (ed), “Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa a, and 
Colombia.” 2013, op.cit. Also, in South Africa, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is 
consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law. 
http://www.justice.gov.za/sca/historysca.htm (2/6/2014). 
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5. Judicial activism in the protection of women’s right to dignity and fundamental 
rights generally is particularly prominent in India54 due to several innovations of 
the Indian Supreme Court and the activism of the likes of Justice P.N. Bhagwati, 
manifest in the Epistolary jurisdiction of courts, Public Interest Litigation (PIL), 
Class Action Litigation (CAL), Legal Aid, the Vishaka Guidelines, the Rule in 
Sheela Barse, the broad interpretation of Article 21 (Right to life and liberty), 
the three-step  rule  of  Constitutional  Proportionality, as well as the liberal 
interpretation and judicialization of the non-justiciable directive principles of 
state policy in the Indian Constitution, among others. All these portray the 
Supreme Court of the Indian as ‘one of the most powerful Constitutional Courts 
in the world.’55 
 
6. Nigeria stands to learn many reasonable lessons from the constitutional, 
legislative and judicial advances in both the Indian and South African 
framework for the protection of the right to dignity of women, especially with 
regards to the interpretation of fundamental rights in India and the judicialization 
of socio-economic rights in South Africa. 
 
 
 
7. Nigeria, India and South Africa are developing countries in the Global South 
and women’s dignity is a common issue among them. Most importantly, legal 
transplant is reasonable and possible between them because they belong to the 
same ‘Common law family’56 of complex plural systems (countries with hybrid 
legal systems comprising common law, religious law and customary law).57 
                                                          
54 Justice Palok Basu. ,(2002) Law Relating to Protection of Human Rights Under The Indian Constitution and Allied Laws Modern 
Laws Publications, Allahabad, India. P.83 
55 Manoj Mate, “Public Interest Litigation and the Transformation of the Supreme Court of India” in Chapter 10, Diana 
Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A. Kagan (ed.) Consequential Courts: Judicial Roles in Global Perspective, 2013 
Cambridge University Press, USA., p.262. Similarly, Deputy Chief Justice of the South African Constitutional Court Dikgang 
Moseneke, has asserted that “The Courts in Common law countries like India and South Africa are the active and liberal 
transformative agent of positive change. They work independently and fearlessly to initiate positive constitutional changes.”   
56 Spamann, H. (2009). Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law. BYU L. Rev., 1813, 
at 1830-1831. 
57 Orucu, E. (2008). What Is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion? J. Comp. L., 3, 34.  
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1.8 Scope and Limitation 
This research is based purely on the legal framework for protecting the right to dignity 
of women in Nigeria, India and South Africa only. It does not cover any other 
jurisdiction. The research lays great emphasis on women’s sexual independence and the 
legal framework for the protection of the sexual dignity of women in these jurisdictions. 
However, the research did not include the trafficking in women for sex and does not 
address the sociological question of why, in spite of formidable legal framework, the 
violation of women’s sexual dignity persists, especially in South Africa58 and India.59  
 
1.9 Definition of Terms 
Grammar constitutes the basis of legal and political thought. The grammar of modern 
constitutionalism determines the structure and limits of key components of 
contemporary legal and political discourse.60 It is, thus, imperative to explain the 
meaning and import of certain terminologies which are core to this thesis. 
 
 
1.9.1 Human Dignity 
Etymologically, “dignity” is derived from the Latin word 'dignitas', which translates as 
'worth'. Human dignity therefore means “human worth”. The precise origin of human 
dignity is unknown and it is humbly submitted that it is a concept which is as old as 
creation of man. However, in Nigeria, the view has been expressed that the African 
                                                          
58 “Violence against women (VAW) in South Africa remains rampant, irrespective of human rights– focused laws passed by the 
government.” Ramadimetja S. Mogale, Kathy Kovacs Burns, and Solina Richter (2012) “Violence Against Women in South Africa: 
Policy Position and. Recommendations” Violence Against Women, May 2012, 18(5): 1 http://vaw.sagepub.com  (24/9/2013). 
59  In one report, economists Siwan Anderson and Debraj Ray estimates that in India, more than 2m women are missing in a given 
year. The economists found that roughly 12% of the missing women disappear at birth, 25% die in childhood, 18% at the 
reproductive ages, and 45% at older ages. They found that women died more from "injuries" in a given year than while giving birth 
- injuries, they say, "appear to be indicator of violence against women". Deaths from fire-related incidents, they say, are a major 
cause - each year more than 100,000 women are killed by fires in India. The researchers say many cases could be linked to demands 
over a dowry leading to women being set on fire… These findings point to life-long neglect of women in India. It also proves that a 
strong preference for sons over daughters - leading to sex selective abortions - is just part of the story. Analysts say deep-rooted 
changes in social attitudes are needed to make India's women more accepted and secure. There is deeply entrenched patriarchy and 
widespread misogyny in vast swathes of the country, especially in the north.” See How India Treats its Women, BBC News India, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-20863860 (2/6/2014). 
60 Maldonado, D. B. (2013). Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia: 
Cambridge University Press., p.1. 
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notion of human value and respect predates western civilization as well as the popular 
Kantian concept of human dignity and also offers a superior indigenous platform for its 
protection.61 
By the classical judicial interpretation of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, dignity 
means “life and personal liberty,” that is, the minimum conditions which must exist to 
enable a person live a free and dignified life.62  
Human dignity is inherent, divine, basic and timeless and should glaringly apply to all 
persons in all nations regardless of sex, race, fraternity, political affiliation, social status 
or religious creed. It is universal in nature and attaches to a person because he is human. 
The authors opine that vulnerable persons such as women and those in the small and 
hidden places63 deserve more dignity so as not to leave the least impression of a 
diminished personhood or a less-than-human being status. The Declaration of the 1993 
UN World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna states that ‘the human rights of 
women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indivisible part of human 
rights.’  Similarly, by the combination of Articles 1 and 5 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights’ and ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.’ CEDAW considers dignity of women as the elimination of 
“prejudices” and practices based on assumptions about the inferiority or superiority of 
either sex.64  
                                                          
61 Casmir, K. A., Ome, E., & Nwankwo, A. (2014). Re-Examination of Igbo Values System, and the Igbo Personality: A Kantian 
and African Comparative Perspective. Open Journal of Philosophy, 4(03), 397. These authors concluded that “the Igbo communal 
system has the best indigenous ethical and environmental structure for the restoration of man’s dignity as posited by Kant and, has, 
for ages before Kant, been at the forefront of this restoration, ethicalization and construction of values for human dignity.” Their 
paper however, was not particular to women nor did it examine the legal framework for the protection of the dignity of women in 
Nigeria, India or South Africa.” 
62  Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 802. 
63 Uju Peace Okeke, “A Case for the Enforcement of Women’s Rights as Human Rights in Nigeria” (The 
Women's UN Report Program & Network (WUNRN)). http://www.wunrn.com/news/2010/04_10/04_05_10/040510_nigeria.htm 
(12/7/2014). 
64 CEDAW Article 5. 
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In State v. Makwanyane,65 the South African Constitutional Court described dignity as 
“the foundation” of other human rights. Desmond Tutu argues that freedom, justice and 
peace in the world are founded on the recognition of the inherent dignity of all members 
of the human family, and of their equal and inalienable rights.66 This is the basic spirit 
of Ubuntu.67 
Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 states that: 
“Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life 
and the integrity of his person.”  
This provision underscores the fact that the right to dignity ought to attach to ‘every 
human being’ to the extent of the ‘respect for his life’ and the ‘integrity of his person.’  
 
In the words of Oscar Schachter, “[r]espect for the intrinsic worth of every person 
should mean that individuals are not to be perceived or treated merely as instruments or 
objects of the will of others.”68 
This restates the inviolable fact that human dignity is a universal attribute and therefore, 
every socio-cultural prejudice or sexual abuse of women is a clear breach of their right 
to dignity and self-worth as human beings.69   
 
1.9.1.1 Common Forms of Abuse of Women’s Dignity 
Most violations of the right to dignity of women in Nigeria, India and South Africa 
hinges on patriarchy, native law and custom or socio-religious mythology.70 
                                                          
65 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) South African Constitutional Court. (also cited in Uju Peace Okeke, op. cit.) 
66  Iyassu Menelik, G. Y. (2014). The Issue of Human Rights In Africa. Africa University (Institute of Peace and Governance), 
Mutare Zimbabwe., 8.  
67  “Ubuntu” meaning unity, human dignity and respect amidst national diversity. See Extra-curial speeches by L.W.H. Ackermann 
'Equality and the South African Constitution: The Role of Dignity' Brain Fischer Lecture delivered at Rhodes House, Oxford on 26 
May 2000, published in S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts., 22, 597-612.) and Chaskalson P (A Chaskalson 'Dignity as a Foundational Value in 
the South African Constitution' Third Brain Fischer Lecture delivered on 18 May 2000 at the Civic Centre, Johannesburg, since 
published in (2000) 16 SAJHR 193). See also the observation of O’Regan J in the celebrated case of S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 
391 (CC). 
68  'Human Dignity as a Normative Concept' (1983) 77 American J of int L 848-54. 
69Margaret Platiner, “The Status of Women under international Human Rights Law and the 1995 UN World Conference on Women, 
Beijing, China” 84 Kentucky Law .Journal (1995-1996), 1249. http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-
bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/kentlj84&section=45, (14/7/2014). 
70 Durojaye, E. (2013). ‘Woman, but not human’: Widowhood practices and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria. International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 27(2), 176-196.  
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In India, the commonest forms include rape,71 forced labour,72 dowry-related 
violence/murder,73 Sati, (self-immolation),74  sex selection and son preference which 
often lead to the abuse/killing of girls or the abortion of female foetuses. In South 
Africa, apart from sexual violence and rape,75 certain crimes and murders like intimate 
femicide (murder by a male partner, boyfriend or husband.), sexual serial killing, rape-
murders and witch burnings have also been linked to patriarchy, domestic violence and 
exploitation of women.76  
In Nigeria the commonest violations of the dignity of women are also rooted in native 
law and custom, patriarchy and socio-religious mythology, and includes traditional 
widowhood rites, female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), forced child marriages,77 
wife beating, wife confinement,78 wife donation,79 widow inheritance,80 son preference 
(which triggers psychological violence, mental torture,81 polygamy and wife 
abandonment), denial of inheritance and proprietary rights,82 and chattelization of 
women and girls, consequent upon the compulsion to pay dowry for customary law 
marriages which usually takes place before the parents of the girl would permit or 
subscribe to her celebrating an Act marriage, particularly in Eastern Nigeria.  
                                                          
71 BBC News India of 29 May 2014 reported the case of two teenage girls found hanging from a tree in a village in the northern 
Indian state of Uttar Pradesh after they had been gang raped. This is in spite of recent legislation providing stiffer penalties for rape 
and allied sexual the offences in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-27615590 
(2/6/2014). 
72 Reports show that thousands of young women work in exploitative and dehumanizing bonded labour conditions in garment 
factories. See Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) and the India Committee of the Netherlands (ICN) titled 
“Maid in India: Young Dalit Women Continue to Suffer Exploitative Conditions in India’s Garment 
Industry.”   (http://somo.nl/publications-en/Publication_3783, accessed on 14/4/2013. 
73 An Indian woman may suffer dowry-related violence/death if her in-laws consider the “groom’s 
price” paid by her family as inadequate. Glyn, Bride Price African Pride or Prejudice? http://www.feelfreenetwork.org/index.php/b
ride-price,  (26/5/2013); Tambiah, S. J., Goheen, M., Gottlieb, A., Guyer, J. I., Olson, E. A., Piot, C., ... & Vuyk, T. (1989). 
Bridewealth and dowry revisited: The position of women in Sub-Saharan Africa and North India [and comments and reply]. Current 
Anthropology, 413-435. 
74 The Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “immolate” as “to kill or destroy (someone or something) by fire”; “to offer in 
sacrifice;  to kill as a sacrificial victim “ to kill or destroy often by fire.” http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/immolate. 
This custom was officially abolished in India in 1829. 
75 Chamuka Takura, 17 August 2011, “The SADC Gender Protocol: Are the 2015 Objectives Achievable?” Ngo Pulse. Cited in 
Gemma Hancox (October 25th, 2012) Marital Rape in South Africa: Enough is enough, BUWA! A Journal on African Women's 
Experiences, 70-74, p.73 http://www.osisa.org/buwa/south-africa/marital-rape-south-africa (13/10/2013). 
76 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN SOUTH AFRICA: A RESOURCE FOR JOURNALISTS, Soul City Institute of Health and 
Development Communication, Soul City, 1999 p.5. 
77 Young or teenage girls are sometimes compelled to marry rich men or other men against their will, so as to help raise money to 
pay off a debt or to train their brothers in school or other vocation. 
78 Islamic law in Nigeria permit women to be kept in purdah (house arrest) and shielded away from the public or stranger. 
79 In parts of Kogi state, custom permits a man to donate his wife to sleep with an august visitor to show total hospitality. 
80 Certain Ibo custom permits a widow to be inherited as “wife” by his stepson or any of his deceased husband’s brothers. 
81 Spousal rape is not an offence in Nigeria because Section 6 of the Nigerian Criminal Code defines unlawful carnal knowledge as 
“carnal connection which takes place otherwise between husband and wife.” 
82 Akinnubi v. Akinnubi (1997) 46 LRCN 137, Contra Nnayelugo v Nnayelugo (2008) All FWLR Pt 401 p.97.  
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The typical Nigerian society also recognizes a man as head of the family by reason of 
which he may dominate, threaten, beat up or even rape his wife or cohabiting partner 
because she is his property whereas it is a taboo for a woman to beat her husband.83 
And regrettably, marital rape is not a crime in Nigeria.84 The man is also the presumed 
breadwinner, even if the woman’s income actually runs the family85  because certain 
Nigerian customary practices affirm the socio-cultural norm that a woman does not 
enjoy any independent personality but is always considered an appendage of a father or 
mother, and this suggests why women do not enjoy succession to the estate of their 
deceased husbands or fathers but are rather considered as part of the estate to be 
inherited by the men.86 
Native custom in parts of Cross River State, Nigeria, require a woman who has still 
birth to trek to an evil forest where her hair and pubic area must be cleanly shaved as 
sacrifice to appease the gods and cleanse her sacrilege.87 Certain Nigerian mythology 
consider women as witches,88 or unclean and subordinate and, therefore, must not 
eat chicken rump, or take yam tubers off the stakes in the yam barn, or even shake 
hands with a man but rather to stoop down, kneel down or bend down low to greet 
him.89 In some cultures a widow is compelled to drink the bath water of her husband’s 
corpse before his burial as “oath” that she had no hand in his death. Indignity may also 
include verbal and emotional torture or the use of abusive and humiliating language, 
and sometimes innuendoes on a woman by her husband, mother in-law and even 
                                                          
83 Olong Mathew Adefi. (2009)  “Cultural Practices and Traditional Beliefs as Impediments to the Enjoyment of Women’s Rights in 
Nigeria.” Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues JCLI Vol. 1, No. 1 (A publication of the Nigerian Bar Association, Idah branch, 
Kogi State, Nigeria) p.117-131. 
84 Section 357 of the Criminal Code Act Cap 77, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990    (applicable in the Southern part of 
Nigeria) defines rape as unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman or girl by any person without her consent, or with her consent, if it 
was obtained unlawfully. But Section 6 of the same Code defines unlawful carnal knowledge as “carnal connection which takes 
place otherwise than between husband and wife.” 
85 Olong Mathew Adefi (2009). ‘Cultural Practices and Traditional Beliefs as Impediments to the Enjoyment of Women’s Rights in 
Nigeria’, ibid at p. 130. 
86 Morolake Omonubi-McDonnell; Gender Inequality in Nigeria (2003) Spectrum Books Ltd, p.130 
87 Akpo Offiong Bassey. (1995), Religion, Culture and tradition in Cross River State in Discrimination, Religion and Culture: A 
Theoretical Approach- Eliminating Discrimination Against Women- Constitutional Rights Project, pp 24-25. 
88  Emile Secker, “Witchcraft stigmatization in Nigeria: Challenges and successes in the implementation of child rights” 
International Social Work (2012) 56(1) 22–36. 
89 Ojilere, Aloy (2008).  “The Customary Law and Socio-religious Mythology on the Rights of Women in Nigeria.” Nigerian 
Journal of Public Law (NJPL) Vol.1 No. 1 Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria, Enugu campus. 257-266. 
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extended family members, especially if she is childless or has only female children.90 It 
is therefore no secret that despite commitments to international and regional human 
rights treaties and conventions, women and girls are still devalued and humiliated in 
Nigeria. 91 
Some Christian authors even contend that the discrimination against women has its 
roots from the Biblical account of creation where the woman was fashioned out of 
man’s single rib.92 
Worse still, at least one author has opined that Nigerian women have become classified 
into the same vulnerable group as aliens, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, 
persons born out of wedlock, children, the disabled and the mentally retarded who are 
most likely to be abused and denied their fundamental rights.93 One therefore wonders 
whether women are not indeed human.94 
However, this thesis does not propagate the view or suggest that all cultural practices 
demean women’s integrity rather that cultural differences are to be respected, but only 
within limits. Also, that cultural difference does not justify assaults on the bodily 
integrity of vulnerable people or the blind application of practices which harm or violate 
the dignity of women particularly95. 
 
 
 
                                                          
90  Ojilere, Aloy (2009). “Domestic Violence and the Law in Nigeria.” CWGS- Journal of Gender Studies Vol. 1 No.4 Centre for 
Women and Gender Studies, Imo State University, Owerri. 75-87. 
91Sani Mustapha Kura, “An analysis of Gender inequality and National Gender Policy in Nigeria” International Journal of 
Scientific & Engineering Research Volume 4, Issue 1, January 2013, p.8 ISSN 2229-5518IJSER © 2013 http://www.ijser.org. 
(24/7/2014). 
92 Ushe, U. M. (2015). Eradicating Sexual Abuse And Gender Based Violence In Africa And America: Role Of Religious Leaders. 
European Scientific Journal, 11(5), 99-116 at 104.  
93 A.A. Idowu (2013).  “Women’s Rights, Violence and Gender Discrimination-The Nigerian Circumstances.” In Ronke Iyabowale 
Ako-Nai (ed.) Gender and Power Relations in Nigeria, Lexington Books, Plymouth, U.K., p. 31-45 esp p. 32; Gasioukwu, M.O.U 
(2003) Human rights: History, Ideology and Law. Jos, Nigeria: Fab educational Books, p.140.  
94 Durojaye, E. (2013). ‘Woman, but not human’: Widowhood practices and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria. International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 27(2), 176-196. 
95 Merry, S. E. (2003). Constructing a Global Law‐Violence against Women and the Human Rights System. Law & Social Inquiry, 
28(4), 941-977 at 946.  The 1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW) also obliges states to 
condemn violence against women and not to invoke custom, religion, or culture to limit their obligations of guaranteeing the rights 
of women. 
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1.9.2 Sustainable 
The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary96 defines “sustainable” to mean inter alia, 
able to be upheld and defended while the Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary defines 
it as able to last or continue for a long time.97 “Sustainability” is now commonly used 
as the yardstick to describe standard circumstances applicable to other areas of national, 
political, social, economic or agricultural development. For instance, renowned 
professor of sustainable development, Jeffery Sachs emphasised the importance of 
sustainability (and in the case of this thesis, a sustainable legal framework) thus: 
As a method of helping to save the world, sustainable development 
encourages a holistic approach to human well-being, one that includes 
economic progress, strong social bonds, and environmental sustainability… 
I predict that sustainable development will become the organizing principle 
for our politics, economics, and even ethics in the years ahead. Indeed, the 
world’s governments have agreed to place it at the very center of the 
world’s post-2015 development agenda. They will soon adopt Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), which will help guide the world to a safer and 
fairer twenty-first-century trajectory.98 
 
In his co-authored paper, The United Nations in the Age of Sustainable Development, 
the learned author further wrote that:  
 
Achieving sustainable development will be the over-riding challenge of this 
century. Throughout most of history, the challenges of integrating economic 
development, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability were local 
or regional. In the 21st century, however, they are indisputably global. Only 
through global cooperation can individual nations overcome the 
                                                          
96 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary- The New Authority on the English Language (Edited by Lesley Brown) vol. 2 (N-
Z), 1993 Claredon Press, Oxford, p.3163. 
97 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sustainable. (11/7/2015). 
98 Sachs, J. D. (2015). The age of sustainable development: Columbia University Press. 
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interconnected crises of extreme poverty, economic instability, social 
inequality, and environmental degradation.’99 
 
 
It therefore follows, that a sustainable legal framework for the protection of women’s 
right to dignity in Nigeria and elsewhere, is one which can endure for a long time 
without becoming easily obsolete, and of course, this is the ultimate desire of the United 
Nations. This thesis contends that this is most realistically achievable in Nigeria by 
judicial creativity and activism, even amidst defective or absent constitutional, 
legislative or policy provisions. Suffice to say, that the advantage of justiciability of 
both fundamental rights and socio-economic rights (which being directive principles, 
are declared non-justiciable in the Constitutions of Nigeria and India) in the South 
African Bill of Rights may well be considered an addendum if the advances in judicial 
creativity and activism in India are effectively applied.  
  
1.9.3 Globalization (or Globalisation) 
Simply put, globalization means “to make global” or “sustainable” or “become part of 
the global” or “integrate or transform into the global”. It implies a national integration 
with the rest of the world in the application of best practices.  
The Calgary Board of Education, Media Services, 2005, rightly described globalization 
as “the process of making something worldwide in scope or application,”100 while 
Swedish journalist, Thomas Larsson, wrote that it is “the process of world shrinkage, of 
distances getting shorter, things moving closer.”101  
                                                          
99 Jeremić, V., & Sachs, J. D. (2014). The United Nations in the age of sustainable development. The Economic and Social Review, 
45(2, Summer), 161-188, at 161. 
100 See http://schools.cbe.ab.ca/logistics/g.html. (17/6/2015).   
101 T. Larsson, The Race to the Top: The Real Story of Globalization (U.S.: Cato Institute, 2001), p. 9. 4, cited at p. 3 of Al-Rodhan, 
N. R., & Stoudmann, G. (2006). Definitions of globalization: A comprehensive overview and a proposed definition, p. 1-
21. Available at: 
http://www.wh.agh.edu.pl/other/materialy/678_2015_04_21_22_04_13_Definitions%20of%20Globalization_A%20Comprehensive
%20Overview%20and%20a%20Proposed%20Definition.pdf. (17/6/2015).   
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In this thesis therefore, “globalization of women’s right to dignity” would also refer to 
the process of internationalizing and making sustainable the legal framework for the 
protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria, that is, the process of reforming and 
sustaining the Nigerian legal system to conform to core standard of international law. 
This will entail the raising of Nigeria’s constitutional provisions, law and policy, as well 
as judicial attitude for the protection of the dignity of women to international standard. 
Globalization usually arises from the exchange of world views on acceptable 
international best practices.  
 
1.9.4 Social Equality and Exclusion102 
The World Bank describes ‘equality’ in terms of Social equity, otherwise defined as 
equity in rights, resources and voice, that is, ‘equal access to the opportunities that 
allow people (in this case, women and girls) to pursue a life of their own choosing and 
avoid extreme deprivations in outcomes.’ According to IMF, ‘Equality of rights refers 
to equality under the law, whether customary or statutory. Equality of resources refers 
to equality of opportunity, including equality of access to human capital investments 
and other productive resources and to markets. Equality of voice captures the ability to 
influence and contribute to the political discourse and the development process.’ The 
absence or denial of social equity invariably drifts victims to ‘social exclusion,’ a 
concept which makes one vulnerable as an outsider, that is, a process which 
systematically disadvantages a certain group by discriminating against them on the basis 
of gender, ethnicity, religion, caste, disability, cultural environment or other 
circumstance, which may include widowhood.103 
 
 
                                                          
102 For detailed expose of this subject, See N. J. Johnson & J. H. Svara (Eds.), Justice for All: Promoting Social Equity in Public 
Administration (2015). New York, USA: Routledge.  
103 The World Bank and IMF reports were culled from Buss, T. F., & Ahmed, U. (2015). Social Equity and Development. In N. J. 
Johnson & J. H. Svara (Eds.), Justice for All: Promoting Social Equity in Public Administration (pp. 56-75). New York, USA: 
Routledge, esp. p. 56-57. 
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1.9.5 Sexual Violence 
In 2002, the World Health Organization, in its World Report on Violence and Health 
defined sexual violence as “any sexual act, attempt to obtain a sexual act, unwanted 
sexual comments, or acts to traffic, or otherwise directed, against a person’s sexuality 
using coercion, by any person regardless of their relationship to the victim, in any 
setting, including but not limited to home and work.”104 
 
1.9.6 Violence Against Women 
 “Violence against women” has been defined in Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women, (DEVAW) 1993 to mean “any act of gender-
based violence that results in or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological 
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.”  
When this violence is perpetrated by a spouse, a family member, or otherwise at home, 
it is described as domestic violence. It includes Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) which 
leads to other violations of human rights of the victim as an individual. It violates the 
right to live with human dignity and identity and amounts to a denial of the right to 
equality which is a compound universal right. Therefore, the inability of the state to 
recognize and criminalize such offence is a further denial of the right to equal protection 
of the law in international law.105 
  
1.9.7 Patriarchy  
Patriarchy is the common notion of seeing the world and perceiving virtually everything 
from the point of view of “inequality” of men and women, and “man” as the head and 
                                                          
104 Badjena, S. S. (2014). Sexual Violence against Women with Disabilities and the Legislative Measures in India. ODISHA 
REVIEW (April-May 2014), 46-57.   
105 Ambily, P. (2014). Evaluating the Criminal Justice Interventions for ‘Intimate Partner Violence’ in India: The Need for a 
Paradigm Shift. SPCERA International Journal of Law and Governance, (SPCERA IJLG), 3(6), 32-42. doi: 
http://spcera.in/pdf/4Amly-Criminal%20-justice%20and%20interventions-%20Ambily.pdf. 
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decision maker who must lead and be obeyed by women. It promotes the popular myth 
that women are inferior to men and creates an almost natural bias against women in 
virtually every sphere of human activity, whether socio-political, religious, cultural or 
economic.  
Generally, Patriarchy has been defined as a system of social relations in which men as a 
category have power over women as a category; where men are regarded as superior 
and women regarded as inferior; where decisions and everything else in society are 
defined according to male interests and concerns without consideration for women106 
and this is a common denominator in Nigeria, India and South Africa.107 Therefore, 
such customary beliefs as “son preference” and “wife ownership” which often 
necessitates certain humiliating practices and the violation of the right to dignity of 
women are rooted in patriarchy.108 
 
1.9.8 Judicial Activism 
The judiciary in India and South Africa are generally considered as independent, 
fearless and with the ability to cause transformative constitutional and socio-political 
consequences. The Indian Supreme Court is particularly famous for its innovative and 
broad interpretation of constitutional provisions especially in relation to fundamental 
rights and the non-justiciable directive principles of state policy in the Indian 
                                                          
106 See Women in Nigeria (WIN) Document, 1985, cited in Ozo-Eson, P. I. (2008), "Law, Women and Health in Nigeria." Journal of 
International Women’s Studies 9(3) at 287. The author however mentioned that “in contemporary Nigeria, women are beginning to 
occupy their rightful places. Women are beginning to be found in professions previously dominated by men such as law, medicine, 
lecturing and so on. Also, women have moved into important positions in both government and the private sector. This 
notwithstanding, there is a lot more to be done concerning the liberation and empowerment of women in Nigeria.” 
107 Reed, H. (2014, July). Race and Patriarchy: Gender and Migration in South Africa During and after Apartheid. In XVIII ISA 
World Congress of Sociology (July 13-19, 2014). Isaconf; Kanu, I. A. (2014). An Enquiry into the Religio-Cultural Experience of 
Women in Nigeria: Towards a Philosophy of Reciprocity. AFRREV LALIGENS: An International Journal of Language, Literature 
and Gender Studies, 1(2), 50-60; Karandikar, S., Frost, C., & Gezinski, L. (2014). Patriarchy and Gender-Based Violence: 
Experiences of Female Sex Workers in India. International Journal of Social Work, 1(1), 1-14. 
108 Makama, G. A. (2013). Patriarchy and Gender Inequality in Nigeria: The Way Forward. European Scientific Journal, 9(17); 
Walton, A. D. (2013). Just men? Towards the education of men for gender justice in a context of religiously legitimised patriarchy: 
A South African case study. International Journal of Educational Development, 33(6), 604-611. doi: 
10.1016/j.ijedudev.2013.05.001; Bhat, Z. A. (2014). Gender Bias and Socio-Economic Problems of Women in India. Abhinav-
National Monthly Refereed Journal of Research in Arts & Education (Online ISSN 2277-1182), 3(4), 8-13.  
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Constitution.109 For instance, in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India & Ors110 and Bandhua 
Mukti Morcha v. Union of India111 and contrary to popular practice, the Indian Supreme 
Court modified and extended the general rule of Locus Standi by inventing “Public 
Interest (or Social Action) Litigation” (PIL) whereby any member of the public having 
“sufficient interest” can approach the court to enforce the Constitutional or legal rights 
of another, or those who cannot approach the court because of their poverty, disability 
or a socially or economically disadvantageous position. Thus, a person need not come to 
the court personally or through a lawyer. He can simply write a letter directly to the 
court complaining his sufferings and the court will treat the letter as a proper writ 
petition. 
Simply put, PIL “bring law into the service of the poor and oppressed. Under the banner 
of Public Interest (or Social Action) Litigation (PIL) and the enforcement of 
fundamental rights under the Constitution, the courts have sought to rebalance the 
distribution of legal resources, increase access to justice for the disadvantaged, and 
imbue formal legal guarantees with substantive and positive content.”112 
 
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,113 the Indian Supreme Court interpreted the right 
to life and personal liberty in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution to cover the 
guarantee of all other fundamental rights including the right to human dignity. It 
particularly interpreted the socioeconomic rights in the non-justiciable directive 
principles as impliedly justiciable because they constitute a bundle of rights without 
which the right to life and liberty, though sacrosanct, becomes unrealistic. 
                                                          
109 Guruswamy, M., & Aspatwar, B. (2013). Access to Justice in India: The Jurisprudence (and Self-Perception) of the Supreme 
Court. In D. B. Maldonado (Ed.), Constitutionalism of the Global South-The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia 
(pp. 329-360): Cambridge University Press. 
110 AIR 1982 SC 149, especially per Bhagwati J, then CJI at 189. 
111 AIR 1984 SC 803. 
112 Cassels, J. (1989). Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible? The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 495-519 at 497. 
113 A.I.R 1978 SC P.597. 
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These forms of judicial interpretations are uncommon because they involve a deep-
down definition of the law which stretches the protection of legal and fundamental 
rights to its farthest populist limit. This is what is known as judicial activism for which 
the judiciary in India is exalted.114  
 
1.9.9 Judicial Pragmatism 
Just as the judiciary and Supreme Court in India is known for its activism, the judiciary 
and Constitutional Court of South Africa is commended for its pragmatism. Heinz Klug 
uses this phrase to show that the Constitutional Court of South Africa operates a higher 
form of uncommon judicial activism arising from “the way in which the courts and 
judges have entered into national political life, and what difference their participation 
has made in the construction of Constitutional democracy in South Africa.”115 He 
defines pragmatism in terms of the fact that albeit the judiciary is the ‘least dangerous 
branch’ of government, ‘the Constitutional Court continues to play a central role in the 
legal system’ and still keeps its legitimacy and authority amidst the ‘political tension 
that are inevitable in a country facing enormous social, political and economic 
challenges that have not left the judicial system unaffected.’116 For instance, in the case 
of F (Applicant) v. Minister of Safety and Security & 5 Ors,117 a policeman on standby 
duty had offered a ride to a lady in a police car and had later raped her on the way. The 
Police tried to abdicate responsibility for the violation of the woman’s right to dignity 
by arguing that the police officer was actually on a frolic of his own because he was not 
on duty when the act was committed. The Constitutional Court rejected this argument 
                                                          
114 Mate, M. (2013). Public Interest Litigation and the Transformation of the Supreme Court of India   In D. Kapiszewski, G. 
Silverstein & R. A. Kagan (Eds.), Consequential Courts: Judicial Roles in Global Perspective (pp. 262-268). New York, USA: 
Cambridge University Press; Babu, S. R. (2013). Contribution of the Supreme Court to the Growth of Democracy in India.  NUJS 
LAW REVIEW, NUJS L. Rev, 6.; Ghosh, P. (2013). Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India. Available at SSRN 
2285517; Bhagwati, P. (1992). The role of the judiciary in the democratic process: Balancing activism and judicial restraint. 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 18(4), 1262-1267.  
115Klug, H. (2013). Constitutional Authority and Judicial Pragmatism, Politics and Law in the Evolution of South Africa’s 
Constitutional Court Consequential Courts: Judicial Roles in Global Perspective (pp. 93-113). New York, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, at 93. 
116 Ibid at 94. 
117 CCT 30/11 [2011] ZACC 37 (Heard on 4 Aug 2011, Decided on 15 Dec 2011). 
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and held the state was vicariously liable for the violation because the police officer wore 
police uniform at the time, had police badge, held himself out as a police officer, and 
also drove in a police car, as a result of which the victim had trusted her. 
Again, in State v. Makwanyane & Anor,118 the Constitutional Court held that death 
penalty was a form of inhuman and degrading punishment which breached the right to 
human dignity and therefore unconstitutional because the right to life is considered 
sacred for everyone and the state is obliged to protect it, even in respect of the most 
violent criminal. This is the South African spirit of Ubuntu: unity, dignity and respect 
for all in spite of national diversity. 
In this thesis the researcher will make no distinction in the use of the words, activism or 
pragmatism or creativity in defining the judicial advances of the Indian Supreme Court 
or South African Constitutional Court because all the three phrases point to the same 
direction, namely, the just, fair and reasonable interpretation of the law to guarantee 
protection of women’s right to dignity and fundamental rights generally. 
 
1.9.10 Legisprudence  
The traditional role of the judiciary in nearly all Constitutions including those of 
Nigeria, India and South Africa is to interpret the law. The legislature is the law-making 
organ of government while the executive performs regular executive functions. This is 
the primary basis of separation of powers. The constitutional role of the judiciary 
includes the review of the legislation, functions and policies of the other organs of 
government as well as administrative functionaries. 
However, in the course of interpreting the law, the judiciary is sometimes faced with the 
confusion of what appropriate step to take in the event that legislation is defective or 
non-existent, as was in the popular Indian cases of Vishaka & Ors v. State of Rajasthan 
                                                          
118 [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
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& Ors119  and Sheela Barse v. Union of India.120 In both cases, the Supreme Court of 
India had to formulate and set new guidelines which applied and were binding as law in 
the absence of a formal legislation made by the legislature. The judiciary may even un-
make laws by setting them aside and declaring them unconstitutional, null and void. 
This bold activist initiative of judicial law-making and un-making is what Yaniv Roznai 
calls Legisprudence, that is, the power of courts to “make laws.”121 This thesis humbly 
describes it by the synonymous phrase: Judislative, that is, the “legislative” power of 
the judiciary. 
 
1.9.11 The Global South  
This phrase was formulated by Daniel Bonilla Maldonado and is used to describe 
“developing countries” as distinguished from “developed countries” (the Global North). 
According to the author,  
 
In this hierarchy, the scholarship and legal products created by the Global 
South occupy particularly low level. It is extraordinary to hear the name of a 
scholar or a legal institution from the Global south in this dialogue. The 
jurisprudence of a Global South court is very seldom mentioned by the 
specialized literature when discussing the meaning of key concepts in 
modern constitutionalism. It is very rare to see a course on comparative 
constitutional law in a North American or Western European university that 
includes a section about the constitutional law of a country in the Global 
South.122  
 
                                                          
119 JT 1997 (7) SC 384); AIR 1997 SC 3011. 
120 AIR 1987 (1) 153. 
121 Roznai, Y. (2014).Legisprudence Limitations on Constitutional Amendments? Reflections on The Czech Constitutional Court's 
Declaration of Unconstitutional Constitutional Act (April 10, 2014), 8(1), 29-57. 
122 Maldonado, D. B. (2013). Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia: 
Cambridge University Press, p.5. The author however stated at pp. 18-19 that these examples are “purely declarative” and “simply 
illustrate the general argument. They are not meant to weigh and evaluate the totality of legal academia in the Global North and 
South. They are only intended to demonstrate the weakness of the argument that homogenizes legal academia in the Global South at 
a low level and the academia of the Global North at a higher one.”  
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It is therefore, on this note, that the researcher joins issues with the author in 
commending the judicial activism and Constitutionalism in India and South Africa 
because ‘the jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court on the use of 
comparative and international law for interpreting the South African Constitution and 
the Indian Supreme Court’s public interest litigation movement are two other examples 
of innovative legal products created in the Global South.’123  
 
1.9.12 Consequential Courts 
In the words of Daniel Bonilla Maldonado,124 ‘the Indian Supreme Court, the South 
African Constitutional Court, and the Colombian Constitutional Court have been among 
the most important and creative courts in the Global South. In Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America, these courts are widely seen as activist tribunals that have contributed (or 
attempted to contribute) to the structural transformation of the public and private 
spheres of their countries. The decisions of these three courts are gradually creating 
what can be called a constitutionalism of the Global South.’ The independence and 
effectiveness of these courts and those of their like in the United States ensure the 
judges’ willingness to respond to citizens’ quest for more assertive rulings, as well as 
political leaders’ tolerance for these rulings even when they upset existing legislation or 
government policy and necessitate drastic constitutional, structural and socio-political 
changes. In the light of these far-reaching activist and innovative judges’ roles including 
their power of legisprudence, interpretative power with regards to fundamental rights, 
access to justice and enforcement of socioeconomic rights etc. The trio of Kapiszewski, 
Silverstein and Kagan, therefore rightly describes them as “Consequential Courts.”125 
 
                                                          
123 Ibid at 18. 
124 Maldonado, D. B. (2013). Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia: 
Cambridge University Press. 
125 Kapiszewski, D., Silverstein, G., & Kagan, R. A. (2013). Consequential Courts- Judicial Roles in Global Perspective. New 
York, USA: Cambridge University Press. (See particularly the INTRODUCTION, pp 1-41). 
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1.10 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured in six chapters.  
Chapter One is the introduction of the thesis which contains such preliminaries as the 
background of the research, methodology of the research, the research objectives, the 
research questions, significance of the study, justification of the jurisdictions of the 
research and literature review. It also explains the meanings and implications of certain 
concepts fundamental to this thesis, namely, human dignity, violence against women, 
sexual violence, judicial activism, judicial pragmatism, consequential courts, 
patriarchy, “legisprudence”, and The Global South. It also contains examples of 
common violations to the dignity of women in Nigeria, India and South Africa.  
Chapter Two examines the international framework for the protection of women’s right 
to dignity. These comprise basic UN covenants, instruments and Thematic Documents, 
as well as the African regional mechanism, particularly the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights and its relevant protocols which apply to Nigeria and South Africa 
only, as no similar regional framework applies to India.126 It also examines the 
substantive obligation of states in international law as well as relevant critique of the 
international framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity, and the way 
forward. 
Chapter Three explores the constitutional framework for the right to dignity of women 
in Nigeria, India and South Africa. It also makes a critique of each of the national 
frameworks and suggests the way forward. 
Chapter Four explores the legislative and policy framework for the protection of the 
right to dignity of women in the three jurisdictions of study including a critique of each 
of the national frameworks as well as the way forward. 
                                                          
126 Asia is the only continent without a regional human rights mechanism and therefore India is not bound by any regional 
framework. 
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Chapter Five recapitulates the fundamental gaps in the existing legal framework for the 
protection of the right to dignity of women in Nigeria, and the core advances in the 
framework of India and South Africa which may serve as valuable lessons for Nigeria.  
Chapter Six is the summary, recommendations and conclusion. In this chapter, the 
researcher makes recommendations, based on the lessons from India and South Africa, 
for bridging the gaps and reforming the existing framework for the protection of 
women’s right to dignity in Nigeria. It also identified major factors which may obstruct 
the implementation of these recommendations in Nigeria.  
 
1.11 Literature Review 
The right to human dignity, and indeed, the right to dignity of women is a living subject 
in domestic, regional and international law. Literature therefore abounds in various 
jurisdictions on the subject but not with collective reference to Nigeria, India and South 
Africa as this research seeks to do.  
Literature for this research were drawn largely from human rights and constitutional 
law texts, national Constitutions, academic journal articles, scholarly legal and social 
literatures, media and research reports, reports and publications of relevant international 
agencies and non-governmental organizations, statutes and legal instruments, executive 
and legislative policies, opinion of stakeholders and academics, court judgments and 
legal thoughts of renowned jurists like Justice P.N. Bhagwati (Former Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court of India) and Justice Dikgang Moseneke (Judge of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa), on directive principles and fundamental rights 
generally.  
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Some of the literature includes: 
The Constitutions of Nigeria,127 India,128 and South Africa129 provides for the 
right to human dignity and respect. This right also avails women. However, the 
Economic, Social and Cultural [ESC] Rights which are necessary to guarantee a life 
with dignity are negative rights in Nigeria, implied rights in India and positive rights in 
South Africa.130 
The Indian Constitution131 contains much wider and explicit fundamental rights 
provisions than the Nigerian Constitution because in addition to the right to life and 
personal liberty, it specifically contains cultural and educational rights which protect the 
interest of minorities, as well as the right to freedom from exploitation with regards to 
bonded (forced) labour and employment of children in hazardous work. The Indian 
Constitution lists some important rights as Directive Principles of State Policy which 
ordinarily places them outside the scope of enforceable fundamental rights. However, 
the judicial ingenuity and activism of some Indian judges including Justice P.N. 
Bhagwati, effectively cured this constitutional defect. For instance, he was convincing 
in his sound ratio decidenda in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India132; and Vishaka & 
Others v. State of Rajasthan & Ors133 that the guarantee of right to life and personal 
liberty in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution134 is plural in content, and by 
implication, inclusive of the rights listed in the directive principles of state policy, and 
must be accordingly interpreted to give impetus to the constitutional guarantees. He 
                                                          
127 Sections 34 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
128 Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950. 
129 Section 10 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
130 The Constitutions of India and Nigeria refer to these ESC Rights as Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy and are non-obligatory and non-justiciable especially by Section 6(6)(C) of the Nigerian Constitution. But in India, they are 
implied as justiciable rights by virtue of the judicial activism of the Supreme Court. In S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), the 
South Africa Constitutional Court described dignity as “the foundation” of other human rights. And in South Africa, where a 
woman’s dignity is violated by way of domestic violence, and she is compelled to go as low as contracting hired killers to 
assassinate her abusive spouse, the court had taken cognizance of her abuse and violation as good reasons to mitigate her sentence 
(See Ferreira & Ors v The State (2004) JOL 13027 (SCA). Similarly, in the Indian case of Khedat Majdoor Chetna Sanghat v. State 
of M.P., AIR 1995 SC 31 the Supreme Court raised a poser to itself thus: “If dignity or honour vanishes what remains of life?” 
131 The Constitution of India, 1950 (As modified up to the 1st December, 2007). 
132 AIR 1978 SC 215. 
133 AIR 1997 SC 3011. 
134 This Article 21 is similar in content and can be read into the right to human dignity in Section 34 of the Nigerian Constitution.   
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described this as reasonable, fair and just interpretation which is essential for 
constitutional development and democratic growth and social justice.  
Some of his other judgments135 necessitated sustainable legal and policy concepts like 
Public Interest Litigations (PIL), The Vishaka Rules, improved Legal Aid and The 
Epistolary Jurisdiction of Courts which promote women’s dignity and enforcement of 
fundamental rights in India.  
Renowned Indian author Sheeraz Latif A. Khan136 did an incisive book on how 
Bhagwati’s contributions have sustained fundamental rights, legal and social justice in 
India. This thesis builds strongly on those contributions in proposing recommendations 
for judicial creativity and activism on the part of the Nigerian judiciary for enhancing 
the protection of women’s right to dignity and fundamental rights generally in the 
country.  
According to Jordan Paust,137 human dignity is an old concept of 
constitutionalism and difficult to define and that it is a dynamic ‘symbol of demand for 
individual value and freedom, equality of dignity and worth’, which is better described 
simply as “the dignity, honor and value of each person” as defined through time. This 
thesis agrees with this definition, but has applied it with particular reference to women 
and girls in Nigeria, India and South Africa. 
Rex Glensy138 describes human dignity as being ‘grounded in a concept of 
autonomy that holds at its core a valued moral center that is equal for everyone (men 
and women).’ This thesis, notes however, that the concept of “equality” of men and 
women is idealistic, though quite strange within the age-long belief in patriarchy and 
patriarchal mind-set common in most African and Asian societies, including Nigeria, 
                                                          
135 See Hussainara khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1369; MC Mehta-Ganga Water Pollution Case (1987) 4 
SCC 463: AIR 198 SC; Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829; S P Gupta v. India, AIR 1982 SC 149; Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha (The Bonded Labour) AIR 1984 SC 802; Vishaka and others v. State of Rajasthan & Ors (JT 1997 (7) SC 384); AIR 1997 
SC 3011,  Khatri v. State of Bihar AIR 1981 SC 928, strengthening  the earlier judgment of Justice Krishna Iyer in M.H. Hoscot v. 
State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 1548. 
136 Khan, S. L. A, (2001). Justice Bhagwati on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, 2001, Deep & Deep Publications PVT. 
Ltd, New Delhi, India. 
137 Paust , J. J. (1984). Human dignity as a constitutional right: A jurisprudentially based inquiry into criteria and content. Howard 
LJ, 27, 145.  
138 Glensy, R. D. (2011). Right to Dignity, The. Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev., 43, 65.  
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India and South Africa, which consider women to be naturally inferior and subordinate 
to men.  
Hon. Justice Gabriel Orjiako139 convincingly traced the historical and 
philosophical basis for the indignity and exploitation of women globally to ancient 
Israel, the Holy Bible, the Quran and customary law. His paper also explored the forms 
of abuse of women’s dignity which is of interest to this thesis, even though the aspect 
on the historical and philosophical basis for indignity and exploitation of women 
globally, falls outside the scope of the thesis. 
 Rafatu Abdul Hamid140 examined Islam and cultural interferences in the lives of 
the Nigerian women and concluded that although Islam abhors obnoxious customary 
practices including son-preference, ‘one of the major obstacles that has impeded the 
progress of man towards freedom and peace is that of the bondage to his tribal customs 
and traditions, some of which have continuously ignored the basic human rights of 
others.’ Her paper did not understudy India or South Africa but certainly stressed the 
point held strongly by this thesis, that some violations of women’s right to dignity in 
India, Nigeria and South Africa, are induced by socio-religious beliefs and practices. 
Guy Carmi and Doron Shultziner141 expressed the view that human dignity 
became common in the constitution of most countries after World War II. This fact is 
underscored in Chapter two of this this which explores the international framework for 
the protection of women’s right to dignity.  
Khokan Kumar Bag and Piyal Basu Roy142 traced the “Changing face of women 
exploitation in India” from the 12th century when Ballal Sen was the ruler of Bengal. 
They also examined some of the causes of these exploitation and suggested remedies 
                                                          
139 Paper delivered by Hon. Justice G.G.I. Orjiako (Rtd), then Chief Judge of Imo State in an opening address at a seminar on 
Discriminatory Laws And Practices Against Women In Nigeria held in Owerri in 1995; (Lagos: Constitutional Rights Project, 1995) 
at p.43. 
140 AbdulHamid, R. (2014). Islam and Cultural Interferences in the Lives of the Nigerian Women. Research on Humanities and 
Social Sciences, 4(17), 1-7.  
141 Carmi, G. E., & Shultziner, D. (2013). "Dignitizing" Constitutions Worldwide: On the Proliferation of Human Dignity in 
National Constitutions. Available at: http://works.bepress.com/guy_carmi/6 (15/6/2015). 
142Bag, K. K., & Roy, P. B. (2012). Changing Face of women Exploitation in India. International Journal of Social science 
Tomorrow, 1(1), 1-6.  
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but their study did not include Nigeria and South Africa, nor did it centre on the legal 
framework for the protection of dignity of women in India, which is part of the crux of 
this thesis. 
Casmir Ani, Emmanuel Ome and Ambrose Nwankwo, A.143 examined the 
indigenous African concept of human value vis-à-vis the Kantian concept of human 
dignity and concluded that the Igbo communal system has the best indigenous ethical 
and environmental structure for the restoration of man’s dignity but their paper 
however, was not particular to women nor did it examine the legal framework for the 
protection of the dignity of women in Nigeria, India or South Africa.” 
Interestingly, Philomena Ozo-Eson144 emphasised “the need to re-examine both 
the customary and statutory laws to reflect justice, dignity and fair play for all members 
of the society irrespective of their gender.” She advocated that the repeal of statutes and 
local customs which encourage men to dominate women and reduce women’s dignity 
(for instance, a law that encourages men to correct their wives by flogging) can redress 
“the general assumption of women’s inferiority and their subjugation to men.”145 From 
a sociological background, the paper rightly and resoundingly posited that law could be 
applied as an instrument of liberation and empowerment for the transformation of 
oppressive and exploitative social order, institutions, and ideologies that create and 
sustain gender-biases. The paper, however, conceded on the other hand, that in 
authoritarian and undemocratic societies, law could be used to maintain negative socio-
cultural, legal or political status quo by the ruling class but that whatever interpretation 
is given to law, law cannot be ignored because of the vital role it plays in maintaining 
order in society.146 Of course, her work was sociological and did not consider the 
dignity of women in Nigeria, India or South Africa from a legal view point, nor did it 
                                                          
143 Casmir, K. A., Ome, E., & Nwankwo, A. (2014). Re-Examination of Igbo Values System, and the Igbo Personality: A Kantian 
and African Comparative Perspective. Open Journal of Philosophy, 4(03), 397.  
144 Ozo-Eson, P. I. (2008). "Law, Women and Health in Nigeria." Journal of International Women’s Studies 9(3), p.285. 
145 Ibid at 286. 
146 Ibid at 286-287. 
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suggest what legal reforms or advances from the judicial creativity or otherwise, may be 
drawn from anywhere to transform Nigeria’s legal framework for the protection of 
women’s right to dignity, especially against sexual abuse.   
Andrew Fagan147 opines that human rights are inherent entitlements belonging 
to every person as a consequence of being human, universal legal guarantees, civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural, protect human values (freedom, equality, 
dignity), inherent to individuals and to some extent, groups, reflected in international 
norms and standards, and are legally binding on states.  
Justice Bankole Thompson148 contends that one of the two juristic realities of the 
interaction of international law and municipal law is ‘the emergence in modern times of 
the notion of human dignity as a paramount norm or ideal in the regulation and conduct 
of human affairs with the promulgation of the UDHR in 1948.’ This truism explains 
why this thesis contends that the sustainability of the legal framework for the protection 
of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria or elsewhere can best be measured by its, or their 
compliance with international law.  
According to Duncan French and Samuel Katja,149 one of the greatest essence of 
international law is that it emphasises the enforcement of socio-economic rights and that 
the interpretation of international law ‘may be able to resolve or at least reduce the 
challenges posed by existing fragmentised misunderstandings’ in municipal law. 
They further asserted that the United Nations ‘is increasingly focused on emerging 
threats to the rule of law … and the root causes of conflict, including economic and 
social justice issues, particularly since festering grievances based on violations of 
                                                          
147 Fagan, A. (2006). Human Rights. The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
148 Thompson, J. B. (2015). Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law: History, Theories, Status, and Related 
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149 French, D., & Samuel, K. (2015). Transitional Justice in Times of “Exponential Change”: Constructing Normative Frameworks 
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economic and social rights are increasingly recognised for their potential to spark 
violent conflict’ consequent upon which ‘greater efforts are needed to ensure a unified 
approach to the rule of law.’150  This thesis relies on this in analysing the significance of 
international law in the domestic human rights forum which is also embedded in this 
research. 
Jeffrey D. Sacks151 emphasised the essence of “sustainability” as a standard tool 
for measuring compliance of economic, social, political, environmental and other forms 
of development with international template. Although his book considered sustainable 
development generally without specific reference to “sustainable legal framework”, it is 
however arguable that this “sustainability” tool may also be applied in measuring 
conformity of the Nigerian legal framework for the protection of women’s right to 
dignity with international law, especially as the author expressed optimism that 
sustainable development will become the organizing principle for politics, economics, 
and even ethics in the world’s post-2015 development agenda when they adopt the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).152 Since equality and empowerment of women 
and girls is Goal No. 5 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), this thesis is 
therefore contemporary as it significantly places Nigeria on the path to a safer and fairer 
twenty-first-century trajectory with respect to the quest for a sustainable legal 
framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity, thereby offering the country a 
second opportunity to pursue the challenges of MDGs No. 3 under SDGs No. 5.  
                                                          
150 French, D., & Samuel, K. (2015), ibid  at 166, citing the 2011 UN Report on “Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict 
and Post-Conflict Societies”  
151 Sachs, J. D. (2015). The age of sustainable development: Columbia University Press. 
 
152 Jeffrey Sachs had also emphasised earlier that the MDGs are remarkable because they set the initial framework, that is, “the 
historic and effective method of global mobilisation” which would eventually give rise to the formulation of the SDGs. (See Sachs, 
Jeffrey D. "From millennium development goals to sustainable development goals." The Lancet 379.9832 (2012): 2206-2211). In 
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are indisputably global. Only through global cooperation can individual nations overcome the interconnected crises of extreme 
poverty, economic instability, social inequality, and environmental degradation.’ (See Jeremić, V., & Sachs, J. D. (2014). The 
United Nations in the age of sustainable development. The Economic and Social Review, 45(2, Summer), 161-188 at 161). 
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Yonglong Lu, Nebojsa Nakicenovic, Martin Visbeck and Anne-Sophie 
Stevance,153 contends that one of the most remarkable features of the SDGs is that they 
emphasis the role of science in sustainable development and place greater demand on 
the scientific community than did the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which 
they replace.154 This underscores the recommendation in this thesis that socio-economic 
rights, including the right to education, be made justiciable in Nigeria either by 
constitutionalization or judicialization.  
Miles Maftean155 has described the practice by which “democratic” groups, 
organizations and states violate human dignity by “institutionalizing and utilizing 
mechanisms that constrain or fully forbid” the protection of civil and political freedom 
as ‘militant democracy’. Although his work was with respect to Eastern and Central 
Europe, it nonetheless underscores this researcher’s contention that the deliberate or 
pretentious lack of political will may constitute a challenge to the implementation of 
plausible suggestions for a sustainable framework for protecting women’s right to 
dignity in Nigeria. 
Watts and Zimmerman156 explains that the violation of the dignity of women is a 
global subject usually rooted in patriarchy. The forms of violations differ with societies 
and jurisdictions, but in which ever form or jurisdiction, these violations are 
synonymous to violence against women. According to the authors, the term violence 
against women includes geographically or culturally specific forms of abuse such as 
female genital mutilation, dowry deaths, acid throwing, and honour killings (the murder 
of women who have allegedly brought shame to their family), as well as forms of 
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violence that are prevalent worldwide such as domestic violence and rape. The authors 
rightly identified ‘spouses and partners, parents, other family members, neighbours, 
teachers, employers, policemen, soldiers, and other state employees’ as some of the 
“potential perpetrators.”157 Merry158 shares this view but ‘attributed at least part of the 
violence experienced by women to customary practices and to the personal laws of 
ethnic and religious communities.’ This thesis attributes these violations to patriarchy 
which creates a societal mind-set of women inferiority to men. It further confirms the 
contention of this thesis that beliefs in certain customary laws, socio-religious 
mythologies and ancient ancestrally inherited practices may threat implementation of 
the recommendations made in this thesis.     
     Andrew Rosser,159 in two of his latest papers stressed the importance of 
justiciable legal frameworks for the protection of human rights (JLFPHR) by seeking 
answers to the following questions: Do justiciable legal frameworks for the protection 
of human rights (JLFPHR) promote the realisation of human rights in “low quality 
democracies? If so, under what conditions? What do answers to these questions imply 
for activists’ strategies for promoting human rights? He contends that although rights 
agendas encounter serious socio-political and institutional obstacles in low quality 
democracies, JLFPHR is crucial to rights realisation because it creates the enabling 
platform for citizens to successfully use relevant Constitutional provisions to challenge 
most threats including government policies that undermined these rights by: (i) aiding 
political mobilisation by poor and vulnerable groups such as women’s groups, and their 
supporting NGOs and (ii) providing a legal basis for these groups to seek judicial 
redress for rights violations, especially if they have ‘access to support structures for 
                                                          
157 Ibid at 1232. 
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legal mobilisation (SSLMs)’, that is, enough financial, technical and organisational 
know-how to sustain the litigation and (iii) they encountered judges sympathetic to their 
cause. The papers therefore concluded that judicial activism and SSLMs are important 
preconditions for JLFPHR to contribute to the realisation of human rights through 
courts, especially in climes where prospective litigants are poor and the cost of litigation 
is high. It also underscores the importance of political mobilisation in creating a broader 
political climate favourable to judicial activism and policy change. 
However, while the arguments and conclusion in the papers are sound and correct, they 
are focused specifically on four “low quality democracies”160 in Asia namely, 
Indonesia, Nepal, Malaysia and Timor Leste, as well as the right to education in 
Indonesia. They did not focus on Nigeria, India or South Africa, or the right of dignity 
of women in any of these countries, even though the arguments and conclusion 
contained in the papers may reasonably apply to other low quality democracies in 
Africa, including Nigeria.  
 
Ambika Kohli161 made a sociological inquest on gang rapes and molestation 
cases in India and expressed the view that the dominance of patriarchy in Indian 
societies explains why some people, including public officials prefer to blame the 
victims of rape rather than the offenders. She rightly and ingenously opined that media 
reporting of such victim-blames is in fact, an indirect justification, support, incitement 
and condonation of violence against women. In her words, ‘the misrepresentation by 
officials of sexual violence against women and blaming of victims for their behaviour or 
mode of dress, not only encourages violence against women but justifies it… Media 
coverage of such responses can arguably be seen to create mores for women’s 
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molestation ultimately increasing tolerance for violence against women.’162 But 
remarkably, her paper, though quite scholarly, is  purely sociological and not legal and 
therefore did not target the broad asessment of the legal fraemework for the protection 
of women’s right to digity in India, Nigeria or South Africa or the gaps and advances 
inherent in each framework, or what lessons Nigeria may learn from any advances in 
the other two jurisdictions, which of course is the object of this instant research. 
Holly Reed,163 Anthony Ikechukwu Kanu164 and Sharvari Karandikar, Caren 
Frost and Lindsay Gezinski165 in their separate papers, cited patriarchy as a common 
rationale for certain violations, abuse and insubordination of women in South Africa, 
Nigeria and India respectively. This thesis accepts the fact that patriarchy constitutes a 
fundamental threat to the implementation of sustainable legal frameworks for protecting 
women’s right to dignity across the three jurisdictions of study. 
Aloy Ojilere and Ching Chuan Gan166 explored the essential role of judicial 
creativity and activism in the protection of women’s right to dignity in India and 
concluded that these advances can also reasonably apply as good lessons for bridging 
the gap in the legal framework for securing women’s right to dignity in Nigeria. 
Kirsten Anderson167 laid the entire blame of violence against women on 
“harmful masculinities” and that it is the obligation of states under international human 
rights law to ensure that these harmful masculinities are 'de-mystified, subjected to 
scrutiny and ultimately reconstructed in order for violence against women to be 
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effectively eliminated.” This thesis thus assessed conformity to the basic principles of 
international law as the template for sustainable legal framework for the protection of 
women’s right to dignity and fundamental rights generally in the jurisdictions under 
review. 
As if in response to Anderson, Sayadmansour and Momenirad168 posits that after 
all, women’s right are not human rights because while human rights are gender neutral 
and attaches to all by virtue of their humanity, women’s rights are rights which attach 
specifically to women. This research disagrees with this argument even though it is 
philosophically appealing. Instead, the humble view of this researcher is that the need to 
protect the right to dignity of women is too critical a subject to be reduced to a gimmick 
of logic or mere semantics. 
Barth, Bermetz, Heim, Trelle, and Tonia169 examined Child Sexual Abuse 
(CSA) as a global phenomenon and concluded that girls are twice or thrice more likely 
to be victims than boys and that one out of every ten women has experienced and can 
recollect one indignifying form of sexual abuse between her childhood and adulthood. 
Their study did not focus on the legal framework for protection of women’s right to 
dignity in Nigeria, India and South Africa. Nevertheless, underscores the vulnerability 
of girls to sexual violations and the need to tackle the menace frontally. 
Ortabag, Ozdemir, Bibis and Ceylan170 undertook a study on how and what 
young adults in Turkey view the concept of violence against women. They concluded 
that most men violated women’s dignity rights without even knowing that violence 
against women is an offence under Turkish law. Their study did not relate to Nigeria, 
India or South Africa. 
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Carol Arinze-Umobi and Amaka Iguh171 examined the role of two major 
international instruments, namely, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
and the African Union Charter on the Rights of Children, in the protection of children 
against sexual abuse in Nigeria. They also explored the “domesticated” version of these 
international instruments, that is, the Nigerian Child Rights Act, 2003 which as the 
authors rightly put it, ‘provide for the best interest of the child’172 and ‘supersedes all 
other legislation that have a bearing on the rights of the child.’173 The authors however 
listed a number of “crucial and fundamental factors” which hinder the implementation 
and enforcement of the Act, to include the issue of locus standi under the Fundamental 
Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 (whereby the child cannot sue in his own 
name but through a parent or guardian who may be financially constrained); the 
overbearing influence of culture whereby “no African child is bold enough to take his 
parents to court”;174 and lack-lustre attitude of most Nigerian states to domesticate the 
Act at the state level consequent upon which, only16 states out of Nigeria’s 36 states 
have promulgated a child Rights Law.175 This incisive paper however did not consider 
the legal framework of other jurisdictions especially India and South Africa, nor did it 
suggest that judicial activism may be applied to bridge whatever gap inherent in the 
Child Rights Act, 2003.  
Ko Ling Chan176 concluded in his study that sexual abuse has a negative unique 
impact on the over all development of women and girls as well as their perception of 
their own dignity. Although the case study was Hong Kong Chinese and not Nigeria, 
India or South Africa, it however, underscores the contention of this thesis that sexual 
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abuse and violation of women’s dignity is an issue of global concern, the difference 
being in the available legal frameworks for its protection in individual countries. 
In their recent study, Fulu, Emma, Alice Kerr-Wilson, and James Lang177 
examined the causes and prevention of violence against women and girls (VAWG) with 
particular reference to sexual abuse and intimate partner violence (IPV) as a health cum 
socio-economic problem but not in relation to the abuse of the right to dignity of women 
in India, Nigeria and South Africa as a legal subject. Of essence to this thesis, the 
writers posited that VAWG is “one of the most widespread abuses of human rights 
worldwide, affecting one third of all women in their lifetime. It is the leading cause of 
death and disability of women of all ages and has many other health consequences.”178 
This underscores the significance and urgency of this thesis, in the quest for a 
sustainable legal framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria, 
the most populous democratic country in Africa, with women accounting for nearly half 
of its population.  
Jackie Dugard examined the scope of access to the South African Constitutional 
Court and criticized the court for being anti-poor and pro-rich. According to her, “in 
stark contrast to the highest courts in countries such as Colombia, Costa Rica and India, 
which regularly and generously grant direct access, the South African Constitutional 
Court only granted direct access in 18 cases in its first twenty years of operation (1994-
2014). In comparison, the Constitutional Court of Costa Rica hears approximately 
17,000 direct access applications each year (called amparos) and the Colombian 
Constitutional Court hears about 450 direct access applications each year (called 
tutelas).” Her paper did not make reference to the Supreme Court of Nigeria nor was it 
centred on women’s right to dignity in any of the jurisdictions of study. Rather it was 
with respect to ESC Rights only. 
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Manfred Nowak179 examined the role of the United Nations as a major 
stakeholder in the global protection of human rights and reiterated his earlier call for the 
establishment of a World Court on Human rights which may receive individual 
complaints of human rights violations, for according to him, ‘human rights create 
obligations of others, above all states, and the rights-holders should have a remedy to 
hold the duty-holders accountable before an independent court. This is the simple logic 
of rights, duties and accountability’ and that ‘human rights without a remedy are like the 
United Nations without Jakob Möller: an empty promise.’180 This thesis relied heavily 
on this contention especially in the critique of the international framework for protecting 
women’s dignity. 
Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
(DEVAW) defines "violence against women" as: “Any act of gender-based violence 
that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or 
suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.” 
Adesina Coker181 concedes that domestic violence is a global issue but added 
that sometimes men are also the victims. He considered sexual violation of women’s 
dignity and recommended urgent review of the legislative deficiency in Section 6 of the 
Nigerian Criminal Code which defines unlawful carnal knowledge as “carnal 
connection which takes place otherwise between husband and wife.” The researcher 
agrees with the author that husbands should be criminally liable for sexual assault and 
rape of their wives in appropriate circumstances, as a sure means of curbing spousal 
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abuse and sexual indignity at home. The researcher however imagines the fate of a wife 
and her marriage if her husband is imprisoned in this circumstance. 
Benson Kunle Sehinde,182 and Dada,183 commended the gender ideology and 
content of the National Gender Policy of Nigeria but regretted the inability of 
government to actually sustain them in practice. He opined, and the researcher agrees 
with him that the human rights of women in Nigeria will be improved greatly if the 
National Gender Policy (NGP) can be implemented, even if without any amendment. 
He did not consider the threat to effective implementation of the NGP posed by the 
non-justiciability of certain rights nor the capacity of the judiciary to hold government 
accountable through judicial activism, as has been effectively done in India. 
Nwankwo,184 Dada,185  Ojilere and Chukwumaeze,186 and Durojaye, Okeke and 
Adebanjo187  variously agree that the laudable provisions of the CEDAW and the 
National Gender Policy of Nigeria can hardly be implemented due to a number of 
constitutional and socio-political inhibitions including a defective and deficient legal 
framework and absence of judicial activism. 
Chegwe188 opined that the guarantee and enjoyment of fundamental rights in 
Nigeria will remain meaningless until Economic, Social and Cultural rights become 
justiciable and therefore agreed with both Anthony Uchegbu189 and Akinola Aguda190 
that the proper enjoyment of the first generation (civil and political rights including the 
right to life) is dependent on the guarantee of the second generation rights (Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights). The scholars made their assertion with respect to right to 
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life. This thesis agrees with them but most humbly submits, that the right to human 
dignity too, cannot be enjoyed without the corresponding guarantee of adequate 
sanitation, housing, work, education and equal socio-political and economic 
opportunities.  It is therefore understandable that Nnamdi Aduba191 agreed wholly with 
the dictum of Justice Bhagwati in the case of Minerva Mills Ltd v. Union of India192 
that:  
a large majority of people who are living in almost sub-human existence in 
conditions of abject poverty and for whom life is one long unbroken story of 
wants and destitution, notions of individual freedom and liberty, though 
representing some of the cherished values of a free society, would sound so 
empty…and the only solution for making those rights meaningful to them is 
to remake the material conditions and usher in a new  social order where 
socio-economic justice will  inform all institutions of public life so that the 
preconditions of fundamental liberties for all may be secured. 
 
Durga Das Basu193 wrote a detailed commentary on Indian Constitution generally. His 
book contains elaborate analysis, case-law and insight into India’s judicial and 
constitutional advancement including the creativity and activism of the Supreme Court 
of India on the broad interpretation of fundamental rights. This confirms the contention 
of this thesis that an activist and “consequential” Supreme Court of Nigeria is a sine 
qua non for sustainable, realistic and reasonable reform of the constitutionalization and 
judicialization of women's right to dignity in Nigeria and other developing countries in 
similar circumstance.    
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Justice Palok Basu194 examined human rights protection in the Indian law and 
allied laws. He said that the right to gender equality and equal protection of the law in 
India must not only exist on paper but must be real, and that government is under an 
obligation to take steps to ensure its full application. The learned jurist cited the case of 
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India195 where the Supreme Court also emphasised that: 
 
A mere formal declaration of the right would not make unequals equal. To 
enable all to compete with each other on equal plane, it is necessary to 
take positive measures to equip the disadvantaged and the handicapped to 
bring them to the level of the fortunate advantaged. 
 
This thesis agrees with this view, and contends that the fact that a Court has no 
enforcement mechanism of its own judgments remains a serious challenge to the 
implementation of a sustainable protection of women’s right to dignity, not only 
in India, but in Nigeria and South Africa also. 
Khwaja Abdul Muntaqim196 made an incisive examination of nearly all the 
domestic and international legal instruments governing the protection of human rights in 
India, as well as relevant case law and commentary on the subject. It reveals that Indian 
Courts usually interpret municipal laws to conform to international law. This thesis is 
thereby inspired to recommend that Nigerian Courts need to apply international law in 
the interpretation of both the justiciable fundamental rights and the non-justiciable 
socio-economic rights (directive principles) irrespective of the inhibitions in Section 12 
of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution with respect to domestication of international law or 
Section 6(6) (c) with respect to the non-justiciability of the directive principles.  
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Terry Buss and Usama Ahmed197 examined dignity from the concept of Social 
equality and exclusion. They cited the definitions of the subjects according to the World 
Bank and IMF. They rightly explained that social equality implies equality in “rights, 
resources and voice” as well as equal access to all opportunities for pursuit and 
realization of a pleasant life and avoidance of extreme deprivations. Their paper was not 
particular to Nigeria, India and South Africa. 
Sushree Sanghamitra Badjena,198 examined the legislative framework for the 
protection of the right to dignity of women with regards to rape and sexual violence 
against women with disabilities in India and cited 14 recent instances to show that 
disabled women and girls are more vulnerable to indignities and abuse than the other 
women. The author noted that although Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution of 
India protect gender equality as well as mandate on the State to adopt measures of 
positive discrimination in favour of women, the Constitution does not include disability 
as a basis of non-discrimination. The author however posited that the enactment of the 
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full 
Participation) Act, 1995 (also known as The Persons With Disability [PWD] Act), 
marks the ‘first time social and economic rights of the disabled have been addressed by 
a statute, even though the Act does not also make the necessary distinction between the 
men and women with disabilities.’ The author however conceded that the activism of 
the Indian Supreme Court has also been applied to bridge any incidental gaps in the 
constitutional and legislative provisions on the instant subject. He cited Suchitra 
Srivastva v. Chandigarh Administration,199  where the Supreme Court had ruled in 
favour of the dignity, personal autonomy and reproductive rights of a mentally 
challenged women who expressed willingness to continue a pregnancy, against the 
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readiness of the Chandigarh Administration to permit its termination because of her 
disability based on the approval of the High Court.200  
Chetna P. Bhadange201 and Lakshmivempalli Lakshmi202  also concede that the 
People With Disability Act, 1995 is a remarkable legislative feat in India. Although 
these authors did not include Nigeria and/or South Africa in their studies, this thesis 
however proposed that similar legislation be enacted to specifically enhance the 
protection of the sexual dignity of disabled women and girls in Nigeria, for instance, by 
relaxing the onus and standard of proof of criminal liability as well as imposing greater 
penal consequences on sexual violators of the mentally or physically vulnerable.    
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 [No. 13 of 2013] of India which 
came into force on April 2, 2013, provides more protections against sexual indignities 
against women and children by the amendments which it made to sections of the Indian 
Penal Code, 1860;203 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973;204 the Indian Evidence 
Act, 1872;205 and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, (POCSO Act), 
2012.206 This law clearly reflects a direct legislative response to the rape, sexual 
harassment and incidental offences against the dignity of women in India by creating 
serious punishment for any violations. More so, for the first time, voyeurism and 
stalking are defined as sexual offenses. 
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    With regards to the sexual and reproductive rights of women in India, some 
scholars especially Maya Unnithan and Stacy Leigh Pigg207 have expressed the view 
that “rights have arrived but justice has not followed”. This paper raises a sociological 
query as to why women still suffer sexual indignity in India in spite of good laws. This 
query is outside the scope of this research. However, having stated earlier that Nigeria 
currently lacks sustainable constitutional, law and policy as well as judicial activism 
necessary to secure women’s right to dignity, this thesis therefore relies on the truism 
that for any meaningful reform to in a democracy, a legal framework must “first” be put 
in place.208 
Marius Pieterse209  insists that it is imperative that rights such as the “right to 
dignity of women” must be asserted because “Rights are powerful and empowering. 
They enable individuals and marginalised groups within society to assert themselves 
against powerful entities in the public and private spheres and, thereby, to draw societal 
attention to their plight.” He also rightly explained that rights help to establish a definite 
“claim” over/to what is being asserted “as moral and legal imperatives, rather than 
‘mere’ [appeal] or cries for help” and thus impact on the manner in which society views 
delivery of such rights and demand accountability from those responsible for this 
delivery. This study was on South Africa only and did not include India or Nigeria. 
Felicia Durojaiye Oyekanmi210 considered gender equity and the exploitation of 
women from a socioeconomic perspective and pointed out that discrimination, 
exploitation and abuse of dignity of women begin even before the child is born due to 
the culture of male-child preference in some societies which sometimes climaxes with 
the conscious abortion of female foetuses. She equally noted that sometimes the baby 
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girls are starved of food so that that baby boys will have enough to eat. The author 
noted that inequality and exploitation occur in various forms and is therefore 
multidimensional both conceptually and empirically, depending on a given 
socioeconomic background, and in her thinking, inequality and exploitation of women 
are most manifest in three areas, namely, prestige/integrity, power and access to 
resource control. 
Mercy Onaodowan Erhun211 examined the rights of a married woman (wife) in 
Nigeria and agreed with Moronake Omonubi-McDonnell212 that it is an acceptable 
socio-cultural norm in Nigeria that a woman does not enjoy any independent personality 
but is always considered an appendage of a father or mother, and that this why women 
do not enjoy succession to the estate of their deceased husbands or fathers under most 
Nigerian customary practices. This researcher agrees with her that the fight for 
emancipation of the dignity of women in Nigeria will remain a tall dream unless 
pertinent customary law issues are redressed.  
Chioma Agomo213 also examined the legal framework for gender equality in 
Nigeria and posited that the quest for the actualization of equality in the human rights of 
men and women is global, transcends and not confined to any specific religious, 
cultural or economic zone.214 She also considered the gender vis-à-vis the fundamental 
objectives and directive principles of state policy in Chapter 2 of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution and opined that the lofty provisions of Sections 15 to 24 are actually 
meaningless because they do not use gender as an analytical indices, do not fall within 
the mainstream of fundamental rights’ provisions, do not consider the special role of 
women and therefore cannot be said to be protective of their human rights.215 She also 
noted that the National Policy on Women adopted by the Federal Government of 
                                                          
211 Mercy Onaodowan Erhun: Appraisal of the Protection of Women’s Rights under Nigerian Laws in Chapter 5 of Gender and 
Power Relations in Nigeria, Ronke Iyabowale Ako-Nai (ed) 2013 Lexington Books, Plymouth, UK, pp. 61-76 esp p.71. 
212 Morolake Omonubi-McDonnell; Gender Inequality in Nigeria (2003) Spectrum Books Ltd, p.130. 
213 Chioma Agomo, The Legal Framework For Gender Equality in Nigeria in Paradox of Gender Equality in Nigerian Politics: 
Essays in Honour of Dr.(Mrs.) Veronica Adeleke, Solomon O. Akinboye (ed) 2004 Concept Publications Ltd, Lagos, pp. 91-100. 
214 Ibid at 91-92. 
215 P.93-95 ibid. 
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Nigeria in 2000 is a good working document which acknowledges that gender 
inequalities exist in law and practice in Nigeria but with a serious problem of 
implementation. She therefore advocated the need for a shift away from the usual 
Nigerian attitude of rhetoric and flamboyant legal and policy provisions in dealing with 
women-related issues to one of practical and sustainable implementation.216 The 
renowned law professor did not however give examples of jurisdictions like India or 
South Africa from where Nigeria can learn lessons on democratic social justice, judicial 
activism and constitutionality. 
In Ogugua Ikpeze’s “Bride Price: The Female Customary Enslavement 
Mechanism in Nigerian Marriages,”217 Ezebuilo Ukwueze’s “Bride Price: Another 
Source of Violence against Women,” 218 and Veronica Okeke’s “Women’s Rights: The 
Bride Price Snare” 219 the authors view the right to dignity of women in Nigeria from 
the remote angle of Bride Price only. Ogugua Ikpeze, postulated that bride price, which 
is a fundamental prerequisite for any marriage in Nigeria, amounts to chattelization and 
purchase of a wife, making her an object of market value, extortion, servitude and 
slavery contrary to the guarantee of right to human dignity in the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution. She cited Solomon v. Ogbodo,220where a father threatened to give his 
daughter to another man in marriage if her present husband was unable to meet his 
demands. The author blamed this kind of exploitation on patriarchy which is usually 
characterized by the notion of domination, superiority and ownership of women by 
men.221 She however, did not consider the judicial or legislative response to 
exploitation of women in India or South Africa but this has been done in this research.  
                                                          
216 Pp.97-100 ibid. 
217 Chapter 15 in Bride Price And The Implications for women’s Rights in Nigeria, Joy Ngozi Ezeilo and Josephine Edna Alumanah 
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218 Bride Price and the Implications for women’s Rights in Nigeria, op.cit, Chapter 9, pp.115-124. 
219 Bride Price and the Implications for women’s Rights in Nigeria, op.cit, chapter 12, pp.149-154. 
220 (1974) 4UILR 396. 
221 Op.cit at 187.  
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Veronica Okeke222 examined the overall implication of bride price on the 
integrity of a wife in marriage and concluded that most communities still opt for bride 
price irrespective of whatever shortcomings. In her opinion, it is rather ironic that no 
African man or woman will advocate for the abolition of bride price because a marriage 
in Africa has little or no value without the payment of bride price even if the couple 
bears children. She cited a BBC “Africa Live” Programme on the subject where, of the 
37 respondents from various cultural backgrounds in Africa, 28 (75%) argued for bride 
price while only 8 respondents argued against it. She however linked poverty and 
domestic violence to bride price because it reduces the integrity of women and girls and 
make them vulnerable to various social, economic, health, and human rights hazards. 
The Non-Governmental Organization, Feel Free Network223 documented cases 
in Uganda where women are compelled to endure various exploitations and abuse and 
still cannot leave the relationship because their families cannot afford to pay back the 
dowry, and in India where a woman faces the danger of dowry-related death if her in-
laws consider the “groom’s price” paid by her family as inadequate.224   
Ezebuilo Ukwueze225 posited that in nearly all countries of the world, women 
face exploitation and threat to their physical and sexual integrity. The author gave 
examples from countries including France, Switzerland, Egypt, Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Guatemala, Syria, Turkey, Guinea, Rwanda, Morocco, South Africa, 
Tanzania, India, Kenya and Uganda.  She also identified trafficking, sexual 
exploitation, widow inheritance, ritual sexual cleansing, political, social and religious 
exploitation of women in Nigeria and said that under certain customary laws, parents 
order their daughters to drop out of school when she is too young just to marry a rich 
suitor who may even be old enough to be her father or in exchange/settlement of a huge 
                                                          
222 Op.cit at 150-151 
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debt owed by her father or family. She however cautioned that the fact that international 
human rights law recognizes, promotes and advocates the preservation of customs and 
traditions of a people as their cultural right and identity, this should not be practiced at 
the expense of the right of dignity and integrity of women and girls.226 The author did 
not refer to remedial protections offered in such circumstance by the judiciary in India 
or the Constitution in South Africa.  
Yougindra Khushalani227 contends that the dignity of women remain inviolable 
even at war times and rape by combatants or paramilitary, rebels, humanitarians, 
civilians or other actors in the war obviously amounts to abuse of the dignity of women  
and to crime against humanity under the Rome statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). This justifies the contention of this thesis that municipal courts must apply 
the principles of international law as a template for sustainable protection of women’s 
right to dignity.  
Gautam Bhan,228 however, argued that sometimes the application of the law 
towards the protection and enforcement of the right to dignity and sexual independence 
offered a misplaced solution to the problem, and that “the foundations of discrimination 
and violence on the basis of gender and sexuality was better fought in other 
battlegrounds – within the family, on the streets, in schools, through the written word, in 
public parks, in movements, through struggle.” The writer was however particular about 
queer struggles in India and Uganda and the appeal against the decision in the Indian 
case of Naz v. Union of India229 which earlier held that India’s anti-sodomy law 
contained in Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code was unconstitutional, null and void). 
                                                          
226 Op.cit at 117-120 
227 Khushalani, Y. (1982). The Dignity and Honour of Women as Basic and Fundamental Human Rights: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers. 
228 Bhan, G. (2014). Moving forward, perhaps: The 2013 India Supreme Court Decision on Section 377. In S. Corrêa (Ed.), Putting 
the Law in its Place: Analyses of recent developments in law relating to same-sex desire in India and Uganda (2014 ed., pp. 20-23). 
229 Naz Foundation v Union of India CWP 7455 of 2001. 
   55 
He was writing particularly on same-sex desire in India and not about Nigeria or South 
Africa, nor was he bothered about the right to dignity of women in India.230  
Donald Horowitz231 examined constitutional change as a sine qua non for a 
realistic quest for a sustainable legal framework for the promotion of democracy and 
human rights in Indonesia. Even though his erudite book did not deal with constitutional 
change or democracy in Nigeria, it underscores the contention of this thesis that a 
sustainable legal framework is the basis for any meaningful democratic reform, 
especially for the general protection of human rights and women’s right to dignity 
particularly in Nigeria.   
Jacques Bertrand,232 in his review of Donald L. Horowitz’s "Constitutional 
Change and Democracy in Indonesia" also emphasised the essence of ‘deep 
constitutional reform’ as the path to a realistic and sustainable democratic change, even 
in an ethnically diverse or complex political setting. This proposition has also been 
made with respect to Nigeria in the long-run. Judicial creativity and activism of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria will however, offer immediate protection to women’s dignity. 
Jeremy Sarkins233 examined the importance and impact of ‘constitutional 
borrowings’ on the making of the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution. 
Although his work did not cover Nigeria and India, this researcher humbly believes that 
Nigeria can similarly do a “constitutional borrowing” from South Africa and a “judicial 
borrowing” from India in order to set a new agenda for the legal framework for the 
protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria. This researcher believes that India can 
also make a “constitutional borrowing” from South Africa so as to bring the economic, 
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social and cultural rights (ESC Rights) in the directive principles of its Constitution 
(which currently exists as implied rights by virtue of judicial activism and innovation of 
the Indian Supreme Court) into the realm of justiciable positive rights. 
The Constitution of South Africa 1996 offers an international model in 
fundamental rights guarantee and protection for any constitutional democracy. It 
recognizes the economic, social and cultural and environmental rights as part of the Bill 
of Rights, unlike in Nigeria where they constitute negative rights or in India where they 
are enforced as implied rights.  In its Section 39(2) it mandates all courts to always 
interpret and develop customary law and common law in such manner as to bring them 
in conformity with the Bill of Rights. This was confirmed by the South African 
Constitutional Court in the case of Carmichele v. The Minister of Safety and Security & 
The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.234  
The South African Constitution also establishes Constitutional Court which is 
the highest court in the land in all constitutional matters including fundamental rights 
and human rights. At the formal inauguration of the court on 15th February 1994, the 
then President, Dr. Nelson Mandela, described the court as “a court South Africa has 
never had, a court on which hinges the future of our democracy.”235 This thesis 
considers this Presidential applause as a manifestation of total belief and commitment to 
the Constitutional Court to uphold the rule of law, equality and justice in South Africa 
as a disconnection from the official racial discrimination, abuse/denial of rights of the 
minority and manifest injustice Apartheid era. 
This certainly explains why Heinz Klug236 described the South African 
Constitutional Court as being more committed to ‘judicial pragmatism rather than the 
symbolic judicial activism’ and one with ‘symbolic authority to publicly engage in 
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“transformative constitutionalism”- a rejection of the negative past, a generous 
interpretation of rights.’  
Justice Dikgang Moseneke237 of the Constitutional Court equally boasts that 
“our courts have been more progressive that any jurisdiction I know in the world.” 
These descriptions are legendary and underscores the contention of this thesis that 
judicial creativity and activism is the most viable approach for of bridging the 
fundamental gaps in the current legal framework for the protection of women’s right to 
dignity in Nigeria.  
Gender equality in marriage and inheritance were recognized by the said Constitutional 
Court in Shilubana & Ors v. Nwamitwa238 and Elizabeth Gumede v. President of the 
Republic of South Africa & Ors.239 Other landmark judgments including Government of 
the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom240 and Minister of Health v. Treatment 
Action Campaign241 where the Constitutional Court of South Africa confirmed the 
socio-economic rights to housing and health respectively, as basic fundamental rights, 
makes this researcher to hold the view that the Court has, indeed, lived up to its bidding 
as a model best practice in the protection of fundamental rights and constitutional 
democracy.242       
Cassels Jamie243 and Manoj Mate244 examined Public Interest Litigation (PIL) 
as a landmark of judicial activism of the Indian Supreme Court. Cassels stated that if 
the complaint is of a 'legal wrong' the appropriate forum is the High Court of the state 
under Article 226 of the Constitution. If a 'fundamental right' is alleged to have been 
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violated the remedy may be sought from the High Court or directly from the Supreme 
Court under Article 32. He also noted that PIL guarantees direct access to justice 
especially for the “less advantaged individuals and groups” who might more 
realistically consider asserting their interests through the courts, and that by liberally 
interpreting constitutional provisions the courts have further sought to rebalance the 
scales of justice.245 Mate concludes that the Indian Supreme Court remains ‘one of the 
most powerful Constitutional Courts in the world,' just like the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa. 
Martin Shapiro246 agrees with this conclusion but considered it “the mighty 
problem” of constitutional review ‘when, where and why the powers that be’ would 
allow ‘a handful of judges without purse or sword get away with making major policy 
decisions?’ The writer rightly concedes however,  that ‘judicial review courts are often 
consequential’ and that ‘a strong measure of judicial independence might be a 
prerequisite to judicial review as an instrument of limiting government and protecting 
rights… [this] necessarily involved some judicial law-making.’247 This justifies the 
recommendation of this thesis that judicial creativity and activism in the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria, especially in the just, fair and reasonable interpretation of fundamental rights 
is a sine qua non for the sustainable protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria, 
just as in the case of the Indian Supreme Court and the South African Constitutional 
Court. 
Paul O'Connell248 had earlier contended that in spite of all the praise for the 
Supreme Court in India and the Constitutional Court in South Africa, ‘over the last 
decade, apex courts in Canada, India, and South Africa – which have traditionally been 
                                                          
245 Ibid at 498. 
246 Shapiro, M. (2013). The Mighty Problem Continues. In D. Kapiszewski, G. Silverstein & R. A. Kagan, (Eds.), Consequential 
Courts- Judicial Roles in Global Perspective (pp. 380-397). New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
247 Ibid at 380. 
248 O'Connell, P. (2011). The Death of Socio‐Economic Rights. The Modern Law Review, 74(4), 532-554.  
   59 
viewed as socio-economic rights friendly – have issued judgments fundamentally at 
variance with the meaningful protection of socio-economic rights.’ 
Rehan Abeyratne249 holds a similar view and argues that it amounts to a 
“judicial overreach” which “threatens the Constitution’s legitimacy” for the Indian 
Supreme Court to have premised the rationale for the enforcement of socio-economic 
rights within Article 21 of the Constitution. This thesis does not share this view because 
the judicial review function of a court is beyond question, even though it is conceded 
that judges may descend in the arena as a result of selfish political, tribal or socio-
religious, or other interests. Consequently, this thesis has cited judicial corruption as one 
of the challenges imminent to the implementation of recommendations for a sustainable 
legal framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria. 
Yaniv Roznai250 opined that in the exercise of its activism, constitutional courts 
should be mindful of its “legisprudence limitations on constitutional amendments” so as 
not to annul a constitutional act which derives its force from the same source as the 
Constitutional Court, otherwise the Court will invariably be threatening its own 
legitimacy. His caution was however directed at the Czech Constitutional Court only. 
However, issues therein raised may apply, mutatis mutandis, to the Supreme Courts of 
Nigeria and India, as well as the Constitutional Court of South Africa. 
Interestingly too, Akinola Ebunolu Akintayo251  examined the Nigerian case of 
Bamidele Aturu v. Minister of Petroleum Resources252 vis-à-vis the decision of the 
South African Constitutional Court in Mazibuko & Ors v. City of Johannesburg & 
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Ors,253 and concluded that while the decision in Mazibuko obviously played down the 
ESC Rights, the Bamidele case seems to have stepped it up, and that on this singular 
note, even the South African Constitutional Court now has at least one lesson to learn 
from the Nigerian Court. The case was however unrelated to women’s right to 
dignity.254 
Amidst these few criticisms,255 Daniel Bonilla Maldonado insists that South 
Africa and India offer classical examples for activist tribunals for the structural 
transformation of society and protection of the right to dignity of women because ‘the 
independence and effectiveness of the Supreme Court of India and the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, especially with regards to democratization and structural 
transformation in public and private spheres of their respective countries are gradually 
creating what can be called a constitutionalism of the Global South.’ Consequently, this 
thesis contends that the Nigerian Supreme Court stands to learn valuable lessons from 
the creativity and activism of the Indian Supreme Court, and the pragmatism of the 
South African Constitutional Court. 
Hammudah ‘Abd al ‘Ati256 examined the relationship of men and women in 
Islam and posited that it is a wrong and fallacious interpretation to hold that Islam 
places men above women, especially in marriage. The author rather opined that Islam 
considers them complementary to each other and this thesis agrees.  
The above literature are quite revealing but a keen perusal will reveal that none of them 
relates specifically to the legal framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity 
in the three jurisdictions of study, that is, Nigeria, India and South Africa. None of them 
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also made a search in India and/or South Africa to find lessons which may be applied to 
bridge the gaps in the Nigerian constitutional, legislative, policy and/or judicial 
framework for the protection of the right to dignity of women. This research will 
therefore explore these grey areas as a unique contribution to global legal and social 
scholarship.  
However, these literature variously and collectively enabled this researcher to piece 
together vital information used in this thesis. Jointly and severally, they also provide 
vital information applied in the constitutional, judicial, law and policy analysis, 
comparisons, critiques and recommendations made in this thesis with respect to 
women’s right to dignity in international law, Nigeria, India and South Africa.    
   62 
CHAPTER 2 
THE INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO DIGNITY OF WOMEN IN NIGERIA, 
INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The breach of the right to dignity of women in whatever manner including rape, marital 
or otherwise, is humiliating and degrading and constitutes a gross violation of 
international law.1  Even the United Nations classify them as violence against women 
and provides appropriate legal framework for the protection of women against these and 
other forms of abuse, exploitation and violence. It also enjoins member states to prohibit 
them by legislation and provide legal and institutional framework to guarantee the 
implementation and enforcement of these rights and protections, as well as punishment 
for their violations and remedy/rehabilitation for victims. This chapter will examine 
these UN instruments in relation to the right to dignity of women. This will involve the 
review of certain Human Rights Documents and Conference Documents of the United 
Nations. 
The chapter reviewed the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights including 
its Optional Protocols, the African Commission, the African Human Rights 
Court, as well as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. It further 
examines the commitment of states (that is, Nigeria and South Africa only), to the 
regional framework because there is no Asian regional human rights mechanism to 
which India may be bound. Finally, it makes a critique of the African regional 
framework and suggests the way forward. This chapter underscores the availability of a 
                                                          
1 See particularly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or  Punishment 1984 (Entered into force in 1987); Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1990; Convention 
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globalized and uniform legislative framework for the protection of the right to dignity of 
women and girls, which serves as template for regional, sub-regional or municipal 
protection of women and girls (as the case may be) in each UN member state.  
Generally, UN member states have three-pronged substantive obligations to 
international human rights law namely: Obligation to Respect, Obligation to Protect and 
Obligation to fulfil2 these international human rights treaties. These obligations 
constitute the yardstick for measuring human rights protection in the respective states 
because it generally leaves the states with no discretion on the application of 
international human rights law.3 
 
2.2 Basic Human Rights Documents 
These are the major UN documents which guarantee worldwide protection human rights 
and fundamental freedoms on the basis of human equality in international law 
irrespective of age or sex.  These basic or core human rights documents are known as 
the international bill of human rights and they are made up of the human rights 
provisions of the UN Charter, 1945 (particularly the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, UDHR 1948) and its  implementing covenants, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966 (which entered into force in 1976), as well as the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 1984.4  
                                                          
2  De Schutter, O. (2010). International human rights law: cases, materials, commentary: Cambridge University Press. 
3 See the decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in the case of F (Applicant) v Minister of Safety and Security & 5Ors 
CCT 30/11 [2011] ZACC 37 (Heard on 4 Aug 2011, Decided on 15 Dec 2-11). 
4  “India has signed and ratified important human rights conventions but not ratified the Torture Convention. On the other hand, it 
has not acknowledged any of the individual complaints procedures and any of the Optional Protocols to these conventions. It has 
entered substantive reservations to ICCPR, ICESCR, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, 1979 (CEDAW). But, negative  
endorsement made by India at the time of signing the treaty,(India  while ratifying ICCPR had made a specific reservation that it 
does not recognize a right to compensation for victims of unlawful arrest or detention) was discarded by the Supreme Court in D.K. 
Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997 (1) SCC 416) when it was  held that the reservations of India have lost significance given that 
the [proper law has been] established by the Supreme Court in ample of cases.”: See R. Bhanu Krishna Kiran, “The Practice of 
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Although these basic UN documents do not specifically address exploitation of women, 
violence against women or domestic violence, they, alongside the Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR, articulate the duty of States Parties to protect every fundamental human 
rights including those commonly violated with respect to women. These include the 
right to life, the right to human dignity, freedom from discrimination, right to equality 
and to the equal protection of the laws.5 
 
2.2.1 Charter of the United Nations  
The United Nations Charter was signed in San Francisco, United States of America at 
the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization on 26 
June 1945, and took effect on 24 October 1945. The UN Charter also contains the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice.6 
Interestingly, the purposes and principles of the United Nations include “To achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion”7 and “to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in 
the attainment of these common ends.”8 
It has, thus, been said that the human rights provisions of the UN Charter are “woven 
through and through the document”, in the statement of purposes, the chapter on the 
General Assembly, on trusteeship, on economic and social co-operation and on the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
International Law In India: An Overview” International Journal of Legal Studies and Research (IJLSR) Vol. 2 No. 2 Sept 2013, p. 
221. 
5 Stop Violence Against Women, Domestic Violence law and Policy, University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/svaw/domestic/laws/international.htm. (16/3/2014). 
6United Nations,  http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/intro.shtml.  
7 Chapter 1, Article 1.3 of the UN Charter. 
8 Chapter 1, Article 1.4 of the UN Charter. 
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Economic and Social Council.9 Specifically, these human rights provisions are 
contained in the Preamble to the Charter as well as some of its Articles.10 
 
In its Preamble, the UN Charter expresses clearly, the determination of the world 
body inter alia, “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small, and also to establish conditions under which justice and respect for 
the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained.” 
It suffices that the UN obliges itself to promote women’s dignity and equality 
worldwide and to ensure that member states observe, domesticate and comply with 
the international templates contained in the basic UN Human Rights Documents, 
thematic Human Rights Documents and main Conference Documents.    
 
Article 1.3 provides that one of the purposes of the UN is: “To achieve international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion” as well as “To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the 
attainment of these common ends.”11 
In Article 8, the United Nations sets the pace for equality of women and men in 
employment and participation by providing that “the United Nations shall place no 
restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under 
conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.” 
                                                          
9 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. “Human Rights in the United Nations Charter”, JSTOR: Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Vol. 243 (Jan., 1946), p.1 
10  Especially 1, 8, 13, 55, 56, 62, 68 and 76. 
11 Article 1.4 
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Article 13.1.b mandates the UN General assembly with the responsibilities, functions 
and powers of “promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, 
educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”. 
Article 55 expresses the resolve of the UN to promote healthy international relations 
and mutual co-operation in cultural, socio-economic, health and allied issues12 as well 
as equality and international reciprocal respect for the “observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without discrimination as to race, sex, language, or 
religion.”13  
Article 56 makes a pledge that all UN member states shall “take joint and separate 
action in co-operation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set 
forth in Article 55.” 
Its Article 62 defines the powers and functions of the ECOSOC (Economic and 
Social Council) which shall include, if necessary, the making of “recommendations 
for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all,14 preparation and submission of draft conventions to 
the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence,15 and 
according to UN-prescribed rules, to convene international conferences on matters 
falling within its competence.16 
 
Article 68 states the procedure for the performance of the functions of the ECOSOC 
which shall be to “set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the 
promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the 
performance of its functions”. 
                                                          
12 Article 55.b 
13 Article 55.c 
14 Article 62.2. 
15 Article 62.3. 
16 Article 62.4. 
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Article 76 contains the basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in line with the 
Purposes and Objectives of the UN set forth in Article 1, and which shall include the 
recognition and tolerance of the interdependence of the peoples of the world, the respect 
for global human rights and fundamental freedoms for everyone without regard to race, 
sex, language, or religion, as well as equal treatment and equality in the administration 
of justice. 
 
 
2.2.2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
After the blood bath and atrocious human rights violations which characterized the 
Second World War, the international community saw the urgent need to create a world 
of peace, tolerance, respect for the sanctity of humanity as one race and the protection 
of human rights an international subject. This led to the creation of the United Nations. 
Thereafter, world leaders met and resolved to develop a road map which will 
complement the Charter of the United Nations and guarantee protection for the rights of 
every individual member of the world community. Thus, the document now known as 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was considered at the first session of the 
UN General Assembly in 1946 and later adopted as resolution 217 A (III) of December 
10, 1948 by the General Assembly, meeting in Paris.17  
The primary essence of the UDHR as an International Bill of Rights is to create “a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” for the guarantee of 
man’s fundamental freedoms and equality.  
 
 
                                                          
17 The Commission on Human Rights which earlier authorized the formulation of the UDHR as “a preliminary draft International 
Bill of Human Rights" was made up of 18 members from various political, cultural and religious backgrounds. Eleanor Roosevelt, 
widow of former American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, chaired the UDHR drafting committee. 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml (3/3/2014). 
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This is obvious from its preamble thus: 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world, 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the 
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and 
belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest 
aspiration of the common people, 
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a 
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights 
should be protected by the rule of law… 
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed 
their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have 
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom, 
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-
operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for 
and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the 
greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge, 
Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations…18 
 
 
 
Even the United Nations proudly describes the UDHR as an important document which 
“sets out, for the first time, fundamental human rights to be universally protected.”19  
                                                          
18 See Preamble to the UDHR. This author has italicized certain portions thereof to lay emphasis on their importance and relevance 
as an international template for human rights protection. 
19 http://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/pages/introduction.aspx (4/3/2014). 
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The UDHR contains thirty articles, most of which provides for various rights and 
guarantees which apply to the human race generally as one family. Accordingly, each 
and every one of those rights applies to both women and men in equal force. 
The UDHR considers humanity as one big family where each member is born free, 
endowed with conscience and reason as well as equality in rights and dignity, and 
should thus relate to one another as brothers.20 It also guarantees everyone’s right to 
life, liberty and personal security21 as well as all other rights and freedoms contained in 
the Declaration, without any manner of distinction or discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity, ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status’ including ‘the political, jurisdictional or 
international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.’22 
Its articles 4 and 5 respectively prohibit human slavery, servitude or slave trade and the 
imposition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment on any 
person.  
The Declaration also accords everyone global citizenship and personality for the 
purpose of legal protection.23 It is therefore understandable that in Chairman, Railway 
Board v. Mr. Chandrama Das,24 the Indian Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the 
Calcutta High Court that a Bangladeshi woman who was gang-raped by some railway 
workers in India was entitled to the protection of right to life under Article 21 of the 
Indian Constitution as well compensation for damages.  
                                                          
20 Article 1. 
21 Article 3. 
22 Article 2. 
23 Article 6. 
24 Chairman, Railway Board v. Mr. Chandrama Das, AIR 2000 988. 
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Similarly, the declaration recognizes human equality before the law and non-
discrimination in the equal protection of the law. It also prohibits the least incitement to 
discriminate.25 
Article 8 of the UDHR is crucial because it guarantees women and men, boys and girls, 
the right to obtain legal redress before a law court or other competent tribunal for any 
violations of rights which they may suffer. And in the event of a criminal prosecution, 
every person shall be entitled to fair and public trial before an independent and unbiased 
court.26 
Under Article 11 of the UDHR, a person has a right to be presumed innocent of any 
charge against him until he is pronounced guilty in law. Furthermore, no person shall be 
compelled to stand trial for any act which was not a punishable offence under municipal 
or international law at the time of its commission, nor shall a heavier punishment be 
imposed outside of what is provided in the written law for the particular offence. 
With particular reference to cultural exploitation of women in Nigeria and India, it must 
be noted that most of those traditional cultural practices, widowhood rites, humiliations, 
deprivations, socio-religious mythologies and other exploitation and violations which 
women suffer in these countries constitute a gross violation of certain specific and 
unambiguous rights guaranteed in international law.  
It is therefore on this premise that the UDHR is considered an international template for 
protecting the human rights of both women and men worldwide (and not of men alone) 
and this is reflected in its Article 12 which provides unequivocally that, 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 
                                                          
25 Article 7. 
26 Article 10. 
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Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference 
or attacks. 
 
In Article 16, the UDHR recognizes the equality of spouses in marriage and divorce, 
and guarantees the right to marry and found a family to “men and women of full age”27 
only. It also provides that a marriage shall not be validly contracted unless and until 
both intending parties give their free and full consent to it.28  It also obliges society and 
the state to protect family life because “the family is the natural and fundamental group 
unit of society.”29 
Article 17 of the Declaration further recognizes the right of women to own immovable 
property either jointly or severally as well as a right not to be deprived of same 
arbitrarily.30 
The totality of Articles 16 and 17 of the UDHR thus makes the Ibo marriage custom or 
culture of “male godhood” unlawful which permits men to consider their wives as “their 
property” which they “bought” with their money: bride price. Same illegality applies to 
customs which allow child marriages, and where girls of school age are forced into 
early marriage by their parents without their consent or where Islamic Sharia law 
permits parents to choose husbands for their virgin daughters.31  
Article 21 gives to everyone the right of equal access to public service of their country 
as well as the right to participate in its political activities and governance, thus making 
“wife confinement”, whereby some Muslim women in Nigeria are locked up in Purdah 
an unlawful socio-religious practice which is a gross violation of human rights in 
international law. 
                                                          
27 Article 16(1). 
28 Article 16(2). 
29 Article 16(3). 
30 Article 17(2). 
31 Yusuf, H. B. (2005). Sexuality and the marriage Institution in Islam: an Appraisal. African Regional Sexuality Resource Center. 
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Under Article 22, women invariably have the right to social security benefits 
commensurate with the resources available in their country as well as the enjoyment of 
the economic and socio-cultural rights necessary for their dignity, personality and 
overall development. 
Article 23 provides the right of equality in work and payment for work as well as the 
freedom to choose suitable employment worthy of human dignity without 
discrimination. This suffices that the use of Dalit women as slave labourers in garment 
factories in India is a gross violation of human rights, which of course is being 
addressed by judicial activism of the Indian courts as introduced by the likes of Justice 
P.N. Bhagwati, former Chief Justice of India. 
Article 25 is also imperative because it specifically creates legal protection and 
privileges for women, including mothers, widows and children. It provides thus: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing 
and medical care, and necessary social services, and the right to security in 
the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or 
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. 
All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social 
protection. 
 
Article 26 guarantees the right to free, compulsory early education as well as equal 
access to technical, professional and higher education according to merit.32 The article 
also provides that such education shall be directed to promote the advancement of the 
human personality, friendship, racial and socio-religious tolerance and world peace. 
                                                          
32 Article 26(1). 
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Article 28 makes everyone an equal partaker in a society for the enjoyment of the rights 
and freedoms contained in the UDHR. 
The foregoing provisions of the UDHR including its preamble, make it safe to conclude 
that any and every manner of abuse, cultural exploitation or violation of the rights of 
women and girls everywhere in the world particularly in India and Nigeria, amounts to 
an affront on the rights and protections offered everyone under international law and 
therefore a gross violation of human rights for which redress must be sought and 
obtained. 
 
 
2.2.3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is a multilateral 
agreement which was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession on 
16th December 1966 by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI). It became 
enforceable on March 23, 1976, vide Article 49. 
The ICCPR mandate state parties to respect the civil and political rights of individuals, 
including the right to life, free speech, assembly and religion as well as political rights 
of participation in the electoral process, right to fair trial and due process.  
The ICCPR is patterned like the UDHR: its core provisions cover the individual and 
political rights of both women and men. It has a preamble, fifty-three articles and 
divided into six parts. 
The Preamble to the covenant recognizes the need to promote equality and dignity of 
women and men as a necessity for world peace. It thus states that, 
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world” and that “these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person.  
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Also that “the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and 
freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby 
everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and 
cultural rights.” 
It thus, obliges States to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and freedoms in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. It also recognizes 
the duty of man to other men and to society to “strive for the promotion and observance 
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”33 
Part 1 (Article 1) recognizes people’s right to self-determination and political 
independence and status, including the right to freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural goals, and manage and dispose of their own resources without external threat or 
intrusion. 
Part 2 (Articles 2 – 5) obliges states to use legislation, where necessary, to guarantee the 
rights recognised in the Covenant, and to provide effective legal redress for any 
violation of those rights, even if they were meted by state actors.34 
The covenant further provides for gender equality under the law and for protection of 
the law,35 "without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,"36 
even “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed”,37 including a mandate on states to provide 
                                                          
33 Preamble to the International covenant on Civil and political Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx 
34 Article 2.3(a) 
35 Article 2.3(b); Article 26 contains a similar provision. 
36 Article 2.1; See also Article 26  which “prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.” 
37 Article 4.1 
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appropriate legal remedy against human rights violations as well as competent 
authorities to enforce those remedies.38 
Specifically, as with the UDHR, certain rights recognized in the ICCPR also provide 
direct protection of rights for women and not just men. These rights include the 
following: 
Article 6 provides for right to life, legal protection of life and prohibition of arbitrary 
deprivation of life. 
Article 7: Right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, including the right not to be subjected to medical or scientific 
experimentation without consent. 
Article 8 contains the right to freedom from every manner of slavery and slave-trade,39 
servitude40 and forced or compulsory labour.41 
Article 9 provides for the right to liberty and security of person and declares every 
illegal detention as unlawful and liable for compensation. It suffices that the practice of 
“wife detention” in Islam may be redressed under this article.  
By Article 10, all persons held in lawful custody shall be treated with humanity and 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. In India, this right is reflected 
in the rule in Sheela Barse42 for the protection of women in custody. 
Article 16 provides for a person to be recognized everywhere as a person before the law 
while Article 17 prohibit every arbitrary interference with one’s privacy, family, home 
                                                          
38 Article 2.3(c) 
39 Article 8.1 
40 Article 8.2 
41 Article 8.3 
42 In Sheela Barse v. Union of India, AIR 1987 (1) 153, the court made certain prescriptions for the protection of women in custody, 
including: 1). That the interrogation of females must be carried out in the presence of female Police officers; 2). That female 
suspects must be kept in separate police lock-ups under the supervision of female constables only; 3). That the police officer in-
charge at any station/post must take responsibility for the safety of women in custody and ensure that bodily searches on them are 
conducted decently by women officers only; 4). That Notice should be conspicuously put in each police lock-up informing arrested 
persons and detainees of their rights; 5). That a woman judge or judicial officer should be appointed to carry out regular surprise 
visits to police stations to verify that all legal safeguards for the protection of the dignity of female detainees are being enforced. 
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or correspondence, as well as to unlawful attacks on one’s honour and reputation, 
including legal protection against any such interference or attacks. 
Article 18 guarantees the freedom of thought, conscience and religion while Article 23 
mandates that men and women can marry and found a family as long as they are of 
marriageable age and have freely volunteered their full consent.43 This article further 
enjoin States to adopt measures to guarantee equality of rights and obligations of 
spouses in and upon dissolution of the marriage, including protection of the best interest 
of any child(ren) of such dissolved marriage. 
Article 25 guarantees the right to political participation, affiliation to a political party 
and the right to vote and be voted for. 
Certain specific portions of the ICCPR, namely articles 6, 7, 8 [paragraphs 8(1) and 
8(2)], 11, 15, 16 and 18 are declared sacrosanct by Article 4.2 to the extent that “No 
derogation from [these] articles may be made” even “in time of public emergency which 
threatens the life of the nation.”44 These preceding provisions/rights in the ICCPR offer 
women protection against all manner of humiliation, exploitation and abuse of rights 
including cultural exploitation. 
Article 3 of the covenant is particularly important because under it, ‘the States Parties to 
the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the 
enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.’  
The ICCPR contains two Optional Protocols.  The First Optional Protocol creates an 
individual complaints mechanism whereby private individuals can complain to the 
Human Rights Committee about violations of the Covenant. The Second Optional 
Protocol simply abolishes the use of death penalty as punishment for crime except most 
                                                          
43 Article 23.2 and article 23.3 respectively. 
44 Article 11 provides that no one shall be imprisoned for failing to honour a contractual obligation while article 15 prohibits the 
imposition of punishment in retrospect for “any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed.” 
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serious crimes of a military nature, committed during wartime. By this Optional 
Protocol, member states may impose death penalty for such crimes as violent rape and 
ethnic cleansing committed at wartime.  
This confirms the contention of this thesis that rape is a heinous violation of women’s 
dignity in international law, and necessitates the obligation on states to provide 
sustainable legal framework to redress and protect against every such violation. It 
further underscores the primacy of equal protection of women’s human rights as well as 
the sacredness of women’s sexual dignity and honour, which are core to the findings 
and recommendations made in this thesis.   
 
 
 
2.2.4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
The establishment of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) followed the adoption of Resolution 2200 A (XXI) by General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 16th December 1966. It became enforceable on 3rd 
January 1976 and India and Nigeria are signatories to the Covenant. 
The Preamble to the ICESCR recognise, among others, that cultural and socio- 
economic rights are inseparable from the “inherent dignity of the human person” and 
that the enjoyment of the right and freedom against fear and want is only be achievable 
if conditions exists for enjoying of economic, socio-cultural, political and civil rights.  
Core rights under the Covenant include Article 6: The right to work; Article 7: the right 
to favourable and just conditions of work; Article 8: the right to freedom of association 
to join trade unions and to participate in workplace strikes; Article 9: the right to enjoy 
social security, insurance and allied benefits; Article 10: the right to safety and 
protection of family as well as the prohibition of child labour; Article 11: the right to a 
standard and adequate living condition, and to the continuous improvement of those 
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living conditions for family and self, including the enjoyment of basic shelter, food and 
clothing; Article 12: the right to attain optimal standard of mental and physical health; 
Articles 13 and 14: the right to education, the free choice of parents to choose between 
public and private schools for their children  and Article 15: the right to participate in 
cultural activities and to benefit from innovations in science, technology and research.  
The supervisory body of the ICESCR is the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights which was set up under the ECOSOC in 1985 to monitor the 
implementation of the terms of the Covenant. The Committee is constituted by 18 
experts who are usually elected by secret balloting from amongst nominees presented 
by the member states to the Covenant. These Committee members may be re-elected for 
a second four-year period. 
The original supervisory mechanism of the ICESCR Committee is the reporting 
procedure which required States parties to present periodic reports to the ECOSOC 
through the UN Secretary-General, on the actualisation of the rights recognised in the 
Covenant.45   
The ICESCR also has an Optional Protocol which provides for both individual and 
collective complaints mechanisms which was first adopted by the Human Rights 
Council, and later by the UN General Assembly on 10th December 2008, to coincide 
with the 60 years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This Optional Protocol 
provides for three supervisory mechanisms for the ICESCR Committee: a) inter-state 
complaint procedure (Article 10); b) individual and collective complaints mechanism 
(Articles 1 and 2); and c) inquiry procedure (Article 11). 
This thesis explores these provisions to show that international law provides globalized 
legislative mechanism for the promotion and enforcement of socio-economic rights 
                                                          
45 See Articles 16 to 21 ICESCR. 
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which are core to sustainable guarantee of human rights including women’s right to 
dignity.  The non-justiciability of socio-economic rights in the Nigerian Constitution 
and their non-judicialization by Nigerian Courts, unlike in India and South Africa 
justifies why this thesis seeks valuable lessons from the legal framework of those 
countries to bridge the gaps in the Nigerian framework.    
 
2.2.5 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or   Punishment 
The Convention Against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 1984 is also commonly referred to as the Convention Against Torture 
(CAT). 
It is a multilateral UN instrument for the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. The arrangement and structure of the Convention 
follows the pattern of the UDHR, ICCPR and the ICESCR.46  The convention was 
adopted and opened for signature and ratification 10th December 1984 by General 
Assembly resolution 39/46. It entered into force on 26th June 1987, vide its article 27 
(1).47 
Article 1.1 of the CAT defines torture as follows:    
 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him 
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or 
a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
                                                          
46 It has three parts, a preamble and thirty three articles. 
47 UN Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx. (9/3/2014). 
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other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 
 
It is thus arguable from the definition of torture in this convention that all manner of 
degrading, inhuman and exploitative cultural practices and attitudes against women in 
Nigeria, India,48 South Africa and elsewhere are unlawful and prohibited by 
international law since they are perpetrated “for any reason based on discrimination of 
any kind.”49  This would include obnoxious widowhood rites, wife confinement, widow 
inheritance, wife donation, forced marriages, spousal rape, female genital mutilation, 
abusive threats and attitudes as well as psychological torture arising from childlessness 
or son preference.  
Its Article 2 enjoin parties to take “effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other 
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory” within their control or jurisdiction 
and to ensure that all such acts of torture are criminalized50 and prosecuted whether they 
are committed by or against its own citizens.51  
Article 8 of the Convention makes torture an extraditable offence and states are further 
permitted under Article 5 to establish a universal jurisdiction under which non-
extraditable torturers can still be brought to trial. It also prohibits the use of any 
evidence obtained by torture in any trial.52 
According to Kofi Annan, 
…the responsibility to protect imposes duties on both sides. Duties on the 
government concern to protect its own people. But it also imposes duties on 
the rest of us, that we cannot sit back and do nothing. We cannot sit back 
and say that is the sovereign duty of that and that government or because of 
the sovereignty we cannot interfere. Some crimes are so shameful and so 
                                                          
48 India signed the Treaty on 14th October 1997 while Nigeria signed it on 28th July, 1988 and ratified it on 28th June, 2001. 
49 Article 1.1 of the Convention Against Torture, 1984. 
50 Article 4 of the Convention Against Torture. 
51 Article 5 
52 Article 15 
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painful that each and every one of us has to ask the question “What can we 
do?” And sometimes, I think, it is enough for us to say ‘We can't take this 
anymore.’53 
 
 
Article 9 enjoins states to provide and share mutual evidence and sensitive information 
which will offer “the greatest measure of assistance” for the prosecution of offences 
which violate the Convention. Torture allegations must also be investigated timeously54 
and right of torture victims to compensation and redress must be guaranteed and 
enforced.55 
However, Article 3.1 of the Convention prohibits the deportation, extradition or 
refouling of people to a country where there are strong indications that they fill be 
tortured.56 
Article 16 mandates parties to take every necessary measure prevent other acts of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment within its jurisdiction or area of control. 
Specifically, the said Article 16 provides that: 
 
Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its 
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article I, when 
such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. 
 
                                                          
53 Kofi A. Annan (2008) “Establishing a Culture of Prevention” The Anna Lindh Lecture,  Raoul Wallenberg Institute, University 
of Lund, Sweden. 2 October 2008. http://rwi.lu.se/old/publicseminars/annalindh/lecture08.pdf  page 5. 
54 Articles 12 and 13 
55 Article 14 
56 The article 3.1 provides that. “No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” 
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It is most humbly submitted that the phrase “when such acts are committed by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity” in article 16 should be interpreted in such a manner as to 
cover and include inhuman, degrading punishment and cultural exploitations which 
violate the human rights of women particularly in Nigeria and India. This is more so, 
bearing in mind the meaning of Violence against Women which, according to the 
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995, means: 
Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, 
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including 
threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether 
occurring in public or private life.57 
There is also The Committee against Torture, established under article 17 of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment and 
which is empowered under Article 20 to investigate allegations of systematic torture. 
The author hereby submits that Article 20 should at all times be interpreted to cover 
such mental and psychological torture arising from cultural exploitation of women 
which is common in Nigeria, India and South Africa.  
Article 22 obliges state parties to recognize the power of the Committee against torture 
to receive and hear complaints from individuals or non-state parties alleging violations 
of the Convention by a party, insofar as the same matter is not pending before another 
international adjudicatory body. Thus in ARA v Sweden58, the complainant was a Sri 
Lankan who was awaiting deportation from Sweden to Sri Lanka.  Although his claim 
did not invoke any specific articles of the Convention (probably because he was not 
represented by counsel), it however raised issues of deportation and refoulment under 
                                                          
57See para. 113( c )  of the Beijing Declaration where violence against women was expressed to include “(c) Physical, sexual and 
psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs.”  
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/svaw/law/un/undocs.htm (26/9/2013). 
58 Communication No: CAT/C/38/D/305/2006 of May 1, 2007 (initial submission on 25 September 2006). 
   83 
article 3 of the CAT. The complainant had applied for political asylum in Sweden 
alleging that he feared persecution, torture or death by the ruling government which his 
family had long opposed. His application was roundly rejected by the Migration Board 
and the aliens Appeals Board between 14 September 2004 and 31 May 2006 because in 
their opinion, ‘Sri Lanka is a democratic state where the judicial system works well.’ In 
reply to the communication, the state party argued that the complaint was inadmissible   
under Article 22 paragraph 5, sub paragraph (a) of the Convention since the same 
complaint is being examined and pending before the European Court of Human Rights 
as  Petition No. 8594/04. And more so, that the European Court of Human Rights did 
not make any interim orders of protection in relation to the deportation order. The 
complainant confirmed this but alleged that the matter was being unnecessarily delayed. 
Accordingly, the Committee against torture decided that the complaint was 
inadmissible.59  
This thesis explores these provisions to show that international law provides globalized 
legislative guide to enable states protect women against various acts of torture, inhuman 
or degrading treatment, commonly manifest in certain obnoxious socio-religious 
mythologies, traditional widowhood rites and cultural practices which humiliate, 
dehumanize, degrade and diminish women’s right to equality and dignity, especially in 
Nigeria and India.   
 
 
 
2.3 Thematic Human Rights Documents  
It must also be noted that within the context of this thesis, women are considered as 
disproportionate and particular victims of certain specific cultural exploitations as well 
as human rights violations such as degradation, trafficking, rape, sexual exploitation and 
dehumanising cultural practices. The United Nations addresses such violations through 
                                                          
59 United Nations, CAT. CAT/C/38/D/305/2006. ( Jurisprudence ) (Translated from its original Spanish to English). 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/MasterFrameView/318c0b6ba6c1de07c12572f10025d5e6?Opendocument.  (2/4/2014). 
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certain conventions and treaties known as thematic human rights documents. These 
thematic documents are usually drafted by specialized United Nations agencies 
responsible for addressing the particular human rights abuse or violation in question. 
However, with particular reference to cultural exploitation of women in Nigeria and 
India, including child marriages, marital rape and other violations of women and girls 
arising from widowhood rites, traditional myths and mind-sets, son-preference, dowry-
related violations and allied cultural practices, specific thematic human rights 
documents relating to women are reviewed. They include, the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, 1990; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) 1979   (with General Recommendation 19 of 1992 and its 
Optional Protocol of 2000); Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
(DEVAW) 1993 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 
(effective July 1, 2002) under which rape is declared a crime against humanity. 
In addition to these, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995 Fourth 
World Conference on Women, Beijing) and the Commission on the Status of Women 
(CSW) will also be reviewed. 
 
2.3.1 Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) is an international 
human rights treaty which recognizes over 40 substantive rights of children and young 
people, aged 17 and below, all over the world.60 So far, the UNCRC is the most widely 
ratified international human rights treaty globally, as well as the only international 
human rights treaty to encompass the rights and freedoms (civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights) of persons below the age of eighteen. It elaborately spells out 
the basic needs of every child which includes a safe, happy and fulfilled childhood 
                                                          
60 Article 1 of the Convention defines a 'child' as a person below the age of 18, and urges states to raise the age of majority in their 
jurisdictions if it falls below 18 years so as to afford greater protection for the world’s children. 
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without discrimination as to sex, religion, social origin, as well as place or status of 
birth.61 The Convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 November 
1989, after more than a decade of negotiations.62 
Although this thesis relates directly to the dignity of women against sexual abuse, the 
essence of reviewing the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) here is to 
show that similar violations of dignity and sexual freedom suffered by the girl child also 
amounts to gross violation and abuse of women’s rights in international law. 
In Article 2, the Child Rights Convention prohibits any form of discrimination against 
children for whatever reason. Article 2.2 specifically enjoin state parties to the 
Convention to “take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against 
all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed 
opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members.”  
According to UNICEF,  
The Convention applies to all children, whatever their race, religion or 
abilities; whatever they think or say, whatever type of family they come 
from. It doesn’t matter where children live, what language they speak, what 
their parents do, whether they are boys or girls, what their culture is, 
whether they have a disability or whether they are rich or poor. No child 
should be treated unfairly on any basis.63 
 
The Convention was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession on 
November 20, 1989 by General Assembly Resolution 44/25, and it entered into force on 
September 2, 1990 vide its article 49. It has a preamble and 54 articles. Only the articles 
                                                          
61  United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), Children and young people. 
http://www.education.gov.uk/childrenandyoungpeople/healthandwellbeing/b0074766/uncrc. (10/3/2014).  All United Nations 
member states have ratified the convention except the United States and Somalia. 
62 Unicef Malaysia, http://www.unicef.org/malaysia/about_crc.html. (29/10/2014). 
63 FACT SHEET: A summary of the rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
http://www.unicef.org/crc/files/Rights_overview.pdf (11/3/2014). 
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relating to the child’s right to life,64 best interests,65 genital integrity and circumcision,66 
decision making,67 forced marriages, reproductive and foetal rights,68 child-selling and 
trafficking,69 right to proper and responsible education and vocation70 will be reviewed 
in this section. 
Circumcision or female genital mutilation is a cultural exploitation of the girl child and 
an invasion of her feminine honour and privacy. It is an unhygienic and unscientific 
traditional practice which is simply based on mythology. The practice is a breach of the 
right protected in Article 16 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which 
provides that “No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
or her privacy, family, home or correspondence, or to unlawful attacks on his or her 
honour and reputation.”  Under article 16.2, the child is also entitled to legal protection 
against any such invasion or interference. 
Article 19 similarly provides that,  
 
States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or 
mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, 
maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of 
parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the 
child. 
 
This practice also offends Article 37(a) which prohibits torture or other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment of the child. 
                                                          
64 Article 6.1 
65 Article 3.1 provides that “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institu tions, 
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.” See 
also article 9.  
66 Article 16 
67 Article 12 
68 Article 36 
69 Article 35 
70 Articles 28-29 
   87 
The customary practice of early child-marriage is synonymous with sexual exploitation 
and abuse of the girl child and a gross violation of Articles 34, 36 and 37 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
Article 34 contains the undertaking by States Parties to “take all appropriate national, 
bilateral and multilateral measures” to protect the child from all forms of sexual abuse 
and exploitation and to prevent her from prostitution, pornography or coercion or 
inducement in any unlawful sexual activity.71 
In some Nigerian and Indian societies, customary law recognizes the godhood of man 
and encourage son-preference, even though certain Islamic teachings abhor them.72 This 
often leads to the unlawful abortion of the female foetus as well as the selling, killing or 
abandonment of girl-children. This obnoxious cultural practice violates Article 36 of the 
Convention which under which contains a blanket mandate on States Parties to “protect 
the child against all other forms of exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the child's 
welfare.” It is also contrary to Article 35 of the Convention which mandates States 
Parties to “take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent 
the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose or in any form.” 
It must however be mentioned in summary, that international law provides adequate 
protection of the girl-child against cultural exploitation of the girl-child and also  
                                                          
71 Two new Optional Protocols to the Convention including The Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child Pornography were adopted on 25th May 2000 and entered into force on 18th January 2002. These Optional Protocols 
supplement the Child rights Convention by including provisions for criminalising violations of Article 34 of the Convention 
prohibiting the “sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography”. The Protocol defines ‘sale of children’, ‘child 
prostitution’ and ‘child pornography’ and sets the criteria for addressing violations under domestic law, both in relation to the 
prosecution of offenders, prevention of the offences and the protection of victims. http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights 
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/humanrightsconceptsideasandfora/humanrightsfora/theunitednations/. (12/3/2014). 
72 The teachings of Prophet Muhammad (PbuH) and certain parts of the Qur’anic verse are opposed to son preference and gender 
inequity: (a) If a man to whom a girl is born neither buries her alive, humiliates her, nor gives his sons preference over her, he will 
be allowed to enter heaven by God, as a reward. (Abu Dawud, Sunan, Kitab al-Adab, 4/337).  (b) Live with them on a footing of 
kindness and equity. If you take a dislike to them, it may be that you dislike a thing which God has meant for your own abundant 
good. (Qur’an 4: 19). Also, in the foreword to his book, Woman in Islamic Shari’ah, the learned Islamic cleric wrote that, “To 
interpret the Islamic concept of woman as “degradation” of woman is to distort the actual issue. Islam has never asserted that 
woman is inferior to man. It has only made the point that woman is differently constituted.” (See Maulana Wahiduddin Khan: 
Woman in Islamic Shari’ah, 2000, The Islamic Centre, New Delhi.  p. 11). 
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encourages governments to assist indigent families and guardians to secure children’s 
“right to a standard of living that is good enough to meet their physical and mental 
needs.”73  
 
2.3.2 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) (with General Recommendation 19 of 1992 and 
Optional Protocol of 2000) 
 
Following exploitation, discriminations and prejudices against women, in spite of the 
clear provisions and the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
and other international human rights instruments which abhor and prohibit all and any 
form of gender – based discrimination, the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979 which created the Convention on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The Convention 
entered into force on 3 September 1981,74  and by March 2010, 186 countries (including 
Nigeria and India) were party to the Convention.75 
Generally, the CEDAW aims inter alia, at improving basic understanding of the 
concept of human rights, as well as the influence of culture and tradition on women's 
rights, by emphatically acknowledging that customs, norms and stereotypes give rise to 
a multitude of legal, political and economic constraints on the advancement of 
women.76 CEDAW, like the rest of the human rights regime, assumes that culture, 
custom, or religion should not excuse or condone violations of human rights.77 It also 
has an equal universal application whereby countries that ratify it assume the burden of 
                                                          
73 Article 27  
74United Nations 1980, Doc. 34/180. “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Resolutions 
and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly During the thirty fourth session, 18 September, 1979 – 7 January, 1980”. Supp. 
No. 46 (A134/46) New York: United Nations. 
75 The Nigerian government ratified CEDAW in 1985 without reservations. However, the CEDAW has remained unenforceable in 
Nigeria because the non-domestication clause in Section 12 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
76 UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Published by the United Nations Department of Public 
Information C DPI/2040 C May 1999. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw20/ending.htm (2/4/2014) 
77 Merry, S. E. (2003). Constructing a Global Law‐Violence against Women and the Human Rights System. Law & Social Inquiry, 
28(4), 941-977, p.945. 
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conforming to its requirements, regardless of their specific cultural attributes.78 The 
CEDAW is acknowledged as an international bill of rights for women and it focuses on 
eliminating discrimination against women that violates the principle of equality of rights 
and respect for human dignity.79 
The preamble of the Convention also stresses "that a change in the traditional role of 
men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full 
equality of men and women". The Convention thus affirms equal responsibilities of both 
sexes in family life and their equal rights with regard to education and work, and attacks 
cultural patterns which define the public realm as a man's world, and the domestic 
sphere as women's domain.80 
This Convention addresses the rights of women to participate in development, as 
stakeholders, and the rights of rural women in particular. As such, the CEDAW has 
been variously described as the most comprehensive and prominent international 
instrument embracing the special concerns of women, and as “essentially an 
international bill of rights for women and a framework for women’s participation in the 
development process … (which) spells out internationally accepted principles and 
standards for achieving equality between women and men.” 81  
The Convention is arranged in six parts and it has a preamble and thirty articles. Part 1 
contains articles 1-6. In Article 1, it specifically defines the phrase Discrimination 
Against women as:  
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has 
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment 
or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of 
                                                          
78 Id at 946. 
79 Id at 950. 
80 UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Published by the United Nations Department of Public 
Information C DPI/2040 C May 1999. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw20/ending.htm (2/4/2014) 
81 J.M. Nasir (Mrs.) – “CEDAW And The Woman Under Sharia” (1999) CJLJ Vol. 5 No. 5 p. 20 at 22-24. 
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equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.  
 
The basis of CEDAW lies in its Article 2(f) which enjoins States parties:  
 
To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish 
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women. 
 
By acceding to the Convention, parties oblige themselves to implement the measures set 
forth in the convention for the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. 
Some of these measures include: 
(1) Incorporating into their legal systems, the core principle of equality of men and 
women. 
(2) Abolition and repeal of all gender repressive or discriminatory laws and replacing 
them with new ones which do not discriminate against women. 
(3) The establishment of courts, tribunals and other public institutions to ensure that 
women are effectively protected against all forms of discrimination including those 
arising from the actions or omissions of institutions or persons, corporate or real.82 
Article 4 declares that ‘affirmative action’ and other positive action taken to protect 
maternity rights will not be considered discriminatory. 
The provision of the CEDAW Article 5 is also imperative because it oblige state parties: 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and 
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the 
                                                          
82 CEDAW articles 2 and 3. See also UN WOMEN: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of women. 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/. (13/3/2014). 
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inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for 
men and women. 
 
This mandate on states to take every necessary action to modify or jettison those 
cultural attitudes and patterns which fuel discrimination, and ensure that issues relating 
to maternity are understood as part of family social life is an acknowledgement that 
certain discriminations against women, including women in India and Nigeria, are 
rooted in and perpetuated by culture and cultural patterns.83  
Under article 6, states undertake to suppress trafficking in women for whatever illicit 
purpose as well as exploitation of prostitution of women.  
Part II of the CEDAW contains Articles 7 to 9, wherein states are mandated to take 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination and ensure equal rights of men and 
women participation in politics, governance and public life;84 and in the opportunity to 
represent their governments overseas and serve at international organisations/bodies.85 
Article 9 enjoins states to ensure that a woman shall not be rendered stateless or 
compelled to change her nationality as a result of marriage, even if she is married to an 
alien or to a husband who subsequently changes his own nationality.  
Part III (Articles 10 to 14) of the CEDAW Convention enjoins states to take appropriate 
measures to ensure equality and non-discrimination against women in certain economic 
issues and social security benefits including education (Article 10)86; work, 
employment, promotion, remuneration, retirement, safe health and working 
environment including marriage and maternity considerations (Article 11); health care 
and family planning benefits, pre-natal and post-natal benefits (Article 12); and the right 
                                                          
83 The combined understanding of the definition of Discrimination Against women in Article 1 and the provisions of Articles 2 and 5 
justifies the quest of this researcher to seek a realistic Framework for Protecting Women’s right to dignity and freedom from 
Cultural Exploitation, particularly in Nigeria and India. 
84 Article 7 
85 Article 8 
86 Article 10.c of the CEDAW specifically mandates the revision of textbooks, school programmes and teaching methods with a 
view to eliminating stereotyped concepts in the field of education. 
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to recreation and cultural life as well as to economic benefits such as loan, mortgages 
and other credit benefits.87  
Article 14 makes a special case for the benefit of rural women and mandates states to 
ensure steps towards eliminating all prejudices and discriminations suffered by rural 
women vis-à-vis their urban counterparts. States are thus enjoined to ensure provision of 
adequate opportunities for education, training and vocation for rural women, their 
improved health, economic and environmental conditions as well as the provision of 
adequate facilities for improved living conditions, especially housing, sanitation, water 
supply, transport, electricity and communications. 
Part IV contains Articles 15 and 16 which emphasizes the equality of women and men 
before the law particularly in the area of private law, and thus provides that women may 
own, manage, administer and even dispose of property.88  
Notably, the CEDAW is the only human rights treaty to mention family planning89 and 
oblige governments to place family planning on the education curriculum90 and to 
develop family codes that guarantee women's rights "to decide freely and responsibly on 
the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, 
education and means to enable them to exercise these rights."91 
Article 16 enjoins states to seek to eliminate discrimination against women in relation to 
marriage, property rights, reproductive rights and family relations. It also declares 
betrothal (child marriage) to be null and void and enjoin states to make legislation in 
compliance with same.92 
 
                                                          
87  Article 13. 
88  Article 15 
89 UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Published by the United Nations Department of Public 
Information C DPI/2040 C May 1999. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw20/ending.htm (2/4/2014) 
90  Article 10.h 
91 Article 16.e 
92 Article 16.2 
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The said Article 16 is very crucial to this subject and is hereby reproduced in extenso: 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family 
relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and 
women: 
(a) The same right to enter into marriage; 
 
(b) The same right to freely choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only 
with their free and full consent; 
 
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its 
dissolution; 
 
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their 
marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests 
of the children shall be paramount; 
 
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and 
spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education 
and means to enable them to exercise these rights; 
 
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, 
wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where 
these concepts exist in national legislation; in all cases the interests of the 
children shall be paramount; 
 
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to 
choose a family name, a profession and an occupation; 
 
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, 
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of 
property, whether free of charge or for a valuable consideration. 
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2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and 
all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a 
minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an 
official registry compulsory.93 
 
Article 17 of the CEDAW Convention recognizes the CEDAW Committee (Committee 
for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women) as the body mandated to 
supervise non-compliance and compliance with CEDAW. The Committee has 23 
members comprising experts in women’s affairs, teachers, diplomats and lawyers 
elected by the states parties to serve a four-year tenure.  
The CEDAW Convention has one reporting system or supervisory mechanism,94 and its 
Article 18 requires that within one year of becoming a party, every member state would 
send report to the Committee of the progress it has so far made in relation to the 
CEDAW.  
Part VI contains Article 23 to 30 and Article 23 creates a provision that where domestic 
privileges and equality rights contained in the national legislation of States or in any 
other international instrument are more beneficial to women than the CEDAW 
provisions, then those national legislation or other international instruments shall prevail 
over the CEDAW.95 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
93 Source: UN WOMEN: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
women.http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm. (14/3/2014). 
94 However, two additional supervisory mechanisms exists under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of 2000. 
 
95 “Article 23 Nothing in the present Convention shall affect any provisions that are more conducive to the achievement of equality 
between men and women which may be contained: 
(a) In the legislation of a State Party; or 
(b) In any other international convention, treaty or agreement in force for that State.” 
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2.3.2.1 CEDAW General Recommendation 19 of 1992  
This recommendation simply brings gender-based violence (including domestic 
violence)96 as a special subject within the contemplation of ‘discrimination against 
women’ in Article 1 of the CEDAW by asserting that, ‘gender-based violence is a form 
of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on 
a basis of equality with men.’97  
The recommendation further defines Gender-based Violence thus:  
 
6. The definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence, that is, 
violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that 
affects women disproportionately. It includes acts that inflict physical, 
mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other 
deprivations of liberty. Gender-based violence may breach specific 
provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions 
expressly mention violence.98 
7. Gender-based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by 
women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general 
international law or under human rights conventions, is discrimination 
within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention. These rights and 
freedoms include: 
(a) The right to life; 
(b) The right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; 
(c) The right to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in time of 
international or internal armed conflict; 
(d) The right to liberty and security of person; 
                                                          
96 Paragraph 9 of the General recommendation emphasise that discrimination under the Convention is not restricted to action by or 
on behalf of Governments (see articles 2(e), 2(f) and 5). For example, under article 2(e) the Convention calls on States parties to 
take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise. Under general 
international law and specific human rights covenants, States may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due 
diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation. 
97 Paragraph 1 of Recommendation 19 of 1992. 
98 Paragraph 6 and 7 respectively. 
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(e) The right to equal protection under the law; 
(f) The right to equality in the family; 
(g) The right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental 
health; 
(h) The right to just and favourable conditions of work.99 
 
In its paragraph 11, the CEDAW recommendation was more emphatic on the concept of 
gender-based violence. It provides that: 
 
Traditional attitudes by which women are regarded as subordinate to men or 
as having stereotyped roles perpetuate widespread practices involving 
violence or coercion, such as family violence and abuse, forced marriage, 
dowry deaths, acid attacks and female circumcision. Such prejudices and 
practices may justify gender-based violence as a form of protection or 
control of women. The effect of such violence on the physical and mental 
integrity of women is to deprive them the equal enjoyment, exercise and 
knowledge of human rights and fundamental freedoms. While this comment 
addresses mainly actual or threatened violence the underlying consequences 
of these forms of gender-based violence help to maintain women in 
subordinate roles and contribute to the low level of political participation 
and to their lower level of education, skills and work opportunities. 
 
The recommendation also acknowledges that family violence and certain exploitation of 
women and girls including rape and sexual assault100 are perpetuated by traditional 
attitudes. Its paragraph 23 states thus: 
Family violence is one of the most insidious forms of violence against 
women. It is prevalent in all societies. Within family relationships women of 
all ages are subjected to violence of all kinds, including battering, rape, 
other forms of sexual assault, mental and other forms of violence, which are 
                                                          
99 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom19. (15/3/2014). It must be noted that certain 
cultural practices in Nigeria and India are exploitative of women’s human rights and thus come under the definition of Gender-
based Violence.  
100 Paragraph 18 of General recommendation 19.  
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perpetuated by traditional attitudes. Lack of economic independence forces 
many women to stay in violent relationships. The abrogation of their family 
responsibilities by men can be a form of violence, and coercion. These 
forms of violence put women's health at risk and impair their ability to 
participate in family life and public life on a basis of equality. 
 
In paragraph 24, specific recommendations are made for the protection of women 
against exploitation and rights abuse. They include: 
(a) States parties should take appropriate and effective measures to 
overcome all forms of gender-based violence, whether by public or private 
act; 
(b) States parties should ensure that laws against family violence and abuse, 
rape, sexual assault and other gender-based violence give adequate 
protection to all women, and respect their integrity and dignity. Appropriate 
protective and support services should be provided for victims. Gender-
sensitive training of judicial and law enforcement officers and other public 
officials is essential for the effective implementation of the Convention; … 
(e) States parties in their reports should identify the nature and extent of 
attitudes, customs and practices that perpetuate violence against women and 
the kinds of violence that result. They should report on the measures that 
they have undertaken to overcome violence and the effect of those 
measures; 
(f) Effective measures should be taken to overcome these attitudes and 
practices. States should introduce education and public information 
programmes to help eliminate prejudices that hinder women's equality. 
 
This thesis shares the view that although CEDAW general recommendation is not 
legally binding nor carries the same weight as the main CEDAW text, its contents are 
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designed to show or explain to states parties their obligations when they are not 
mentioned or not sufficiently explained in the convention itself.101  
 
2.3.2.2 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) Optional Protocol of 2000 
 
The Optional Protocol to CEDAW was adopted at the fifty-fourth Session of the UN 
General Assembly on 6 October 1999, and it entered into force on 22nd December 
2000.102 As at 13th March 2014, 104 states were parties to the Optional Protocol and 80 
have signed it. Nigeria signed the Optional Protocol on 8 September 2000 and ratified it 
on 22nd November 2004 while India has not done either.103 
The Optional Protocol has a Preamble and 21 Articles. However, the Articles most 
relevant to this study are articles 1,2,3,4, 8 and 17 because they directly reflect the crux 
of the two additional supervisory mechanisms created under the Optional Protocol.104 
First, is the individual Complaints Mechanism in Articles 1 to 4. 
Article 1 of the Optional protocol is a commitment by State parties to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the CEDAW Committee, while Article 2 provides for an individual 
complaints mechanism (known as Communication Procedure),  which allows individual 
or groups of women, to submit claims to the CEDAW Committee and seek redress for 
violations of rights protected under the CEDAW.  Where the Communication is being 
made on behalf of any party, it must be with the full consent of that party or with cogent 
reason(s) as to why the consent was not obtained. The Protocol states further that 
                                                          
101 Merry, S. E. (2003). Constructing a Global Law‐Violence against Women and the Human Rights System. Law & Social Inquiry, 
28(4), 941-977, p.952. 
102 22 December 2000, No. 20378.  In accordance with article 16(1) (see paragraph 16 of Resolution A/RES/54/4). 
103 However, the application and enforcement of the CEDAW (with its Optional Protocol) in Nigeria is hindered by the Non-
domestication clause in Section 12 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. It is for this reason that Nigeria’s Minister of Women Affairs 
and Social Development, Hajia Zainab Maina, expressed worries on 14th September, 2013 over the failure of the National Assembly 
to domesticate the CEDAW.  http://http.ngrguardiannews.com/national-news/132759-minister-decries-non-domestication-of-cedaw-
gender-bil. (14/3/2014). 
104 UN WOMEN: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of women. 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/text.htm. (14/3/2014). 
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individual communications can only be admitted if it is in writing, signed and concerns 
a state which has become party to the CEDAW Protocol,105 and provided also that all 
domestic remedies had been exhausted.106  
The second is the inquiry procedure established by Article 8 of the Optional Protocol, 
under which the CEDAW Committee may suo motu, “initiate a confidential 
investigation by one or more of its members where it has received reliable information 
of grave or systematic violations by a State Party of rights established in the 
Convention.”  
In undertaking such confidential investigation, the CEDAW Committee may, with the 
consent of the state party concerned, visit it physically, after which any of its findings, 
comments or recommendations will be transmitted to the said party, to which it may 
respond within six months.107  
The Protocol includes an ‘opt-out clause’, allowing states upon ratification or accession 
to declare that they do not accept the inquiry procedure.108  
Article 17 of the CEDAW Protocol provides that there shall be no reservations to the 
Protocol.  
One of the individual communications so far heard by the CEDAW Committee under 
this Optional Protocol is Szijjarto v. Hungary.109 In that communication, the author went 
into labour pain, broke her amniotic fluid and experienced heavy bleeding on 2 January 
2001. She was driven in an ambulance to Fehérgyarmat Hospital, about one hour away.  
                                                          
105 Article 3, CEDAW Protocol. 
106 Article 4 of the CEDAW Optional Protocol. The entry into force of the Optional Protocol places the CEDAW at par with ICCPR 
and CAT, which also have individual complaints mechanisms. 
107 Article 8, CEDAW Protocol. 
108 A similar inquiry procedure exists with respect to Convention Against Torture (CAT). 
109 Communication No. 4/2004, submitted on 12 February 2004. The Committee’s views under article 7, paragraph 3, of the 
CEDAW Optional Protocol was made on 14 August 2006. http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights 
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/cases/internationalcases/committeeontheeliminationofdiscriminationagainstwomen/nr/2522. 
(12/3/2014). 
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Upon quick examination, the doctor found that the foetus had died in her womb and 
informed her that a caesarean section was urgently required to remove the dead foetus. 
And while on the operating table, she was handed a consent form to sign for the 
caesarean section and she did. She was also made to sign a barely legible note hand-
written by the doctor and added to the bottom of the form, which read: “Having 
knowledge of the death of the embryo inside my womb I firmly request my 
sterilization.110 I do not intend to give birth again; neither do I wish to become 
pregnant.” The doctor and the midwife counter-signed the same form. The patient also 
signed statements of consent for a blood transfusion and for anaesthesia. Hospital 
records also showed that within 17 minutes of the ambulance arriving at the hospital, 
the caesarean section was performed, the dead foetus and placenta were removed and 
the patient’s fallopian tubes were tied. However, before leaving the hospital the patient 
requested from the doctor, information on her state of health and when she could safely 
have another baby. It was just then that the doctor explained the meaning of the word 
‘sterilization’ to her. 
The patient was aggrieved and filed this communication before the CEDAW 
Committee, alleging discrimination and gross violation of her rights, having been 
denied informed consent to sterilization which is a standard requirement of both 
international human rights law and domestic law, and derives from respect for a 
woman’s human rights as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
After listening to the arguments of the parties, the CEDAW Committee, acting under 
article 7, paragraph 3 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of 
                                                          
110  A Latin term unknown to the patient was used instead of the simple English word “Sterilization”. 
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All Forms of Discrimination against Women, concluded that the instant facts constitute 
a violation of the patient’s rights guaranteed in articles 10 (h): (right of access to 
specific information and advice on health and family planning); article 12:  (obligation 
of States to take all appropriate measures to ensure equality of men and women and 
eliminate discrimination against women in relation to health care services, pregnancy 
and family planning) and article 16 paragraph 1(e): (reproductive rights to decide freely 
and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the 
information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights) of the 
CEDAW Convention by the state of Hungary, acting through the hospital.  
 
2.3.2.3 Substantive Commitment of States to CEDAW 
It is important to examine the various levels of commitment which Nigeria, India and 
South Africa make to CEDAW. 
So far, Nigeria has no official commitment to CEDAW and the Nigerian courts are not 
bound to apply or enforce the CEDAW provisions. This is a result of the non-
domestication provision contained in Section 12 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, 
coupled with the fact that the CEDAW has not been domesticated as part of the laws of 
the Federation of Nigeria. It is for this reason that the Nigerian representative to the 
CEDAW Committee has said that Nigeria is notorious for abandoning and ignoring 
international agreements.111  
This is a disregard of the pacta sunt servanda in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on 
the law of Treaties which provides that “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties 
to it and must be performed by them in good faith” as well as the provisions of Article 
27 of the convention which provides thus: ‘A party may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.’ 
                                                          
111 Nwankwo, O. (2013). "Nigeria is notorious for violating international agreements." Lagos, Nigeria, Nigerian vanguard 
Newspaper.  
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In India, the Constitution does not specifically and positively mandate Courts to apply 
the CEDAW or other allied international instruments, even though its Article 51 (c) 
provides that “The State shall endeavour to foster respect for international law and 
treaty obligations in the dealings of organised people with one another.” However, the 
CEDAW is still made applicable and enforceable as a result of the judicial creativity 
and activism of the Indian Supreme Court as was manifest in the court’s rationale for 
the formulation of the celebrated Vishaka Guidelines.112    
As for South Africa, there is a positive mandatory constitutional commitment to 
international law generally, and not just to CEDAW. Section 39(1) of the South African 
Constitution provides that “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum- (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law.  
 
2.3.3 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) 
The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW) was 
adopted at the 85th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly by Resolution 
A/RES/48/104 of 20 December 1993. It has a long preamble and six articles. 
It was the first international human rights instrument adopted by the United Nations 
which specifically addresses violence against women. Even though DEVAW is not a 
binding treaty, it is still a source of international law and applies to all UN member 
states.  
The Declaration was made in recognition of “the urgent need for the universal 
application to women of the rights and principles with regard to equality, security, 
liberty, integrity and dignity of all human beings” and bearing in mind that “those rights 
                                                          
112 It is hereby restated for emphasis and clarity that in justifying the rationale for formulating the Vishaka Guidelines, the Supreme 
Court (per Verma, CJI in Vishaka and others v. State of Rajasthan & Ors (JT 1997 (7) SC 384); AIR 1997 SC 3011).stated inter 
alia that India was a signatory to the CEDAW and therefore must be bound by it whether or not its provisions are replicated in a 
national legislation.  
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and principles are enshrined in international instruments, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.”113 
The DEVAW holds violence against women as an obstacle to the achievement of 
human equality, development and global peace and encourage States to take necessary 
measures to combat such violence. It also recognizes that violence against women 
represents the historical reality of inequality in power relations of women and men, 
which encourage the domination of women by men, thus forcing women into 
subordination114 and that states should not invoke custom, religion, or culture to limit 
their obligations.115 
It further recognizes inter alia, that women belonging to minority groups, indigenous 
women, refugee women, migrant women, women living in rural or remote communities, 
destitute women, women in institutions or in detention, female children, women with 
disabilities, elderly women and women in situations of armed conflict, are especially 
vulnerable to violence and urge states to take appropriate measures to secure legal, 
political, social, and economic equality for women in their countries as a matter of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.116 
Article 1 of the Declaration defines the term "violence against women" to mean,  
Any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, 
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including 
threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether 
occurring in public or in private life. 
                                                          
113 United Nations General Assembly. http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r104.htm. (15/3/2014). 
114 See preamble to the DEVAW. 
115 Merry, S. E. (2003). Constructing a Global Law‐Violence against Women and the Human Rights System. Law & Social Inquiry, 
28(4), 941-977 at 946.  
116 Article 3. 
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Most importantly, Article 2 covers other aspects of violence against women which 
includes: 
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, 
including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, 
dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other 
traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence 
related to exploitation; 
 
(b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general 
community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual       harassment and 
intimidation at work, in educational institutions       and elsewhere, 
trafficking in women and forced prostitution; 
(c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by 
the State, wherever it occurs.117 
 
Summarily, DEVAW underscores that violence (including violation of women’s 
dignity) occurs both in “private or public life” and therefore condemns the unequal and 
popular socio-cultural construct by which women are forced into subordination and 
treated less than men. Importantly too, its Article 4 encourages states to take certain 
specific steps to address these violations and exploitations which constitute domestic 
violence. These steps include capacity building to train law enforcement personnel, 
promote research and management of databases on domestic violence cases, facilitation 
of administrative, political, cultural and socio-legal programs to prevent violence 
against women, as well as the development of a comprehensive legal system reform 
whereby all known or perceived acts of domestic violence are investigated and 
punished.  
 
 
                                                          
117 Some of these forms of violence against women constitute cultural exploitation of women or are condoned as a result of trado-
cultural, religious or mythological beliefs. 
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2.3.3.1 The Vienna Declaration and Platform for Action (VDPA), 1993  
The Vienna Declaration and Platform for Action (VDPA) is the outcome of the 1993 
UN World Conference on Human Rights, held in Vienna, Austria.118 
Article 5 of the Vienna Declaration affirms that:  
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally 
in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same 
emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and 
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in 
mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and 
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  
 
The Vienna Declaration is significant for a number of reasons, namely; 
1. It affirms the universality and inalienability of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as “the birth right of all human beings”, hence, “their protection and 
promotion is the first responsibility of Governments"119 and also acknowledges 
that international cooperation is vital to their realisation.120 
 
2. It recognizes and emphasizes that the human rights of women and the rights of 
the girl-child are an important, inalienable, integral and indivisible part of 
universal human rights, and that the full and equal participation of women in the 
socioeconomic, political, and cultural life, at the national, regional and 
                                                          
118 The World Conference on Human Rights was held by the United Nations in Vienna from June 14 through June 25, 1993, with 
representatives of 171 States in attendance. United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, June 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1663 [hereinafter Vienna Declaration] (reproducing U.N. Doe.A/CONF. 
157/24 (Part I) (Oct. 13, 1993), at 20-46). The World Conference was the first international conference to be held on human rights 
in twenty-five years. See Anne Reifenberg, Women Appear Primed For Success at Human Rights Meeting, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, June 14, 1993,at IA (describing groundwork for 1993 World Conference).This was quoted in Bunch, C. (1990). Women's 
rights as human rights: Toward a re-vision of human rights. Hum. Rts. Q., 12, 486.  
119 In its Part I, paragraph 27, the VDPA states inter alia that "Every State should provide an effective framework of remedies and 
redress human rights grievances or violations.” (This will comprise the administration of justice, including law enforcement and 
prosecutorial agencies and, especially, an independent and consequential judiciary supported by a legal profession which is sensitive 
to international human rights law). 
120 Part 1, paragraph 1. 
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international levels, as well as the eradication of all forms of discrimination on 
grounds of sex are core objectives of the international community.”121 
 
3. It declares further in Part 1, paragraph 18 that Gender-based violence and all 
forms of sexual harassment and exploitation, including those resulting from 
cultural prejudice and international trafficking, are incompatible with the dignity 
and worth of the human person, and must be eliminated by intensified legal 
effort and through national action and international cooperation in areas such as 
socioeconomic development, social security, education, and safe maternity and 
health care. 
 
4. The Convention calls on Governments, NGOs, institutions and 
intergovernmental organizations to intensify efforts for the protection and 
promotion of human rights of women and the girl-child including the promotion 
of all human rights instruments relating to women because women’s rights and 
gender-based exploitation are legitimate issues of international concern.122 
 
 
5. It also declares that violations of the human rights of women in situations of 
armed conflict are violations of the fundamental principles of international 
human rights and humanitarian law, and that all such violations especially 
murder, systematic rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy, require a 
particular effective international response. Above all, the Convention urges the 
UN General Assembly to adopt the draft Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence against Women (DEVAW) and implored States to combat Violence 
against Women in accordance with the DEVAW provisions.123 
                                                          
121 Part 1, paragraph 18. 
122 Part 1, paragraph 19. 
123 Part II, paragraph 38. 
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This Declaration is so important that in Part 1, paragraph 26 it cautions states to avoid 
making any reservations with respect to international instruments on the protection and 
promotion of the human rights of women and the girl-child, thus justifying the 
instrument as one that is “deeply concerned by various forms of discrimination and 
violence, to which women continue to be exposed all over the world.”124 
 
2.3.4 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Following the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
in the early 1990’s, the UN proposed the creation of a permanent international criminal 
court. Thus, in 1994, a draft statute for the establishment of a permanent international 
criminal court was submitted to the UN General Assembly by the International Law 
Commission. Thereafter, a conference of the UN General Assembly on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court was held in Rome, to "finalize and 
adopt a convention on the establishment of an international criminal court.” Thus was 
the adoption on 17th July 1990, of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
which established a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). The Statute entered 
into force on 1st July, 2002. 
The ICC had jurisdiction to try individuals who commit the ‘most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole.’ The Rome Statute defines these 
serious crimes as ‘the crime of genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; and the 
crime of aggression.’  
Article 7 (g) of the Rome Statute defines crime against humanity as “any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: . . . Rape, sexual slavery, 
                                                          
124 See part of the Preamble to the Declaration. 
   108 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of 
sexual violence of comparable gravity.”  
Since, marital rape, albeit not specifically mentioned in Article 7 (g), usually involves 
aggression, hostility and violence which disproportionately affects married women, this 
thesis suggests that marital rape be covered under the phrase, “any other form of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity” in order to accord greater legal protection to wives and 
place perpetrators within the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
So far, no spouse has been brought before the ICC for marital rape but recent reports 
indict military forces in Myanmar125 and the Democratic Republic of Congo126 of using 
rape as weapon of war. This statute significantly globalizes the sanctity of women’s 
dignity, especially with respect to sexual violations, which is the crux of this thesis.  
 
2.3.5 The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1995  
In certain cultures and societies including Nigeria and India, some females become 
victims of violence from the time of their conception, that is, before they are born, when 
expectant parents abort their unborn female foetuses because they hoped for sons 
instead. Girls are also subjected to such common traditional practices as female genital 
mutilation, which leave them maimed and traumatized. Sometimes too, the girls are 
forced into early marriages before they are even physically, psychologically or 
emotionally ready and mature. Women also become victims of rape, incest, exploitation 
                                                          
125 Writing for Reuters, Washington, (Jan, 14, 2014) under the caption, “Myanmar still uses rape as weapon of war: women's 
group”, David Brunnstrom reported that, “A women's group says the military in Myanmar is still using rape as a weapon of war, 
with more than 100 women and girls raped by the army since a 2010 election brought about a nominally civilian government that 
has pursued rapprochement with the West. The Thailand-based Women's League of Burma said in a report made available to 
Reuters that 47 of the cases documented were gang rapes and 28 of the women were either killed or had died of their injuries. It said 
several victims were as young as eight. The group said the situation showed the need for legal reform in Myanmar, also known as 
Burma, and for changes to a 2008 Constitution to ensure that the military is placed under civilian control.” 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/14/us-myanmar-military-rape-idUSBREA0D0CA20140114. (2/3/2014). 
126 A report in the online US edition of THEWORLDPOST (A Partnership of THE HUFFINGTON POST and BERGGRUEN 
INSTITUTE ON GOVERNANCE) of 2 March, 2014 stated that in 2011, “The United Nations named two Congolese army colonels 
who appear to be blocking an investigation of soldiers accused of mass gang-raping at least 47 women in eastern Congo, and said if 
the attackers are not identified the officers themselves should stand trial for the crimes committed by the troopers under their 
command. Government troops carried out the mass rapes in the remote and mountainous villages of Bushani and Kalambahiro in 
North Kivu province from Dec. 31 to Jan. 1, according to witnesses and victims cited in the report from the U.N. human rights 
office.” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/22/congo-mass-rapes-by-gover_n_906624.html (2/3/2014). 
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and domestic violence which often lead to frustration, life-long trauma, physical 
deformity, handicap or death. 
Researchers agree that rape is a commonly used weapon of war and armed conflict, 
employed as a strategy to subjugate and terrify entire communities, intimidate them and 
weaken their resistance to aggression.127 The United Nations also reported that soldiers 
deliberately rape and impregnate women of different ethnic groups in and around the 
war zones and abandon them to their fate without personal or medical care or economic 
support.128 
Research also reveals that during ethnic conflict, rape of “enemy” women and girls have 
been explicitly ordered, encouraged or tacitly condoned as both a military tactics and a 
nationalistic policy.129 For instance, in former Yugoslavia, refugees described how 
public raping of women and girls by military actors was systematically used to force 
families to flee their homeland, thus achieving the goal of ‘ethnic cleansing.’130 It is on 
this premise that the Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on 
Women, Beijing 1995, declared that rape in armed conflict is a war crime, a crime 
against humanity and could, under certain circumstances, be considered genocide. 
 
2.3.6 The Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) 
Apart from the various United Nations treaties, Conventions and thematic documents 
for the protection of Women’s rights above discussed, the United Nations also 
                                                          
127 Buss, D. E. (2009). Rethinking ‘rape as a weapon of war’. Feminist legal studies, 17(2), 145-163; Diken, B., & Laustsen, C. B. 
(2005). Becoming abject: Rape as a weapon of war. Body & Society, 11(1), 111-128; Farwell, Nancy. "War rape: New 
conceptualizations and responses." Affilia 19, no. 4 (2004): 389-403. 
128 United Nations, Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations. Background Information on Sexual 
Violence used as a Tool of War. http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgsexualviolence.shtml (29/12/2015). 
United Nations Department of Public Information DPI/1772/HR--February 1996. 
129 Shana Swiss, MD and Joan Giller, MB, “Rape as a Crime of War: A Medical Perspective” JAMA (The Journal of American 
Medical Association) August 4, 1993, Vol. 270, No. 5, p. 613. http://www.womens-rights.org/Publications/JAMA%2093.pdf. 
(3/3/2014).  
130 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations; 1993, 
United Nations document E/CN. 4/1993/50. 
   110 
established the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW).  The CSW was 
established in 1946 by Resolution 11(II) of the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC). It is the United Nations organ dealing specifically with women’s issues.  
It is the mandate of the CSW to prepare progress reports and recommendations to the 
ECOSOC on issues bothering on the promotion of women’s socio-economic, 
educational and political rights.  
The CSW is the Preparatory Committee and forum for review and evaluation of the 
implementation of the various UN Conferences on women including the popular Beijing 
Conference.131  
The CSW is constituted by 45 state members elected by the ECOSOC on the basis of 
regional and geographical equity to serve for four years. The Commission’s annual 
meeting lasts eight days and holds at the UN headquarters in New York. 
The Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) is also worthy of mention. It is 
arguably the secretarial arm of the CSW and its programmes are directed towards 
monitoring the ‘Forward-Looking Strategies’ developed during the various World 
Conferences on women. It is the mandate of the DAW to undertake and co-ordinate 
group and expert meetings as well as thematic research and advisory seminars in line 
with the focal themes of each session of the Commission on the Status of Women.132 
 
The cumulative significance of highlighting relevant provisions of core international 
and regional human rights instruments in relation to the protection of the right to dignity 
of women and girls, is to show that, jointly and severally, women’s right to dignity is a 
contemporary subject of international law which member States are obligated to secure 
                                                          
131 That is, the 1995 Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women. The Commission also acted as the Preparatory Committee forum 
and for earlier World Conferences on Women, held 1975 in Mexico, 1980 in Copenhagen and 1985 in Nairobi, Kenya. 
132 The United Nations, ICELANDIC HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE. http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights-
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/humanrightsconceptsideasandfora/humanrightsfora/theunitednations/. (12/3/2014). 
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through constitutional, legislative, judicial, as well as law and policy measures. Inherent 
gaps in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution which holds international law inferior to 
municipal law under the non-domestication provision in Section 12; whereby courts are 
not obliged to apply international law; the non-justiciability of socio-economic rights, 
and the manifest lack of judicial creativity and activism (unlike the practice in India and 
South Africa), justifies why this thesis draws valuable lessons from India and South 
Africa to bridge the gaps in the Nigerian framework for the protection of the right to 
dignity of women.  
 
2.4 Substantive Obligation of States to International Human Rights Law 
Generally speaking and as earlier mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, member 
states of the United Nations have three-pronged substantive obligations with respect to 
the enforcement of international human rights law, namely: Obligation to Respect, 
Obligation to Protect and Obligation to Fulfil.133 In the landmark case of F (Applicant) 
v. Minister of Safety and Security & 5 Ors,134 the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
listed the three obligations as “respect, protect and promote” when it explained that in 
determining whether the Minister of Safety and Security should be held vicariously 
liable for damages arising from the brutal rape of a thirteen year old girl by a policeman 
on standby duty, “the state’s constitutional obligations to respect, protect and promote 
the citizen’s right to dignity, and the freedom and security of the person would have to 
be taken into account.” 
These obligations equally take away from nation states the choice or discretion to abide 
or not to abide by international law and underscores why international law is used as 
template to measure states’ commitments to human rights protection. But even at that, 
                                                          
133 De Schutter, O. (2010). International human rights law: cases, materials, commentary: Cambridge University Press. 
134 CCT 30/11 [2011] ZACC 37 (Heard on 4 Aug 2011, Decided on 15 Dec 2-11). Note however, that the Minister of Safety and 
Security, as cited in these proceedings, has been renamed the Minister for Police. 
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the call has been reiterated135 for the establishment of a World Court of Human Rights 
(similar to the  Council of Europe, the Organization of American States and the African 
Union which have adopted a major human rights treaty and established a regional court 
with the function of handing down binding judgments on individual complaints), if the 
United Nations is to be taken seriously as ‘a meaningful human rights protection 
system’ for the global enforcement of rights and punishment of violators of 
international human rights law,136 because according to him, ‘human rights without a 
remedy are like the United Nations without Jakob Möller: an empty promise.’137 
It is essential and axiomatic that states remain primarily responsible in international law 
for enforcing the protection of human rights within their jurisdictions.138  
For instance, Paragraph I of part 1 of the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Program of 
Action states thus:  
 
The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms the solemn commitment 
of all States to fulfil their obligations to promote universal respect for, and 
observance and protection of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, other 
instruments relating to human rights, and international law. 
 
According to Manfred Nowak,  
The realisation of economic, social and cultural rights is today considered as 
important as respect for civil and political rights. This synthesis between the 
two main categories of human rights emanating from the formerly 
antagonistic human rights concepts is no longer in question, and human 
                                                          
135 Nowak, M. (2014). The Right of Victims of Human Rights Violations to a Remedy: The Need for a World Court of Human 
Rights. Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 32(1), 3-17. 
136 Nowak, M. 2009. “Eight Reasons Why We Need a World Court of Human Rights.” In International Human Rights Monitoring 
Mechanisms – Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller (2nd edn), edited by G. Alfredsson, J. Grimheden, B. G. Ramcharan, and A. 
de Zayas, 697–706. Leiden; Boston: Martin Nijhoff). The author rightly argues that “All regional organisations with any meaningful 
human rights protection system, i.e. the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States and the African Union, have 
adopted a major human rights treaty and established a regional court with the function of handing down binding judgments on 
individual complaints.” He specifically referred to the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 with a permanent and full-time 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg; the American Convention on Human Rights 1969 with an Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in San José; and the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981 with an African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights in Arusha, created by an Optional Protocol of 2008. 
137 Nowak, M. (2014) op.cit at 10. 
138 Dada, J. A. (2013). "Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations in Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal." Journal of Law, Policy 
and Globalization 10: 1-18 at 2.  
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rights have achieved an undisputed status as the only universally recognised 
value system of our time. Every state in the world has recognised as legally 
binding at least a few of the core UN human rights treaties.139  
 
However, while the respect and obligation to enforce international law is obligatory in 
the determination of matters relating to fundamental rights and the Bill of Rights,140 
under the provision of Section 39 of the South African Constitution and Article 51 (c) of 
the Indian Constitution141 as well as by the judicial activism of the Indian Supreme 
Court142 respectively, this is not so in Nigeria vide Section12 of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution.143 
 
2.5 Critique of the International Framework for the Protection of Women’s Right 
       to Dignity 
There are currently three functioning regional human rights systems across the world. 
These are the European, the Inter-American and the African systems. All these have 
institutions established to spearhead the promotion and protection of human rights 
within the respective regions. The European system has one-tier institutional machinery 
of a regional human rights court whereas the lnter-American and the African systems 
have two-tiered institutional machinery of regional human rights commissions and 
courts.144 
The one fundamental gap inherent in all UN international human rights instruments 
therefore is the inability of the United Nations to actually redress human rights 
                                                          
139 Nowak, M. (2014). The Right of Victims of Human Rights Violations to a Remedy: The Need for a World Court of Human 
Rights. Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 32(1), 3-17., p. 8 
140 Section 39 of the South African Constitution provides that “(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must 
consider international law. (Underlined for emphasis). 
141 Article 51 (c) provides that “The State shall endeavour to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings 
of organised people with one another.” 
142 In justifying the rationale for formulating the celebrated Vishaka Guidelines, the Supreme Court stated inter alia that India was a 
signatory to the CEDAW and therefore must be bound by it whether or not its provisions are replicated in a national legislation. (per 
Verma, CJI in Vishaka and others v. State of Rajasthan & Ors (JT 1997 (7) SC 384); AIR 1997 SC 3011).  
143 This Section precludes courts from applying foreign and international treaties unless they are domesticated into local legislation 
by the National Assembly. An elaboration of this assertion is made in the discussion on the regional framework in the later part of 
this chapter as well as in Chapter 3 following.  
144 Bogale, B. (2014). Regional human rights institutions: a comparison of the European and the African human rights systems. East 
African Journal of Peace and Human Rights, 20(1), 44-67.  
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violations. This is primarily due to the absence of a permanent World Court of human 
rights.145 This gap cuts across all human rights including the right to dignity of women 
and for this singular reason the UN is perceived as a toothless bulldog that provides 
more of principles an absolutely nothing in sustainable remedies and redress. The most 
authoritative proponent of this call is erudite UN administrator Manfred Nowak who 
gave eight reasons why a World Court of Human Rights remains the main solution to 
bridge inherent gaps in the international framework for the global protection of human 
rights generally.146 Nowak who has proposed that the UN needs to follow the examples 
of the European, American and African regional human rights systems, each of which 
has a permanent court which receives individual, group and state complaints and 
accordingly adjudicate and exercise unlimited jurisdictions over individual, group and 
state violators of international human rights.147   
 
2.5.1 The Way Forward 
The most consequential threat to the protection of women’s dignity and human rights 
generally in international law is the inability of the United Nations system to positively 
enforce punishment against individual and state violators of human rights. The is due to 
the absence of a permanent World Court of Human Rights, unlike what obtains in the 
European, American and African regional human rights systems,148 namely,  the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),149  the Inter-American Court of Human 
                                                          
145 Nowak, M. (2014). The Right of Victims of Human Rights Violations to a Remedy: The Need for a World Court of Human 
Rights. Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 32(1), 3-17.; Nowak, M. 2009. “Eight Reasons Why We Need a World Court of Human 
Rights.” In International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms – Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller (2nd edn), edited by G. 
Alfredsson, J. Grimheden, B. G. Ramcharan, and A. de Zayas, 697–706. Leiden; Boston: Martin Nijhoff. 
146 Nowak, M. 2009. “Eight Reasons Why We Need a World Court of Human Rights.” In International Human Rights Monitoring 
Mechanisms – Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller (2nd edn), edited by G. Alfredsson, J. Grimheden, B. G. Ramcharan, and A. 
de Zayas, 697–706. Leiden; Boston: Martin Nijhoff. 
147Nowak, M. (2014). The Right of Victims of Human Rights Violations to a Remedy: The Need for a World Court of Human 
Rights. Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 32(1), 3-17. 
148Nowak, M. (2014). The Right of Victims of Human Rights Violations to a Remedy: The Need for a World Court of Human 
Rights. Ibid. 
149The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is an international court established in 1959 to monitor respect for human rights 
among the member States of the Council of Europe. The Court is based in Strasbourg, France and it exercises jurisdiction over 
individual or state members alleging violations of the civil and political rights set out in the European Convention on Human Rights. 
(See Migration and Human Rights, Council of Europe. http://www.coe.int/t/democracy/migration/bodies/echr_en.asp (26/12/2015)). 
The European Court of Human Rights has delivered thousands of binding judgments which have led governments to alter their 
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Rights150 and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) 
respectively.151 
Erudite UN administrator Manfred Nowak gave eight reasons why a World Court of 
Human Rights remains the main solution to remedy the inherent gaps in the 
international framework for the global protection of human rights generally.152 This 
researcher agrees wholly with these reasons and arguments because they are 
resoundingly reasonable, logical, contemporary and authoritative, but further opines 
with respect, that such a court will particularly protect against violations of the right to 
dignity of women especially in Nigeria, India and South Africa. It will also put both 
individual and state violators of the right to dignity of women (by reason of rape/marital 
rape, sexual abuse, patriarchy, customary law, socio-religious mythology, denial of 
economic, social and cultural rights or otherwise), on edge especially when they realize,  
                                                                                                                                                                          
legislation and administrative practice in a wide range of areas. When the Court find states responsible for human rights abuses, they 
ask governments to pay compensation to the victims, engage in symbolic measures and effect policy changes in their domestic 
human rights policies and practices to ensure that the violations do not recur. The Court is therefore a significant agent of positive 
change, transformation and consolidation of the rule of law and democracy in Europe. (See Hillebrecht, C. (2014). The power of 
human rights tribunals: Compliance with the European Court of Human Rights and domestic policy change. European Journal of 
International Relations, 20(4), 1100-1123). 
150 At the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights held in San José, Costa Rica in November 1969, delegates of 
the member States of the Organization of the American States (OAS) adopted the American Convention on Human Rights, which 
entered into force on July 18, 1978. To secure human rights in the American continent, the Convention then created two authorities 
with competence to observe human rights violations: the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights. The Organization of American States established the Court in 1979 to enforce and interpret the provisions 
of the American Convention on Human Rights.  Its two main functions are thus adjudicatory and advisory. Under the former, it 
hears and rules on the specific cases of human rights violations referred to it. Under the latter, it issues opinions on matters of legal 
interpretation brought to its attention by other OAS bodies or member states. The first hearing was on June 29 and 30, 1979 at the 
OAS’ headquarters in Washington, D.C. (See History of the Inter American Court of Human Rights, available online at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/about-us/historia-de-la-corteidh (26/12/2015).  
151 Although the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) is discussed below in this chapter [2.6.2.2], it must 
however be mentioned that the Court is a regional human rights court established following the adoption of the Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It entered into force on 25 January 2004. Its role is to enforce compliance with the Charter 
provisions or provide remedies to victims of human rights violations in Africa. At the ECOWAS sub-regional level, the Economic 
Commission of West African States (ECOWAS) Community Court of Justice (ECOWAS CCJ) is the adjudicatory body responsible 
for redressing the violation of human rights within member states including Nigeria. The ECOWAS Court has broad access 
mechanism which permits aggrieved individuals and NGOs to bypass national courts and file actions directly with the Court.-(See 
Alter, K. J., Helfer, L. R., & McAllister, J. R. (2013). A new international human rights court for West Africa: the ECOWAS 
community court of justice. American Journal of International Law, 107(4), 737-779). 
152 Nowak, M. (2014). The Right of Victims of Human Rights Violations to a Remedy: The Need for a World Court of Human 
Rights, op.cit. at 10. 
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as in the case of crimes against humanity, that it is only a matter of time before they are 
brought to justice.153  Accordingly, the eight reasons recommended by Manfred Nowak 
are hereby adopted by this researcher and listed elaborately as follows: 
1. Human rights without a remedy are like the United Nations without Jakob 
Möller: an empty promise: As with all other rights, human rights create 
obligations of others, above all states, and the rights-holders should have a 
remedy to hold the duty-holders accountable before an independent court. This 
is the simple logic of rights, duties and accountability. 
 
2. Final views on communications are nice, but legally binding judgments are 
simply better: the language of UN human rights treaties, which use the term 
“communications” instead of complaints and “final views” instead of 
“decisions” is simply out dated. 
 
 
3. Although the United Nations still maintains a strict separation between East and 
West, we can’t deny it: the Cold War is over: It is indeed strange that the UN 
maintains even now an Eastern European Group and a Western and Others 
Group when most of the former Central and Eastern European states have 
already joined the EU. The language and spirit of UN human rights treaty 
monitoring still follows this Cold War spirit. 
 
4. The United Nations might learn from regional organisations: All regional 
organisations with any meaningful human rights protection system, i.e. the 
Council of Europe, the Organization of American States and the African Union, 
                                                          
153 This is in the light of Nowak’s Reason No. 7 that ‘the Statute of the World Court can be opened for ratification by non-state 
actors.’ This will make the court indeed a world court with unlimited jurisdiction over individuals, groups and state violators of 
international human rights. 
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have adopted a major human rights treaty and established a regional court with 
the function of handing down binding judgments on individual complaints. 
 
 
5. The powerful Human Rights Council needs an even more powerful Human 
Rights Court as independent counterpart: Although this argument was originally 
meant in an ironic manner, it even holds more truth today. The Universal 
Periodic Review mechanism would be an ideal political supervision mechanism 
for the implementation of the judgments of a future World Court of Human 
Rights, similar to the supervision of states’ compliance with the judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe. 
 
6. The creation of the World Court is easier than we might think and does not even 
require any treaty amendment: While other reform proposals, such as replacing 
the existing treaty monitoring bodies by one standing “super-committee”, would 
require lengthy treaty amendment procedures, the World Court can be 
established by means of an additional treaty containing the Statute of the Court. 
 
7. The Statute of the World Court can be opened for ratification by non-state 
actors: How we can hold inter-governmental organisations, transnational 
corporations and other non-state actors accountable for human rights violations 
constitutes one of the major challenges of international law in the twenty-first 
century. The creation of the World Court of Human Rights seems to provide a 
practical solution on the basis of voluntary commitments. 
 
8. The World Court can enforce the right of victims to adequate reparation: After 
long negotiations, the General Assembly in 2005 adopted the UN Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
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of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law (GA Res. 60/147 of 16 December 2005). But 
no mechanisms were developed for the practical implementation of these 
principles. The World Court could provide a solution. In addition to handing 
down binding judgments at the global level, the Court could also be empowered 
to order the respondent party in a legally binding manner to provide adequate 
reparation to the victims, including restitution, rehabilitation, compensation, 
legal changes and other forms of satisfaction.154 
 
2.6 Regional Protection of Women’s Right to Dignity in Nigeria and South Africa 
This part of the thesis examines the regional instruments for the protection of human 
rights and invariably, the right to dignity of women in Nigeria and South Africa only. 
Specifically, these are the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1981 (The 
African Charter) with its Women Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights (The Women Protocol), the African Commission on  
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Human Rights Court. The Chapter also 
examines the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, as well as the  
commitment of states, that is, Nigeria and South Africa, to the African Charter. Lastly, 
it makes a critique of the regional framework and suggests the way forward. 
 
2.6.1 Human Rights in India and ASEAN Member States  
As for India, the country is not bound by any regional human rights instrument because 
Asia is strangely, the only region of the world without a regional mechanism for the 
protection of human rights. This is without prejudice to the still “toothless” ASEAN 
                                                          
154 See Nowak, M. 2009. “Eight Reasons Why We Need a World Court of Human Rights.” In International Human Rights 
Monitoring Mechanisms – Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller (2nd edn), edited by G. Alfredsson, J. Grimheden, B. G. 
Ramcharan, and A. de Zayas, 697–706. Leiden; Boston: Martin Nijhoff). These reasons are reproduced from Nowak, M. (2014) 
op.cit p.10. 
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Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, ICHR (also known as the ASEAN 
Charter),155 which is an advisory body on human rights in South-East Asia founded in 
the late 2008 but to which India does not also belong.156 To date there is still no 
ASEAN Human Rights Court. It is doubtful there will ever be one in the next decade. 
Generally speaking, the human rights records in the ASEAN member states are poor to 
begin with. This confirms that in India, the protection of human rights generally and 
women’s dignity in particular, is not regulated by any institution equivalent to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court; the European 
Commission on Human Rights and the European Court; or the African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights.157  
Nonetheless, India parades a formidable and fearless judicial system which, by its 
creativity and activism, has effectively applied international law to bridge any gaps 
which may have existed as a result of the absence of a regional human rights 
mechanism or charter. Human and fundamental rights protection and enforcement in 
India is discussed in extenso in Chapter four of this thesis. 
 
2.6.2 The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1981  
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 1981,158 otherwise known as “The 
African Charter” is the regional mechanism for the protection and promotion of human 
rights (including the right to dignity of women) in Africa. It was established under the 
aegis of the Organisation of African Unity, OAU (now African Union, AU).159 The 
                                                          
155 Kelsall, M. S. (2009). The new ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights: toothless tiger or tentative first step? 
In L. K. Quintana (Series Ed.), Analysis from the East-West Center (pp. 1-8). Honolulu, Hawai'i The Asian Pacific Issues Reports on 
Topics of Regional Concern. This author however concedes that though the ICHR lacks teeth, “the fact that all Ten ASEAN 
governments agreed to implement a single commission is remarkable and is an essential first step toward ASEAN’s stated goal of 
respecting and protecting human rights.” At p.1  
156 The Ten ASEAN member states are Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Laos, Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia and Burma (Myanmar). 
157 Sidney Jones (1995). Regional Institutions for Protecting Human Rights in Asia. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American 
Society of International Law) Vol. 89, Structures Of World Order (April 5-8 1995), pp. 475-480. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25658967. (18/10/2014). 
158 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981). 
159 See article 3(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. At its first meeting in Durban, South Africa, 9–10 July 2002 the 
African Union decided that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights established by the African Charter on Human 
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Charter was entered into force on 21 October 1986 and as African member nations, 
Nigeria and South Africa are bound by its provisions. 
South Africa signed and ratified the Charter on 9 July 1996 while Nigeria signed it on 
31 August 1982, ratified it on 22 June 1983,160 and later domesticated it into local 
legislation as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and 
Enforcement) Act cap 10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 or Cap A9, Laws of 
the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 
The Preamble of the African Charter, like most international agreements, underscores 
the rationale and prime considerations of the Charter. These include that “freedom, 
equality, justice and dignity are the essential objectives for the achievement of the 
legitimate aspirations of the African peoples’”161, the obligation of AU member states to 
eliminate all forms of colonialism in Africa and to direct their efforts towards improving 
the lot of the African people in line with UN Charter and Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,162 the recognition of the “tradition and the values of African 
civilisation” as well as “the reality and the respect for peoples’ rights [which] should 
absolutely guarantee human rights.”163  
 
The Charter is precisely arranged thus: “Rights and Obligations” (Articles 1 to 29); 
“Human and Peoples’ Rights” in Chapter 1 (Articles 1 to 26); “Obligations” in Chapter 
2 (Articles 27 to 29) and “General Provisions”, which includes the regulations on the 
Charter’s ratification and entry into force and the criteria any supplementation. The first 
section of the Charter contains all the three generations of human rights. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and Peoples’ Rights shall operate within the framework of the African Union, para. 2(xi) of Decision ASS/AU/Dec. 1(I). 
http://www.who.int/hhr/Human_and_Peoples_rights.pdf. (13/4/2015). 
The African Union (AU) came into being to replace the OAU in May 2001 after South Africa deposited its instruments as the 35 th 
member state to ratify the Constitutive Act of the African Union on 23 April 2001. The official launching of the AU later held in 
Durban, South Africa on 10 July 2002. 
160 See http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ratification/. (10/4/2015).    
161  Paragraph 2 of the Preamble. 
162 Paragraph 3 of the Preamble. 
163 Paragraph 5 of the Preamble. 
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Remarkably, the Rights contained in the Charter also carry obligations on the individual 
in relation to the state and in relation to other individuals.164 Paragraph 6 of the 
Preamble states inter alia, “that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also entails the 
assumption of obligations”. No similar provision is contained in the European or Inter 
American systems.  
 
Article 1 obliges member states to recognise the rights, obligations and freedoms 
expressed in the Charter and to “to take legislative and other measures pertaining to the 
implementation” of all rights, obligations and freedoms provided in the Charter.165  
Individual Rights in the Charter are contained in Articles 3 to 18. More specifically, 
Article 18, Paragraphs I and II relate to the collective rights of the family, while its 
Paragraphs III and IV includes the rights of women, children, the elderly and the 
handicapped.  
Article 2 guarantees equality and non-discrimination and states that the rights contained 
in the Charter shall be enjoyed “without any differentiation such as race, ethnic group, 
skin colour, language, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
wealth or other status”. 
Article 3 of the African Charter provides for the right of equality before the law and 
equal protection of the law while Article 4 guarantees the inviolability and respect for 
human life and integrity.  
Article 5 guarantees the Right to human dignity thus: 
 
Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in 
a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of 
exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, 
torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment and treatment shall be 
prohibited.  
                                                          
164 This arguably underscores the African notion of “brotherhood”. 
165 This is an emphatic obligation on Member States to incorporate the Charter into their various municipal laws. 
   122 
In addition to civil and political rights, the Charter also codifies Socio-economic and 
Cultural rights166 as well as “collective rights” or “Peoples’ Rights”. It is the only 
human rights instrument which guarantees “Peoples’ Rights” as justiciable rights.167 
The Charter also creates obligations towards other human beings;168 one’s family, the 
state169 and the international community.170 
 
The Charter is the African version of the UN Human Rights Charter intended to 
globalize and sustain human rights protection in Africa. Phillip171 described the Charter 
as “ushering in a new era of recognition of fundamental human rights and freedoms as 
well as the legal protection of individuals and groups against repression and 
totalitarianism.” However, it fell short of the strict pattern of the European and Inter-
American Human Rights mechanisms which created both Human Rights Commission 
and Human Rights Courts under the respective Human Rights Conventions. 172 On the 
contrary, the African Charter had no regional “human rights court” at that time. It 
however had only the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights which could 
not enforce compliance with the Charter provisions or provide remedies to victims of 
human rights violations in Africa because its functions under Article 45 of the African 
Charter were mainly promotional, protectional and quasi-judicial but basically non-
compelling.  
                                                          
166 Articles 15 to 17. 
167 These “collective rights” include the “rights of peoples’” to existence and to unquestionable and inalienable right to self-
determination [Art. 20 (1)]; freedom and liberation from colonial domination in accordance with international law [Art. 20 (2)]; 
support for liberation against foreign political, economic or cultural domination [Art. 20 (3)]; not to be deprived of the freedom to 
dispose of their wealth and natural resources in their own interest [Art. 21 (1)]; lawful recovery of its property and adequate 
compensation in the event of any unlawful deprivation or dispossession [Art. 21 (2)]; socio-economic and cultural development 
consistent with their identity and common heritage [Art. 22 (3)]; national and international peace and security, and friendship with 
other nations in consonance with the Charters of the UN and OAU [Art. 23 (1)]; a satisfactory environment [Art. 24]; duty to 
promote and ensure the respect and understanding of the rights and freedoms contained in the Charter through teaching, education 
and publication [Art. 25] and duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts and the establishment and improvement of 
appropriate national institutions to promote and protect the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter [Art. 26]. 
168 Article 28 
169 These obligations, per Article 29 includes to assist one’s nation and community with one’s physical and intellectual endowments, 
to protect and not to threaten national security, to defend the territorial integrity of the state, to create or provide employment and to 
pay one’s taxes.  
170  Article 27. 
171 Phillip A., “The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights- An Effective Weapon for Human Rights”, 4 Journal of Inter’ l 
& Comp. Law, 1992, at 226.  
172 Yerima F. Timothy, “African Continental Human Rights Courts: Features and Comparative Critique with the European and Inter-
American Courts of Human Rights” Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, Vol. 1 No. 1, 2009, 20-34.  
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It was not until 1998 that the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the 
OAU adopted a Protocol173 establishing the African Human Rights Court174  to give 
judicial teeth to the rights contained in the African Charter and allied human rights 
instruments ratified by relevant Member States.175   
 
2.6.2.1 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established under article 
30 of the African Charter with its functions listed in article 45 of the Charter to include 
the promotion of human and peoples’ rights, the protection of human and peoples’ 
rights and the interpretation of the provisions of the African Charter.  
The Commission also receives and examines reports from member states outlining what 
legislative or other steps have been taken or are being taken to meet the obligations of 
protecting and promoting human rights in their jurisdictions.176 After considering these 
reports, the Commission may address general observations to the State concerned or 
transmit the general observations and the State party’s report and comments to the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the AU. The Commission may also 
receive and consider individual communications alleging violation by a State party of 
any of the rights guaranteed in the Charter.177  
Interestingly too, if a State party believes that another State party is in breach of its 
obligations under the Charter, that State party may draw the attention of the violating 
State Party to such breach, or bring the matter to the attention of the Commission 
directly. This is known as an inter-state communication of the African Commission on 
                                                          
173 Article 66 of the African Charter authorizes the adoption of Protocols and Agreements as supplements pursuant to the Charter 
provisions. 
174 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 9 June 1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROJIII (entered 
into force on 25 January 2004). 
175 Article 3 (1) of the Protocol, op.cit. 
176 Article 62 of the African Charter. 
177 Article 55 ibid 
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Human and Peoples’ Rights.178 In any case, the Commission will investigate the 
complaint and issue a decision known as “recommendation”.179 This recommendation is 
however, non-compelling. 
At least two eminent scholars posit that one of the major challenges facing the 
Commission is the “absence of effective follow-up mechanism to ensure 
implementation of its findings and recommendations.”180 
Other lapses in the Commission, according to Udombana,181 include lack of effective 
individual access, lack of power to enforce or remedy breach of human rights, lack of 
independence and inadequate funding. These, inter alia, necessitated the need for an 
African Human Rights Court with full judicial powers.  
 
2.6.2.2 The African Human Rights Court 
The African Human Rights Court came into being on 9 June 1998 following the 
adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Establishment of an African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights182 and it entered into force on 25 January 2004.  
The Court was established as a regional human rights court to enforce compliance with 
the Charter provisions or provide remedies to victims of human rights violations in 
Africa, a necessary role which the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
could not play under the African Charter system. The establishment of the African 
Human Rights Court placed the African regional mechanism at par with other regional 
                                                          
178 See articles 47–49 and 52 ibid. 
179 Article 46 ibid 
180 Murray, R., & Long, D. (2015). The Implementation of the Findings of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: 
Cambridge University Press, p. vii. 
181 Udombana N. J., Human Rights and Contemporary issues in Africa (Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd., 2003) at 128-133; Obiora C. 
O., The African Human Rights System- Activist Forces and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) at 71-73. 
182 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, June 9, 1998: OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III).   
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mechanisms like the European and Inter-American Human Rights mechanisms which 
also have Human Rights Courts in addition to Human Rights Commissions as earlier 
stated in this chapter. 
The main functions of the Court under article 3 (1) of the Protocol establishing it is to 
enforce compliance with the Charter provisions and provide remedies for victims of 
human rights violations in Africa.  
The Court is composed of eleven judges with not more than one from each AU member 
state, and who must have verifiable experience on matters relating to human and 
peoples’ rights in addition to practical judicial and academic competence.183 
The judges of the Court are elected by the AU Assembly to serve on a part-time basis184 
for a single six year renewable tenure,185 due consideration being given to persons from 
major regions of Africa, major legal systems as well as adequate gender 
representation.186 This “adequate gender representation” in the election of judges will 
certainly ensure that key issues bothering on the violation of women’s rights in Africa 
are not relegated to the back bench. This also places the African Court ahead of its 
European and Inter-American Counterparts which have no provision for adequate or 
equitable gender representation in the appointment of judges.187  
Yerima188 contends that the African Human Rights Court provides judicial guarantee for 
the protection of human rights in Africa and fills the gap in the African human rights 
system vis-à-vis the European and Inter-American systems. 
                                                          
183 Article 11 of the African Human Rights Court Protocol. 
184 By Article 15 (4) ibid, other than the President of the Court, all other judges of the African Human Rights Courts are to serve and 
function part-time.  
185 Articles 11(1) and 15 (1) ibid. 
186 Articles 11 (2) and 14 (2) ibid.  
187 Yerima F. Timothy, “African Continental Human Rights Courts: Features and Comparative Critique with the European and Inter-
American Courts of Human Rights”, op.cit at 24.  
188 Yerima F. Timothy, ibid at 21-22. 
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The African Human Rights Court Protocol provides for the impartiality and 
independence of the judges by providing in Article 18 that office of a judge is 
incompatible with any activity that will compromise or interfere with his impartiality 
and independence. Also, a judge of the African Human Rights Courts cannot sit on a 
panel if the case to be heard is one in which his country of origin is a party.189 
Furthermore, by Article 19 (1), a judge of the Court cannot be removed or suspended 
from office without the unanimous agreement of the other judges confirming that the 
erring judge is no longer fit to perform the functions of a judge. This is to insulate the 
office of the judges from unnecessary political stampede of their home states in the 
event that refuses to compromise their positions when pressured to do so. But once a 
judge is so removed by the unanimous agreement of his brother judges, it shall be final 
unless the Assembly of Heads of State and Government reverse the decision in the 
following session.190  
The adjudicatory mechanism of the African Human Rights Court is liberalised and 
devoid of unnecessary procedural hiccups because the Protocol permits the Court to 
develop its own rules and procedure. This is to circumvent the delayed justice which 
may ensue from strict rules of procedure and unnecessary legal technicalities, including 
the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies which has been the bane of the African 
Human Rights Commission. For instance, in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre 
(SERAC) & Anor v. Nigeria191 where the issue of local remedies was waived because 
the Commission’s earlier communication to Nigeria was roundly ignored by the 
country. This caused a delay whereby it took the Commission five years to take a 
decision on the matter.   
 
                                                          
189 Article 22 of the African Human rights Protocol. 
190 Article 19 (2). 
191 Communication No. 155/95 
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The Court may receive communications from the African Commission, Non-
Governmental Organisations and individuals. Article 56 of the African Charter 
stipulates certain preconditions for the admissibility of Communication by the African 
Human Rights Court. These are: 
1. It must bear the author’s name even if he requests for anonymity. This will 
ensure that the Court process is not abused by mere busy-bodies. 
2. It must be written in a clear and unambiguous language which does not insult or 
disparage the concerned State or its institutions or the AU. 
3. The communication must be brought to the Court within reasonable time after 
all local remedies have been fully exhausted,192 a requirement which has been 
described as the most controversial of all.193  
4. It must be compatible with the African Charter or the Constitutive Act of the 
AU. 
5. Must not be matters that have already been settled one way or the other. 
6. May be sent directly if other remedies are taking unduly long time.  
 
Access to the African Human Rights Court takes two form namely, Automatic access 
and Optional access. Under Article 5 (1) of the Human Rights Court Protocol, a State 
Party acquires automatic access to the Court once it ratifies the Protocol. On the other 
hand, under Article 5 (3) and 34 (6), the Optional Protocol involves the signing of a 
separate Declaration authorising the Court to receive communications from an 
individual and NGOs against a State Party. 
For instance, in the case of Femi Falana v. The African Union,194 the applicant, a 
Nigerian human rights lawyer approached the African Human Rights Court with an 
application against the African Union. In his Application he averred that the 
                                                          
192 See SERAC v. Nigeria, supra. 
193 Yerima, op.cit at 27. 
194 Application No. 001/2011 http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/africancourt-humanrights.pdf 
(12/10/2013). 
   128 
Government of Nigeria had not made a Special Declaration vide Article 34(6) of the 
Protocol so as to confer upon individuals the right of access to the African Human 
Rights Court. He further averred that the Nigerian government had ignored several of 
his attempts pressurising it to make the Special Declaration. He averred further that this 
refusal or failure to accept the competence of the Court in line with Article 34(6) of the 
Protocol has denied lawful access to Court.  
The Court rejected his application by a 7-3 majority votes on the grounds inter alia, that 
the African Union is juristic person is neither a party/signatory to the African Charter 
nor the Protocol itself, and therefore cannot be subject to any obligation under any of 
them. Accordingly, the Court reiterated that the combined import of Article 5(3) and 
34(6) of the Protocol, it lacked the jurisdiction to hear cases instituted by nationals of a 
country which has not complied with said Articles of the Protocol.  
 
Bearing in mind that individuals and NGOs are the major players and the most likely 
petitioners against the respective States for human rights violations, this lack of direct 
individual access to the Court is an anti-climax and “a major embarrassing obstacle”195 
which “contradicts acceptable standards for human rights protection”196 and therefore 
raises doubt on the sincerity and willingness of African States to submit to judicial 
scrutiny for human rights protection and violations.197    
 
The proceedings of the African Court including its judgements must also be conducted 
in public198 and its judgement as handed down by the majority of the judges within 
ninety days of conclusion of hearing,199 “shall be final and not subject to appeal.”200 
                                                          
195 Mughwai A.,“The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Prospects and Challenges”, available online  at 
http://www.cam.es/docs/fiheros/20081003000769pdf-  (Cited in Yerima, T. F. (2011). Comparative Evaluation of the Challenges of 
African Regional Human Rights Courts. Journal of Politics and Law, 4(2), p120.  
196 Olisa Agbakoba, “The Creation of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights”, available online at 
www.nbaprogrammes.org.  (14/4/2015). 
197 Yerima, op.cit at 33. 
198 Article 10 (1) of the African Human Rights Court Protocol. 
199 The Protocol did not say the effect of non-compliance with this provision or the quality of a judgement handed down outside the 
prescribed time frame. This is indeed a lacuna. However, in the light of the domestication of the African Charter into local 
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Furthermore, parties may be represented by counsel of their choice, albeit legal aid may 
avail a party if it is in the interest of justice.201 Article 10 (3) also guarantees unfettered 
assistance, facilities and protection of the African Human Rights Court to all persons, 
parties, witnesses or representatives appearing before it “in accordance with 
international law, necessary for discharging their functions, tasks and duties in relation 
to the Court.” 
 
Under Article 27 (1) of the enabling protocol, the African Human Rights Court shall 
“order an appropriate measure to remedy the violation including the payment of fair 
compensation or reparation” if it is satisfied that a victim’s right under the African 
charter has been violated. The Court may also make necessary interim or provisional 
orders to maintain status quo if the case is one of “extreme gravity and urgency and 
pending, and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons.”202 This provision is 
indeed significant because it can help to protect human rights by mitigating the extent of 
violation or stalling further violation of rights pending the determination of the 
substantive communication by the Court. 
The judgement of the Court shall bind member states and parties thereto and copies 
thereof are sent to the African Commission, the member States and the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government through the Council of Ministers of the AU.203 
Thereafter, the State Parties must comply with the obligation guaranteeing compliance 
with and execution of such judgement, and within the time which may be prescribed by 
the Court for its compliance/execution. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
legislation in Nigeria, the relevant provisions of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (that is, Section 294 (5)) as well as relevant 
decisions of Nigerian courts may be applied with respect to judgements delivered out of time, in which case, it shall not be set aside 
or voided unless there was a miscarriage of justice on the part of any of the complaining applicant. Under the said Section 294 (5) of 
the Nigerian Constitution: “The decision of a Court shall not be set aside or treated as a nullity solely on the ground of non-
compliance with the provision of sub-section (1) of this Section (on the issue of 90 days) unless the Court exercising jurisdiction by 
way of appeal or review of that decision is satisfied that the party complaining has suffered a miscarriage of justice by reason 
therefore.”    
200 Article 28 of the African Human Rights Court Protocol. 
201 Article 10 (2) of the African Human Rights Court Protocol. The Protocol did not however say who will bear the cost of providing 
the legal aid. 
202 Article 27 of the African Human rights court protocol. 
203 Article 29 ibid. 
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It is also a lacuna that the African Human Rights Court will remain helpless if any of its 
decisions is ignored by the member State or party against whom it is directed because 
the Court lacks the machinery, organ or authority (such as an African Police) to ensure 
due and diligent execution of, or compliance with its judgements. This is without 
prejudice to the powers of the Court under Article 31 of the enabling Protocol to publish 
the list of State violators of its judgements and decisions in its annual report to the AU, 
thereby stigmatising, peer-reviewing,204 exposing and “shaming” 205 the disobedient 
State in the comity of African nations.  
So far, it is clear that inasmuch as the African Human Rights Court is considered a bold 
step in the judicial enforcement and protection of human rights in Africa, the part-time 
status of its judges, the apparent denial of direst access to NGOs and individuals among 
others, are sour thumbs for which Yerima has likened to “giving justice with the left 
hand and seizing it with the right hand.”206   
 
2.6.2.3 Women Protocol to the African Charter 
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of 
Women in Africa 207(“The African Women’s Protocol” or “The Maputo Protocol”) was 
adopted in 2000, as a women-specific mechanism ‘to ensure that the rights of women 
are promoted, realised and protected in order to enable them to enjoy fully all their 
human rights.’ Apparently, the Maputo Protocol was necessitated by the lack of clear 
and specific provision for protection or implementation of women’s rights generally 
                                                          
204 Pityana N.B., “The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Municipal Law”, Seminar for Southern African States on 
Ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African court on Human and Peoples’ rights, 
Gaborone, Botswana, 9-12 Dec. 2003, available online at http://www.unisa.ac.39/contents/about/principle/dois/municipallawdoc. 
(cited in Yerima, op.cit at 32). 
205 See Mutua A., “The African Human Rights Court: a Two Legged Stool?” 21 Human Rights Quarterly, 342 and 358. 
206 Yerima, op.cit at 33. 
207 Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Maputo, CAB/LEG/66.6 (Sept. 13, 2000); reprinted in 1 
Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 40, entered into force on Nov. 25, 2005. https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/protocol-women2003.html. 
(10/4/2015). 
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under the African Charter.208 This fact is evident from the Preamble to the Women’s 
protocol which expresses concern that:  
despite the ratification of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
and other international human rights instruments by the majority of State 
Parties and their solemn commitment to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination and harmful practices against women, women in Africa still 
continue to be victims of discrimination and harmful practices.209  
 
The African Women Protocol promotes the human rights of women in Africa by 
specifically prohibiting violence against women, including discrimination, sexual 
violence and harmful practices among others.210  
Article 1 of the African Women Protocol defines various terms used in the Protocol, 
four of which are very particular to this research namely, 
1. "Discrimination against women" means any distinction, exclusion or 
restriction or any differential treatment based on sex and whose objectives 
or effects compromise or destroy the recognition, enjoyment or the exercise 
by women, regardless of their marital status, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in all spheres of life.211 
2. "Harmful Practices" means all behaviour, attitudes and/or practices which 
negatively affect the fundamental rights of women and girls, such as their 
right to life, health, dignity, education and physical integrity.212 
3. "Violence against women" means all acts perpetrated against women 
which cause or could cause them physical, sexual, psychological, and 
                                                          
208 F Viljoen “An introduction to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa‟ (2009) 16 Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice 17. 
209 See Protocol to The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on The Rights of Women in Africa 
http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/women-protocol/achpr_instr_proto_women_eng.pdf (20/10/2014). 
210 Article 1 defines discrimination against women, violence against women and harmful practices against women.  Other specific 
rights contained therein include: elimination of discrimination against women (article 2); rights to life, integrity and security of 
person  (article 4);  obligation to eliminate harmful practices  (article 5); special protection of women in armed conflicts  (article 11); 
women’s right to education and training  (article 12); women’s socio-economic and welfare rights  (article 13); right to health and 
reproductive rights (article 14); right to food security  (article 15); right to adequate housing  (article 16); right to a healthy and safe 
environment  (article 18); right to special care protection for elderly women  (article 22); the provision of special care and protection 
for women with disabilities  (article 23); provision of special care and protection for women in distress  (article 24).  
211 Article 1 (f) of the African Women Protocol. 
212 Article 1 (g) ibid. 
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economic harm, including the threat to take such acts; or to undertake the 
imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or deprivation of fundamental 
freedoms in private or public life in peace time and during situations of 
armed conflicts or of war.213 
4. “Women” mean persons of female gender, including girls.214 
 
The definition of “women” to include girls suffices that the entirety of this research on 
the right of dignity of women invariably covers the right to dignity of the girl-child too. 
It further suffices the protections offered to women against all forms of violence and 
harmful practices as well as discrimination under the African Women Protocol apply 
equally to the girl-child.  
Its Article 3 specifically provides for the right to dignity of women in elaborate terms 
thus:  
1. Every woman shall have the right to dignity inherent in a human being 
and to the recognition and protection of her human and legal rights; 
2. Every woman shall have the right to respect as a person and to the free 
development of her personality; 
3. States Parties shall adopt and implement appropriate measures to prohibit 
any exploitation or degradation of women; 
4. States Parties shall adopt and implement appropriate measures to ensure 
the protection of every woman’s right to respect for her dignity and 
protection of women from all forms of violence, particularly sexual and 
verbal violence. 
The Women Protocol is particularly significant because it also widows-sensitive. Its 
Article 20 enjoins State Parties to “take appropriate legal measures to ensure that 
                                                          
213 Article 1 (j) ibid. 
214 Article 1 (k) ibid. It will be seen in the future if, and to what extent, this definition will cover transgender people. 
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widows enjoy all human rights” by ensuring that widows are not subjected to inhuman, 
humiliating or degrading treatment, and shall automatically become the guardian and 
custodian of her children, after the death of her husband, unless this is contrary to the 
interests and the welfare of the children. Similarly, a widow shall have the right to 
remarry, and in that event, to marry the person of her choice.215 
Under Article 21 of the Women Protocol, a widow shall have the right to inherit an 
equitable share in her late husband’s as well as the right to continue to reside in the 
matrimonial home. Even if she remarries, she can still retain the house if it belongs to 
her by purchase or inheritance.216 Under the Protocol, women shall also have same right 
as men to inherit the estate of their parents equitably.217 
Suffice to say that the Women Protocol makes sufficient provisions for the protection of 
African women’s rights generally. Interestingly, Article 31 provides that in member 
states where existing national, regional, continental or international instruments and 
treaties offer wider and better protections for women’s rights, the Women Protocol shall 
be waived in preference to those other instruments. 
Both Nigeria and South Africa have signed, ratified and deposited the Maputo 
Protocol.218 But albeit the protocol is obviously women-centric (addressing feminine 
issues like domestic violence, polygamy, female genital mutilation, women’s equality, 
reproductive rights and maternal healthcare), Viljoen219 expressed fear that the protocol 
may be bedevilled by common impediments to the implementation of the parent Charter 
because, for instance, from its adoption in 2003 up to 2009, no single inter-state or 
individual communications alleging any violation of the Protocol was received by the 
                                                          
215 Article 20 (a)-(c). 
216 Article 21 (1) 
217 Article 21 (2) 
218 Nigeria signed the Protocol on 16/12/2003, ratified it on 16/12/2004 and deposited it on 18/2/2005. South Africa signed it on 
16/3/2004, ratified it on 17/12/2004 and deposited it on 14/1/2005. Source: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ratification/ (20/10/2014). 
219 F Viljoen “An introduction to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa.” (2009) op.cit. 38-40. 
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Commission or the African Human Rights Court,220 and this does not of course suggest 
any lack of abuse nor does it guarantee the promotion and protection of women’s rights 
or the dignity of women in Africa within the period. 
 
2.6.2.4 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child  
Another African instrument which invariably seeks to protect and promote the right to 
dignity of women, in this case, the girl-child is the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child, adopted under the auspices of the then OAU (now African Union, 
AU). It makes various provisions for various rights and protections for African Children 
and lists legislative and other specific measures which States parties of the AU (in this 
case, Nigeria and South Africa) must take to implement the Charter provisions for the 
right and welfare of African children (in this case, the girl-child). Additionally, the 
Charter protects other rights which may directly or indirectly impact on a girl-child’s 
enjoyment of the right to dignity, safety, health and welfare. These include non-
discrimination221; welfare of handicapped children222; protection against child labour223; 
protection against torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and child abuse (article 16); 
family protection224; protection against harmful traditional rites and socio-cultural 
practices;225 safety and protection of refugee children226; protection against sexual 
exploitation227; and against the use and abuse of illicit drugs.228  
South Africa signed the Charter on 10 October 1997 and ratified it on 7 January 2000 
while Nigeria signed it on 13 July 1999 and ratified it on 23 July 2001.229  
 
                                                          
220 Ibid. 
221 Article 3. 
222 Article 13. 
223 Article 15. 
224 Article 18. 
225 Article 21. 
226 Article 23. 
227 Article 27. 
228  Article 28. 
229 http://www.achpr.org/instruments/child/ratification/. (10/4/2015). Nigeria has domesticated this charter into the Child Rights Act 
but this researcher fear that the constitutional and judicial threats regarding the enforcement and status of African Charter, even after 
its domestication may also affect the Child Rights Act. 
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2.6.2.5 Commitment of States to the African Regional Framework  
Here, the researcher precisely examines the level of commitment which Nigeria and 
South Africa have respectively made to the African Charter and how this have impacted 
on the protection of women’s right to dignity in Africa. 
Generally, Nigeria’s commitment to the African Charter is weak even though the 
Charter has been domesticated as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap 10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990230 
in accordance with the provision of Section 12 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
Ordinarily, the fact of domestication should have enabled automatic application of the 
Charter but it does not. This is owing to the fact that Nigerian Courts still hold Cap 10 
as part of Nigeria’s municipal law which makes it naturally inferior to the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution, including Section 6 (6) (c) which declare certain class of rights 
guaranteed under the Charter as non-justiciable. This presupposes that Nigeria consider 
the Charter as part of international law and therefore non-compelling.  
In Chief Gani Fawehinmi v. Gen. Sani Abacha,231 the Supreme Court considered the 
status of Cap 10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 and held inter alia, that 
although the legislation is one with international appeal, in the event of any conflict its 
provisions can only prevail over other domestic legislation but certainly not over the 
Nigerian Constitution. 
The fact that Nigerian courts are not obliged to follow and apply international law in the 
interpretation of fundamental rights remain a threat to the enjoyment of human rights in 
Nigeria, coupled with the fact that Nigerian Courts still consider human rights 
(applicable in international law) as merely persuasive while only the fundamental rights 
guaranteed in Chapter 4 of the 1999 Constitution remains justiciable as positive rights. 
                                                          
230 Or, Cap A9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 
231 (2000) 4 SC (part II) 1. 
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Consequent upon the distinction between “human rights” and “fundamental rights” in 
Nigeria, most of the second generation of rights (socio-economic rights) guaranteed 
under the African Charter and international law as positive rights are described as 
“fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy” (that is negative rights) 
in Chapter 2 of the Nigerian Constitution, and made non-justiciable by Section 6 (6) (c) 
thereof. This is not so in South Africa. Also there is no formal or constitutional role for 
NGOs and allied organisations for the monitoring of violations and human rights 
implementation in Nigeria. The National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria should 
be empowered to play the same constitutional role as the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC).232    
Section 39 (1) (b) of the South African Constitution makes it mandatory for the Courts 
to apply international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. This 
Bill of Rights is also all-encompassing because it contains both the civil and political 
rights (guaranteed and justiciable fundamental rights in Nigeria) and the second 
generation of rights (the non-justiciable rights in Nigeria) as well as environmental 
rights and make all justiciable and enforceable.233  
Furthermore, the South African Constitution Section 233 provides that when 
interpreting legislation, the Court must prefer an interpretation which conforms to 
international law to an interpretation which does not. Accordingly, the Courts in South 
Africa have continued to uphold to this tenet. Thus in the celebrated right to housing 
case of Grootboom v. Oostenberg Municipality & Ors234and Ex parte Chairperson of 
the Constitutional Assembly: Re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa,235 the South African Constitutional Court held inter alia that the issue as 
                                                          
232 Ogunniran, I. (2010). Enforceability of Socio-Economic Rights: Seeing Nigeria through the Eyes of Other Jurisdictions. Unizik 
Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence, 1(September 2010), 73-87 at 87. 
233 See The Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
234 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (c); South Africa v Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
235 1996 (4) S.A. 46 (CC). 
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to whether socio-economic rights are justiciable at all in South Africa was put beyond 
doubt by the text of the Constitution itself.  
Section 184 (3) of the Constitution of South Africa obligates the South African Human 
Rights Commission to ensure that relevant organs of state furnishes it with information 
on steps being taken by them towards realizing the second generation of rights in the 
Bill of Rights. It is therefore without doubt, that South Africa has a strong commitment 
to the regional framework for the protection of human rights including the right to 
dignity of women in Africa, unlike Nigeria.236 Any reference to Nigeria as a leader in 
the justiciability of socio-economic rights is questionable.237 
 
2.6.2.6 Critique of the African Regional Framework and the Way Forward 
Although Murray238 calls the African Charter a timely and ambitious regional 
instrument,  however, its Afrocentric emphasis239 on such communal imperative as anti-
colonialism, people’s rights, morality, imposition of duties on individuals and states and 
the attitude to derogations on justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights, have 
been considered as weak points of the Charter.240  Ouguergouz described the rights 
provision of the Charter as “imprecise” because “the pertinent clauses of the African 
Charter offer only weak legal protection to the individual.”241 Sindjoun considers the 
                                                          
236 Even though India is not bound by any regional human rights instrument, the creativity and activism its Supreme Court has 
ensured justiciability and a classical commitment to the enforcement of both first and second generation of human rights both under 
the Indian Constitution and under core international human rights law. This is without prejudice to the fact that the fundamental 
objectives and directive principles contained in Chapter 2 of the Nigerian Constitution were cloned from the Indian Constitution 
(See Ogunniran, I (2010) op. cit at 79). 
237 Ogunniran, I (2010) op. cit at 79. 
238 R Murray “The African charter on human and peoples’ rights 1987-2000: An overview of its prospects and problems.” (2001) 1 
African Human Rights Law Journal 1.  
239 F Viljoen “Africa’s contributions to the development of international human rights and humanitarian law.” (2001) African 
Human Rights Law Journal 20. See also the Thesis of Oluwasina, A. V. (2011). Domestic Impact of The African Charter on Human 
And Peoples’ Rights and The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa: A Case Study of Nigeria, University of Pretoria. 
240 Dada, J. A. (2012). Impediments to Human Rights Protection in Nigeria. Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L., 18, 67-92, at 75. 
241 “Un nouvel ordre humanitaire re´gional en Afrique”, F Ouguergouz La Charte africaine des droits de l‟homme et des peuples. 
Une approche juridique des droits de l‟homme entre tradition et modernite´ (1993) 389 (The English translation is “The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A legal approach to human rights between tradition and modernity”) quoted in Oluwasina, 
A. V. (2011), op.cit. Chapter 1, page 1; citing JD Boukongou “The appeal of the African system for protecting human rights‟ (2006) 
6 African Human Rights Law Journal 271at 285. 
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Charter as unrealistic and a mere “window-dressing for the purpose of acceding to 
international civilization.”242 
The research, therefore, found that the penal authority of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is responsible for implementing the African Charter, 
is simply “recommendatory” and non-compelling, and consequently, most states 
including Nigeria243 have, at one time or the other, simply ignored the Commission’s 
recommendations.244  
It is therefore strongly recommended without prejudice to the African Human Rights 
Court, that the Commission be empowered to hand down enforceable punitive Orders 
against erring member states and individuals rather than exercising mere 
“recommendatory” and non-compelling authority. There is also need to rethink on the 
derogation clauses in the African charter as well as the part-time status of the judges of 
the African Human Rights Court and the lack of direct individual access to the 
Commission and the Court. 
The long period of time between the adoption and entry into force of relevant Optional 
protocols to the African Charter is a minus to sustainable protection of human rights in 
Africa including the right to dignity of women. For instance, the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was adopted 
in 1998 and entered into force in 2004, and the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the African Women 
                                                          
242 L Sindjoun “La civilisation internationale des murs: éléments pour une sociologie de l’ide´alisme structurel dans les relations 
internationales‟ (1996) 27 Etudes internationales 848 quoted in JD Boukongou “The appeal of the African system for protecting 
human rights‟ (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal 271, cited in  Oluwasina, A. V. (2011), op.cit. 
243 In the communication of the celebrated “Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni Nine” (International Pen & Others (on behalf of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 212 (ACHPR 1998) para 8, the Nigerian government carried out the execution of the “Ogoni 
Nine” in violation of the recommendation of the African commission that the execution be suspended pending the final 
determination of their representative communication. 
244 For instance, a 2003 Research carried out by Lirette Louw in South Africa showed that it was only in six cases out of 44 
communications in which the African Commission found violation of the Charter did the concerned member states comply fully 
with its recommendations (See L Louw “An analysis of state compliance with the recommendations of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights‟ unpublished LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 2005) 61.   
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Protocol) was adopted in 2000 and entered into force in 2005. It is also regrettable, that 
the Commission even has no way of monitoring or determining whether an indicted 
member state has complied with or is taking steps to comply with any of its 
recommendations.245   
 
2.7 Conclusion 
The African Charter of Human and People’s Rights embodies the regional framework 
for the protection of human rights in Africa including women’s right to dignity. It is 
also without doubt that the African Charter guarantees without qualification, the rights 
to equality before the law and to human dignity and inviolability.246 The Women 
Protocol to the African Charter also contains specific provisions for the guarantee of 
many facets of women’s rights including the right to dignity of women in Africa 
including Nigeria and South Africa.  
In all, it can be safely conceded that the rights of women, particularly the right to 
dignity of women, which African Union member states, particularly Nigeria and South 
Africa, have subscribed to under other international human rights instruments,247 are 
consistent with the provisions of the African Charter.248 However, the difference lies in 
the fact that while South Africa has shown unalloyed domestic respect and obligation to 
the regional framework, the same cannot be said of Nigeria. 
 
In conclusion, this researcher most humbly considers it illuminating to reproduce in 
extenso, the observations of  E. Steinerte and R.M.M. Wallace that:  
                                                          
245 JD Boukongou “The appeal of the African system for protecting human rights‟ (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal 
271at 288. 
246 Okpalaobi, B. (2014). "An Evaluation of the Relevance and Enforceability of African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights in 
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247 The relevant international human rights instruments have earlier been examined above.  
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Although the benefit of international human rights instruments should 
accrue to the individual, such instruments are addressed to states. Primary 
responsibility for giving effect to the international human rights standards 
flowing from them therefore clearly rests with the national authorities of 
each contracting state.  
How the provisions of international treaties become part of a state’s 
municipal law is a matter of domestic law: Some states are dualist in their 
approach to international law, meaning that treaties must be transformed 
into domestic legislation (e.g. by way of an act of the domestic legislature) 
before their provisions will be considered part of the domestic legal system. 
The approach of other states is monistic: international treaties automatically 
become part of domestic law at the time a state accedes or ratifies the 
instrument. 
These processes may allow an individual to claim the rights that the 
particular international human rights treaty protects. Such is the primary 
raison d’être of each international human rights treaty, as clearly any treaty 
is only as good as its implementation and enforcement. So it is not 
surprising that the international community has created ways of ensuring the 
effective implementation of international human rights treaties.’
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE 
RIGHT TO DIGNITY OF WOMEN IN NIGERIA, INDIA AND SOUTH 
AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE CRITIQUE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The constitutional framework for protecting the right to dignity of women in Nigeria, 
India and South Africa lie in the basic provisions and guarantees of the right to human 
dignity in their national constitutions. However, the actual guarantee of this right is to 
be located not just in the positive or justiciable fundamental rights alone but also in the 
interpretation and justiciability of the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (described 
as “Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter II of the 
1999 Nigerian Constitution, and Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV, Articles 
36-51 of the Constitution of India, 1950) which make life worth living with dignity. It 
also includes the latitude of the right to equality, access to justice and the procedure for 
enforcement of fundamental rights in respect of Nigeria, India and South Africa. The 
chapter also highlight the gaps in the Constitutional framework of the three jurisdictions 
under review and will conclude inter alia, that the ESC Rights are negative rights in 
Nigeria, implied rights in India, and positive rights in the South African Bill of Rights. 
It will further conclude that the South African constitutional model is classical while the 
Indian model is standardized by the judicial activism of its courts, and the Nigerian 
model is begging for immediate reform.   
 
3.2 Constitutional Framework: NIGERIA 
The 1999 Nigerian Constitution literally contains a guarantee for the right to human 
dignity. This obviously includes the right to dignity of women, albeit the non-
justiciability of the second and third generation of rights [Economic, Social, Cultural 
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and environmental rights] which are necessary international indices for proper 
enjoyment of human rights (and listed in Chapter II of the Constitution as Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy) remain an inherent impediment.  
 
3.2.1 The Right to Dignity of Women Vis-a-vis the Fundamental Objectives and 
           Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 
The right to dignity of women in Nigeria is protected by the “Right to human dignity” 
in Section 34 of the 1999 Constitution which provides that: “Every person is entitled to 
the dignity of his/her person and no one shall be subjected to torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment.” Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
19811 also provides that “Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be 
entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily 
deprived of this right.”  
 
However, in Nigeria, apart from the first generation civil and political rights, the second 
generation of rights (comprising the Economic, Social and Cultural rights) which are 
necessary indices to guarantee protection of women’s dignity (as in the South African 
Constitution) are tagged Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy and are non-obligatory and non-justiciable by Section 6(6) (c) of the 
Constitution. Nigerian courts do not even imply them as enforceable rights like in India, 
even though they contain bundle of rights which would make human life and dignity 
more meaningful. In the case of Attorney General (Ondo State) v Attorney General 
(Federation)2 the Nigerian Supreme Court emphasised that the fundamental objectives 
and directive principles of state policy are mere declarations which cannot be enforced 
by legal process unless the National Assembly enacts specific legislation for their 
enforcement. 
                                                          
1 Cap 10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. 
2 (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt 772), 222. 
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The unreasonableness of the non-justiciability provision was decried by Akinola Aguda, 
JSC (rtd.) when he said:  
 
I feel much concerned to think that the directive principles are to be 
regarded as a mere ideal, a utopia, the arrival of which the citizen can only 
pray and hope for, but in respect of which he can hope for no assistance 
whatsoever from the courts. If this were so then wherein lies the 
expectations and the hopes of a bright future for the teeming millions of our 
people..?3 
 
It has also been considered a fallacious irony that the Constitution which is the 
supposed fundamental law of the land, that is, the grundnorm upon which other laws 
derive validity, would itself declare some of its own provisions unenforceable until it 
obtains a “green light” from the National Assembly or other legislation outside of 
itself.4   
 
Even an important women-specific international human rights treaty like the CEDAW 
does not have legal force in Nigeria due to the perceived implication of the non-
domestication provision under Section 12(1) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.  
The said Section 12 (1) provides that: 
 
No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force 
of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into 
law by the National Assembly. 
 
This thesis humbly contends that an international human rights instrument like the 
CEDAW which is subscribed to by Nigeria does not fall within the contemplation of a 
treaty between the Federation and any other country in Section 12(1) because the 
                                                          
3 See Jemibewon, D. M., The Military, Law and Society: Reflections of a General (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd. 1998) at 109. 
Quoted in Anthony O. Nwafor (2009) Enforcing Fundamental Rights in Nigerian Courts – Processes and Challenges (4 Afr. J. Leg. 
Stud. (2009) 1-11), p.5. 
4 See G.N. Okeke and C. Okeke, “The Justiciability of the Non-Justiciable Constitutional Policy of Governance in Nigeria” IOSR 
Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) Volume 7, Issue 6 (Jan. -Feb. 2013), PP 09-14 at 11. 
www.Iosrjournals.Org  (7/6/2014). 
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United Nations is not a “country” by any stroke of interpretation. The researcher 
therefore recommends that the Nigerian courts should endeavour to resolve this 
constitutional aberration, by applying the kind of interpretational creativity and activism 
common in India. 
 
Similarly, in Nigeria, there is no national law dealing with the rights of women or 
inherent societal inequalities against women.5 An attempt to domesticate the CEDAW 
by the promulgation of the ‘Abolition of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 
Nigeria and other Related Matters Bill, 2006’ (CEDAW Bill) was frustrated by the 
National Assembly6 due to lack of legislative seriousness and the fact that women rights 
issues are considered as being more domestic than national.  Even the Nigeria National 
Gender Policy of 2000 (adopted in 2006) which is fashioned along the lines of CEDAW 
cannot be implemented due to inherent socio-political factors7 including lack of 
executive political will, men-dominated National Assembly, corruption and general 
insensitivity to the most pressing problems of women and girls. All these and more 
constitute “the Nigerian factor”.8  
Nearly ten years after The Protocol of African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
on the Rights of Women in Africa (Women’s Protocol),9 not a single individual or inter-
state communication on violation of women’s right has been received by the 
Commission. At least one writer has, however, expressed hoped that the common socio-
                                                          
5 Durojaye, E., Okeke, B., & Adebanjo, A. (2014). “Harmful cultural practices and gender equality in Nigeria.” Gender and 
Behaviour, 12(1), 6169-6181. 
6 Ebenezer Durojaye, Woman, but not Human: Widowhood Practices and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria Int J Law Policy 
Family (2013) 27 (2): 176-196. doi: 10.1093/lawfam/ebt001 First published online: May 6, 2013 (Viewed 11/7/2014). 
7 Sani Mustapha Kura, (2013) “An analysis of Gender inequality and National Gender Policy in Nigeria” op.cit at 8. 
8 This is a common derogatory phrase used in Nigeria to explain away the ills of government and corrupt public officials. It is a 
ready ‘excuse’ for every conceivably ineptitude on the part of government or society generally. 
9 Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the African Union General Assembly in 2003 in Maputo CAB/LEG/66.6 (2003) entered 
into force 25 November 2005. 
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political and cultural apathy which threaten the implementation of the parent document 
does not catch up with its protocol.10 
More so, there is no compulsion on the Nigerian courts to apply international human 
rights law either arising from constitutional provisions or judicial activism as are 
common in India and South Africa. It is without doubt that the constitutional provisions 
for the sustainable guarantee of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria are weak and 
inadequate. 
 
3.2.2 The Supreme Court of Nigeria, Locus Standi, and Access to Justice for the 
Enforcement of Fundamental Rights 
The notion of “access to justice” refers to the ease of process by which an aggrieved 
person may institute action for the enforcement of his fundamental right in a competent 
court. In Nigeria, this ease is lacking inter alia, because there is no right of access to the 
Supreme Court for the enforcement of fundamental rights at first instance, unlike in 
India and South Africa where, in addition to the High Court, this right of access also 
exists at first instance to the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court respectively.11 
 
3.2.2.1 Locus Standi 
 
Section 46(1) of the Nigerian Constitution provides thus:  
 
Any person who alleges that any of the provisions of this Chapter12 has 
been, is being or likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him may 
apply to a High Court in that State for redress. 
                                                          
10 D.M. Chirwa (2006) “Reclaiming Wo(manity): The merits and demerits of the African Protocol on Women’s Rights” 56 
Netherlands international Law Review 63-96. 
11 In India, a petitioner may present his Writ petition for the enforcement of fundamental rights before the Supreme Court at first 
instance under Article 32 or the state High Courts under Article 226. Thus, in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [AIR 1982 SC 149], 
Justice Bhagwati stated that “any member of the public or social action group acting bona fide can invoke the Writ Jurisdiction of 
the High Courts or the Supreme Court seeking remedy against violation of the legal or constitutional rights of persons who for 
whatever reason or disability cannot approach the Court by themselves.” And in South Africa, Section 167 of the Constitution 
permits a person to bring an action directly to the Constitutional Court or to appeal directly to the court, in exceptional cases, when 
it is in the public interest and with leave of the Constitutional Court.  
12 That is Chapter IV of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution which contains the Fundamental Rights provisions. 
   146 
This common law doctrine of locus standi is therefore premised upon the assumption 
that “ no court is obliged to provide a remedy for a claim in which the applicant has 
a remote, hypothetical or no interest.”13 Thus, where a plaintiff fails to disclose his legal 
basis, right or authority to demand for the reliefs he seeks or what injury he has 
suffered, is suffering or will suffer, he lacks locus standi to institute such a suit or be 
heard. This is the basic and archaic nature of locus standi which focuses on “the party” 
seeking to obtain relief from court rather than on “the issue” for which he seeks 
adjudication.14 
It suffices that, even where the violation of fundamental right arises from a public 
injury or wrong which affects  a number of people,  the plaintiff can only be competent 
to sue if he shows that he has suffered  more,  or  is  likely  to  suffer  more,  than  all 
the persons who have suffered the violation. This narrow or restrictive application of 
locus standi was applied by the Nigerian Supreme Court in two prominent cases: 
Adesanya v. The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria15 and Olawoyin v. 
Attorney-General of Northern Nigeria.16 
It needs to be mentioned that in the celebrated case of Fawehinmi v. Akilu & Anor,17 the 
Supreme Court interpreted and applied locus standi in a liberal or expansive manner 
when it held in favour of the applicant’s application for mandamus that, with respect to 
criminal law, by Section 342 and 343 of the Criminal Procedure Law, “every Nigerian 
is his brother’s keeper and that any person including a legal practitioner can bring an 
application for mandamus to compel the Director of Public Prosecutions to exercise his 
                                                          
13 Per Oputa J.S.C. in Attorney General of Kaduna State v. Hassan, 2 NWLR (Pt 8) 483 at 524-525. 
14 Malemi, E. (2012). The Nigerian Constitutional Law (With Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009). Lagos: 
Princeton Publishing Company, pp. 501-502. 
15 (1981) All NLR 1 SC. 
16 (1961) 2 SCNLR 5. This restrictive application of locus standi has been followed in several other cases including Thomas v. 
Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR Part 18, p.669 SC; Chuba Egolum v. Olusegun Obasanjo (1999) 7 NWLR Part 611, p. 355; Keyamo v. 
Lagos State House of Assembly (2000) 12 NWLR Part 680, p.196 CA; Fawehinmi v. Inspector General of Police (2002) 7 NWLR 
Part 767, p.606 SC. But this is not so with the application of Public Interest Litigation/Class Action Litigations in South Africa and 
India as well as the doctrine of epistolary jurisdiction of courts in India.  
17 (1987) 1 NWLR Part 67, p.797 SC. In that case, the applicant, a legal practitioner and friend to Mr. Dele Giwa, former Editor of 
Newswatch Magazine who was murdered by parcel bomb. The court was to decide whether the applicant as a friend of the deceased 
and attorney to his media outfit had legal competence to sue for the brutal murder of his friend. The court held that he had and that 
every Nigerian had a duty to one another as “his brother’s keeper.” However, the military government of Nigeria at the time 
circumvented that decision with an Edict restricting locus standi to criminal cases only. This narrow application of locus standi 
remains part of the Nigerian law till date.  
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discretion to prosecute an alleged crime or in default permit a private prosecution of 
it.”18   
 
This decision is the locus classicus on the liberal approach to locus standi in Nigeria.19 
But unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Fawehinmi v Akilu did not overrule its earlier 
decision on the narrow approach to locus standi in Adesanya v. The President of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. Consequently, both cases represent the legal precedents on 
the subject in Nigeria and leave it to a judge’s discretion on which approach to adopt in 
given cases. And according to Ese Malemi,20 “over the years, however, the courts have 
tended more to apply the decision in Adesanya’s case” in spite of the fact that “on the 
whole a narrow or restrictive application of locus standi usually and generally frustrates 
public interest litigation, the monitoring and enforcement of human rights and access to 
justice and remedy, among others.”21   
 
Taiwo Adewale22 laments that it is regrettable that Nigerian Courts still remain largely 
conservative with regards to locus standi at a time when other common law countries 
are adopting the liberal, sustainable and globalized approach to the subject in the 
enforcement and protection of human rights.  
Dada has expressed the view that though the doctrine is being gradually relaxed, it 
remains a ‘formidable albatross’ in human rights litigation in Nigeria.23  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Ibid at 874. 
19 The High Courts also applied the liberal approach to locus standi in these cases: Mike Ozekhome & Ors v. President of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor (1990) 2 WBRN 58; Beko Ransome Kuti & Ors v. Attorney-General of the Federation 
(Unreported) Suit No. M/287/92; Adefalu & Ors v. Governor of Kwara State & Ors (1984) 5 NCLR 766. 
20 Op. cit at 511. 
21 ibid at 507. 
22 Taiwo, E. A. (2009). Enforcement of fundamental rights and the standing rules under the Nigerian Constitution: A need for a 
more liberal provision. African Human Rights Law Journal, 9(2), 546-575.  
23 Dada, J. A. (2012). Impediments to Human Rights Protection in Nigeria. Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L., 18, 67-92 at 87. 
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According to Hon. Justice Philip Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC, 
 
We look forward to a time when Nigeria will advance to the position of 
Canada where every citizen has not only the right to be heard, but has also 
the locus standi to challenge such breaches of the provisions of the 
Constitution.24  
 
3.2.2.2 Enforcement of Fundamental Rights  
Generally, in Nigeria, the frustration apparent in the enforcement of fundamental rights 
begins from the point of determining his legal standing, that is locus standi, and up till 
choosing which particular court has competence to hear the petition up till the process 
and rules of procedure for the enforcement of these fundamental rights.  
Where the applicant has good standing in law and but the violator of the fundamental 
right is the government or its agent, the application shall, by Section 251 of the 
Nigerian Constitution, be initiated at a Federal High Court, even though most states in 
Nigeria do not have Federal High Courts and most of the 774 local governments do not 
even have High Courts. Added to an ordinarily frustrating and clumsy enforcement 
procedure inherent in the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009,25 
this is a limiting or inhibiting factor to access jurisprudence for fundamental rights 
enforcement process in Nigeria.26 Similarly, where a statute makes it a condition 
precedent to serve a pre-action notice on a defendant, the failure to comply therewith 
would also deny a party of locus standi irrespective of “the issue” at stake.27  
 
The general frustration in the access to justice in Nigeria was once described thus: 
 
 
The procedure for the enforcement of fundamental rights in the High Courts 
requires the obtaining of leave of court by filing a motion ex parte supported 
                                                          
24 “Human Rights Proceedings: Domestic Provisions and Experience of Nigeria” p.7, Presented at the Judicial Colloquium on the 
Democratic Application of International Human Rights Norms held in Abuja, Nigeria on 9-13 December, 1991.  
25 Broad and specific inherent hiccups in the Rules are discussed below in this section as well as in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
26 Anthony O. Nwafor, “Enforcing Fundamental Rights in Nigerian Courts-Processes and Challenges,” 4 Afr. J of Leg. Stud. 
(2009)1-11, p.8 
27 Malemi, E., (2012) op. cit at 502. 
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by an affidavit, the statement of material facts and verifying affidavit within 
twelve months of the occurrence of the event complained against. When 
leave is granted, a motion on notice is filed in the same manner as the 
motion ex parte and served on the party complained against (respondent). 
The party served must have at least eight days to respond, before the 
hearing, which must be within fourteen days of the granting of leave.28 
 
In the Nigerian case of Oguegbe v Inspector-General of Police,29 the court refused an 
application for leave to enforce the fundamental right to personal liberty, on the ground 
that the application for leave was sought 30 months after the alleged breach. A similar 
decision was held in another case, Fred Egbe v. Honourable Justice Adefarasin.30 This 
is most contradictory of the Statute of Limitation which sets six years as the time within 
which such civil breaches must be redressed or be statute-barred. Interestingly, under 
Order III Rule 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 
(which replaces the previous Rules of 1979), this limitation of time no longer exist in 
Nigeria’s fundamental rights jurisprudence.  
The 2009 Rules also seemed to have widened the scope of locus standi beyond the 
precise provision of Section 46 (1) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, because while the 
Constitution empowers ‘a High Court in that State’ to hear applications for breach of 
fundamental rights, the 2009 Rules empowers ‘the Federal High Court or the High 
Court of a State or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja’ to do same 
under Order 1 Rule 2. 
It also gives impetus to the African Charter by providing that an action for breach of 
fundamental rights may lie in the event of a breach, likelihood of a breach of any of the 
fundamental rights guarantees in the 1999 Constitution or the African Charter on 
                                                          
28 Anthony O. Nwafor, ibid, while analysing the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979. But the current 
Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 has eliminated the requirement of leave and by its Order II Rule I, the 
applicant may choose to commence the action by a motion on notice or any other originating process acceptable to the court. The 
application shall be accompanied by a statement, affidavit in support, with or without exhibits and a written address. The 
requirement of filing of a verifying affidavit is also eliminated and the cost of filing reduced substantially. 
29 (1999) 1 FHCLR 59. 
30 (2003) 14 WRN 57. 
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Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 2004.31 But regrettably, 
other laudable provisions of the 2009 Rules are contained in its “Preamble” rather than 
as specific Order(s) or Rules(s) as is conventional with such Rules. Even an important 
issue like “Public Interest Litigations” is placed in the preamble only.32 Accordingly, 
fear has also been expressed that “the nature of a preamble does not give assurance that 
the contents have much legal weight.”33  This fear is reasonable, considering the 
decision in the American case of Jacobson v Massachusetts34 which emphasised that the 
Preamble does not have any legal force, even in the Constitution because it merely 
introduces the document as a whole and does not, in and of itself, permit the exercise of 
any legal power whatsoever, and that any power exercisable under the Constitution 
must emanate from another part of the Constitution but definitely not the preamble.35  
 
Worse still, the 2009 Rules have failed to eliminate the threat of complexity in the 
commencement of an action that was the bane of the 1979 Rules. By Order 9(1), the  
failure to comply with the provision as to place, time, form or manner in an application 
for the enforcement of fundamental rights shall be considered a mere “irregularity” 
which may not nullify the proceedings unless “it relates to the mode of commencement” 
of the application. Suffice to say, nonetheless, that the usual rigours of commencement 
of action must certainly be complied with. This offers another reason for the view that 
                                                          
31 See Aligba, A. (2011). Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009: An Appraisal. Benue State University Journal 
of Private and Public Law, BSUJPPL, 1(1), 61-70., especially pp. 67-68. 
32 Preamble 1 (e) reads: “The Court shall encourage and welcome Public interest litigations in the human rights field and no human 
rights case may be dismissed or struck out for want of locus standi. In particular, human rights activists, advocates or groups as well 
as any non-governmental organisations, may institute human rights application on behalf of any potential applicant. In human rights 
litigation, the applicant may include any of the following:  
(i) Anyone acting in his own interest; 
(ii) Anyone acting on behalf of another person; 
(iii) Anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of a group or class of persons; 
(iv) Anyone acting in the public interest, and 
(v) Association acting in the interest of its members or other individuals or groups.”  
33 See Abiola Sanni “Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009 as a Tool for the Enforcement of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights in Nigeria: The need for Far-reaching Reform,” 11 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 511 2011, p.524.  
34 197 US 11 (1905), cited in Abiola Sanni, op.cit. 
35For instance, it has been scholarly argued by Abiola Sanni, (op. cit at 528) that although paragraph 3(b) of the Preamble to the 
Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009 mandates courts to 'respect' municipal (The fundamental Objectives and 
directive Principles of state policy and the African Charter), regional and international bills of rights (including CEDAW?) cited to 
it or brought to its attention or of which the court is aware, the word “respect” is ambiguous and imposes no definite obligation on 
the courts, else, the imperative word “shall” would have been used instead. At best, the statement is a mere persuasion and not a 
directive or compulsion on Nigerian courts to apply and enforce international human rights law (more so, in the light of the non-
domestication provision in Section 12 of the Constitution) as it is in India (with judicial activism) and South Africa under its Bill of 
Rights. 
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“Nigerian laws on protection of women’s rights have been criticized for lacking the 
willingness to promote women’s right as they are inadequate, misinterpreted and 
unenforceable.”36  
This thesis therefore agrees with the recommendation/conclusion in one “appraisal” of 
the 2009 Rules that in spite of their simplification, for judges, legal practitioner and 
prospective litigants to benefit fully from its good intentions (manifest in its preamble), 
especially on public interest litigations and the expansion of locus standi in the 
enforcement of fundamental rights, the National Assembly must first amend Section 46 
(1) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. Otherwise all the seemingly plausible provisions 
of the current Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 will remain 
inferior, void and ineffective to the extent that it is inconsistent with Section 46 (1) of 
the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.37 This argument is reasonable because Section 1(1), (2) 
and (3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution provides that:  
 
 (1) This Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force 
on    the authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  
 
(2) The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any 
persons or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or 
any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution.  
 
(3) If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, 
this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be void.  
 
                                                          
36 N. I. Aniekwu ‘Legalising Cairo: Prospects and Opportunities for Reproductive Rights in Nigeria’ (2006) 1 & 2 CODESRIA 
Bulletin 49 (quoted in  Uju Peace Okeke “A Case For The Enforcement of Women’s Rights As Human Rights in Nigeria”; The 
Women's UN Report Program & Network (WUNRN) http://www.wunrn.com (16/7/2014). 
37 Aligba, A. (2011). Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009: An Appraisal, op. cit, at p.70. 
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Above all and as earlier stated in this chapter, there is no right of access to the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria for the enforcement of fundamental rights, except on appeal. This is 
not so with regards to the enforcement of writ petitions in the Supreme Court of India38 
or the Bill of Rights in the Constitutional Court of South Africa.39 
 
3.2.3 Limitation of Rights in the Nigerian Constitution 
The 1999 Nigerian Constitution permits of much derogation of fundamental rights. In 
Nigeria, even the right to life is subject to limitation and derogation in time of 
emergency.  
For instance, Section 33(1) of the 1999 Constitution guarantees the right to life but its 
sub-section 2 provides that a person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of 
his life: 
 
if he dies as a result of the use, to such extent and in such circumstances as 
are permitted by law, of such force as is reasonably necessary - 
 
(a) for the defense of any person from unlawful violence or for the 
defense of property; 
 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person 
lawfully detained; or 
 
(c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny.” 
 
On the basis of the derogation of rights in the Nigerian Constitution, the Supreme Court 
held in Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v. Emewulu & Anor40   
that all rights and freedoms are subject to limitations of overriding public interest or 
                                                          
38 In India, the right of access to enforce fundamental rights is elaborately simple and devoid of any procedure whatsoever. A 
petitioner is at liberty to present his writ petition for the enforcement of fundamental rights before the Supreme Court under Article 
32 or the state High Courts under Article 226. By the application of the Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India, a writ petition may 
be commenced on the basis of a mere newspaper report, a personal letter addressed to a judge or even by the court suo motu.  
39 Section 34 of the South African Constitution provides that “Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal 
or forum.”  
40 [2001] 3 S.C.N.J. 106. 
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state policy.41 This is not so in India42 or South Africa43 where the three-step rule of 
constitutional proportionality applies to ensure that all legislative or executive actions 
of state which seek to limit or infringe a fundamental right must meet three basic 
criteria namely, 
(a) It must have an objective that is sufficiently and reasonably important to justify 
limiting the right in question;  
(b) The measures designed by the relevant state action to meet its objective must have a 
rational nexus with that objective; and  
(c) The means used by the relevant state action to infringe the right asserted 
must be proportionate to the object it seeks to achieve.44  
 
Section 45 (1) of the Constitution also provide grounds upon which a law may be 
justified even if it restricts or derogates from positive fundamental rights. The Section 
provides thus: 
Nothing in Sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of this Constitution shall 
invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society 
 
(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or 
public health; or 
 
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons. 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 See also Dada, J. A. (2012). Impediments to Human Rights Protection in Nigeria. Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L., 18, 67-92 at 77 
where the learned author also cites media reports of extra-judicial killings which invariably occurred as a result of the constitutional 
derogations:  see Editorial  Comment,  THE PUNCH, Aug. 13, 2009, at 14; see also SUNDAY TRIBUNE, May 19, 1991, at 1; 
NEWSWATCH, Aug. 24, 2009, at 10-18   
42 In the case of Khedat Majdoor Chetna Sanghat v. State of M.P. (1995) SC 31, the Supreme Court of India observed that “If 
dignity or honour vanishes what remains of life?” 
43 With regards to the right to life and the right to human dignity, Section 37 (5) (c) of the South African Constitution provides that: 
No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state of emergency, and no legislation enacted or other action taken in 
consequence of a declaration, may permit or authorise any derogation.” 
44 Section 36 of the Constitution of South Africa which provide for the non-derogation of the rights in the Bill of Rights additionally 
provides a fourth precondition namely, that the state must ensure that there is no “less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
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Furthermore, Section 45 (2) provides that:  
An act of the National Assembly shall not be invalidated by reason only that 
it provides for the taking, during periods of emergency, of measures that 
derogate from the provisions of Section 33 or 35 of this Constitution; but no 
such measures shall be taken in pursuance of any such act during any period 
of emergency save to the extent that those measures are reasonably 
justifiable for the purpose of dealing with the situation that exists during that 
period of emergency.  
 
 
Again, Section 6(6) (c) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution clearly removes the authority 
of courts to enforce the enjoyment of the socio-economic rights contained as “directive 
principles” in the Constitution and without which, as in India, it is impossible to live life 
with dignity.45 The said Section 6(6) (c) provides that: 
 
The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of 
this section shall not except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, 
extend to any issue or question as to whether any act of omission by any 
authority or person or as to whether any law or any judicial decision is in 
conformity with the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of 
State Policy set out in Chapter II of this Constitution.   
 
Unfortunately, the sustainability and realistic enforcement of the rights to dignity and 
equality, as well as the right of access to justice and the independence of the judiciary in 
Nigeria is logically threatened by this non-justiciability provision. For instance, 
Sections 17 falls under the unenforceable directive principles of state policy in the 
Nigerian Constitution and its subsection (1) and (2) provides thus: 
(1) The State social order is founded on ideals of Freedom, Equality 
and Justice.  
 
                                                          
45 Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161;  Shantistar Builders v. Narayan K Totame, Shanti Star Builders case (1990) 1 
SCC 520. 
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(2) In furtherance of the social order-  
(a) every citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations and 
opportunities before the law; (b) the sanctity of the human person 
shall be recognised and human dignity shall be maintained and 
enhanced; (c) governmental actions shall be humane; (d) 
exploitation of human or natural resources in any form whatsoever 
for reasons, other than the good of the community, shall be 
prevented; and (e) the independence, impartiality and integrity of 
courts of law, and easy accessibility thereto shall be secured and 
maintained.46  
 
It is, therefore, safe to conclude, with particular reference to Section 17(2) (b) and (e) of 
the Nigerian Constitution (above highlighted for emphasis), among others, that huge 
constitutional limitation and restrictions stand against the enforcement, promotion and 
protection of women’s right to dignity and human rights generally in Nigeria.  
 
 
3.2.4 Application of International Law  
In Nigeria, the courts are not bound to apply international human rights law. This is 
because of the clear distinction which exists between “fundamental rights” which are 
enforceable and listed in Chapter IV of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution and “human 
rights” which are viewed as part of international treaty which Nigerian courts are not 
bound to apply unless and until they are domesticated into local legislation by 
enactment pursuant to Section 12 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.  
The said Section 12 provides thus:  
No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force 
of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into 
law by the National Assembly.  
 
                                                          
46 Bold portions are for emphasis 
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In the case of Sani Abacha v. Gani Fawehinmi,47 the Supreme Court interpreted Section 
12 (1) of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution (the ipissima verbis of Section 12 (1) of the 
1999 Nigerian Constitution) vis-à-vis international law thus: 
 
Constitution is the supreme law of the land; it is the grundnorm. Its 
supremacy has never been called to question in ordinary circumstance. 
Thus, any treaty enacted into law in Nigeria by virtue of Section 12 (1) of 
the 1979 Constitution (now Section 12 (1) of the 1999 Constitution) is 
circumscribed in its operational scope and extent as may be prescribed by 
the legislature.48 
 
This suggests that Nigeria applies the dualist approach to treaty enforcement whereby 
international law is considered a separate form of law which is inferior to municipal 
law.  So far, the constitutional non-domestication clause in Section 12 remains one of 
the reasons why the CEDAW provisions are not compelling in the Nigerian courts.  
Similarly the non-justiciability of the directive principles of state policy in Section 6(6) 
(c) of the Nigerian Constitution makes it impossible for government to be bound by 
international law. For instance one of the non-justiciable foreign policy objectives in the 
fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy in Nigeria is contained in  
Section 19 (c) and (d) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution which provides that:  
The foreign policy objectives shall be - (c) promotion of international co-
operation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among 
all nations and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations; (d) 
respect for international law and treaty obligations… 
 
It is thus not much of a surprise that Nigeria’s National Policy on Women, 2000, and 
later the National Gender Policy, 2006 (fashioned in line with the CEDAW) has also 
                                                          
47 (2000) 6 NWLR 228. 
48 Ibid at 258. 
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remained comatose, and thus justifies the observation made by Nigeria’s representative 
to CEDAW that Nigeria is “a country notorious for violating international 
agreements.”49 
The application of CEDAW and other international human rights treaties would have 
been enforceable if Nigeria had adopted the monist approach which considers municipal 
law and international law as one and the same, and therefore international law may be 
applied directly within the municipal legal order since both seek to achieve the same 
goal.50 This was much the argument of Mohammed, JSC in the Abacha v. Fawehinmi 
case when he held thus: 
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights’ (Notification and 
Enforcement Act, Cap 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990) is a 
statute with international flavour. Therefore, if there is a conflict between it 
and another statute, its provisions will prevail over those of that other 
statutes because for the reason that it is presumed the legislature does not 
intend to breach an international obligation. Thus it possesses greater vigour 
and strength than any other domestic statute.51 
 
It is however, imperative that in determining the application or otherwise of 
international human rights law in Nigeria, the judiciary should have at the back of its 
mind, the clear and unambiguous provisions of the pacta sunt servanda in Article 26 of 
the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties which provides that “Every treaty in force 
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith” as well as 
Article 27 thereof which provides further that “A party may not invoke the provisions of 
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”  
                                                          
49 Nwankwo, O. (2013). "Nigeria is notorious for violating international agreements." Lagos, Nigeria, Nigerian vanguard 
Newspaper, 22 September, 2013 http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/09/nigeria-is-notorious-for-abandoning-international-treaties-
oby-nwankwo/ (26/9/2013).  
  
50 Dada, J. A. (2012). Impediments to Human Rights Protection in Nigeria. Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L., 18, 67-92, p. 73. 
51 Abacha v. Fawehinmi, supra at 215. 
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3.2.5 Legal Aid 
Legal aid is the provision of free legal services to those who cannot afford the cost due 
to poverty or other circumstance. Therefore, the importance of legal aid cannot be 
overemphasised in a country like Nigeria where, according to the Minister of Women 
Affairs and Social Development, Hajiya Zainab Maina, “70% of Nigerian women are 
living below poverty line”52 and can hardly afford the cost of litigation. 
The 1999 Nigerian Constitution makes provision for legal aid.   
Its Section 36 (1) provides that: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any 
question or determination by or against any government or authority, a 
person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court 
or other tribunal established by law and constituted in such manner as to 
secure its independence and impartiality. 
 
And in Section 46 (4) (b) it provides that:  
The National Assembly - (b) shall make provisions-  
(i) for the rendering of financial assistance to any indigent citizen of Nigeria 
where his right under this Chapter has been infringed or with a view to 
enabling him to engage the services of a legal practitioner to prosecute his 
claim, and  
(ii) for ensuring that allegations of infringement of such rights are 
substantial and the requirement or need for financial or legal aid is real.” 
 
A careful perusal of Section 36 reveals that legal aid is not a positive right of its own, 
but is merely offered as an addendum to the right to fair hearing in Section 36 (6) (b) & 
(c) under which inter alia, every person “charged with a criminal offence” shall be 
                                                          
52 Daily Post, http://dailypost.ng/2013/07/13/70-of-nigerian-women-are-living-below-poverty-line-minister/. (22/4/2015). 
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entitled to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; and defend 
himself in person or by legal practitioner of his own choice.53 It is therefore apparent 
from the phrase “charged with criminal offence,” that the Section does not intend nor 
pretend to cover persons (including women) who seek to litigate or defend their 
fundamental right to dignity in civil processes.  
This is without prejudice to the fact that the right to fair hearing in Section 36 (1) of the 
Nigerian Constitution is stated to apply to a person “In the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations, including any question or determination by or against any 
government or authority.”  
It is also obvious that the “legal aid provision” in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, that 
is, Section 46 (4) (b) does not enshrine “legal aid” as a positive/fundamental right 
either. It merely empowers the National Assembly to make provisions for the rendering 
of financial assistance to any indigent citizen54 with a view to enabling him to engage 
the services of a legal practitioner. It suffices that obligation of the state is not to provide 
legal aid (as it is in India by the interpretative power of judicial creativity and activism) 
but to render financial assistance with a view to enabling him provide or himself. What 
if, by the “Nigerian factor” the state claims not to have the capacity to render any 
financial assistance?55   
In Nigeria, the Legal Aid Council56 is empowered under the Legal Aid Act57  to render 
legal aid to “needy persons” charged under the Criminal Code (whether at first instance 
                                                          
53 Section 36 (6) (b) & (c) of the Nigerian Constitution, 1999. 
54 Under Section 9 of the Legal Aid Act, only persons whose income do not exceed N1,500 (equivalent of USD 7.5 or MYR 27) per 
annum shall be granted legal aid. But where the person’s annual income exceeds the stated N1,500 he may get legal aid if he is 
willing to contribute to the funding [Section 9 (2)-(3)]. This is the level of legislative unreasonableness which is part of “the 
Nigerian factor” which inhibits the sustainable protection of the right to dignity of women and fundamental rights generally in 
Nigeria. Proverbially, this is like giving something with the left hand and taking it back with the right hand. 
55 The Indian Supreme Court held inter alia, in Khatri v. State of Bihar,55 that the due process application of Article 39A (the 
equivalent of Section 46(4)(b) of the Nigerian Constitution) creates a continuing right to legal aid which attaches to the accused 
person from the time of his first arraignment before a magistrate up till his final appeal at the Supreme Court, and that it also creates 
an unqualified constitutional obligation on the state to provide the legal aid irrespective of any real or imagined administrative or 
financial constraints. 
56 The Legal Aid Council is a Federal government agency established by Decree No. 56 of 1976 as a corporate body with perpetual 
succession. The Council is empowered to establish branches in various states of the Federation. It is now regulated by the Legal Aid 
Act, Cap L9 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (An Act to provide for the establishment of the Legal Aid Council which is 
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or appeal) with murder, manslaughter, assault occasioning bodily harm, malicious or 
wilful wounding, aiding and abetting the commission of certain crime (or their 
equivalent under the Penal Code) as well as civil claims in respect of accidents but 
certainly not with respect to cases for the enforcement of fundamental rights including 
the right to human dignity. But in India, the right to free legal aid generally applies to an 
accused person in a criminal trial, as well as a petitioner seeking justice for the 
violation of her right to dignity or other fundamental rights under the broad 
interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.   
It is, therefore, humbly submitted that since most Nigerian women are poor58 and the 
inability to pay the cost of litigation is agreed to be the commonest reason why most 
people cannot seek redress for most violation of their rights, 59 legal aid in cases of 
violation of such important fundamental right as the right to human dignity would be 
ordinarily necessary to “widen the road” and ensure uninhibited access to justice as 
basic human right60 necessary to guarantee protection of women’s right to dignity.  
 
Given the current constitutional lacuna with respect to legal aid in Nigeria, it is most 
humbly submitted that the country urgently requires a creative and activist judiciary 
with the ingenuity, courage and fearlessness to give a just, fair and reasonable 
                                                                                                                                                                          
responsible for the operation of a scheme for the grant of free legal aid in certain proceedings to persons with inadequate financial 
resources). The Act also establishes the Legal Aid Fund to enable the Council receive and utilize funds from the Federal and state 
governments, individuals, private and public charities and philanthropists to enable it carry out its activities (Section 3 of the Act).   
57 See second Schedule to the Legal Aid Act, Cap L9 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 
58 A recent study concluded that “there is every need to empower Nigerian women particularly in the present global economy which 
recognizes the need for individuals to develop their potentials and contribute to the overall development of the nations. Poverty will 
be reduced to the barest minimum if the government of Nigeria will take appropriate measures to implement and enforce laws and 
policies directed towards enabling women have the same rights as men” (Oduwole, T. A., & Fadeyi, A. O. (2013). Gender, 
Economic Activities and Poverty in Nigeria. Journal of Research in Peace, Gender and Development (JRPGD), 2(7), 106-125. doi: 
http:/dx.doi.org/10.14303/jrpgd.2013.103 Available online at http://www.interesjournals.org/JRPGD (19/4/2015).  
59 “The possession of a right and consequently a right of action to sue are meaningless without reasonably affordable and accessible 
administration of justice system. Fair enough, the Nigerian Constitution has granted to the individual right of access to court or the 
legal right to litigate and defend claims. Law is an effective means of protecting legal rights and guarding against political, 
economic, social and other forms of injustice. However, the average individual may be hampered from obtaining justice in court by 
various factors… In Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, poverty is a reality and the commonest hindrance to obtaining justice”: 
Malemi, E. (2012). The Nigerian Constitutional Law (With Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009). Lagos: 
Princeton Publishing Company), p. 545. 
60  S.L.A. Khan (2001) JUSTICE BHAGWATI ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES, op.cit, p. 156.  
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interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution61 which will redefine legal 
aid in Nigeria and elevate the protection of women’s dignity to the standard in India 
where the Supreme Court insists that the violation of a woman’s dignity is a violation of 
her life.62 
 
3.2.6 Critique of the Nigerian Constitutional Framework and the Way Forward 
Thus far, this research has observed that the 1999 Nigerian Constitution contains a 
number of provisions which fundamentally inhibit the realization and protection of 
women’s right to dignity and human rights generally. Worst of all, Nigerian courts have 
been conservative and not exhibited the requisite interpretative creativity and activism 
necessary to circumvent these constitutional lacuna or resurrect any of its dead 
provisions in order to promote and protect women’s right to dignity.  
Fundamentally, the lack of direct original access to the Supreme Court for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights constitutes a lacuna in Nigeria’s constitutionalism. 
The import of this lacuna was explained by South African socio-economic and equality 
rights activist and academic Jackie Dugard, when she wrote thus: “Across the 
developing world, and particularly in Latin America, one of the mechanisms adopted to 
facilitate this access is enabling people to directly petition the highest court to defend 
their rights (rather than only arriving there, perhaps, after many appeals through lower 
courts).”63  
                                                          
61 For instance, in the Indian case of Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1369, Justice Bhagwati 
strengthened the earlier decision in M.H. Hoscot v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 1548 by applying to it the fair, reasonable 
and just rule and observed that the right to legal aid is fundamental and may only become immaterial if the beneficiary refuses to 
accept it. 
62 In the Indian case of Khedat Majdoor Chetna Sanghat v. State of M.P., (1994) 6 SCC 260, the Supreme Court raised a poser itself 
thus: “If dignity or honour vanishes what remains of life?”  
63 See Jackie Dugard “Closing the doors of justice? The South African Constitutional Court’s Approach to Direct 
Access.” Published in Open Democracy/Open Global Rights of 25 May, 2015, Available at:  
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/jackie-dugard/closing-doors-of-justice-south-african-constitutional-
court%E2%80%99s-approac (31/5/2015). 
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Specific fundamental gaps in the Nigerian Constitutional framework for the protection 
of women’s right to dignity vis-à-vis international law and the Constitutional framework 
of India and South Africa are elaborated in Chapter 5 of this thesis. This researcher 
deems it unnecessary to recite them here. 
And as for the way forward, this thesis strongly contends that, short of undertaking the 
onerous and near-impossible task of amending the fundamental rights provisions in 
Chapter IV of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, only an independent, activist and creative 
judiciary can provide the needed sustainable remedy to bridge these gaps and set 
Nigeria on the path of sustainable reform.  
Other specific and elaborate recommendations for bridging the fundamental gaps in the 
current Constitutional framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity in 
Nigeria are contained in chapter 6, [6.4.1] (Recommendations for Constitutional Reform 
in Nigeria) of this thesis. The author sees no need to recite them here. 
 
3.3 Constitutional Framework: INDIA 
The protection of fundamental rights in Indian jurisprudence has an ancient origin. 
According to Rasool, ‘in ancient India the State had a crucial role to play in the 
protection of human happiness and to ensure the promotion and protection of human 
rights in accordance with the supreme law, dharma.’64 
The philosopher author cited the Vedic culture (1500 to 600 B.C.) in which India “laid a 
solid foundation for an overriding importance of Dharma (just law) in private and 
public life. Since dharma was conceived as conducive for highest good and welfare of 
all, subordination of desire (Kama) and economic activities (Artha) to dharma moulded 
good behaviours of the king and his subjects.”65 
                                                          
64 Rasool, D. I. (2015). Human Rights: Ancient Indian Jurisprudence. Indian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 3(2), 1-15.  
65 Ibid at 2. 
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Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950 guarantees the right to human dignity as 
part of the right to life and liberty. The major constitutional lacuna also, is the non-
justiciability of the directive principles (as in the Nigerian Constitution). However, the 
creativity and activism of the Supreme Court of India in the “due process interpretation 
of fundamental rights” have made these non-justiciable rights enforceable and 
applicable as implied fundamental rights. Suffice it to say, that the advantage which the 
constitutionalism of the South African Bill of Rights enjoys over the Indian Constitution 
is levelled by the judicial activism of the Indian courts. This explains the reason why the 
Indian Supreme Court has been eulogised as ‘one of the most powerful Constitutional 
Courts in the world.’66  
 
3.3.1 The Right to Dignity of Women Vis-a-vis the Fundamental Objectives and 
           Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution of India, 1950 
In India, the right to dignity of women is protected under the “Right to life and personal 
liberty” in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution of 1950 which provides that: “No 
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by law.”  
As in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, the Indian Constitution also contains directive 
principles of state policy which are also declared non-justiciable by virtue of Article 37. 
However, by the art of judicial innovation and activism, the Indian Supreme Court 
equates dignity to life and thus defines and enforces these non-justiciable rights as 
implied fundamental rights, that is, the “minimum requirements which must exist in 
order to enable a person to live with human dignity.”67 Accordingly, the right to human 
                                                          
66 Cassels, J. (1989). Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible? The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 495-519; Mate, M. (2013). Public Interest Litigation and the Transformation of the Supreme Court of India   In 
D. Kapiszewski, G. Silverstein & R. A. Kagan (Eds.), Consequential Courts: Judicial Roles in Global Perspective (pp. 262-268). 
New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
67 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India and Others (The Bonded Labour) AIR 1984 SC 802 
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dignity in India is generally considered as part of a constitutional culture which upholds 
individual worth and value,68 and all that goes along with it. Consequently, every breach 
of human dignity is a breach of right to life in India.69 The importance of the honour and 
dignity of women in India was further underscored by the Indian Supreme Court in the 
case of Khedat Majdoor Chetna Sanghat v. State of M.P.,70 when it raised a poser to 
itself thus: “If dignity or honour vanishes what remains of life?”  
 
3.3.2 The Supreme Court of India Vis-a-vis Access to Justice for the Enforcement 
          of Writ Petitions 
But in India, the right to access to enforce fundamental rights is elaborately simple and 
devoid of any procedure whatsoever. A petitioner is at liberty to present his writ petition 
for the enforcement of fundamental rights before the Supreme Court under Article 32 or 
the state High Courts under Article 226.  
The process is also not expensive because legal aid is interpreted as a justiciable right 
under the broad meaning of the right to life and personal liberty in Article 21 and the 
state is held accountable for its provision as a constitutional right,71even up to the level 
of an appeal.72  
Also, with the development of the concept of Public Interest Litigation (PIL), the 
doctrine of Locus Standi in India has been neutralized to such an extent that a Writ 
petition for the enforcement of fundamental rights is deemed to have been properly filed 
even where the complaint is made on a mere letter written to a judge73 or a newspaper 
report of the violation.74 This is the dictum of Epistolary jurisdiction of Courts in India. 
 
                                                          
68 Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Admn (1980) 3 SCR 855. 
69 Per Justice Bhagwati in Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and Ors, (1981)2 SCR 516. 
70  (1994) 6 SCC 260: AIR 1995 SC 31. 
71 Per Justice Krishna Iyer in M.H. Hoscot v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 1548. 
72 Khatri v. State of Bihar AIR 1981 SC 928. 
73 Mrs. Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar & Ors AIR 1983 SC 339.  
74 Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala  AIR 1973 SC 1461. 
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The right to life and personal liberty in Article 21 is the bedrock of the Human Rights 
protection and enforcement in India. Through its positive approach, innovation and 
activism, the Indian judiciary remains steadfast as an institution for providing effective 
redress against human rights the violations.  
By its liberal and compound interpretation of “life and personal liberty,” the courts have 
formulated and merged a plethora of rights.75 In the old case of A.K. Gopalan v State of 
Madras,76 the earlier Supreme Court had given a narrow definition to these concepts 
when it held that each Article in the fundamental rights provisions of the Indian 
Constitution dealt with separate unrelated rights which were mutually exclusive. But 
this view has thus far been reversed by the later Supreme Court which held in the 
celebrated case of Maneka Gandhi v Union of India77 that the fundamental rights are 
related to each other and not mutually exclusive but form a single integrated scheme in 
the Constitution, stating that “the ambit of Personal Liberty by Article 21 of the 
Constitution is wide and comprehensive. It embraces both substantive rights to Personal 
Liberty and the procedure prescribed for their deprivation” which also must be fair, just 
and reasonable. 
Additionally, India has two court-made rules which were formulated specifically to 
protect the dignity of women especially with respect to sexual abuse in custody and in 
their work places, namely, The Rule in Sheela Barse and The Vishaka Guidelines.  
In Sheela Barse v. Union of India, 78 the Supreme Court of India formulated guidelines 
in the absence of legislation, for the protection of the dignity and sexual independence 
of women in custody, based on a Class Action Litigation (CAL). These guidelines 
became known as The Rule in Sheela Barse.  
                                                          
75 This is traceable to the practice in ancient Indian philosophy whereby the protection of all individuals were defined as the Dharma 
of the king, which obliged the king to prosecute or extradite violators for breach of Dharma irrespective of their socio-religious or 
economic standing positions. Further to this duty, the king was obliged to invent and apply necessary strategies for the effective 
promotion and protection of all rights.-See Rasool, D. I. (2015). Human Rights: Ancient Indian Jurisprudence. Indian Journal of 
Legal Philosophy, 3(2), 1-15 at 4. 
76 A.I.R 1950 SC p.27.    
77 A.I.R 1978 SC p.597. 
78 AIR 1987 (1) 153.  
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And in Vishaka & Ors v. State of Rajasthan, 79  the Supreme Court of India performed 
its “law making” role when it formulated guidelines for the protection of women against 
sexual violation at their workplaces, in the absence of legislation. These guidelines 
became popular The Vishaka Guidelines, and they have been promulgated into the 
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) 
Act, 2013. 
Accordingly, the gaps in the existing law are filled by the evolution of juristic 
principles, which in due course of time get incorporated into the law of the land thereby 
promoting its development.80 It is therefore realistic and reasonable that the Supreme 
Court of India has been cited alongside the Constitutional Courts of South Africa and 
Colombia as “consequential courts” which are agents of transformative change and 
democratization in the “global south.”81 
 
3.3.3 The Right to Equality: Article 14 
The principle of gender equality is enshrined in the preamble,82 Fundamental Rights 
provisions83 as well as the Fundamental Duties and Directive Principles in the Indian 
Constitution, 1950 (as modified up to 1st December, 2007) which encourages 
government to adopt and pursue measures of positive discrimination in favour of 
women.84 
Article 14 specifically provides that “The State shall not deny to any person equality 
before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” 
                                                          
79 AIR 1997 SC 3011.  
80  Babu, S. R. (2013). Contribution of the Supreme Court to the Growth of Democracy In India. NUJS Law Review, NUJS L. Rev, 6. 
81  Maldonado, D. B. (2013). Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia: 
Cambridge University Press. 
82 The Indian Constitution seeks “to secure” to all its citizens”: “JUSTICE”; “EQUALITY of status and of opportunity”; and 
“assuring the dignity of the individual.” 
83 Articles 12-35 of the Indian Constitution contain the Fundamental Rights. 
84 Women’s Rights Initiative, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL PROVISIONS FOR WOMEN IN INDIA, National 
Legal Research Desk. http://nlrd.org/womens-rights-initiative/legislations-laws-related-to-women/constitutional-and-legal-
provisions-for-women-in-india?subscribe=success#blog_subscription-2.  (13/7/2014). 
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And Article 15 (1) and (2) prohibits the State from discriminating against any citizen on 
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them; or cause any 
Indian citizen to suffer disability, liability, restriction or condition with regards to the 
use and enjoyment of public infrastructure. 
Badjena85 examined the legislative framework for the protection of the right to dignity 
of women with regards to rape and sexual violence against women with disabilities in 
India and concluded that disabled women and girls are more vulnerable to suffer 
indignity, humiliation and abuse than the other women. The author noted that the 
principle of gender equality is enshrined in the Preamble, Fundamental Rights, 
Fundamental Duties and Directive Principles in the Indian Constitution, including the 
mandate on the State to adopt measures of positive discrimination in favour of women 
but that Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Indian Constitution does not include disability as a 
ground for non-discrimination. 
However, constitutional protection of persons with disability and sickness is made in 
Article 39A of the Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter-IV of the Constitution 
which obliges the State to promote a legal system which “promotes justice, on a basis of 
equal opportunity,” and, “in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or 
schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not 
denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.”86 
Furthermore, Article 41 enjoins the State to ensure the provision of the right to work, 
education as well as the right to public support and assistance in the event of 
unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, within the limits of economic 
capacity. Already, by sheer art of judicial activism and innovation in constitutional and 
fundamental rights interpretation in India vis-à-vis the right to life and personal liberty, 
                                                          
85 Badjena, S. S. (2014). "Sexual Violence against Women with Disabilities and the Legislative Measures in India." ODISHA 
REVIEW (April-May 2014): 46-57.  
86 The Indian Legislature has also promulgated the People With Disability Act which sufficiently clears every doubt and takes care 
of any gaps inherent in the constitutional provisions on gender equality for people with disabilities in India. 
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these principles are being enjoyed as justiciable positive rights in India. This is a big 
lesson for Nigeria to follow.  
 
3.3.4 Right to Legal Aid 
Poverty and inability to pay for the services of an attorney are common reasons why 
most women cannot seek legal redress for certain abuses and violation of rights. Studies 
also show that Poverty is not a gender neutral condition as the number of poor women 
exceeds that of men in most third world countries87 and it is even “nearly universal 
across affluent Western democracies” where inherent structural factors tend to feminize 
poverty and threaten gender equality.88 
Therefore, legal aid is necessary to “widen the road” and ensure uninhibited access to 
justice as a basic human right necessary to guarantee women’s right to dignity and 
freedom and human rights generally.89 
Article 39A of the Indian Constitution obligates the State to ensure that the legal system 
promotes equal justice to all by providing “free legal aid, by suitable legislation or 
schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not 
denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.” 
 
Ordinarily, Article 39A is caught in the web of non-justiciability and it was so applied 
by the Supreme Court in the early days of the Indian Constitution. At that time, the 
scope of legal aid was restricted to the right of the applicant to engage the services of a 
lawyer of his choice and not a right to be offered the services of a lawyer at the expense 
of the state.90 However, according to Khan,91 the courage and interpretative activism of 
                                                          
87 Bastos, A., Casaca, S. F., Nunes, F., & Pereirinha, J. (2009). Women and poverty: A gender-sensitive approach. The Journal of 
Socio-Economics, 38(5), 764-778; Shaffer, P. (1998). Gender, poverty and deprivation: evidence from the Republic of Guinea. 
World Development, 26(12), 2119-2135; Quisumbing, A. R., Haddad, L., & Peña, C. (2001). Are women overrepresented among 
the poor? An analysis of poverty in 10 developing countries. Journal of Development Economics, 66(1), 225-269. 
88 Brady, D., & Kall, D. (2008). Nearly universal, but somewhat distinct: The feminization of poverty in affluent Western 
democracies, 1969–2000. Social Science Research, 37(3), 976-1007.  
89  S.L.A. Khan (2001) Justice Bhagwati on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, op.cit, p. 156.  
90  Tara Singh v. State, AIR 1951 SC 441; Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 SC 217. 
91 S.L.A. Khan, (2001) Justice Bhagwati on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, op.cit. p. 155. 
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the later Supreme Court with the likes of Justice P.N. Bhagwati caused the right to free 
legal aid to be read into and enforced as part of the fundamental rights. 
Thus, in M.H. Hoscot v. State of Maharashtra,92 Krishna Iyer, JSC, held that the state 
was bound to provide free legal aid to an indigent, or incommunicate person as a 
constitutional right, if the circumstance and justice of the case permits. However, in 
Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar 93 Justice Bhagwati strengthened 
the decision in Hoscot by applying to it the fair, reasonable and just rule and observed 
that the right to legal aid is fundamental and may only become immaterial if the 
beneficiary refuses to accept it. He further expanded this concept by holding in Khatri v. 
State of Bihar,94 that the due process application of Article 39 creates a continuing right 
to legal aid which attaches to the accused person95 from the time of his first arraignment 
before a magistrate up till his final appeal at the Supreme Court, and that it also creates 
an unqualified constitutional obligation on the state to provide the legal aid irrespective 
of any real or imagined administrative or financial constraints. 
 
Since legal aid is considered a constitutional fundamental right in India, it thus logically 
follows, as with all other constitutional rights, that the plaintiff cannot even on his own 
volition waive or surrender the enjoyment of the constitutional right in favour of the 
respondents. In the case of Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India & Ors,96 the Supreme Court 
cautioned that “Fundamental Rights under the Constitution cannot be bartered away. 
They cannot be compromised nor can there be any estoppels against the exercise of 
Fundamental Rights available under the Constitution,” as doing so would amount to a 
breach of public policy. Remarkably too, the benefit of legal aid under the Indian 
                                                          
92  AIR 1978 SC 1548. 
93  AIR 1979 SC 1369. 
94 Khatri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 928. 
95 It must be borne in mind that although the right to free legal aid so far discussed generally applies to an accused person in a 
criminal trial, it can also be inferred in respect of a woman seeking justice for the violation of her right to dignity under Article 21. 
96 AIR 2000 SC 1401. 
   170 
Constitution applies also to social action groups and voluntary organisations that render 
legal aid services and benefits to the deserving public, especially at the grassroots.97  
 
3.3.5 Limitation of Rights in the Indian Constitution  
Article 19 (2)-(6) of the Indian Constitution permits reasonable executive, legislative or 
administrative action which seeks to limit the enjoyment of certain rights.  
The permissible limitation of rights however does not include the right to dignity or life 
in India.98 In the case of Om Kumar & Ors v. Union of India in Delhi Development 
Authority v. Skipper Construction & Anor99 the Indian Supreme Court applied what is 
now described as “The Three-Step Rule of Constitutional proportionality.” The 
Supreme Court explained the rule thus:  
 
By ‘proportionality', we mean the question whether, while regulating 
exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of 
measures has been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to 
achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative 
order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the court will see that the 
legislature and the administrative authority maintain a proper balance 
between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order 
may have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the 
purpose which they were intended to serve. The legislature and the 
administrative authority are however given an area of discretion or a range 
of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the rights excessively 
or not is for the court. That is what is meant by proportionality.100  
                                                          
97 Centre for Legal Research v. State of Kerala 3 SCJ 1986 SC 17.  
98 Article 19(1) lists the affected rights to include the right to freedom of speech and expression; freedom to assemble peaceably and 
without arms; freedom to form associations or unions; freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India; freedom to reside 
and settle in any part of the territory of India and freedom to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business 
within the territory of India. 
99 [2001] 4 LRI 1049. 
100 Paragraph 29, page 12 of the judgement. This  three-step  test  was  re-affirmed  in  Malaysia by the Federal  Court  
Per Dato’ Gopal Sri Ram FCJ in Sivarasa Rasia v. Badan Peguam, Malaysia [2010] 2 MLJ 333, (FC) at para 30 at p 
351 where his Lordship held thus:  
“[A]ll forms of state action-- legislative or executive measure — that infringe a fundamental right must:  
(a) have an objective that is sufficiently important to justify limiting the right in question;  
(b) the measures designed by the relevant state action to meet its objective must have a rational nexus with that objective; 
and  
(c) the means used by the relevant state action to infringe the right asserted must be proportionate to the object it seeks to 
achieve.”   
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It suffices that ‘reasonable restrictions’ which the State could impose on the 
fundamental rights should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is 
required for achieving the objects of the legislation. Therefore, legislation which 
arbitrarily or excessively invaded the right could not be said to contain the quality of 
reasonableness unless it struck a proper balance between the rights guaranteed and the 
control permissible under arts 19(2) to (6). Otherwise, it must be held to be wanting in 
that quality.101   
Generally, in determining the proportionality of any legislative or administrative 
restrictions to fundamental rights (of course not including the right to life and dignity of 
women in India), the burden of proof lay on the state to show that the restriction was 
reasonable and proportionate. And in arriving at a decision on the proportionality and 
reasonableness or otherwise of a restriction or limitation, the High Court or Supreme 
court “must keep in mind the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the 
underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil 
sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition as well as the 
prevailing conditions of the time.”102  
 
3.3.6 Application of International Law 
The Indian Constitution does not contain any specific provision which obliges the 
application of international human rights law in the Indian Courts.  
However, by its uncommon creativity and activism, the Indian Supreme Court applied 
international human rights law in formulating the Vishaka Guidelines which protected 
women’s dignity against sexual harassment at the workplace, at a time when there was 
no legislation on the subject. 
                                                          
101 See Mahajan J, (as he then was) in Chintaman Rao v State of Uttar Pradesh [1950] SCR 759.  
102 See the observation of Patanjali Sastri CJ in State of Madras v. V Row [1952] SCR 597, as well as that of Jeevan Reddy J in State 
of AP v Mc Dowell & Co (1996) 3 SCC 709. 
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According to the Court: 
 Gender equality includes protection from sexual harassment and right to 
work with dignity, which is a universally recognised basic human right. The 
common minimum requirement of this right has received global acceptance. 
The International Conventions and norms are, therefore, of great 
significance in the formulation of the guidelines to achieve this purpose. 
The obligation of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for the 
enforcement of these fundamental rights in the absence of legislation must 
be viewed along with the role of judiciary envisaged in the Beijing 
Statement of Principles of the Independence of the judiciary in the 
LAWASIA region. [T]hese principles were accepted by the Chief Justices 
of the Asia and the Pacific at Beijing in 1995 as those representing the 
minimum standards necessary to be observed in order to maintain the 
independence and effective functioning of the judiciary.103 
 
The Court observed that it also relied on two provisions of the CEDAW namely Article 
11 which enjoin State Parties to take all appropriate steps to ensure equality at work, 
safe working conditions and eliminate discrimination against women in the workplace 
and Article 24 which enjoin State Parties to apply all necessary measures at the national 
level to ensure the full realization of the rights recognised in the CEDAW. This is an 
ingenious and commendable judicial way to apply international human rights law for 
the protection of women’s dignity even where municipal law offers no direct remedy.  
In that case, the court also emphasised that the consideration of "International 
Conventions and norms are significant for the purpose of interpretation of the guarantee 
of gender equality, right to work with human dignity in Articles 14, 15 19(1)(g) and 21 
of the Constitution and the safeguards against sexual harassment implicit therein." The 
judgment of August 1997 was given by a bench of Justices headed by J. S. Verma (then 
Chief Justice of India). 
                                                          
103 Vishaka & Ors v. State of Rajasthan & Ors, JT 1997 (7) SC 384. 
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By this finesse of judicial activism, especially in the “just, fair and reasonable” 
interpretation of constitutional provisions on fundamental rights, the Indian Supreme 
Court has brought fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution at par with 
international human rights. Accordingly, Indian courts do not apply the dogmatic 
approach which is common in Nigeria where the courts are obliged not to apply 
international law unless they are first domesticated as part of municipal law,104 and that 
even where a conflict arises between the African Charter on Human and People’s rights 
vis-à-vis the Nigerian Constitution, that the African Charter must give way.105 
 
3.3.7 Critique of the Indian Constitutional Framework 
In relation to the right to dignity of women and fundamental rights generally, one of the 
prominent gaps in the Indian Constitution is that the rights contained in the directive 
principles are not rather enshrined as positive or fundamental rights, as it is in the South 
African Bill of Rights.  
 
The Indian Constitution also makes no distinct provision for the guarantee of women’s 
reproductive right as a specific fundamental right outside the right to life and liberty. 
This is without prejudice to Article 42 which directs the state to make provisions for 
just and human conditions of work and maternity relief. However, with regards to the 
sexual and reproductive rights of women in the global south generally, including India, 
some scholars especially Unitthan and Pigg106 have expressed the view that “rights have 
arrived but justice has not followed”. 
The Indian Constitution also does not specify that international human rights law should 
be mandatorily applied in all courts or tribunals, as is common in the South African 
                                                          
104 Section 12 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
105 Abacha v Fawehinmi (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228. 
106 Unnithan, M., & Pigg, S. L. (2014). Sexual and reproductive health rights and justice–tracking the relationship. Culture, health & 
sexuality, 16(10), 1181-1187.  
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Constitution. It has however been severally mentioned in this research that the 
innovation and activism of the Indian Supreme Court has sufficiently bridged these gaps 
by interpreting, defining, applying and enforcing the directive principles as implied 
fundamental rights and also connecting women’s right to dignity and reproductive 
health to the right to life and liberty in Article 21. 
Though the Supreme Court of India is considered as “one of the most activist judiciaries 
in the world,”107 however, the Court’s activism, especially with regards to social action 
litigation (SAL), has been criticised as being undemocratic, ineffective, judicial 
grandstanding and a violation of the principle of separation of powers.108   
 
3.3.8 The Way Forward 
In his Outlines of Indian Legal and Constitutional History, M.P. Jain remarked that 
“The judicial system, on the whole, is tolerably adequate […] Despite all achievements 
a few serious defects […] have become time-honoured as they have persisted for so 
long.”109  
This statement clearly buttresses the need for certain recommendations, albeit slight, for 
the strengthening of the Indian Constitutional framework, including its “tolerably 
adequate” judicial advances for protecting the dignity of women and human rights 
generally. But even in such rare cases, the Indian Supreme Court had formulated and 
applied the Doctrine of Curative Petition further to and as an extension of Article 137 of 
the Constitution. By this doctrine, a petitioner is entitled to question a final judgement 
even after the dismissal of the review petition110 under Article 137. In a judgement of 
                                                          
107 Rajagopal, B. (2007). Pro-human rights but anti-poor? A critical evaluation of the Indian Supreme Court from a social movement 
perspective. Human Rights Review, 8(3), 157-186.  
108 Upendra Baxi, “The Avatars of Indian Judicial Activism: Explorations in the Geographies of (In)Justice” in S.K.Verma and 
Kusum (eds.) Fifty Years of the Supreme Court of India: Its Grasp and Reach (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2000) at 161.  
109 Quoted in Badami, N., & Chandu, M. (2014). Access to Justice in India. In Institutional Competition between Common Law and 
Civil Law, Chapter 7(pp. 211-235). Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
110 Review Jurisdiction of Supreme Court of India: Article 137 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2169967 
(29/8/2014). This paper however concludes that the doctrine of curative petition which basically permits a second review “may not 
seem to be reasonable… particularly when there is no eminent necessity or demand to do so.(See ibid at 18). 
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far reaching consequences in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra111, the Supreme Court 
held, per S.P Barouche, then CJI, that ‘though the judges of the highest court do their 
best subject to the limitation of human fallibility yet situations may arise, in the rarest of 
rare cases, which would require reconsideration of a final judgement to set right 
miscarriage of justice.’ In that case, a five-man Constitution bench of the Supreme 
Court unanimously held that in order to rectify gross miscarriage of justice in its final 
judgement which cannot be challenged, the court will allow curative petition by the 
victim of miscarriage of justice to seek a second review of the final order of the court.112 
It is also specifically recommended that the Indian Constitution be amended to enshrine 
the non-justiciable ESC rights currently referred to as Directive Principles of State 
Policy as positive fundamental rights, even though they presently apply as implied 
fundamental rights by reason of the consequential interpretative activism and creativity 
of the Indian Supreme Court.  
It should also provide specifically for the guarantee of the reproductive rights of 
women, and declare the application of international human rights law obligatory in all 
courts or tribunals among others. These improvements will place Indian 
constitutionalism at par with that of South Africa and reduce the seeming dependence 
on judicial creativity and activism for the protection of women’s right to dignity in 
India. After all, according to two Indian scholars, “while we might have rights-
enhancing judgments from courts that interpret the Constitution expansively, these 
judgments do not transform structures of injustice.”113 
 
 
                                                          
111 AIR 2002 SC 1771.   
112  So long as the petitioner establishes a genuine violation of principle of natural justice, fear of the bias of the judge and judgment 
that adversely affected him. Additionally, the petition must accompany certification by a Senior Lawyer relating to the fulfilment of 
the requirements. 
113 Sircar, O., & Mandal, S. (2013). What's law got to do with justice? Infochange Agenda, March (26), 2-6 at 3. 
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3.4 Constitutional Framework: SOUTH AFRICA 
The Constitution of South Africa enshrines the civil and political rights, economic, 
social and cultural rights as well as environmental rights as positive justiciable rights in 
its Bill of Rights. Consequently, with respect to the guarantee and protection of human 
rights, the Constitution is acclaimed to be one of the best in the world!114 This is in 
addition to the South African Constitutional Court which Heinz Klug has extolled for its 
‘transformative constitutionalism,’115 ‘generous interpretation of rights’ and ‘judicial 
pragmatism rather than the symbolic judicial activism.’116 At the formal inauguration of 
the Constitutional Court, then President Nelson Mandela described it as ‘a court South 
Africa has never had, on which hinges the future of our democracy.’117 
 
3.4.1 The Right to Dignity of Women in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
          Africa, 1996 
Section 10 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of South Africa 1996 guarantees 
women’s right to dignity thus: “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their 
dignity respected and protected.” 
However, unlike in India and Nigeria, the Bill of Rights in the South African 
Constitution enshrines both the first and second generation of rights as justiciable 
positive rights, thus guaranteeing all other bundle of rights which make life worth living 
and with dignity. It suffices that these rights stand independently and do not derive their 
efficacy from judicial activism and interpretative innovation or any implied application 
as is obtained in India. This character places the South African Constitution far ahead of 
                                                          
114 Moseneke, D. (2012). "32nd Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: A Journey from the Heart of Apartheid Darkness towards 
a Just Society: Salient Features of the Budding Constitutionalism and Jurisprudence of South Africa, The Geo. LJ 101: 749.
  
115 Sunstein, C. R. (2001). Social and economic rights? Lessons from South Africa. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics 
Working Paper No. 124, p. 4. 
116 Klug, H. (2013). Constitutional Authority and Judicial Pragmatism, Politics and Law in the Evolution of South Africa’s 
Constitutional Court. Consequential Courts: Judicial Roles in Global Perspective. New York, USA, Cambridge University Press: 
93-113. 
117 Presidential Speech at the formal inauguration of the South Africa Constitutional Court, 15th February, 1994. 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/thecourt/history.htm#cases (Accessed on 7/6/2013). 
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those of Nigeria and India, and explains why its Preamble note contains the following 
statement: “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.”118 
The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state as well as both natural or juristic persons.119 Section 
8(3) of the South African Constitution enjoins courts to apply and if need be, develop the 
common law to ensure full protection of the rights contained in the Bill of Rights, in the event 
that municipal law is short on any such right.  
Section 39 of the Constitution further mandates courts when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, to ensure that they promote the common values of an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, as well as international law. This 
means that the CEDAW does not suffer the fate of non-implementation due to non-
domestication which is the situation under Section 12 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
The Bill of Rights also recognizes other rights or freedoms conferred by common law, 
customary law or legislation, as long as they do not derogate from the Bill of Rights. It 
further enjoins courts to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights 
when developing legislation, common law or customary law. 
Section 184(3) of the South African Constitution also obligates non-judicial bodies to 
monitor and superintend the performance/compliance of government and its agencies 
with the enforcement of socio-economic and environmental rights. The said Section 
provides that: 
 
Each year, the South African Human Rights Commission must require 
relevant organs of state to provide the commission with information on the 
measures they have taken towards the realization of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights concerning housing, healthcare, food, water, social security, 
education and the environment.     
 
                                                          
118 See Breen, D., & Nel, J. A. (2014). South Africa-A home for all: The need for hate crime legislation. South African Crime 
Quarterly, 38, 33-43. 
119 Section 8 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
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With particular reference to the right to dignity of the girl-child in particular and 
children generally,120 the Constitution of South Africa ranks among the best in the 
world. According to Warren Binford,121 the Constitution of South Africa 1996 
represents an unrivalled ground-breaking advancement in the guarantee of children’s 
rights. This is because, for the first time, ‘children’s rights were robustly and 
comprehensively recognized in the express language of a nation’s Constitution rather 
than ‘primarily through statutes, case law, and international treaties, with only 
occasional recognition of specific rights such as the right to primary education and 
certain family rights found in the express language of Constitutions.’ The author 
emphasises that apart from South Africa, ‘no country had promulgated a Constitution 
that recognized children as a unique population of rights holders with numerous specific 
rights beyond those held by adults’122 and that this rare advancement also places South 
African Courts, especially the Constitutional Court above the courts in other 
jurisdictions which ‘interpreted their Constitutions to recognize children’s rights (albeit 
these rights are usually limited in both number and scope relative to adults).’123  
It is also logical and reasonable to assert that the fact that Section 39 (1)(b) of the South 
African Constitution mandates courts to consider and apply international law in making 
decisions while Section 233 enjoins them to always prefer a statutory interpretation 
which favours international law as against one that does not, it presupposes as Warren 
Binford rightly said that South African children not only enjoys rights protection under 
the municipal law but they also enjoy those guaranteed internationally under the UN 
                                                          
120 The emphasis of this thesis is particularly on the rights of the “female” or girl-child. 
121 Binford, W. (2015). The Constitutionalization of Children's Rights in South Africa: 1994-2014. New York Law School Law 
Review, 59(2).  
122 In addition to some of the universal rights embodied in the Bill of Rights including housing (Section 26); health care, water, 
sanitation and social security (Section 29), the South African Constitution uses clear, emphatic and unambiguous language to oblige 
the state to ensure the protection of children-specific rights guarantees in its Section 28. For purpose of this thesis, these includes 
inter alia, the obligation to protect the child against “maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation” (Section 28(1) (d), and 
“exploitative labour practices” (Section 28 (1) (e), which would otherwise certainly derogate the dignity of the girl-child.   
123 Binford, W. (2015). The Constitutionalization of Children's Rights in South Africa: 1994-2014, op.cit. 
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Convention on the Rights of the Child, the African Children’s Charter and other 
international treaties which South Africa has subscribed to.124  
This form of advanced constitutionalism in the protection of the right to dignity of the 
girl-child represents a good lesson for both Nigeria and India, even though Indian courts 
remarkably apply their creativity and activism to bridge even the most insidious 
legislative or constitutional lacuna. 
 
3.4.2 The Constitution of South Africa Vis-a-vis Access to Justice for the 
Enforcement of the Right to Dignity in the Constitutional Court 
South Africa has elaborate guarantee of fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights in its 
Constitution of 1996. The Bill of Rights is considered a cornerstone of South Africa’s 
democracy and it affirms the core values of human dignity, equality and freedom125 and 
the state is obliged to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” these rights.126 
Accordingly, the strength of constitutionalism in South Africa lies more on the Bill of 
Rights and independence of the South Africa Constitutional Court than on the overall 
judicial innovation and activism as it is in India. This is because the need for judicial 
activism is considerably reduced because the Bill of Rights says it all. The 
Constitutional Court, short of formulating guidelines in the absence of legislation, as in 
India, merely ensures that the provisions of the Bill of Rights are interpreted to conform 
to the dictates of international law on human rights and equality. 
Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides that: 
Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected 
and protected. 
                                                          
124 See Binford, W. (2015). The Constitutionalization of Children's Rights in South Africa: 1994-2014, ibid, p. 11. 
125 Chapter 2, Section 7(1) of the 1996 South Africa Constitution. 
126 Section 7(1) ibid. 
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With respect to the dignity right of children, (and for our purpose, the girl-child), 
Section 28 (1) (a) and (d) of the South African Constitution are imperative. They 
provide thus: 
Every child has the right to (a) a name and a nationality from birth; (d) to be 
protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse and degradation. 
 
It must be noted that the specific right of children in Section 28 of the South African 
Constitution are to be enjoyed in addition to some of the rights (with respect to adults) 
contained in the Bill of Rights as well as in international and regional instruments 
ratified by South Africa. 127 
According to Julia Sloth-Nielsen & Benyam Mezmur, even ‘the Constitutional Court in 
its first decision affirmed dignity as a founding principle of the court generally, and then 
held that the dignity rights of children have heightened importance.’128 
Section 12(1) of the Constitution guarantee the right to freedom and security of the 
person to be free from “all forms of violence from both public and private sources”, as 
well as the right not to be treated or punished in a “cruel, inhuman or degrading way” 
while Section 12(2) is particularly protective of women’s physical and psychological 
integrity and reproductive rights thus: 
Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity which includes 
the right to (a) make decisions concerning reproduction; (b) to security in 
and control over their body; and (c) not to be subjected to medical or 
scientific experiments without their informed consent. 
 
                                                          
127 Binford, W. (2015). The Constitutionalization of Children's Rights in South Africa: 1994-2014, ibid, p. 11. 
128 Sloth-Nielsen, J., & Mezmur, B. D. (2008). 2+ 2= 5-Exploring the Domestication of the CRC in South African Jurisprudence 
(2002-2006). Int'l J. Child. Rts., 16, 1 at 24-25. 
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Environmental rights which are negative rights in the Nigerian Constitution and implied 
rights in the Indian Constitution are justiciable rights in Section 24 of the South African 
Constitution. 
The Women’s Charter for Effective Equality, 1994 combines with the Bill of Rights and 
the peculiar independence of the Constitutional Court to offer sustainable protection for 
the dignity of women in South Africa.  
Article 1 of The Women’s Charter provides severally that:  
The responsibility to ensure that the principle of equality informs all aspects 
of our lives shall not be limited to the state but shall be borne by all, 
including employers, family members and civil society. 
The State shall establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure the effective 
protection and promotion of equality for women, which shall be accessible 
to all women in South Africa. 
 
Section 167 of the South African Constitution permits a person to bring an action 
directly to the Constitutional Court or to appeal directly to the court, in exceptional 
cases, when it is in the public interest and with leave of the Constitutional Court. It is 
therefore reasonable that the independence and effectiveness of the Supreme Court of 
India and the Constitutional Court of South Africa has been identified as the backbone 
of legislation for safeguarding the dignity of women and inching progressively towards 
the “constitutionalism of the Global South.”129  
 
 
 
                                                          
129 Daniel Bonilla Maldonado(Ed), Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist tribunals of India, South Africa, and 
Colombia, (2013) Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, p.4. 
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3.4.3 Limitation of Rights in the South African Constitution  
Generally, it can be argued that there is practically no limitation of rights under the 
South African Constitution. This is because Section 36(1) of the Constitution provides 
stringent and near impossible criteria which must be met before such limitation can be 
permissible.  
By the provisions of the said Section 36(1), 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including-  
(a) the nature of the right;  
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
 
Aside the above onerous conditions, Section 36 (2) provides that “no law may 
limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.” With specific regards to the 
limitation of the right to dignity and the right to life, Section 37 (5) (c) of the 
Constitution of South Africa provides that even where a state of emergency is 
lawfully declared by an Act of Parliament under Section 37 (1) to restore peace 
and order, or at a time when the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, 
general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency,  
No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state of emergency, 
and no legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of a 
declaration, may permit or authorise any derogation from the right to 
Human dignity in Section 10 and the right to life in Section 11 of the South 
African Constitution.  
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This is similar to the Three Step Rule of Constitutional Proportionality130 developed by 
the Indian Courts as a check to the practical application of Article 19(2)-(6) of the 
Indian Constitution which permits limitation and restrictions to certain fundamental 
rights (not including the right to dignity or life).131 However, the criteria of less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose in Section 36 (1) (e) places the South African 
version ahead of India’s. 
It is thus arguably affirmed that there is practically no limitation of rights contained in 
the Bill of Rights in the 1996 South African Constitution. 
 
3.4.4 Application of International Law 
Section 39 of the South African Constitution makes the application of international law 
mandatory and compelling in all courts, forum or tribunals hearing and interpreting the 
Bill of Rights. The said Section 39 provides thus:  
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (a) must 
promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; 
and (c) may consider foreign law. 
 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
 
Accordingly, there is no difference between the rights enshrined in the South African 
Bill of Rights on the one hand and the human rights guaranteed in the Charter of the 
United Nations and other international human rights instruments on the other hand.  
                                                          
130 See Om Kumar & Others v. Union of India in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction & Anor [2001] 4 LRI 1049, 
op.cit.. 
131 Article 19(1) lists the affected rights to include the right to freedom of speech and expression; freedom to assemble peaceably 
and without arms; freedom to form associations or unions; freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India; freedom to 
reside and settle in any part of the territory of India and freedom to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or 
business within the territory of India. 
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This is unlike in Nigeria where a clear distinction is made between “fundamental rights” 
which are enforceable and listed in Chapter IV of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution and 
“human rights” which are viewed as part of international treaty which Nigerian courts 
are not bound to apply unless and until they are domesticated as part of the municipal 
law under Section 12 of the Nigerian Constitution, and even upon domestication, the 
African Charter (the African regional human rights Charter) has been declared inferior 
to, and not at par with the Nigerian Constitution132 vide Section 1(1) and (3) thereof 
which affirms its supremacy and that “if any other law is inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall 
to the extent of the inconsistency be void.” 
Furthermore, Section 233 of the Constitution of South Africa requires a court when 
interpreting legislation to “prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is 
consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
with international law.” 
Under the Constitution of South Africa, even sensitive matters like state security must 
also conform to international Law. In Section 200 (2) it provides that: “the primary 
object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity 
and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international 
law regulating the use of force.”  Section 199 (5) also provides that the “security 
services must act, and must teach and require their members to act in accordance with 
the Constitution and the law, including customary international law and international 
law binding on the Republic.” 
                                                          
132 Gani Fawehinmi v. Gen. Sanni Abacha (2000) 4 SC (Part II) 1. 
   185 
It is significant that South Africa is the only country in Africa which enshrines the 
application of international law in its Constitution133 thereby leaving the courts with no 
discretion whether or not to apply international law when interpreting municipal law.   
It is also significant that the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 
1996 was signed into law by President Nelson Mandela on Human Rights Day, 10th 
December 1996 at Sharpeville, the scene of the massacre of African demonstrators 
against the apartheid laws in 1960.134 John Dugard135 thus concludes that “the South 
African Constitution seeks to ensure that South Africa law will evolve in accordance 
with international law.”  
 
3.4.5 The South Africa Constitutional Court 
South Africa has an independent Constitutional Court which is the highest court in the 
land and whose jurisdiction is solely for constitutional matters. At its inauguration, 
former President Nelson Mandela proudly described the Constitutional Court as ‘a court 
like no other, on which hinges the future of our democracy.’136 Most Justices of the 
Constitutional Court acknowledge that one of the core values inherent in the South 
African Constitution is Ubuntu, that is, ‘social harmony and healing.’137 
In furtherance of the right to dignity of women, the Constitutional Court recognized 
gender equality in marriage and inheritance as basic constitutional rights in the cases of 
Shilubana & Others v. Nwamitwa138 and Elizabeth Gumede v. President of the Republic 
                                                          
133 Oppong, R. F. (2006). Re-Imagining International Law: An Examination of Recent Trends in the Reception of International Law 
into National Legal Systems in Africa. Fordham International Law Journal, 30(2), 269-345 at 323. (citing Tiyanjana Maluwa, The 
Incorporation of International Law and Its Interpretational Role in Municipal Legal Systems in Africa: An Exploratory Survey, 23 
S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 45,46 (1998) who was also citing Gerhard Erasmus, The Namibian Constitution and the Application of Inter-
national Law, 15 S. AR. Y.B. Int'l L. 81, 93 (1989-1990)). 
134 Dugard, J. (1997). International law and the South African Constitution. Eur. J. Int'l L., 8, 77-92 at 92.   
135 John Dugard, ibid at 78.  
136 See President Nelson Mandela’s Speech at the Inauguration of the Constitutional Court on 14 February 1995 in Johannesburg. 
http://hooyberglaw.wordpress.com/2013/12/06/president-nelson-mandelas-speech-at-the-inauguration-of-the-constitutional-court/, 
(24/7/2014). 
137 Mark Kende, (2006). “President Nelson Mandela’s Constitutional Law Legacy” in Human Rights, International Relations and 
Globalization published by Grupo Editorial Ibanez, 2006, http://www.law.drake.edu/clinicsCenters/conLaw/docs/recentMaterials-
mandelaLegacy.pdf (24/7/2014). 
138 (2008) ZACC 9. 
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of South Africa & Ors139 respectively. In other landmark judgments including 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom140 and Minister of Health v. 
Treatment Action Campaign141 the Court confirmed that the socio-economic rights to 
housing and health respectively were basic fundamental rights.  
In matters relating specifically to the rights of children, (and for our purpose, the right to 
dignity of the girl-child), the South African Constitutional Court has also taken “the 
most definitive decisions”142 in emphasising and considering the welfare and best 
interest of the child, even in matters where the child is nor a party. For instance, in S v. 
M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae),143   a single mother was convicted of theft 
and fraud and sentenced to four years imprisonment. However, because there will be no 
one to take care of her three children while she is in prison, the Constitutional Court 
converted her sentence to a non-custodial sentence and further urged courts to always 
consider the best interests of the child during every sentencing, especially what impact 
the incarceration of a parent(s) will have on the child(ren). 
It must be noted that the decision of the court may be varied by the peculiar 
circumstance of each case. Invariably, where a spouse or other care-giver or guardian 
will be available to take care of any child(ren), the court would readily impose or 
confirm a custodial sentence on a convicted parent. This was the case in MS v. S144 
where the Constitutional Court imposed a custodial jail sentence on a woman whose 
husband was available at home to take care of their children in her absence.  
Most interestingly, the protection of the dignity rights of children, including the girl-
child in South Africa was taken to a higher plane in the case of J v. National Director of 
                                                          
139 (2008) ZACC 23. 
140 [2000] ZACC 19. 
141 Case No. CCT/8/02, Heard on 2, 3 and 6 May 2002, Decided on 5 July 2002. 
142 Binford, W. (2015). The Constitutionalization of Children's Rights in South Africa: 1994-2014, op.cit, p. 11. 
143 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC). 
144 2011 (2) SACR 88 (CC).   
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Public Prosecutions & anor (Childline South Africa and others as amici curiae)145 
where the Constitutional Court held inter alia, that it is in the paramount best interests 
of child sex offenders that they have a right not to be identified by name nor have their 
names included on the lists of sex offenders. All these confirm that the Constitutional 
Court is, indeed, a global model in the protection of right to dignity of the girl-child as 
well as women’s fundamental rights and constitutionalism generally. 
 
3.4.6 Critique of the South African Constitutional Framework and the Way 
Forward 
It has been stated in this research that the South African Constitution of 1996 contains a 
formidable Bill of Rights which has been widely acclaimed as meeting the widest 
standard of international human rights law. 
The South African Constitutional Court is also acclaimed as “a consequential court” 
with regards to constitutional matters and matters relating to human rights as elaborately 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights. In spite of these praises, the South African 
Constitutional Court has also been criticized on two major points.  
Firstly, a prominent judge of the Constitutional Court, Justice Dikgang Moseneke has 
observed that ‘the tardiness of government implementation and the institutions in 
implementing court orders promptly and effectively remains a consistent threat to our 
constitutionalism.’146 He cited the case of Government of RSA & Ors v. Grootboom147  
where the Constitutional Court had ordered the state to provide suitable alternative 
housing to the applicant but this order was not carried out until the applicant had died.  
Secondly, pro-poor South African author and socio-economic and equality rights 
activist, Jackie Dugard has criticised the Constitutional Court for being anti-poor and 
                                                          
145  2014 (7) BCLR 764 (CC). 
146 Moseneke, D. (2012). 32nd Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: A Journey from the Heart of Apartheid Darkness towards a 
Just Society: Salient Features of the Budding Constitutionalism and Jurisprudence of South Africa, The. Geo. LJ, 101, 749. 
147 [2000] ZACC 19. 
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‘likely to become increasingly elite,’ having ‘failed to utilise the direct access 
mechanism to proactively select—not to mention to proactively seek out—deserving 
direct access cases from socio-economically disadvantaged groups.’148  
Jackie Dugard  argued that the intention of the constitutional provision allowing direct 
access  to the Constitutional Court when it is ”in the interests of justice” is simply to 
protect the socio-economically disadvantaged class, but that this essence is 
fundamentally defeated because in the first twenty years of its existence between 1994 
and 2014, the South African Constitutional Court “only granted direct access in 18 
cases” whereas the ‘Constitutional Court of Costa Rica hears approximately 17,000 
direct access applications each year (called amparos) and the Colombian Constitutional 
Court hears about 450 direct access applications each year (called tutelas).’149 It is thus 
imperative that the South African Constitutional Court needs to hear more number of 
cases and be more pro-poor by making itself more accessible to the socially 
disadvantaged.150  
This thesis further suggests that the South African Constitution be fine-tuned to allow 
direct access to the Constitutional Court, even without leave, as it is applicable in India 
by judicial creativity and activism. 
This thesis contends, therefore, that the latitude of access jurisprudence for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights in India is wider and preferred to that of South 
Africa because apart from the dictum of epistolary jurisdiction of courts, the writ 
petitioner in India has an unhindered constitutional right to choose bringing his original 
action before a High Court or direct to the Supreme Court. Needless to say that there is 
no similar right of direct access to the Supreme Court of Nigeria. 
                                                          
148 Jackie Dugard “Closing the doors of justice? The South African Constitutional Court’s Approach to Direct 
Access.” Published in Open Democracy/Open Global Rights of 25 May, 2015.  Available at:  
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/jackie-dugard/closing-doors-of-justice-south-african-constitutional-
court%E2%80%99s-approac (31/5/2015). 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
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This researcher also agrees with the recommendation of Justice Moseneke that the 
Constitutional Court should always set a deadline or time frame for its orders and 
directives to be carried out and that both individual and state violators should be 
punished severely. This is to make the Constitutional Court more pragmatic and 
consequential and strengthen the framework for protecting the dignity of women and 
human rights generally in South Africa. Anything less may diminish and dilute the 
effective protection of the ESC Rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and may 
therefore upset the pragmatism and transformative credence of the court151 as well as 
constitutionalism in South Africa.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The Constitutional framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity and human 
rights generally in India is quite impressive and superior to the Nigerian framework. 
Although it is not as water-tight as the South African Constitutional framework, the 
activism and creativity of the Indian judiciary in the interpretation of relevant 
fundamental rights provisions have effectively and reasonably bridged any inherent 
gaps in its constitutional framework. These advances provide many lessons for Nigeria.  
The sustainable enjoyment of women’s right to dignity in particular, and human rights 
generally, rests also upon the positive justiciability of socio-economic rights and 
environmental rights as is manifest in the Bill of Rights in the South African 
Constitution. 
However, the Constitutions of Nigeria and India expressly declare socioeconomic rights 
and environmental rights as non-justiciable. But while these rights remain 
unenforceable negative rights in Nigeria, they have become enforceable as implied 
rights in India by virtue of the independence, creativity and activism of the Indian 
                                                          
151 Moseneke, D. (2012) op.cit.  
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Supreme Court. Thus, by the standard indices of international human rights law, 
constitutionalism and the courts in India and South Africa have become “consequential 
courts in the Global South,”152 leaving Nigeria far behind in reforms.153 
This researcher holds the view that it may be an almost impossible feat for the Nigerian 
legislature to make the non-justiciable rights justiciable by constitutional amendment.  
The reason for this difficulty lie in Section 9 (3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution 
which make it almost impossible to obtain the mandatory number of federal and states 
parliamentary support necessary to effect any such amendments to the fundamental 
rights provisions in Chapter IV thereof. The opinion has been reasonably and rightly 
expressed that such constitutional amendment bottlenecks can only be resolved by the 
amendment of the amendment-provision of the 1999 Constitution: 154 It is thus humbly 
suggested that judicial innovation and creativity be applied as the very best reasonable 
and immediate option to effectively bridge both constitutional and other legislative 
inadequacies which hinder the general protection of human rights, as is common in 
India.  
However, with specific reference to sexual and reproductive rights of women in the 
Global South generally, some scholars have expressed the view that most human rights 
frameworks “increasingly pervade” global health  policies  and programmes, leaving 
one with the reasonable belief that “rights have arrived but justice has not followed.”
                                                          
 
152 Maldonado, D. B. (2013). Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia, 
Cambridge University Press. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING THE 
RIGHT TO DIGNITY AND SEXUAL INDEPENDENCE OF WOMEN IN 
NIGERIA, INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter the researcher examines the legislative and policy framework for the 
protection of the right to dignity of women in Nigeria, India and South Africa, with 
special regard to the Criminal jurisprudence on rape and other violation of the sexual 
dignity of women at home, in the workplace or the open space. It also examines the 
Nigerian Gender Policy, 2006 as well as certain remarkable political steps taken by the 
Government of India to advance access to justice and empowerment in the protection of 
women’s and dignity. With regards to the girl-child in Nigeria, the Child Rights Act is 
also examined.1 
It must be noted that the African Charter (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Cap 10, 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 is the domesticated version of the regional 
human rights instrument, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981. 
Since the African Charter was elaborately discussed in Chapter two of this thesis, there 
is no further discussion of Cap 10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. 
However, with specific reference to India, this chapter has inter alia, examined certain 
legislation on dowry and sex-selection.  
Two major legislation on violence against women which seeks to protect women and 
the girl-child’s right to dignity and sexual independence and against any form of 
                                                          
1 Two other national legislations which relate to women are National Laws on the Rights of Women and Girls in Nigeria Trafficking 
in Persons (Prohibition) Law-NAPTIP Act 2003 and the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and Administration 
(Amendment) Act, 2005. However, they are not considered here because Trafficking in persons is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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violence in South Africa are also examined in this chapter. They are the Domestic 
Violence Act, 116 of 1998 and the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act, 2007. The discussion of these legislation is premised on the fact that a 
violation of a woman’s dignity, especially her sexual dignity amounts to gross violence. 
The Chapter also makes a critique of Nigeria’s, India’s and South Africa’s legislative 
and policy framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity and makes 
recommendations for the way forward in each case. 
 
4.2 Legislative and Policy Framework: NIGERIA 
The Nigerian legal system is an offshoot of English legal system but while English laws 
are dynamic and have been developed to meet most rapid changes, their Nigerian 
counterparts have largely remained static. Thus, Nigeria is saddled with laws that are in 
some cases eighty years old and have not been revised to respond to the contemporary 
situations, among them, the dignity and empowerment of women. As a federal republic, 
each of Nigeria’s 36 States has its own State House of Assembly2 which has powers to 
draft its own legislation, subject to a Federal legislation on the same subject or the 
provisions of the 1999 Constitution.3 
However, the fact of being a federation as well as the practice of a tripartite system 
whereby civil law, customary law and religious law apply simultaneously makes it quite 
difficult to harmonise or eliminate most discriminatory socio-cultural practices cum 
religious mythologies which ignore, eliminate or diminish women’s rights including the 
rights to dignity and equality.4 Consequently, die-hard adherents of customary law and 
                                                          
2 Section 90 of the 1999 Nigeria Constitution provides that “There shall be a House of Assembly for each of the States of the 
Federation”. 
3 Section 100 (1) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution provides that “The power of a House of Assembly to make laws shall be 
exercised by bills passed by the House of Assembly and, except as otherwise provided by this Section, assented to by the 
Governor”. 
4 http://genderindex.org/country/nigeria#_ftn1 (13/5/2015). 
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Islamic law status quo observe practices and myths, even if they are unfavourable to 
women’s constitutional rights to life, dignity, marriage, inheritance or movement.5 
Unfortunately, the bill, [Abolition of all Forms of Discrimination against Women in 
Nigeria and other Related Matters Bill] was debated and later abandoned by Nigeria’s 
National Assembly in the mid- 2000s. Regrettably, as at the date of this research, the 
Nigerian National Assembly did not pass that bill into law, nor did it pass any other 
Federal bill prohibiting violence against women. Hence, Nigeria has no law against 
domestic violence even though it has ratified the CEDAW and the African Union 
Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, albeit both international instruments remain 
“undomesticated” and of no legal effect.6  
 
4.2.1 The National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria 
The National Human Rights Commission was established by the National Human 
Rights Commission (NHRC) Act, 1995, as amended by the NHRC Act, 2010, in line 
with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly which enjoins all member 
States to establish national human rights institutions for the promotion and protection of 
human rights.  The Commission serves as an extra-judicial mechanism for the 
enhancement of the enjoyment of human rights.  Its establishment is aimed at creating 
an enabling environment for the promotion, protection and enforcement of human 
rights.  It also provides avenues for public enlightenment, research and dialogue in order 
to raise awareness on human rights issues.7 
The complaint mechanism of the commission can be accessed by all victims of human 
rights violation in Nigeria or by their agents. The compliant may be submitted online or 
                                                          
5 Ojilere, A., & Gan, C. C. (2015). Learning from the Indian Judiciary: New Directions for Securing Nigerian Women’s Right to 
Dignity. Asian Women, 31(1), 81-106, at 87. 
6 By Section 12 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution contains the domestication provision that no international treaty “shall have the 
force of law” unless and until “any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly.” 
7  OECD Development Centre (2014). Social Institution and Gender Index (SIGI): Nigeria. http://www.nigeriarights.gov.ng/ 
(4/11/2014). 
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in in writing to the Executive Secretary, at any office of the National Human Rights 
Commission in Nigeria. A complaint may also be submitted orally to a representative of 
the Commission at the offices of the Commission. Where this is so, the representative 
will reduce it into writing and the victim or his agent will then sign or thumb-print the 
same. Every such written or transcribed submission must bear the complaint’s full 
information, the facts in support of his claim, as well as the relief sought.8  
The Act was amended by the National Human Rights Commission (Amendment) Act, 
2010. Under the amendment, the Commission became independent in the conduct of its 
affairs and its recommendations and awards were recognized and enforced as decisions 
of a High Court of a state. 
This amendment though appealing, is still deficient considering that fact that the 
decision of a state High Court in Nigeria is subject to appeal to a Court of Appeal and 
finally to the Supreme Court of Nigeria. This researcher thus envisages and 
recommends that the Act be further amended to make the award and recommendations 
of the Commission at par with the judgement of a Court of Appeal, or even as a final 
judgement of the Supreme Court, similar to the constitutional powers of the South 
African Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court of India with respect to matters 
relating to the Bill of Rights. This will introduce direct right of access to the 
Commission with respect to human rights violations, thereby complementing the regular 
functions of courts rather than encroaching on them.  
Furthermore, the establishment and powers of the Commission should take root in the 
Nigerian Constitution, just as in the case of the Human Rights Commission in India.  
                                                          
8  National Human Rights Commission, Nigeria. http://www.accessfacility.org/national-human-rights-commission-nigeria. 
(4/11/2014). 
   195 
There is also need to establish Human Rights Commissions in the various states of 
Nigeria as in India too, so as to bring justice closer to a woman in the event of a breach 
of her right to dignity. 
 
4.2.2 The Criminal Jurisprudence on Rape  
The law relating to rape in Nigeria is rarely discussed even though rape occurs very 
often and is considered as the most dehumanizing act that can be done on a woman or 
girl.9 The opinion has also been held that Nigerian female victims of rape are rather 
punished by the laws that be and stigmatized by society instead of being rendered 
justice to and protected.10   
Rape is one of the sexual offences known to the Nigerian criminal jurisprudence.11 The 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) considers rape as a form of discriminatory violence against women12 Article 
1(g) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recognizes rape as a crime 
against humanity.13 
The Black’s Law Dictionary14 describes rape as “unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
female without her consent; The unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman by a man 
forcibly and against her will; The act of sexual intercourse committed by a man with a 
woman not his wife and without her consent, committed when the woman’s resistance 
is overcome by fear, or force, or under prohibitive conditions.”  
 
 
                                                          
 
9 Aydin v. Turkey, 23178/9 (1997) ECHR, 75 25 September 1997 
10 Ogba, Onwuchekwa Chidinma, Rape Victims: Re-defining the law governing rape in Nigeria. University of Ado-Ekiti Law 
Journal 2010 Vol. 4 p.28 
11 Other sexual offences include indecent assault, defilement, incest, child pornography, offences against public decency and 
morality, carnal knowledge against the order of nature etc. contained in Chapter 20 of the Criminal Code Act Cap C38, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (applicable in Southern Nigeria). 
12 Activities for eliminating all forms of violence against women and girls are guided by UN Women’s global strategic plan 2011-
2913 Development Results Framework goal 3: To Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls and expand access to services 
http://www.unwomenpacific.org/pages.cfm/our-programmes/evaw/ 
13 The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949,pp.287-288) also states that “women 
shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of 
indecent assault.”  
14 6th edition page 1260 
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By Section 357 of the Criminal Code,15 
 
Any person who has unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman or girl, without 
her consent or with her consent if the consent is obtained by force or by 
means of threats or intimidation of any kind, or by fear of harm or by means 
of false and fraudulent presentation as to the nature of the act or in case of a 
married woman by impersonating her husband is guilty of an offence which 
is called Rape. 
 
 
And under Section 282 of the Penal Code,16  
 
 
A man is said to commit rape who has sexual intercourse with a woman: 
i. Against her will 
ii. without her consent 
iii. with her consent when her consent has been obtained by putting her in 
fear of death or of body harm. 
iv. With her consent when the man knows that he is not her husband and 
that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to 
whom she is believed herself to be lawfully married. 
v. with or without her consent, when she is under fourteen years of age or of 
unsound mind. 
 
 
The above provisions merely underscore the ingredients of the offence of rape without 
actually giving a succinct and detailed definition of it. This is unlike the law in Section 
1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act of England and Wales 2003 which defines rape in clear 
terms as an offence which is committed when a person intentionally penetrates the 
vagina, anus or mouth of another person with a part of his body or anything else. 
 
Following the definitions of rape in Nigeria where the Penal Code uses the phrase 
sexual intercourse and the Criminal Code uses carnal knowledge in describing the 
                                                          
15 Cap C38, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 (Applicable in Southern Nigeria). 
16 Cap 345, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 (Applicable in Northern Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja). 
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offence, it has been plausibly argued that by the phrases used, the Penal Code creates a 
limitation because it points to a male or man penetrating the vagina of a woman or girl 
with his manhood or penis while under the criminal code, it embraces every rape victim, 
be it male, female or child and with any kind of instrument, be it penis, objects or with 
an animal.17 Suffice to say that the core elements of rape in Nigeria, and all of which the 
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt in order to secure a conviction for rape 
are as follows:  
1. Legal capacity of the accused as to his age 
2. Penetration, as actus reus 
3. Lack of consent by the victim/survivor 
4. Marital/Spousal Rape exemption 
 
The requirement of age/legal capacity of the accused is premised on the irrebuttable 
common law presumption of law that a child under the age of seven is doli incapax, that 
is, incapable of forming the mens rea for the commission of any crime (including rape). 
Another irrebuttable presumption of law is that a boy who below the age of twelve is 
incapable of having canal knowledge of a woman, and therefore cannot be convicted of 
the crime of rape.  
 
Similarly, since by its statutory definition, rape is an offence committed against a 
woman or a girl, and never a man or a boy, it follows that no woman can be convicted 
of raping a man or boy, and no man can be convicted of raping another man, no matter 
the circumstance. However, it is noteworthy that a person who lacks the capacity to 
commit rape may be convicted of aiding, abetting, counseling or procuring the 
commission of rape. 18 
 
                                                          
17 See Ogba, Onwuchekwa Chidinma, Rape Victims: Redefining the law governing rape in Nigeria. University of Ado-Ekiti Law 
Journal 2010 Vol. 4 op.cit at p.251 
18 S.P.F. Harris, Principles of the Criminal Law, 13th Ed. Sweet & Maxwell, London 1919, p. 166. 
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In Nigeria, penetration is considered the actus reus of rape, that is, the actual physical 
sexual intercourse. In the case of Edet Okon Iko v. The State,19  the Supreme Court held 
inter alia that the essential and most important element of rape is penetration, and that 
unless and until even the slightest penetration is proved, the prosecution must fail.  
 
Also, in Jegede v. The State20  Belgore, JSC (as he then was) stated the law as follows: 
A person does not have to put in the whole of his penis into the girl’s vagina before he 
is said to have intercourse with the girl; in law, a mere penetration is enough to 
constitute the offence of rape.  This is why even where penetration was proved but not 
of such a depth as to injure the hymen, it has been held to be sufficient to constitute the 
crime of rape, albeit the prosecutrix who is allegedly defiled is found to be virgo intacta 
(i.e. a Virgin). 
 
However, Nigerian Courts sometimes apply unreasonable “patriarchal” logic and give 
conflicting decisions on cases of rape and sexual violations to the woman’s dignity. For 
instance, in Aiki v. Idowu,21 the Nigerian Supreme Court held that, in the absence of 
evidence that rape of a four year old girl was likely to endanger her life; the defendant, 
who had raped her to death, could not be convicted of murder by virtue of Section 
326(3) of the Criminal Code since the mens rea of rape is not to kill or cause death and 
therefore, ordinarily speaking, a case of murder rather than manslaughter cannot be 
easily established against the offender.22 
                                                          
19 (200) 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 221, per Iguh, JSC. 
20 (2000) 7 SCNJ 135 at 141 
21 (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 239) 361, 
22 And in Upahar v The State, (2003) 6 NWLR (Pt. 816) 230, the accused persons were charged with rape and abetment of rape 
respectively. The evidence against them by the victim/survivor was that the 1st Appellant pulled off his shorts, tore her pant, laid her 
down in the bush and while the 2nd appellant held her legs apart, the 1st appellant lay on her naked, and did everything necessary to 
unlawfully have carnal knowledge of her. The medical report of examinations carried out on the victim/survivor read thus: 
“perineal examination revealed normal external genitalia, tender vulva with whitish secretion; the hymen was lax lacerated but 
there was no active bleeding.” 
The court accepted as a fact that the 2nd appellant held the victim’s legs apart while the 1st appellant took out his penis and inserted 
into her vagina but went ahead to hold that since neither the medical report nor the eye witness could corroborate the actual act of 
penetration, penetration was therefore incomplete, and consequently reduced the appellants convictions to attempted rape and 
abetment of attempted rape respectively. 
With regards to Aiki v Idowu, this researcher humbly contends that the Supreme Court was wrong on the question whether rape of a 
four year old was likely to endanger her life. No evidence is necessary; the court should have taken judicial notice of that obvious 
reality. Common sense and a glancing acquaintance with psychobiology would lead to the conclusion that rape of a four year 
old child by an adult male was definitely life threatening. 
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Again, the mens rea of rape is an intention to have sexual intercourse without the 
woman’s consent. It follows that proof of consent or the lack of it is very material to the 
fate of the accused person. Consent is therefore an exculpating legal defence to a rape 
charge, and as long as the consent pleaded was obtained voluntarily and genuinely.23 
 
The import of Section 357 of the Criminal Code and Section 282(1) (a)-(e) of the Penal 
Code is that the mens rea of rape is satisfied where the woman’s consent to the sexual 
intercourse was obtained by force, threats or intimidation of any kind, or by fear of 
harm or by means of fraudulent representation as to the nature of the act, or by 
impersonating the victim’s husband. Another critical fact of Nigeria’s law on rape is the 
exemption of marital/spousal rape from the definition of rape. 
In summary, the combined effect of Section 6 and Section 357 of the Criminal Code is 
that a man cannot be guilty of raping his wife. 
 
Section 6 provides, in part, that: Unlawful carnal knowledge means carnal connection 
which takes place otherwise between husband and wife. In the same vein, Section 
282(2) of the Penal Code provides that: Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife 
if she has attained puberty. 
According to A. O. Yusuf,24  “it is assumed that by reason of marriage, both the husband 
and the wife enter into a mutual matrimonial contract, which includes an advance and 
irretractable access to their bodies and consent to have sexual intercourse with each 
other.” 
 
The Nigerian criminal jurisprudence therefore dilutes the right to dignity and sexual 
                                                                                                                                                                          
And on the Court of Appeal decision in Upahar, I agree entirely with the thinking that the court was actually looking for proof of 
virginity instead of proof of penetration, more so, when earlier decisions had specifically emphasized that the slightest penetration 
of the vagina with the penis was sufficient proof whether or not there was evidence of broken or lacerated hymen (See Ngozika Orji: 
Proof of Sexual Offences in Nigeria, UNIZIK Law Journal vol. 7 No. 1, 2010, p.310). 
23 (See Sunday Jegede v The State (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 733, 264; Iko v The State (supra) 
24 Gender Inequality and selective victimization under the Nigerian Law of Rape, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria Journal of Private 
and Comparative Law (JCPL) Vol. 2 & 3, 2007-2009 p.101; Reference has always been made to the words of Sir Matthew Hale in 
the History of the Pleas of the Crown, vol. 1, p. 629 to the effect that “…the husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself 
against his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up himself in this kind unto her 
husband which she cannot retract.” 
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independence of women by fueling the misconception that marriage is the prescribed 
avenue for the satisfaction of innate impulse, particularly in man; hence, no manner of 
sexual intercourse within marriage should be considered offensive.  
 
Technically, even the Nigerian law of evidence also places the woman-victim of rape 
“on trial” and in a precariously weak position at the trial of her violator.  
Section 211 of the Evidence Act provides thus: 
 
When a man is prosecuted for rape or for attempt to commit rape or for 
indecent assault, it may be shown that the woman against whom the offence 
is alleged to have been committed was of a generally immoral character, 
although she is not cross-examined on the subject; the woman may in such a 
case be asked whether she has a connection with other men, but her answer 
cannot be contradicted and she may also be asked whether she had 
connection on other occasions with the prisoner, and if she denies it may be 
contradicted. 
 
This simply means that if it is found that the victim had previously had sex with other 
men or even the accused person in the past, the court would invariably hold that she had 
volunteered her consent to the present act constituting the alleged rape. This paper will 
later show that the evidence of rape under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 of 
India offers better protection which does not place a rape victim on a similar “trial”. 
Again, by Section 179(5) of the Nigerian Evidence Act: “A person shall not be 
convicted of the offences mentioned in paragraph B of the subsection 1 of Section 51 or 
218, 221, 223, or 224 of the Criminal Code upon the uncorroborated testimony of one 
witness." 
Generally, by law and practice, the evidence of the victim of rape must be corroborated 
to sustain a conviction for the offence.  
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However, the judge must make it clear that he has the risk in question in his mind – 
what is necessary is that the judge’s mind upon the matter should be clearly revealed. 
Under the said Evidence Act, there is no requirement that an accused standing trial for 
rape cannot be convicted on uncorroborated evidence of one witness. However, over the 
years the common law principles have been that evidence of the prosecutrix needs to be 
corroborated or at best, the court will be wary to convict on such uncorroborated 
evidence.25 
 
In the case of Simon v. Police,26  Adetokunbo Ademola, J (as he then was) succinctly 
put the position of the law in Nigeria thus: “it is not a rule of law in Nigeria that in 
sexual offenses accused person should not be convicted on the uncorroborated evidence 
of a prosecutrix, that the court may after paying attention to the warning nevertheless 
convict if they are satisfied of the truth.27 This rule of practice arises out of the 
unconfirmed belief that women would deliberately lie about being assaulted to explain 
away premarital intercourse, infidelity, pregnancy or to retaliate against a lover.  
 
Accordingly, the burden on the prosecution to corroborate the testimony of the 
prosecutrix by independent evidence is heavy and tasking to the extent that even when a 
prosecutrix testified that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina, it is not enough 
and there must be corroboration by an independent witness of what the prosecutrix 
testified before.28 
There is a second reason for the rule for corroboration in sexual cases, namely, because 
these cases are particularly subject to the danger of deliberate false charge resulting 
from sexual neurosis, fantasy, jealously spite or simply a girl’s refusal to admit that she 
consented to an act of which she is now ashamed.  
                                                          
25 In this book, Proof of Guilt, Glanville Williams noted that “the rule is that the jury must be directed that it is dangerous to convict 
a person for any sexual offence based on the uncorroborated testimony of one witness.”  See Glanville Williams, Proof of Guilt.  
The Hamlyn Trust Lectures, Stevens & Sons Ltd, London 1955, p. 122 
26 (1951) WLNLR 23 
27 Also, in Ukut v. State (1965) 1 NRNLR 306 it was said that in sexual offences including rape, the court should wary to convict an 
accused without corroboration, but in State v. Ogiondiegion (1968) 1 NMLR 117) it was stated that the requirement of corroboration 
of evidence of the prosecutrix is not required but that the judge must warn himself on the risk of convicting of such evidence alone. 
28 See Idris Rai v. The State (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 925) 491 at 512. 
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In general the requirement of corroboration in sexual cases follows the same rule as for 
accomplice evidence of detail. The danger of convicting on the evidence of an 
accomplice who is trying to minimize his own part in the affair is obvious even to an 
unintelligent person. In sexual cases on the other hand, the danger is usually not 
obvious. 
Moreover, there is tendency in sexual cases for the proceedings to start with prejudice 
against the defendants, if the complainant is a girl of tender years whose appearance 
makes a strong appeal to the sympathy and protective feelings of the court. In the light 
of modern psychology the technical rule of corroboration seem but a crude and childish 
measure, if it be relied upon as an adequate means for determining the credibility of the 
complaining witness in such charges.29 
The point must also be underscored that many countries have recognised that there is 
little justification for the requirement of corroboration and that it seriously impedes the 
conviction of sexual offenders and have thus done away with this requirement for 
sexual crimes e.g. Canada, United Kingdom, New Zealand and India.30 
 
Furthermore, Section 183(3) of the Nigerian Evidence Act requires that no person shall 
be convicted upon the unsworn testimony of a child unless it is corroborated by some 
other supporting material implicating the accused person.  
It is trite that sexual offences fall under the category of offences where corroboration is 
required either as a matter of law or of practice. For some offences such as defilement, it 
is specifically provided that the court cannot convict based on the uncorroborated 
testimony of one witness, while for other offences such as rape, out of practice, the 
judge is required to caution the jury, or himself where there is no jury, that it is unsafe 
                                                          
29 However, a research on rape by the Malaysian NGO, All Women’s Action Society (AWAM) showed that it is very rare for 
women to report rape because of current prosecution practice, the stigma as a rape survivor and their psychological desire to forget 
about the crime.  Therefore these beliefs are in actual fact, false.  See page 26 of the MEMORANDUM ON LAWS RELATED TO 
RAPE IN MALAYSIA (PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENTS) Submitted by the Anti-Rape Task Force, Prepared by All Women’s 
Action Society (AWAM); Women’s Centre for Change, Penang (WCC); Sisters in Islam (SIS); Women’s Aid Organization (WAO); 
Protect and Save the Children (P.S. the Children) September 2003.   
30 See Memorandum on Amendments to Laws Related to RAPE, op. cit. page 27. 
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to convict based on the uncorroborated evidence of one witness.  
This double requirement for corroboration under the law for sexual offences against the 
child makes the task of prosecuting the accused person very onerous and may cause his 
acquittal. The criminal law in Nigeria seem to have ignored the fact that such sexual 
offences are usually committed in secret and hidden places away from the public glare 
thus eliminating even the least possibility or likelihood of any corroborative evidence. 
In addition, the likelihood of having an adult witness(es) to such sexual offences is 
remote because such crime will most likely not be committed before non-participating 
adult conspirators.  
In the light of the foregoing, this thesis therefore contends that the Nigerian Criminal 
jurisprudence on rape is weak and fraught with loopholes. The sexual offences listed in 
the two Criminal Codes of Nigeria (the Penal Code applicable in Northern Nigeria and 
the Criminal Code applicable in Southern Nigeria) include rape, indecent assault, 
abduction and sexual offences against the order of nature (sodomy and bestiality). 
However, common acts of sexual indignity and misconduct like stalking, voyeurism, 
domestic violence with sexual colorations, disrobing, spousal rape, and sexual 
harassment (at home and at the workplace) which are grievous criminal offences in 
India,31 were offences unknown to Nigeria’s criminal jurisprudence, even though the 
opinion has been expressed that “sexual harassment is a common feature in Nigerian 
society particularly in offices where some men in positions to hire labour exploit 
women’s desperation for jobs and demand sexual gratifications ahead of job offers.”32 
There is therefore an urgent need for legislative review and judicial activism with 
regards to the Nigerian criminal jurisprudence on rape and sexual offences. 
Interestingly, on 3 June, 2015 (two days to the end of its four year life) the Nigerian 
Senate suspended its own Rules and hurriedly passed 46 Bills into Law in 10 minutes! 
                                                          
31 See India’s Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013.  
32 Ozo-Eson, P. I. (2008). "Law, Women and Health in Nigeria." Journal of International Women’s Studies 9(3), p.295. 
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These Bills have been pending since the four year tenure of the Senate.33 One of such 
Bills is the Sexual Offences Bill (SB. 279) which prescribed life imprisonment for 
rapists and those who have sexual offences intercourse with children below 11 years of 
age. The Bill also criminalizes child sex tourism and the deliberate infecting of others 
with HIV/AIDS or other diseases, and prescribes 10 years imprisonment for incest and 
child pornography.34  
Additionally, it included various sentences and fines for other sexual offenses such as 
sexual harassment, prostitution of mentally disabled persons and lacing drinks with 
drugs with intent to sexually abuse. It also mandated storing names of sex offenders in a 
database and further provides a witness protection program to safeguard victims and 
witnesses on trial for sexual crimes.35 The bitter irony of the Bill is that by criminalizing 
‘sexual intercourse with children below 11 years,’ it means that the Act has pegged 
minimum the legal age of sexual intercourse in Nigeria 11 years. By this provision, the 
Bill is arguably defining a child to mean a person less than 11 years of age. 
Consequently, the new Bill has placed itself at variance with both the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
and the Child Rights Act, 2003 all of which define a child as a person below 18 years of 
age. However, it is yet to be seen what will be the ultimate fate of the Bill will be since 
it has not been passed by the Federal House of Representatives or signed into law by 
President of Nigeria. 
 
4.2.3 National Legislation on Domestic Violence  
Till date, there is no national legislation against domestic violence in Nigeria. There is 
also no legislation against intimate partner violence (IPV) in Nigeria, even though 
                                                          
33 The Guardian Newspaper Online, 4 June 2015. http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/06/senate-dumps-own-rules-passes-46-
bills-in-10-mins/ (5/6/2015). 
34 The Guardian Newspaper Online, 4 June 2015, ibid.  
35 http://www.ibtimes.com/nigerian-senate-approves-life-imprisonment-child-rapists-1953232 (5/6/2015). 
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Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) is considered a terrible form of domestic violence 
which leads to other violations of a woman’s human rights and dignity. 36 It violates the 
right to live with human dignity and identity as well as a denial of the universal right to 
equality. 37 Therefore, the inability of the Nigerian state to recognize and criminalize 
most offences related to gender-specific domestic violence and intimate partner violence 
against women is a further threat to the right to dignity and equal protection of women 
guaranteed in international law, and therefore a fundamental lacuna in its legislative 
framework.  
It must however be mentioned that some states in Nigeria have certain laws prohibiting 
and criminalizing various forms of women-specific violations.38 Ozo-Eson39 contends 
also that the Nigerian police usually consider and dismiss wife battering as a “family 
matter” which does not call for legal justice or police intervention, and that 
consequently, domestic violence and other violent behaviour against women do not 
attract the attention of the society let alone enacting laws against them,40 albeit spousal 
abuse has been identified as the most degrading and devastating form of domestic 
violence which breaches a woman’s right to dignity. And according to Amnesty 
International, spousal abuse is borderless and usually perpetuated against every class of 
                                                          
36 Ambily, P. (2014). Evaluating the Criminal Justice Interventions for ‘Intimate Partner Violence ’in India: The Need for a 
Paradigm Shift. SPCERA International Journal of Law and Governance, (SPCERA IJLG), 3(6), 32-42. doi: 
http://spcera.in/pdf/4Amly-Criminal%20-justice%20and%20interventions-%20Ambily.pdf  
37 Ambily, P. (2014), ibid 
38 Some of these state legislations include: (a) Law to Prohibit Female Circumcision and Genital Mutilation, Edo State 1999; (b) A 
Law to Amend some of the Provisions of the Criminal Code Law Cap. 48 Laws of Bendel State 1976 as applicable to Edo state, 
2000; (c) A Law to Prohibit Girl Child Marriages and Female Circumcision or Genital Mutilation in Cross River State, 2000; (d) 
The Female Genital Mutilation (Prohibition) Law, Bayelsa State, 2000; (e) A Law to make it unlawful to infringe the Fundamental 
Rights of Widows and Widowers, and for other Related Matters, Enugu State 2001; (f) A Law for the Monitoring of Maternal 
Mortality in Edo State and other Matters Connected Thereto, 2001; (g) Rivers State Reproductive Health Service Law, No. 3 of 
2003; (h) Rivers state Schools Rights (Parents, Children and Teachers) Law No. 2, 2005; (i) Women's Reproductive Rights, 
Anambra State, 2005; (j) Age of Customary Marriage Law, 1956; (k) Limitation of Dowry Law Chapter L 15, 1956; (l) Children 
and Young Persons Law, 1958; (m) A Law to Provide Protection Against Domestic Violence and For Connected Purposes (Lagos 
State) 2012.; (n) Ekiti State Gender-Based Violence (Prohibition) Law, 2011; (o) Imo State Free, Compulsory Qualitative Education 
Law 2011.- See p. 24-25, http://www.ng.undp.org/content/dam/nigeria/docs/IclusiveGrwth/UNDP_NG_inclusiveGrwth_Gender-
Briefing-Kit230513.pdf (13/5/2015). 
39 Ozo-Eson, P. I. (2008). "Law, Women and Health in Nigeria." Journal of International Women’s Studies 9(3), p.295 
40 Ibid at 292 
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women: literate and illiterate, rich and poor, able bodied and even the physically 
challenged.41  
This researcher therefore contends further that the absence of relevant legislation 
against domestic violence in Nigeria poses a consequential threat to the globalization 
and sustainable protection of women’s right to dignity in the country.  
 
4.2.4 National Gender Policy, 2006 
The Nigerian National Gender Policy, NGP 2006 was articulated by the Federal 
Ministry of Women Affairs. It is the outcome of an extensive research and consultative 
process whose objectives, goal, targets and strategies were adopted by the consensus of 
partners and stakeholders at several zonal and national workshops.  
It replicates the international template for monitoring, measuring and ensuring that both 
women and men benefit from basic socio-economic programmes necessary to eliminate 
discrimination and guarantee equality. It replaced and filled the gaps in the National 
Policy on Women 2000 (existing at the time) which later came into effect in 2001.  
The goal of the National Gender Policy is to “build a just society devoid of 
discrimination, harness the full potentials of all social groups regardless of sex or 
circumstance, promote the enjoyment of fundamental human rights and protect the 
health, social, economic and political wellbeing of all citizens in order to achieve 
equitable rapid economic growth; evolve an evidence-based planning and governance 
system where human, social, financial and technological resources are efficiently and 
effectively deployed for sustainable development.”42 Nigeria’s National Gender Policy 
(NGP) reiterates that equality and empowerment of women is a sine qua non for the 
                                                          
41  Amnesty International, 2005. See also Ozo-Eson, P. I. (2008) ibid at 293. 
42 The UN Gender Theme Group, Nigeria (2013). Gender Equality Briefing Kit. Nigeria: The United Nations System in Nigeria, p. 
27. http://www.ng.undp.org/content/dam/nigeria/docs/IclusiveGrwth/UNDP_NG_inclusiveGrwth_Gender-Briefing-Kit230513.pdf 
(14/5/2015). 
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actualization of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) No. 3. Kunle 
Sehinde43 considers the actualization of Millennium Development Goal no. 3 (Gender 
equality and the empowerment of women) as ‘the one needed to achieve all other 
MDGs.’  
Uche Okonkwo44 even suggested that the NGP should be enshrined in the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution, following the examples of Zimbabwe, Kenya, and especially 
Rwanda where, additionally, the National Women Council has been constitutionalized 
in Article 187 of the 2003 Constitution.45 He rightly suggested the constitutionalization 
of the NGP as well as the introduction of gender studies as a core school subject in 
secondary and higher institutions in Nigeria.46 The paper however did not make 
reference to India or South Africa nor was it particular on women’s right to dignity. 
The NGP is the core domestic policy instrument for realizing Nigeria’s commitments to 
national, regional and international policy and treaty instruments, including CEDAW, 
the African Union Protocol to the Rights of Women in Africa, and the DEVAW, for the 
promotion and protection of women’s human rights including their right to dignity, as 
well as sexual independence at home, in private, public and or open space.  
It has also been reported that the NGP aims to “reduce gender bias that arises from 
traditional cultural customs” by focusing on empowerment and basic education for 
women and “the abolishment of traditional practices which are harmful to women.”47 
And with regards to female health, the NGP seeks to tackle Female Genital Mutilation 
(FGM), Vesico-vaginal fistula (VVF) and violence against women (VAW).48  
                                                          
43 Sehinde, B. K. (2013). An Overview of Legal and Implementation Framework of Nigeria’s National Gender Policy. In R. I. Ako-
Nai (Ed.), Gender and Power Relations in Nigeria (pp. 87-100). Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, at 89. 
44 Okonkwo, U. U. (2013). Gender Question and National Policy in Nigeria: Historical Analysis. Kaduna Journal of Sociology 
(KJS), 1(1), 278-287.  
45 Ibid at p.283. 
46 Ibid at pp.284-286. 
47 See Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Public Policy Department, (March 2011). Country Gender Profile Nigeria: 
Final Report (pp. 10-13), especially the Summary at pp. iv-v. 
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/thematic_issues/gender/background/pdf/e10nig.pdf (14/5/2015).  
48 Ibid at p. v.  The report also described VVF as “an abnormal fistulous tract extending between the bladder and the vagina that 
allows the continuous involuntary discharge of urine into the vaginal vault. The cause is inadequate care on giving birth without 
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It is therefore beyond argument that the laudable contents and focus of the NGP are 
premised on Nigeria’s quest for social justice (Chapter II of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution), popular and inclusive democracy (CEDAW and the African Union 
Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa) as well as participatory and sustainable 
development (MDGs), for every Nigerian, irrespective of sex or circumstance.  
Overall, the NGP seeks to equip stakeholders with strategic skills for achieving standard 
levels of social, cultural and fiscal change for the empowerment and inclusion of all 
citizens, even though a recent study shows that relevant public agencies mandated to 
document information and data on gender statistics in Nigeria “lack basic technical 
competencies and show very little commitment to the engendering process.”49  
The researcher agrees with the optimism expressed by Durojaye, Okeke and Adebanjo50 
that if fully implemented, the NGP is elaborate and protective enough on women’s 
rights and therefore capable of delivering sufficient equality in rights, dignity and non-
discrimination including the elimination of three major harmful cultural practices 
against women namely, son preference, primogeniture and burial/widowhood rites. 
The daunting challenge however, is not the content of the policy document but the 
impossibility of its implementation as a proper legislation due to the non-domestication 
of the CEDAW upon which the NGP rests. It is for this reason that Oby Nwankwo, 
Nigeria’s representative to the CEDAW Committee, lamented that Nigeria is notorious 
for violating international agreements.51 
                                                                                                                                                                          
medical access, or receiving violence. WHO says that in the Sub Sahara Africa, Middle East and Asia, 2 million or more suffer VVF 
all over the world (NPO Japan VVF website) http://blog.fistula-japan.org/ (14/5/2015).  
49 Omoluabi, E., Aina, O. I., & Attanasso, M. O. (2014). Gender in Nigeria’s development discourse: relevance of gender statistics. 
African Population Studies, 27(2s), 372-385. 
50 Durojaye, E., Okeke, B., & Adebanjo, A. (2014). Harmful cultural practices and gender equality in Nigeria. Gender and 
Behaviour, 12(1), 6169-6181.  
51 Nwankwo Oby, “Nigeria is notorious for abandoning international treaties” Nigeria Vanguard Newspaper, 22 September, 2013 
(Interview with Josephine Igbinovia) http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/09/nigeria-is-notorious-for-abandoning-international-
treaties-oby-nwankwo/ (28/3/2015). 
   209 
On this note, the researcher joins the call on the Nigerian National Assembly to 
domesticate the CEDAW into the Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This will 
weigh on the executive to take steps towards its implementation or risk litigation for 
non-compliance. 
 
4.2.5 The Child Rights Act, 200352 
In consequence of the mandates in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
the AU Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Nigerian National Assembly 
promulgated the Child Rights Act, 2003.53 
The Act replicates allied international and regional instruments which recognize 
children as human beings and as subject of their own rights aside other general rights 
which apply to adults, some of which also cover children.54 
The Act is arranged in 24 parts, 278 sections and eleven schedules. It also repeals the 
Children and Young Persons Act and consolidates all previous laws relating to children 
into one. It spells out the rights and responsibilities of children in Nigerian and protects 
their rights against all forms of exploitation, abuse and violation.55 
Each part of the Act embodies issues specific to the child’s welfare, best interest and the 
administration of juvenile justice. These include the core essence of best interests of the 
child;56 the protection of the basic rights of a child and other protections;57 the care and 
                                                          
52 This Act is being examined in specific relation to the legislative framework for the protection of the right to dignity of the girl-
child as a “woman”.   
53 The Child Rights Bill was passed into law by the National assembly in July 2003 and was signed into law in September 2003 by 
the then President Olusegun Obasanjo. 
54 Arinze-Umobi, C., & Iguh, A. (2011). Child's Sexual abuse: The Role of International Instrument in Nigeria. Benue State 
University Journal of Private and Public Law, BSUJPPL, 1(1), 71-79. Two major child-specific international and regional human 
rights instruments apply for the protection, development, survival and inclusive participation of children in Nigeria. These are the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1989 (and 
ratified by Nigeria in 1991) and the African Union Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, adopted by the AU Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government in July 1990 (and ratified by Nigeria in 2000). The Convention on the Rights of the Child outlines 
the human rights to be respected and protected for every child below 18 years old and enjoins states to ensure the implementation of 
the rights recognized in the Convention by taking necessary legislative, administrative and other measures.  
55 Dankadai, L. B. (2015). An Appraisal of Children’s Right and Child Domestic Servants Under Child Rights Act 2003. Advances 
in Social Sciences Research Journal, 2(3), 261-270, at 265. 
 
56 Part I. 
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protection of children in need;58 rules for the supervision and care of children;59 tests to 
determine a child’s paternity or maternity;60 custody and possession of children;61 as 
well as wardship, guardianship, adoption and fostering of children;62 
Part XIII creates a family court while Part XIV provides for day-care and child-minding 
for infant child. The Act also provides for community and voluntary homes and 
government support for the child63 and with respect to the administration of child justice 
and allied institutions.64 
Section 11 of the Act provides elaborate protection of the child’s right to dignity thus: 
 
Every child is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person, and 
accordingly, no child shall be; subjected to physical, mental or emotional 
injury, abuse, neglect or maltreatment or punishment, including sexual 
abuse; subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
subjected to attacks upon his honour or reputation; or held in slavery or 
servitude, while in the care of parent, legal guardian or school authority or 
any other person or authority having the care of the child. 
 
The Act is a significant statutory framework which invariably secures the right to sexual 
dignity and life of the girl-child. For instance, bearing in mind that the offence of rape 
can be committed by men only in Nigeria, Section 31 of the Child Rights Act 
criminalizes any sexual intercourse with a child below 18 years and make it punishable 
with imprisonment for life, even if the child consented thereto or the accused sincerely 
thought the child to be older than 18 years.65 Section 32(1) and 33(2) makes it an 
offence punishable with 14 years imprisonment to sexually abuse or exploit a child in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
57 Parts III and IV. 
58 Part V. 
59 Part VI. 
60 Part VII. 
61 Part VIII. 
62 Parts IX to XII. 
63 Parts XV to XIX. 
64 Part XX. Other miscellaneous provisions are contained in Part XXIV. 
 
65 Section 31(3) of the Child Rights Act 
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any other manner not specified in the Act. It is therefore necessary for stake holders in 
the administration of justice in Nigeria to show decisiveness in the implementation of 
the Act. 
Regrettably, a recent poll reveals that in most rural schools and rural communities in 
Nigeria, “up to 85% of both children and adults respectively do not know that there is a 
law protecting the rights of the child in Nigeria.”66 
 
4.2.6 Critique of the Nigerian Legislative and Policy Framework 
The fundamental gaps in the legislative and policy framework for the protection of 
women’s right to dignity in Nigeria are elaborated in chapter 5, particularly [5.3] of this 
thesis.  
However, it is imperative to emphasise that the absence of a national legislation on 
domestic violence in Nigeria, as well as the inability to implement the NGP arising 
primarily from the non-domestication of the CEDAW and the Women Protocol to the 
African Charter leave pressing gaps in the law and policy mechanism for the protection 
of women’s dignity and women’s rights generally in Nigeria. Ditto the narrow 
definition of rape, the non-criminalization of spousal rape and wife beating in the 
Nigerian criminal jurisprudence, as well as the “patriarchal” provision in Section 179(5) 
of the Nigerian Evidence Act that “A person shall not be convicted of the offences 
mentioned in paragraph B of the subsection 1 of Section 51 or 218, 221, 223, or 224 of 
the Criminal Code upon the uncorroborated testimony of one witness."67 
It is also a legislative set back that 12 years after the promulgation of the Child Rights 
Act, 2003, only 16 out of Nigeria’s 36 states have domesticated the Act (bearing in 
mind that child rights protection are on the residual list of the 1999 Nigerian 
                                                          
66 Arinze-Umobi, C., & Iguh, A. (2011). Child's Sexual abuse: The Role of International Instrument in Nigeria, op. cit at 79. 
67 The offences referred to in those sections include rape and other sexual offences. 
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Constitution which means that under the federal structure of Nigeria, individual states 
have exclusive jurisdiction to make laws relevant to their own circumstances.68 This 
researcher however agrees with Akinwumi that “the rights of the child can no longer be 
negotiated away in the name of culture or political interest if the condition of the 
Nigerian child is to change.”69 This thesis also shares the earlier view of Donnelly70 
which Akinwumi71 also subscribed to, that it is impossible to protect legal rights 
without a special force established to justify all to such rights, that is to say, there is 
need for a special police unit (not just a department within the police force) for the 
enforcement of child rights in Nigeria. 
  
The provision in the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 which 
seek to expand locus standi and introduce public interest litigation in the enforcement of 
fundamental rights in Nigeria is merely “pretentious” because it is contained in the 
“Preamble” only rather than as a “Rule” or “Order”.  Both old and recent scholarships 
are united on the legal implication of “Preamble” in a legislation or Constitution. 
According to Abiola Sanni, “the nature of a preamble does not give assurance that the 
contents have much legal weight.”72  And in the old American case of Jacobson v 
Massachusetts73 the court emphasised that the Preamble does not have any legal force, 
even in the Constitution because it merely introduces the document as a whole and does 
not, in and of itself, permit the exercise of any legal power whatsoever, and that any 
power exercisable under the Constitution must emanate from another part of the 
Constitution but definitely not the preamble. 
                                                          
68 The 16 states which have domesticated the Child Rights Act are Abia, Anambra, Bayelsa, Ebonyi, Edo, Ekiti, Imo, Jigawa, 
Kwara, Lagos, Nassarawa, ogun, Ondo, Plateau, Rivers and Taraba, even though in most parts of Nigeria there is still very little 
information on the Child Rights Act (See Arinze-Umobi, C., & Iguh, A. (2011). Child's Sexual abuse: The Role of International 
Instrument in Nigeria, op.cit. at 77-79). The researcher humbly observes that it seems most of the core states in the predominantly 
Moslem Northern Nigeria are reluctant to promulgate the Act into state law because the Act defines a child as a person below 18 
years while child marriage is permissible in their own jurisdictions.    
69 Akinwumi, O. S. (2010). Legal impediments on the practical implementation of the Child Right Act 2003. International Journal 
of Legal Information, 37(3), 10, at p,362. 
70 Jack Donnelly: 1989, Universal Human Rights in Theory and in Practice, Ithaca and London; Cornel University Press, p.9. 
71 Akinwumi, O. S. (2010), ibid at 362. 
72 See Abiola Sanni “Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009 as a Tool for the Enforcement of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples' Rights in Nigeria: The need for Far-reaching Reform,” 11 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 511 2011, p.524  
73 197 US 11 (1905), cited in Abiola Sanni, op. cit. 
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Furthermore, for purpose of filing an application for the enforcement of fundamental 
rights, the 2009 Rules define a “court” in Order 1 Rule 2 to mean “the Federal High 
Court or the High Court of a State or the High Court of the Federal Capital territory, 
Abuja is inconsistent with the clear provisions of Section 46(1) of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution which prescribes that an application be made to “a High Court in that 
State”. Therefore, being a subsidiary legislation, the 2009 Rules cannot override or 
amend the Constitution but shall rather be considered void to the extent of its 
inconsistency with the Constitution.74 It is therefore a significant lacuna that in spite of 
its “good intention” the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 
cannot even be deemed to be a “proper law” unless and until the National Assembly 
amends the said Section 46(1).75  
This researcher humbly holds the view that it must have been in the urgent good desire 
to change the old order and expand the access jurisprudence for the enforcement of 
fundamental rights in Nigeria that the Chief Justice of Nigeria “mistakenly” overshot 
the clear provisions of Section 46(3) of the Constitution to wit: “The Chief Justice of 
Nigeria may make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of a High Court for 
the purpose of this Section.”76  
Suggestions have also been made for the setting up of service projects in all Nigerian 
states to disseminate information and sensitize rural dwellers on the relevant provisions 
and protections in the Child Rights Act. Human rights NGOs, the media and civil 
society groups should also mount pressure on the executive and legislature in the 
various states where the Child Rights Law has not been domesticated to do so, because 
after all, there is nothing wrong with the provisions of the Child Rights Act.77 
Recently, the 7th Nigerian Senate passed the Sexual Offences Bill, 2015 which makes 
                                                          
74 Section 1(3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
75 Aligba, A. (2011). Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009: An Appraisal. Benue State University Journal of 
Private and Public Law, BSUJPPL, 1(1), 61-70, at 70. 
76 Highlight and underline are for emphasis. 
77 Aligba, A. (2011), Ibid at 79.  
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sexual intercourse unlawful if the victim is below 11 years old. This is very 
embarrassing because it deviates from the definition of a child in international, regional 
and other municipal human rights instruments as a person below 18 years of age.  
 
4.2.6.1 The Way Forward 
The current Nigerian legislative and policy framework for the protection of the right to 
dignity of women, especially against domestic violence and sexual violations is fraught 
with several defects which leave legislative gaps begging to be bridged. 
The way forward for bridging these gaps and reforming the Nigerian legislative and 
policy framework for the protection of the right to dignity of women are elaborated in 
Chapter 6 of this thesis, (particularly 6.4.2: Recommendations For Law And Policy 
Reform In Nigeria).  The researcher therefore considers it unnecessary to discuss them 
here.  
However, it must be stated too that in addition to other recommendations, the existing 
jurisprudence on rape in Nigeria needs also to be amended to provide inter alia, that a 
woman living separately from her husband under a decree of judicial separation or a 
decree nisi not made absolute; or who has obtained an injunction restraining her 
husband from having sexual intercourse with her, shall be deemed not to be his wife for 
the purposes of this section. Similarly, a Muslim woman living separately from her 
husband during the period of ‘iddah’, shall be deemed not to be his wife for the 
purposes of this lawful sexual intercourse. 
The justification for such amendment is to assert that marital rape means any 
unconsented or unwanted intercourse or penetration (vaginal, anal or oral) obtained by 
force, threat of force, or when the wife is unable to consent. On this note, this researcher 
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disagrees with the contention of A. O. Yusuf,78  that marriage creates between the 
couple permanent advance consent and irretractable access to their bodies with respect 
to sex. 
More so, by the removal of the exception, the current protection that is given to men 
who rape their wives will thereby be removed, and they can be made equally liable to be 
charged with rape. This will also go a long way in checking the growing menace of 
domestic violence against women in Nigeria and elsewhere.79 This proposition is based 
on the premise that sex must be a cooperative act of free will and there is no reason why 
the same premise should not be applicable to parties who are married to each other, 
irrespective of a possible argument which may arise, especially among Muslims that 
criminalising marital rape would be against the Islamic principle under which a Muslim 
wife is required to submit to her husband’s request for sexual relations.80 
 
With particular regards to the Child Rights Act 2003, this thesis suggests inter alia, that 
urgent steps be taken to initiate, facilitate and promote public enlightenment and 
sensitization on the provisions of the Child Rights Act 2003 especially on the 
prohibition and penal consequences of child labour so as to deter and discouraged 
parents and guardians who perpetuate this form of indignity on their house-maids. 
 
4.3 Legislative and Policy Framework: INDIA 
In addition to constitutional guarantees and a fearless and innovative judiciary, India 
also has a pro-active legislature and remarkable women-sensitive legislation which meet 
the minimum requirements of international law for the protection of women’s dignity 
                                                          
78 Gender Inequality and selective victimization under the Nigerian Law of Rape, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria Journal of Private 
and Comparative Law (JCPL) Vol. 2 & 3, 2007-2009 p.101; Reference has always been made to the words of Sir Matthew Hale in 
the History of the Pleas of the Crown, vol. 1, p. 629 to the effect that “…the husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself 
against his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up himself in this kind unto her 
husband which she cannot retract.” 
79 For instance, by the September 2007 amendment to the Penal Code of Malaysia, marital rape has been criminalized.  By making it 
illegal for a man to cause ‘fear or death or hurt to his wife…to have sexual intercourse’.   
80 Reports abound of many battered women who have said that their husbands demanded sex directly following a beating, regardless 
of the wife’s wishes or emotional or physical state. When a woman consents to sex out of fear or coercion, it is rape, and the 
perpetrator should not be allowed to get away with the offence by the mere fact that he is married to the survivor; see Center for 
Research on Partner Violence www.welleslev.edu.   
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and freedoms generally. These prominent legislative advances, particularly on baby sex-
selection, dowry, dignity and sexual violations are considered hereunder.  
 
 
 
4.3.1 Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 [as amended by the Protection of 
Human Rights (Amendment) Act, No. 43 of 2006]: The National Human Rights             
Commission, State Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Courts 
 
The United Nations first International Workshop on National Institutions for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights held in Paris in 1991 formulated what 
became known as The Paris Principles.81 These principles relate to the status and 
functioning of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights 
and it enjoins UN member States to establish national human rights institutions for the 
promotion and protection of human (and women’s) rights.  
The Paris Principles which have been applauded as “the foundation and reference point 
for the establishment and operation of national human rights institutions,”82 provides 
that a national institution for the promotion and protection of human rights shall be 
vested with competence, broad mandate, independence and constitutional powers to 
perform its functions. 
In line with the Paris Principles and in addition to the existing constitutional powers of 
the Supreme Court and High Courts on fundamental rights under Articles 32 and 226 
respectively, the Indian Government also established the National Human Rights 
Commission of India [hereinafter referred to as the Commission] under the Protection 
                                                          
81 Adopted as Resolution 1992/54 of 1992 by the United Nations Human Rights Commission and later by the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 1993. 
82 Asia Pacific Forum, http://www.asiapacificforum.net/about/paris_principles.html.  (25/10/2013). 
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of Human Rights Act, 1993. India thus became the first South Asian country and among 
the first few countries to establish the Commission.83  
It has been said that the establishment of the Commission as an autonomous body is a 
clear indication of India’s commitment towards the effective implementation and 
protection of human rights as prescribed under national and international instruments.84 
The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 has eight chapters and 43 Articles. Section 2 
(d) of the Act defines human rights as “rights relating to life, equality and dignity of the 
individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in international covenants and 
enforceable by Courts in India.”  This definition is broad enough and the specific 
mention of the most pressing rights of women, namely, life, equality and dignity is 
indicative of India’s positive stride towards the protection of women’s right to dignity 
and freedom from exploitation. 
Chapters 2 and 4 of the 1993 Act (as amended by the Protection of Human Rights 
(Amendment) Act 2006, No.43 of 2006) established the National Human Rights 
Commission and State Human Rights Commission respectively and spell out their 
functions in Section 12 to include the following:  
1. Initiate or hear a private or public interest petition based on the allegation of 
violation of human rights or abetment thereof or negligence by a public officer 
to prevent such violation, as well as intervening in any matter for the 
enforcement of human rights pending before any court with the approval of such 
court. 
 
 
                                                          
83  According to Manoj Kumar Sinha, Manoj Kumar Sinha , “Role of the National Human Rights Commission of India in Protection 
of Human Rights” http://www.rwi.lu.se/pdf/seminar/manoj05.pdf (25/10/2013), “The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka was 
established under the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka Act, No. 21 (1996) and became operational in September 1997. The 
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) of Nepal is an independent and autonomous statutory body established in the year 
2000 under the Human Rights Commission Act 1997.”  
84 Manoj Kumar Sinha , “Role of the National Human Rights Commission of India in Protection of Human Rights” 
http://www.rwi.lu.se/pdf/seminar/manoj05.pdf (25/10/2013). 
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2. Visit, examine and make recommendations on the living conditions of inmates at 
any jail or government facility for the detention, housing, treatment, reformation 
or protection of inmates. 
 
3. Study and review existing safeguards provided by or under the Constitution or 
any other law, treaty or international instrument for the protection of human 
rights and recommend measures for their effective implementation. 
 
4. Undertake and promote research on the study and promotion of human rights 
through mass literacy, public enlightenment, the media etc. and to support and 
encourage human rights NGOs and like institutions. 
 
5. Review the factors, including acts of terrorism which inhibit sustainable 
enjoyment of human rights and recommend appropriate remedies for the 
promotion and protection of human rights.  
Interestingly, the Commission’s mandate covers causes related to women and children, 
atrocities on Dalits/Members of minority community, the disabled and bonded labour.85  
Article 10 (c) of the Act empowers the Commission to adopt and regulate its own 
procedure thereby guaranteeing its independence and effectively insulating it from 
common procedural hiccups or technicalities which may hinder effective human rights 
delivery. To avoid inflow of abusive and vexatious complaints, the Procedural 
Regulation 8 of the Commission further empowers it to refuse certain category of 
complaints especially if they relate to events which occurred more than one year prior to 
lodging the complaint or matters which are sub judice (unless the court approves), 
vague, apparently frivolous, anonymous or based on pseudonymous identities and/or 
subjects as well as those which fall outside the mandate of the Commission.  
                                                          
85  http://www.nhrc.in, cited in Manoj Kumar Sinha , “Role of the National Human Rights Commission of India in Protection of 
Human Rights” op. cit. 
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Section 30 of the Act establishes the Human Rights Courts for the purpose of providing 
speedy trial of offences arising out of violation of human rights in the various states 
where no special courts exist for this purpose.86                   
Its Section 31 empowers the various State Governments to nominate a Public 
Prosecutor or appoint an advocate (with at least seven years of practical experience) 
who shall act as a Special Public Prosecutor to conduct cases in the Human Rights 
Court. 
It is humbly submitted that the diligent compliance with the Paris Principles further 
confirms India’s commitment for providing sustainable legal framework to protect 
women’s dignity and human rights generally, a step which other developing countries 
may want to follow.        
 
4.3.2 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.                                          
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 [also known as Domestic 
Violence Act] came into force in India on 26 October 2006. The Act takes a sweep at 
domestic violence generally and offers protection to a wife or female co-habiting 
partner against violence from her husband or male partner or their relatives. The Act 
also covers mothers, widows as well as biological and adopted sisters.  
The Act defines “domestic violence” to include the unlawful demand for any dowry or 
other property or valuable security as consideration for marriage. It thus incorporates 
and replicates the earlier provisions of Section 498A IPC which criminalizes the 
demand or payment of dowry as consideration for marriage.87 This protects women and 
girls against the exploitative culture of “chattelization” of marriage and invariably 
secures their right to life and dignity.  
                                                          
86  See the Proviso in Section 30 (a) and (b) of the Act. 
87  Under Section 2 (h) of the Act, "’dowry’ shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 
1961 (28 of 1961).” 
   220 
Section 3 of the Act prohibits and criminalizes every domestic violence including those 
act, omission or commission of a respondent (husband, live-in lover, partner or other 
family member of the aggrieved woman/female victim) which harms, injures or 
endangers her mental or physical well-being, or tends  to cause her any physical abuse88, 
sexual abuse89, verbal and emotional abuse,90 economic abuse,91 or with a view to 
coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any 
dowry or other property or valuable security including threat of any such or similar 
abuse. 
The Act rightly contemplates that domestic violence may be perpetrated in or out of 
marriage and by persons (whether male or female) other than a husband, for instance, 
his relatives. And to guarantee complete protection to the aggrieved women, it 
empowers her to sue any such relative as ‘respondent’.92 Thus, in Kalpana W/o Santosh 
Jadhav v. Hanma & Ors,93 the petitioner filed an action against eight respondents (six 
were women, including her sister in-laws and in-laws) for harassment under Section 12 
of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Sessions Court 
rejected her suit and dropped charges against the six women on the ground contended 
by them inter alia, that being women, they fell outside the definition of 'respondent' in 
the Act, and therefore proceedings against them were incompetent.  
                                                          
88 The Section define physical abuse as any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, 
limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal 
force. 
89 The Section defines sexual abuse to include any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates 
the dignity of woman. 
90 The Section defines verbal and emotional abuse to include insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule 
especially with regard to not having a child or a male child, and repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the 
woman is interested. 
91 The Section defines economic abuse as including deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the woman is 
entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which she requires out of necessity 
including, but not limited to, household necessities for her and her children, if any, as well as stridhan and other valuable securities 
or rent/payments arising from both movable and immovable property, jointly or separately owned by her or her children. [Stridhan 
generally refers to “what a woman can claim as her own property within a marital household. It may include her jewelry (gifted 
either by her family), gifts presented to her during the wedding or later, and the dowry articles given by her family.”] See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dowry_law_in_India#Stridhan 12/11/2013. 
92 Section 2 (q) of the Act defines “respondent” to mean “any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with 
the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an aggrieved wife 
or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male 
partner.” 
93   2013 Indlaw MUM 908; Criminal W.P. No. 63 of 2013, delivered on 27 September, 2013. 
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On appeal, the Bombay High Court upheld the appeal, set aside the decision and held 
that "the view taken by the Sessions Judge that women will not be covered by the 
definition of the term 'respondent' as given in the Domestic Violence Act, is clearly 
contrary to law." He also cited Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade 
& Ors,94 where the Supreme Court had specifically addressed the issue.  
The Act also protects the reproductive rights, sexual choices and property rights of 
women and against common psychological trauma and ridicule associated with 
childlessness or not having a male child, among others.95 
The Act has other salient characteristics namely, 
1. The definition of “domestic relationship” in Section 2 (f) protects women who 
are or have been in a relationship with the abusing partner where both parties 
have lived together in the same house (shared household) alone or with other 
tenants or family members and are related by consanguinity, marriage or a 
relationship in the nature of marriage, or adoption. 
 
2. It protects single women, widows, mothers and sisters, from the violence, 
exploitation, threat and abuse of their spouses/partners.  
 
3. The definition of “physical abuse” in Section 3 covers such exploitative 
indignities as sati sacrifice, sexual violence, marital rape and bonded labour.  
 
 
4. Section 19 empowers a court to make an Order of residence under Section 17 (1) 
prohibiting the violated woman from being evicted from the matrimonial home 
or a shared residence, even if she has no interests or title to such residence.96 
Interestingly, this order of residence is gender-specific and cannot be made 
                                                          
94   2011(3) Mh.L.J. (Cri.) 73; 2011 Indlaw SC 94.  
95   See Section 3 op.cit. 
96  Section 17 provides thus: “(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every woman in a 
domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial 
interest in the same.(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the 
respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law.” 
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against a woman.97 The police is enjoined to ensure compliance with any Order 
of residence98while shelter homes are obliged to house the violated woman if 
need be.    
 
 
5. To protect the parties’ privacy, proceedings may be heard in camera99 and the 
court may also make Protection Orders restraining the abusive husband or 
partner from committing or aiding any further abuse, or from entering the 
woman’s workplace or her favourite locations, or even attempting to 
communicate her by any physical or electronic or telegraphic manner, or issuing 
a threat to any of her relatives or friends.100 The breach of a protection Order is a 
non-bailable offence punishable with up to one year imprisonment, a fine or 
both101 and the accused may be convicted upon the singular testimony of the 
aggrieved person.102  
 
   
 
6. Provision is also made under the draft Act for the appointment of Protection 
Officers and NGOs or similar bodies to assist abused women with legal aid, 
Medicare, safe shelter and if such Protection Officers fail to discharge these 
duties they may be jailed for one year, a fine or both.103 
 
7. Above all, a petition under the Act may even be for violations which took place 
before the commencement of the Act, even if the parties no longer live together. 
 
This was the conclusion of the Indian Supreme Court in V.D. Bhanot v. Savita 
Bhanot,104 after considering the constitutional protections in Article 21 of the 
Constitution vis-à-vis the provisions of Sections 31 and 33 of the Domestic Violence 
                                                          
97  See Proviso to Section 19 (1) (b). 
98 Section 19 (5). 
99  Section 16 provides thus: “Proceedings to be held in camera.-If the Magistrate considers that the circumstances of the case so 
warrant, and if either party to the proceedings so desires, he may conduct the proceedings under this Act in camera.” 
100 Section 18 
101 Section 32 (1) 
102  Section 32 (2). And By Section 31(3), the accused may also be charged under any provision of the Indian Penal Code including 
Section 498A, or the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, as the case may be, if the facts of the case disclose the commission of an offence 
under any of those laws. 
103  Section 33. 
104 (2012) 3 SCC 183.  
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Act and bearing in mind that the objects of the Act is to protect the rights of women 
under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution as a way of guaranteeing their dignity.  
Erudite Indian female scholar Usha Kiran Rai105  describes the Act as one which 
expansively captures the abuse of women with some degree of precision and a clear and 
unambiguous statement of the right of women to be free. 106   
The authors therefore, humbly contends that presenting the Protection of Women from 
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 in an unambiguous language which provides undiluted 
protections against a wide range of violations and abuse of women shows the legislative 
zeal with which India seeks to strengthen the legal framework for the protection of 
women’s dignity. 
 
4.3.3 Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, No. 13 of 2013   
Following the December 2012 gruesome gang rape and murder of a female medical 
student in a New Delhi bus in India, as well as the local and international outburst that 
ensued, the Indian Government, on 23 December 2012, set up a three member 
Committee headed by Justice J.S. Verma, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
(other members on the Committee were Justice Leila Seth, former judge of the High 
Court and Gopal Subramanium, former Solicitor General of India) to recommend 
amendments to the Indian Criminal Law so as to provide for quicker trial and enhanced 
punishment for criminals accused of committing sexual assault against women.  
Earlier, in the case of Sakshi v. Union of India107 the Supreme Court had decried the 
frequent sexual abuse of children and the inadequacies in the legislation on rape in India 
and had called on the legislature to review and upgrade the law. 
                                                          
105 Usha Kiran Rai, “Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act: A Search for New Paradigms” 
http://www.academia.edu/1342148/Protection_of_Women_from_Domestic_Violence_Act 12/11/2013. 
106 She however emphasised that Women first need to be educated in order to understand the purpose and scope of the Act and that 
without this, the law will achieve little. See: Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act: A Search for New Paradigms,” ibid.
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The Verma Committee made recommendations on laws related to rape, sexual 
harassment, trafficking, child sexual abuse, medical examination of victims, police, 
electoral and educational reforms and submitted its report on January 23, 2013. Several 
key recommendations of this Committee are now contained in the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act, 2013. 
This anti-rape legislation was signed into law by India's President, Pranab Mukherjee, 
on April 2, 2013. The law amends the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the Protection of Children from 
Sexual Offences Act, 2012.  
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 is thus considered as a drastic penal 
response by the Indian legislature to rising cases of sexual assault, rape, exploitation and 
incidental indignities and humiliation of women in India.108  
This Amendment Act offers enhanced protection for women’s dignity by introducing 
new sexual offences and making fundamental changes to the definition, scope and 
punishment for rape and allied offences in the old legal order. These include;  
1. The expression “exploitation” now includes prostitution or other forms of sexual 
abuse, forced labour, humiliating services, slavery and the like, or the forced 
removal of organs109 while the act of rape is now described with specific 
physical terminology, even though it remains gender-specific against men.110  
It is humbly submitted that the retention of rape as a gender-specific crime, even in 
international law,111 has become legislatively faulty because after all, in the past, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
107 (1999) Cr LJ 5025 (SC); See also Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s The Indian Penal Code  33rd Edition, 2011, LexisNexis Butterworths 
Wadhwa Nagpur, India, p.754. 
108 Bhattacharyya, R. (2013). Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013: Will It Ensure Women's Safety in Public Spaces?. Journal 
Space and Culture, India, 1(1), 13-26. 
109 Amendment Act Section 7, Penal Code Section 370 to substitute old Section 370 and 370A. 
110 Amendment Act Section 9, Penal Code, Section 375. 
111 Preliminary Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Ms. 
Rhadika Coomaraswamy, in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1994/95, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42, 22 
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women in Ireland and England have been convicted for rape.112 The definition of rape 
laid down in Sexual Offences Act, 2003 of England covers acts of non-consenting 
intentional penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth of the complainant, man or woman 
as the case may be. 
Realistically, it is also an unequivocal an act of “unlawful carnal knowledge” if a 
woman “forcibly penetrates” the anus of a man, or the vagina or anus of another woman 
with her fingers or objects other than the penis “without voluntary consent.” This may 
be more common during a coerced sexual intercourse between lesbians, transgender or 
gays, and even in prisons.  
This proposition is not strange and has been acknowledged by earlier researchers as a 
common practice in both male and female prisons. G.J. Knowles113 citing the findings 
of other researchers wrote that in prison, moral or humanistic concerns have little 
relevance because power and status are dependent on domination and selfish 
gratification which often emphasise violence and exploitation and de-emphasise mutual 
caring and reciprocal satisfaction.114 Accordingly, for many inmates, eroticism is best 
obtained by aggression since the degree of satisfaction derived from the act of sex is 
often dependent on the degree of force and humiliation applied on the other partner.115 
This use of force and humiliation is also the common with lesbian/ homosexual rapes of 
women in female prisons.116 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
November, 1994, para. 49. (cited in Maria Eriksson (2010): Defining Rape: Emerging Obligations for States under International 
Law?, Örebro Studies in Law 2, p. 21.  
112 Mary Keny, Women beware women, The Guardian, (March 19, 2001) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/mar/19/gender.uk 
(Cited in Siddharth Mehta (April 2013) “Rape Law In India: Problems in Prosecution Due to Loopholes in the Law.”  Electronic 
copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2250448. (29/7/2014).   
113 Gordon James Knowles, “Male Prison Rape: A Search for Causation and Prevention,” The Howard journal of Criminal Justice, 
Vol. 38, Issue 3, pp.267-282, Aug 1999 (Article first published online: 16 Dec 2002. Doi: 10.1111/1468-2311.00132), p.274.; 
http://www.justdetention.org/pdf/knowles2.pdf (29/7/2014). 
114 Wooden, W.S. and Parker,]. (1982) Men Behind Bars: Sexual Exploitation in Prison, New York: Plenum Press. P.14 
115 ibid 
116 Propper, A.M. (1981) Prison Homosexuality: Myth and Reality, Lexington, MA: D C Heath, p. 143; Scacco, A.M. (Ed.) (1982) 
Male Rape: A Case Book of Sexual Aggressions, New York:  AMS Press. 
   226 
2. The general punishment for rape in India was seven years imprisonment to life 
and a fine. But the new law introduced special circumstances under which the 
minimum punishment will range from ten years to life imprisonment, namely, 
rape of detainees by police officers or public servants, rape by a family 
member,117 relative, teacher, guardian, or persons in position of confidence or 
authority; or the rape of a women below sixteen years.118 And if the victim dies 
thereby or falls into a pitiable or permanent vegetative state, capital punishment 
will ensue. 
 
3. Punishment for gang rape becomes 20 years minimum to life and a fine119 while 
a new offence of “sexual harassment” is introduced as Section 354A IPC.120                                                      
 
4. New offences of voyeurism and stalking were also introduced into the Indian 
criminal jurisprudence as Sections 354C and 354D IPC respectively.                                                                             
 
Voyeurism is said to be committed when one “watches, or captures the image of a 
woman engaging in a private act121 in circumstances where such act would obviously 
not be possible except by an unlawful breach of her privacy. The first conviction for 
Voyeurism is imprisonment of one to three years and a fine, while a second or 
subsequent conviction carries a jail term of three to seven years, and a fine. 
 
Stalking is synonymous with “Pestering” and it is said to be committed when one 
follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to contact her repeatedly to foster personal 
interaction, despite her clear indication of disinterest. This “pestering” may be a direct 
                                                          
117  This covers marital rape. 
118 Amendment Act Section 9, Penal Code Section 376. 
119 Amendment Act Section 9, Penal Code Section 376D. 
120 The said Section 354A IPC, defines sexual harassment as including physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and 
explicit sexual overtures, a demand or request for sexual favours, making sexually coloured remarks, forcibly showing pornography 
or any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature. 
121 Explanation 1.–– For the purposes of this Section, “private act” includes an act of watching carried out in a place which, in the 
circumstances, would reasonably be expected to provide privacy, and where the victim's genitals, buttocks or breasts are exposed or 
covered only in underwear; or the victim is using a lavatory; or the person is doing a sexual act that is not of a kind ordinarily done 
in public. 
Explanation 2.–– Where the victim consents to the capture of images or any act, but not to their dissemination to third persons and 
where such image or act is disseminated, such dissemination shall be considered an offence under this Section. 
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or indirect physical, telephonic, telegraphic, internet or other electronic communication 
which constitutes nuisance and creates fear of violence, alarm or distress in the woman. 
Stalking carries imprisonment of one to three years and a fine, unless the accused shows 
that he was acting lawfully per  court order, or reasonably, or to detect and prevent a 
crime.122 Public servants who knowingly disobey or neglect to record a report a 
violation of this amendment, or investigate it diligently may be jailed for six months to 
two years and a fine123 while superintendents of public or private hospitals who fail or 
refuse to treat crime victims risk imprisonment of one year and a fine.124 
 
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 also amends the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973 and accord women certain privileges. For instance under Section 160 
(1) of the Code, any police officer investigating a crime may, by order in writing, invite 
any person as witness but if such intended witness is a woman, her statement will be 
recorded only at her residence. Similarly, by Section 46 (4), no women shall be arrested 
after sunset and before sunrise, except in exceptional circumstances, and even so, the 
arrest can only be made by a police woman and with the written permission of the 
Judicial Magistrate of the area.  Upon notifying the woman orally of her arrest, she is 
presumed to have submitted thereto and a male police officer shall not touch her person 
to effect arrest or search.125  
 
A physical/medical examination after arrest shall only be conducted on her by or under 
the supervision of a female registered medical practitioner, and if she is below eighteen 
years, she shall not be detained in a police station or jail but in an Observatory Home.126 
                                                          
122 Furthermore, a prison term of between 10 years to life imprisonment as well as a fine will now be imposed on persons convicted 
of trafficking a minor, and if more than one minor is involved, the sentence will be a minimum of 14 years' imprisonment, 
extendable to life imprisonment, and liability to a fine (Amendment Act Section 8, Penal Code Sections 370(4) & (5)); And the 
punishment for an acid attack that causes harm to the victim will be a minimum term of 10 years' imprisonment, extendable to a life 
term, while conviction for voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw acid with the intention of causing damage will incur a 
punishment of five to seven years imprisonment (Amendment Act Section 5, Penal Code Sections 362A & 362B). 
123  Amendment Act Section 3; Penal Code Section 166A. 
124 Amendment Act Section 3, Penal Code Section 166B. 
125 Section 51 (2) of the Code. 
126 Section 54 of Code of Criminal Procedure 
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Interestingly, any trial for rape under the Indian Penal Code, shall, as far as practicable, 
be presided by a female judge or magistrate.127 The authors humbly express scepticism 
for this provision because of a strong likelihood of gender-bias against the male accused 
by a female judge which may lead to injustice,  and submits instead that special panel 
courts of three (a presiding female judge sitting with two male judges) be established to 
hear such cases.  
Under Section 157 of the Code, every investigation of rape, shall be conducted at the 
residence of the victim/survivor and, as far as practicable by a woman police officer, 
and if the victim/survivor is under eighteen years, she should be questioned in the 
presence of her guardian or parents or a social worker of the locality. If the rape victim 
is a child, the investigation must be carried out expeditiously within three months of the 
report128 and the trial proper must be held in camera with minimal media coverage 
which shall not reveal the identity of the parties.129 It is further submitted that while it is 
reasonable and responsible to protect the identity of a child victim of rape, such 
privilege ought not to avail the accused. On a second thought, this author feels that 
securing the identity of the accused accords with the presumption of innocence, 
moreover, he may not even be found guilty. 
 
The new law also amends Section 155 (4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which 
provided that in a trial for rape or attempt to rape a woman, the fact that the victim was 
of easy virtue or immoral character diminished the weight of her evidence as was 
upheld by the court in the notorious case of Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra.130  
 
                                                          
127 Section 26 of the Code. 
128 Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure of India (as amended). 
129  See Section 327 of the Code. 
130 AIR 1979 SC 185.  In that case, known as the Mathura case, the rape victim was subjected to the equally dehumanizing ‘finger-
tests’ (now abrogated) to determine the extent of internal injury incurred.  
The examining physician reported that there was no physical injury on the girl-victim, Mathura, but that her hymen revealed “old 
ruptures” and her vagina also admitted two fingers easily. The court thus trivialized her testimony because she was already used to 
sexual intercourse. 
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By the new amendment Tukaram’s Case becomes obsolete and the dignity of a woman 
is now protected against sexual invasion even if she is an acknowledged prostitute or ‘a 
woman of easy virtue.’ That fact will also not reduce the weight which the court 
attaches to her testimony or evidence, nor will it exculpate or mitigate the charge 
against the accused person. Thus, in State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan 
Mardikar,131 the Supreme Court held, per Ahmadi, J. that:  
 
Even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to privacy and no one can invade 
her privacy as and when he likes. So also it is not open to any and every 
person to violate her person as and when he wishes. She is entitled to protect 
her person if there is an attempt to violate it against her wish. She is equally 
entitled to the protection of law. Therefore, merely because she is a woman 
of easy virtue, her evidence cannot be thrown overboard. 
 
All these amendments underscore advances in the legal framework for the protection 
and promotion of women’s dignity in India, albeit this thesis agrees wholly with 
Gitanjali Maria’s view132 that laws and legislation are not enough to restore what was 
lost in the pride and dignity of a raped or violated woman.  
 
4.3.3.1 The Justice J.S. Verma Committee Report: Prelude to the Criminal Law              
            (Amendment) Act, 2013  
Following the gruesome rape and murder of a female medical student in India, as well 
as the local and international outburst that ensued, the Indian government, on 23 
December 2012, set up a three member Committee headed by Justice J.S. Verma, 
former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,133 to recommend amendments to the Indian 
                                                          
131 AIR 1991 SC 207.   
132 Gitanjali Maria, “Sexual Exploitation Against Women.” Published in the newsletter Civil Service of India, 
http://www.civilserviceindia.com/subject/Essay/sexual-exploitation-against-women.html (28/3/13). 
133 Other members on the Committee were Justice Leila Seth, former judge of the High Court and Gopal Subramanium, former 
Solicitor General of India. 
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Criminal Law so as to provide for quicker trial and enhanced punishment for criminals 
accused of committing sexual assault against women.  
The Committee submitted its report on January 23, 2013.134 It made various 
recommendations for the protection of women’s dignity against rape, sexual 
harassment, trafficking, and child sexual abuse, medical examination of victims, police, 
electoral and educational reforms. Other key recommendations of the Committee are 
summarised thus.135 
 
1. That a special Rape Crisis Cell should be set up to provide legal assistance to 
rape victims and be notified as soon as a FIR on sexual assault is made. 
 
2. That Close Circuit Televisions be installed at the entrance and in the 
interrogation rooms at every police station.  
 
3. That necessary IT facility should be provided to enable a complainant in a case 
of rape or sexual violation to make the complaint online. 
 
4. That police officers should be specially trained in the handling of sexual 
offences while they also be duty bound to assist complainants and victims of 
sexual offences whether the crime was committed within or outside their 
ordinary service jurisdiction. 
 
                                                          
134 Jagdish Sharan Verma, The Honourable Former Chief Justice of India, popularly described as “The face of judicial activism in 
the 1990s” and among the most active and respected Indian jurists, later died at a Gurgaon hospital on the night of Monday, April 
22, 2013 at the age of 80. Doctors at the Medanta Medicity said he died of multiple organ failure. According to Dr Yatin Mehta, 
chairman of Medanta's Institute of Critical Care and Anesthesiology, the jurist "was brought to us with excessive gastro-intestinal 
bleeding on Friday, and we found that his liver had started failing. We admitted him in the ICU and put him on intensive supportive 
care. But eventually there was excessive bleeding, and his organs started failing one after the other." (Source: Indian Express 
Newspaper of Tuesday, 23 April 2013.  http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/justice-verma-the-face-of-judicial-activism-dies-of-
multiple-organ-failure/1106404/. (14/11/2014). 
135 Summary Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law, 2013, PRS Legislative Research, 
Centre for Policy Research, India, 25 January 2013. www.prsindia.org; http://www.prsindia.org/administrator/uploads/general/1359
132636~~Justice%20Verma%20Committee%20Report%20Summary.pdf (30/10/2014). 
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5. That caution should be taken to ensure that public-spirited persons who offer 
any manner of assistance to victims of sexual offences should not be mistreated 
or unnecessarily roped into the crime. 
 
6. That more people be recruited into the police and that Community Policing 
should be introduced and encouraged to provide adequate training to volunteers. 
 
7. The Verma Committee also recommended a separate Bill of Rights for women 
in order ensure that women live a life of dignity and security as well as the right 
to a complete sexual autonomy including with respect to her relationships.  
 
8. To tackle the gory incidence of dowry related violence and death of women in 
India, the Verma Committee recommended that all marriages celebrated in India 
(irrespective of the personal laws under which such marriages are solemnised) 
shall mandatorily be registered in the presence of a magistrate, who will ensure 
that the said marriage has been solemnised with the full and free consent of both 
partner and without any demand for dowry having been made.  
 
4.3.3.2 Critique of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 
The researcher identified the following shortfalls in the new anti-rape law in India. 
1. The law is not internationally contemporary because it shields women only. It 
does not cover men, lesbians, same-sex couples and transgender from sexual 
assault and rape. This is without prejudice to any “innovative” interpretation 
which the Supreme Court may deem fit and proper for the offence of “carnal 
intercourse against the order of nature” in Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. 
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2. The law is not intended to be a religious or moral code, yet it seems to 
“criminalize” sexual intercourse generally without emphasising that the core 
legal elements of offence of rape or sexual assault, namely, non-consensual or 
“coercion” and “violence”.  
 
3. The law is silent on the criminalization of marital rape, except in cases where the 
couple is “separated”, and of course the separation is intended to be one ordered 
by a court of competent jurisdiction. It therefore does not cover a spouse who 
leaves the matrimonial home for any good cause, including a mistreatment by 
the other spouse 
 
4. The law still insulates armed forces personnel in “disturbed areas” from 
prosecution for rape and sexual assault, even in the light of Article 7(1) (g) of 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which lists rape, sexual 
slavery or any other form of  sexual violence of comparable gravity” in war-time 
as crime against humanity.136  
 
5. The law remains silent on parliamentarians and politicians facing rape charges 
keeping their remaining positions and offices until convicted, albeit the road to 
criminal justice may be bumpy and slow. The researcher holds the view that the 
reverse should have been the case, at least for sake of public decency, sensitivity 
and morality. 
 
In the light of these drawbacks, the researcher hereby propose that critical initiatives be 
expedited with respect to educational reforms, civic education and sensitization, police 
and criminal justice personnel trainings and reforms, further overhaul of the criminal 
                                                          
136  In relation to rape in Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means a rape “when committed as part of a 
wide spread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. “ 
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jurisprudence as well as special humanitarian centres for victim care, counselling and 
rehabilitation. 
Finally, the researcher humbly observes that since legislative amendment is a 
continuum, the future is still bright for law reform in India. Thus, the fact that a forward 
step has been initiated with the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 is good enough, 
because the prelude to any meaningful reform in a constitutional democracy is that “you 
have to have a law first.”137 
 
4.3.4 The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Specific Penal Code Protections against 
Dowry 
 
In addition to the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (Act 28 of 1961),138 
the Indian Penal Code (IPC) also contains gender-specific provisions which protect 
women against cultural exploitations like dowry-related violence/death, Sati (Self-
immolation), degrading treatment and cruelty to wives by their husbands or his relatives 
or others. 
Under Section 304B IPC, where a woman dies within seven years of her marriage as a 
result of any burns, bodily injury or in suspicious circumstances and evidence reveals 
that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or 
any of his relatives in connection with any demand for dowry, her death shall be called 
"dowry death" and her husband or his relative shall be held liable. The punishment upon 
conviction is seven years to life imprisonment but where the violation amounts only to 
cruelty, Section 498A IPC prescribes punishment of up to three years imprisonment and 
a fine.139  The burden is also upon the accused persons to prove their innocence because 
                                                          
137 Karuna Nundy, “Explaining India’s new anti-rape laws” (Explanatory interview of eminent Indian Supreme Court lawyer), BBC 
NEWS Asia, 28 March 2013. http://m.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-21950197, (25/7/2014). 
138  This Act is not discussed separately because copious references have already been made of its relevant provisions in the 
Introduction of this paper.  
139 The Section defines "cruelty" to mean any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit 
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or physical); or Harassment of the woman so as to 
coerce her or any person related to her to meet (or for failing to meet) any unlawful demand for any property. 
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all dowry related offences in India are strict liability offences under Section 8-A of the 
Dowry Prohibition Act.  
The researcher humbly holds the view that these provisions may verily redress common 
cruel and dehumanizing socio-cultural practices against women in India and secure their 
dignity and freedom from exploitation.  
 
4.3.5 The Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of 
Sex Selection) Act, 1994  
The patriarchal mind-set which promotes the preference of sons to daughters is a 
common socio-cultural exploitation of women in India.140 In the Writ Petition of Centre 
for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes (CEHAT) & Ors v. Union of India & Ors,141 
the High Court, per Shah J, acknowledged that male child preference is a cultural 
pandemic in India which continues to plague women and girls, and violate the overall 
essence of their existence, even before, during and after conception. 
The multiplier effect of this exploitative culture is that women suffer gross violations 
and indignities including sex selection/sex determination which often culminates in the 
forced abortion of female foetuses, using crude or even advanced modern scientific 
technology (to ensure that technically, the abortion will not be considered as murder). 
In apparent response to this cultural exploitation, the Indian legislature enacted the Pre-
conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) 
Act, 1994, a law which prohibited and criminalized predetermination of baby’s sex and 
removal of female foetuses. However, when perpetrators resorted to using advanced 
medical techniques to determine baby sex and remove female foetuses, thereby 
                                                          
140 Certain derogatory expression in Asia holds that training a daughter is like watering your neighbour’s garden. At the end of the 
day, it’s not yours!  
141  Writ Petition (civil) 301 0f 2000 (Judgement delivered on 10/9/2003). http://nlrd.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/CEHAT-VS-
UNION-OF-INDIA.pdf. 
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subverting the Act technically, a class action was filed by the petitioners/NGO, Centre 
for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes (CEHAT) & Ors142 under Article 32 of the 
Indian Constitution challenging such continued violation.  
Consequently, the Court laid down several new directions which eventually caused the 
legislature to proactively amend the Act and renamed it "The Pre-conception and Pre-
natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994." The object of 
the Act was to prohibit, criminalize and prevent medical practitioners and allied 
personnel from conducting tests to pre-determine the sex of a foetus or giving out 
information of the sex of a foetus to patients or removing same.143 
In State through District Appropriate Authority-cum-Civil Surgeon, Faridabad 
(Complainant) v. Dr. Anil Sabhani, Prop. M/s Dr. Anil’s Ultrasound Opp. G.H. Palwal, 
Faridabad & 2 Ors,144 two medical doctors who violated the Act were convicted on 
criminal charges and sentenced to two years imprisonment and fine  “as a deterrent to 
other persons, so that no one indulged in such heinous crime.” 
In a bid to circumvent the Act, the convicts had devised special illegal codes as means 
of conveying the sex of foetus to the patients without even uttering any words. For 
instance, if they tell the patient to come for her report on Monday, it means the foetus is 
male and if they tell them to come on Friday, it means a female. Sometimes too, the 
doctors merely signs his signature in red ink to indicate a girl or blue ink for a boy. No 
words are exchanged. It’s an unspoken thing and one doesn’t even have to ask, she 
says.145 
                                                          
142  Op.cit. 
143 See the Preamble to the Act. 
144 Case No. 295/2 OF 2001; Date of Institution: 5.11.2001/20.7.2004; Date of Decision: 28.3.2006. 
145National Legal Research Desk, http://nlrd.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ANIL-SABHANI-CASE-ON-CRIMINAL-ACTION-
AGAINST-DOCTORS-FOR-COMMITINGSEX-DETERMINATION-TEST.pdf. 
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The Court held that conduct of the convicted medical practitioners were highly 
reprehensible and undeserving of leniency because their illegal acts contribute to the 
unlawful abortion of female foetuses as well as a decline in the sex ratio of girls to boys 
which may eventually make women extinct in the country. 
This interplay of judicial independence and legislative pro-activity is a gigantic advance 
in India’s legal framework which may reasonably be exported to Nigeria and other 
jurisdictions where the laws are yet inferior. 
 
4.3.6 The Vishaka Guidelines/Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace 
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013  
In Medha Kotwal Lele & Ors v. Union of India & Ors,146 the Supreme Court decried 
that fifteen years after the Vishaka guidelines147 Parliament was yet to enact a proper 
law to protect women against sexual harassment at the workplace. 
 
 In apparent reaction to this and to underscore the legal importance attached to women’s 
dignity in India, Parliament promulgated the Sexual Harassment of Women at 
Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013148 ‘to provide protection 
against sexual harassment of women at workplace and for the prevention and redressal 
of complaints of sexual harassment and for matters connected therewith or incidental 
thereto.’ 
This Act follows CEDAW and invariably places the guidelines in Vishaka within the 
ambit of Indian Constitutionalism as well as international law. This is clear from its 
Preamble thus:  
                                                          
146  (2013) 1 SCC 297 (Judgement delivered on 19 October, 2012). 
147 These guidelines for the prevention and redressal of sexual harassment of women at the workplaces have already been discussed. 
148 With effect from 22 April 2013 
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WHEREAS sexual harassment results in violation of the fundamental rights 
of a woman to equality under articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India 
and her right to life and to live with dignity under article 21 of the 
Constitution and right to practice any profession or to carry on any 
occupation, trade or business which includes a right to a safe environment 
free from sexual harassment; 
AND WHEREAS the protection against sexual harassment and the right to 
work with dignity are universally recognized human rights by international 
conventions and instruments such as Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination against Women, which has been ratified on the 25th 
June 1993 by the Government of India… it is expedient to make provisions 
for giving effect to the said Convention for protection of women against 
sexual harassment at workplace. 
 
This new law fills the legislative vacuum which existed post Vishaka and complements 
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 by specifically addressing 
sexual harassment of women at workplace and providing the much needed legislative 
redress process. This is a further manifestation of legislative pro-activity in 
strengthening the legal framework for the protection of the dignity of women in India. 
The Act protects both employed and unemployed women at their “workplaces” 
(including domestic servants in private homes or dwelling places) irrespective of age.149  
Section 2 (e) of the Act defines ‘domestic worker’ to mean: 
a woman who is employed to do household work in any household for 
remuneration whether in cash or kind, either directly or through an agent on 
a temporary, permanent, part time or full time basis, but does not include 
any member of the family of the employer. 
 
                                                          
149 The definition of “aggrieved woman” in Section 2 (a) of the Act covers these class of persons. 
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And by Section 2 (f), “employee” means, 
a person employed at a workplace for any work on regular, temporary, ad 
hoc or daily wage basis, either directly or through an agent including a 
contractor, with or without the knowledge of the principal employer, 
whether for remuneration or not, or working on a voluntary basis or 
otherwise, whether the terms of the employment are express or implied, and 
includes a co-worker, a contract worker, probationer, trainee, apprentice or 
called by any other such name. 
 
The Act also elaborately defines workplace in Section 2 (o) as including: 
Any department, organisation, undertaking, establishment, enterprise, 
institution, office, branch or unit which is established, owned, controlled or 
wholly or substantially financed directly or indirectly by the Government or 
its agencies or a co-operative society; or any private sector organisation, 
enterprise, private society, trust, non-governmental organisation, or service 
provider engaged in commercial, professional, vocational, educational, 
sports/recreational, industrial, health (hospitals and nursing homes), 
financial and allied  services including production, supply, sale, distribution 
or service. 
It also includes a dwelling place, a house or unorganised sector as well as 
any place visited by the employee in the course of her employment 
including transportation provided by the employer for undertaking such 
journey. 
 
A critical appraisal of the above definitions suggests that the Act does not specifically 
cover “marital rape” which presumably occurs at a “dwelling place” or “house”.        
The researcher humbly hold the view that, considering the judicial fearlessness, 
interpretational innovation, independence and activism common in India, one would not 
be surprised if, when the need arises, the Indian Supreme Court, applying the rule of 
“Due Process”, extends the latitude of “domestic worker”, “employee” or “workplace” 
in the new Act to cover sexual harassment and intimidation of wives or rape by their 
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husbands or partners at home, in line with the broad meaning of right to life in Article 
21 of its Constitution.150  
Generally, the Act is arranged in thirty sections with many sub-sections and clauses 
comprising twenty core sections and ten miscellaneous sections. 
Section 3 (2) of the Act lists the circumstances, acts and behaviour which may 
constitute sexual harassment to include implied or explicit promise of preferential 
treatment in a woman’s employment, or threat of present or future detrimental treatment 
in her employment, humiliating her or deliberately creating an intimidating and hostile 
work environment to unbalance her health or safety.  
 
It also provides a Complaint procedure in Section 9, whereby an aggrieved woman may 
report sexual harassment in writing to the internal complaint committee or local 
complaint committee as the case may be (set up by the employer to handle complaints 
internally), within three months of the incident or three months following the last 
incident, if there were several.  Where the complainant is not literate enough to write, 
the committee is obliged to assist her to ensure that her complaint is recorded in writing. 
The committee may also extend the three months period for making a complaint if it 
deems it necessary and just in the circumstance. But where the aggrieved woman is 
physically or mentally incapable of making the complaint, or if she is dead, the 
complaint may be made on her behalf by a personal or legal representative.151  
 
However, at the instance of the aggrieved woman, the internal committee may seek 
peaceful resolution of the matter before inquiring into her complaint.152 Pending its final 
                                                          
150  This is without prejudice to the elaborate provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 which 
already covers all manner of social, economic and sexual violations of a wife or live-in partner by her husband or partner or their 
relatives. 
151 Section 9 (2) of the Act. 
152 Section 10 of the Act provides (1) The Internal Committee or, as the case may be, the Local Committee, may, before initiating an 
inquiry under Section 11 and at the request of the aggrieved woman take steps to settle the matter between her and the respondent 
through conciliation: Provided that no monetary settlement shall be made as a basis of conciliation; (2) Where a settlement has been 
arrived at under sub-section (1), the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall record the settlement so 
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report, the committee may also recommend palliatives including the transfer of either of 
the parties or the grant of up to three months leave to the aggrieved woman, irrespective 
of her normal leave.153 At the completion of inquiry, the committee shall submit its 
report and recommendations to the employer or District Officer as the case may be, 
within ten days and copy the parties.154 If the committee finds the respondent liable, it 
may recommend that he be punished for sexual harassment in accordance with the 
service rules of his workplace and/or that deductions be made from his salary to pay 
costs or compensation to the aggrieved woman or her legal heirs.155 But if the 
committee establishes the innocence of the respondent and that the report/evidence 
against him was mala fide (and not due to mere inability of the woman to prove her 
case), the committee may also recommend punitive actions against the woman and/or 
her agents under the service rules. 
 
Under Section 16 of the Act, the result of any inquiry on a complaint of sexual 
harassment, as well as the identity of the parties and their witnesses shall remain 
confidential. Even a media report on the justice of the case shall not disclose the identity 
of the parties, except to refer to them by Alphanumeric only.156 
The researcher considers this confidentiality proviso as a shield against shame which 
the respondent least deserves, except to the extent that even if the committee finds him 
liable, he still has a right of appeal under Section 18, otherwise, only the aggrieved 
woman and her witnesses deserve such confidentiality.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
arrived and forward the same to the employer or the District Officer to take action as specified in the recommendation; (4) Where a 
settlement is arrived at under sub-section (1), no further inquiry shall be conducted by the Internal Committee or the Local 
Committee, as the case may be.”  
153  Section 12 (1) and (2). 
154  Section 13. 
155  Section 13 (3) (ii). 
156  Section 17. 
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4.3.7 The Rule in Sheela Barse for the Protection of Women in Custody                           
In Sheela Barse v. Union of India,157 the Supreme Court of India formulated guidelines 
based on a class action litigation filed to protect the sexual rights and dignity of women 
in custody, at a time when no legislation existed on the subject. The writ petition 
followed reports of rape, molestation and sexual exploitation of women and girls held in 
custody, especially various police lock-ups in India.158 The Supreme Court Directives in 
that case became known as the Rule in Sheela Barse and they applied to all police lock-
ups and detention centres in India. The crux of the rule includes: 
1. The interrogation of females must be made in the presence of female police 
officers. 
2. Female suspects must be kept in separate police lock-ups under the supervision 
of female constables only. 
3. The police officer in-charge at any station/post must take responsibility for the 
safety of women in custody and ensure that bodily searches on them are 
conducted decently by female officers only. 
4. Notice of the rights of arrestees and detainees must be posted conspicuously at 
police lock-ups. 
5. Appointment of female judges or judicial officers to carry out regular surprise 
visits to police stations to ensure compliance with all the rules. 
 
By these rules, courts could also order that rehabilitation or other special assistance be 
provided to female inmates in appropriate cases.              
 
 
 
                                                          
157 AIR 1987 (1) 153. 
158    Ram Kumar v. S H Pradesh AIR 1995 SC 1995; P Rathinam v. S of Gujarat (1993) 2 Scale 631. 
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4.3.8 Unique Political Actions to Protect Women’s Safety and Sexual Dignity 
In addition to the legislative strides and judicial legislation discussed above, the Indian 
Government has also taken unique political steps to promote and protect the safety, 
empowerment and sexual dignity of women. This is manifest in three major arears, 
namely, the setting up of an all-women bank, the Prime Minister’s directive on public 
complaints and the banning of Uber Online-hailing taxi services provider in India.159
  
4.3.8.1 Bharatiya Mahila Bank [BMB]160: India’s First All-Women Bank 
It needs to be restated here, that in November 2013, the then Prime Minister of India, 
Manmohan Singh161 launched the Bharatiya Mahila Bank in Mumbai. The bank is the 
first all-women bank in India and was established to provide financial services 
predominantly to women and women self-help groups as a deliberate policy to promote 
economic justice and empowerment of women and to broaden the social base for their 
dignity, integrity and development. It is an all-women’s bank because all the eight 
members of its management board are women.162  
The bank was established to help women overcome gender-specific economic problems 
of lack of access to credit capital which could trigger a multiplier effect of demeaning 
their safety or compromising their sexual dignity. The bank has been described as ‘the 
beginning of a unique new institution’ and ‘a small step towards economic empowerme
nt of our women’163 which will help women overcome gender-specific problems of lack 
                                                          
159 The need has not arisen to make such taxi ban in Nigeria, however other unique political measures announced by the Indian 
government for the safety and dignity of women are not available for women in Nigeria. Meanwhile, the president-elect of Nigeria, 
Gen. Muhammadu Buhari in his “Special message to Nigerian women” on the International women Day, 2015, restated his 
commitment to empowering Nigerian women. According to him, “my plan for Nigerian women has been made clear in ‘My 
Manifesto and Vision for Nigeria.’ In his said Manifesto and Vision for Nigeria document released to the media in Dec. 2014, 
Buhari said that: ”Women all over the world are playing an ever increasing role in moving their nations forward both in and outside 
government. In keeping with the times, my government will ensure that Nigerian women are given the opportunity to rise and play 
an even more prominent role in moving out great nation forward. See Vanguard Newspaper, Nigeria Online of 8 March, 2015 at: 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/03/womens-day-buhari-restates-commitment-to-empowering-women/#sthash.MWZJXIWp.dpuf 
(18/5/2015). 
160 Hindi Language Translation of Indian Women Bank. 
161 Former Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi is India’s new Prime Minister, elected May 2014. 
162 The BMB has an all-woman, eight member board of directors. 
 http://zeenews.india.com/business/news/economy/bharatiya-mahila-bank-for-economic-empowerment-of-women-pm_89058.html 
(25/11/2013). 
163See The Prime Minister’s remark, Ibid. 
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of access to credit capital due to inherent difficulty in furnishing collateral because 
family property are usually not registered in their names.164 This marks another political 
high point for economic empowerment of women in India which suggests a parameter 
for sustainable legal framework for protecting women’s dignity. 
 
4.3.8.2 Direct Access to Prime Minister for Public Complaints  
 
Even though the dictum of epistolary jurisdiction of courts is a landmark of the Indian 
judicial process which has worked towards the protection of women’s right to dignity in 
India, still the current Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Narendra Modi, upon assuming office 
in 2014, made a bold directive for advancement of women’s dignity and sexual 
independence in India. He directed that all persons, especially women and girls, whose 
right to dignity have been violated and who have no facility, means or capacity to report 
to the police or initiate judicial process, may complain directly to his office or to him 
personally via any of his social media pages on Facebook or Twitter, which are made 
public.165 This bold political action enlarges the scope of access jurisprudence in India, 
especially for women who believe or think that the police will down-play their reports 
of violations. 
 
4.3.8.3 Banning of Uber Online-Hailing Taxi Services in India         
The Indian media reported that, following allegation that a taxi driver employed 
by the online cab-hailing services company, Uber, was arrested for 
allegedly raping a 27-year-old female passenger, the transport department of the 
Indian Government blacklisted and banned ‘all operations and transport services 
                                                          
164 Ibid. See remark by India’s Finance Minister P. Chidambaram at the launching of the bank. 
165 Office Address: South Block, Raisin Hill, New Delhi-110011, India, Fax: +91-11-23019545, Tel: +91-11-23012312, Official 
Website: www.narendramodi.in; Residential Address: 7 Race Course Road, New Delhi, India; Facebook Page: 
facebook.com/narendramodi.official; Twitter Account: twitter.com/narendramodi; Google Plus Account: 
plus.google.com/+NarendraModi; YouTube Channel: youtube.com/user/narendramodi. 
http://www.indiancelebinfo.com/2014/10/narendra-modi-office-contact-address-email-phone-number-website.html (29/4/2015).  
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provided by www.uber.com with immediate effect.’ 166 This shows the pro-active 
political steps taken by the Indian Government towards protecting the dignity of 
women.  
The Government in New Delhi held the US-based company Uber vicariously liable for 
the violation of the woman’s dignity because it neglected to show diligent care for the 
safety and sexual dignity of its prospective female passengers. Reasons: Shiv Kumar 
Yadav, the 32-year-old cab driver who allegedly raped the passenger had previously 
been jailed seven month for rape in 2011, and for Uber to have employed him at the risk 
of the general safety of women without being diligent enough to have run a background 
check and obtained police clearance on him and its other drivers for the safety of the 
general public. 
 
4.3.8.4 Introduction of New “Social Justice Bench” at the Supreme Court 
One of the assurances in the Preamble to the Indian Constitution is the assurance of 
“Social justice,” which generally includes the safety and secure living conditions for the 
vulnerable group including women and children. And to actualize this assurance, the 
Indian Supreme Court has set up a new bench known as the “Social Justice Bench”167  
His Lordship the Chief Justice of India ordered constitution of this Special Bench to 
facilitate early and specialized disposal of both new and pending cases relating 
specifically to the vulnerable members of society especially women and children.168 
The Chief Justice further directed that this Bench would sit on every working Friday at  
2.00 p.m. with effect from 1st December, 2014, and will be monitored regularly169 to 
ensure optimum realization of the assurance of the “social justice” intent of the Indian 
Constitution.  
                                                          
166 The Times of India, Delhi 8 Dec, 2014: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Delhi-govt-bans-Uber-cab-service-
following-rape-incident/articleshow/45411516.cms  (28/4/2015). 
167 LAW RESOURCE INDIA, 3 December, 2014: https://indialawyers.wordpress.com/2014/12/03/supreme-court-constitutes-a-
special-bench-titled-as-social-justice-bench-for-hearing-matters-related-to-women-and-children/ (30/4/2015). 
168 Ibid. 
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This underscores the seriousness and proactivity in law and policy relating to women’s 
dignity and protection in India. 
 
4.3.8.5 Comprehensive Legal and Counselling Centres and 181 Mobile Helpline 
Services for Women in Distress  
In his message to the International Women’s Day on 8 March, 2015, Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi announced the “setting up one-stop-centres that will provide 
assistance, legal advice and psychological counselling to women who face violence or 
abuse. The Government is also commencing a mobile helpline to enable women to dial 
181 for access to counselling and referral services."170  
This is a major policy stride aimed at protecting women’s safety and dignity and 
bringing positive change in the lives of women. In the words of the Prime Minister, 
“We must walk shoulder-to-shoulder to end all forms of discrimination or injustice 
against women.”171 
 
4.3.8.6 Opening of 24-Hours Gender Help-Desk Centres for Women and Children 
In the Indian State of  Kerala, a  24 hour gender  help desk centres  have been opened 
for  providing short term gender shelter facility,  medical help,  legal support and 
counselling to those women and children , who are the victims of the  domestic 
violence.172 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
169 This Bench will comprise of Hon ‘ble Mr. Justice Uday U. Lalit, and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur. 
170 PMINDIA, Text of PM’s Message on International Women’s Day, 08 Mar, 2015, available at 
http://pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/text-of-pms-message-on-international-womens-day/ (28/12/2015).  
171 See Text of Indian PM’s Message on International women’s day, March 8, 2015, http://www.narendramodi.in/text-of-pms-
message-on-international-womens-day (18/5/2015); 
http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/committed-to-bring-positive-change-in-womens-lives-prime-minister-narendra-modi-744962 
(18/5/2015). 
172 Kerala Women: An initiative of Kerala Social Welfare Department http://www.keralawomen.gov.in/index.php/headlines/333-24-
hour-gender-help-desk-centres-for-women-and-children. (18/5/2015). 
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4.3.8.7 Launching of SOTERIA Free Emergency Android Application for 
Women’s Safety and Crime Control 
Smacon Technologies Tripunithura, India has also developed a smart emergency 
android application known as SOTERIA to provide help for women in distress. This 
mobile app which can be downloaded from the Google App store in android/smart 
phones derives its name from the Greek Goddess Soteria, which is regarded in the 
Greek Mythology as the goddess of safety, protection, preservation and deliverance 
from harm. 
Normally, on the Soteria App SETTINGS, the user saves the mobile phone numbers of 
three most important persons from whom she would expect help during an emergency. 
And once distressed or in need of help, she can send out SOS or distress call by simply 
touching or dialling the CALL option in the Soteria app on her android/smart phone or 
devise.  This would automatically send and deliver information of her location as text 
message to the three saved numbers. Her location can then be traced through the 
location tower of mobile application or Google API or GPS technology. The Soteria 
application can also send instant status updates in Facebook.173 
This application is an unrivalled mobile advance specially introduced in India to 
provide safety for women and enhance protection of their right to dignity. 174 Although 
there seem to be more reported cases of public rape and violation of women’s sexual 
dignity in India than in Nigeria, the Soteria app is still considered a remarkable lesson 
which may be reasonably applied with respect to cases of marital rape, sexual 
harassment and other forms violence or abuse which reduce the dignity of women.  
                                                          
173 Currently, the Soteria emergency/safety mobile app is most popular in Urban India, where of course, the cases of violation of 
women’s sexual dignity are more endemic. But one would reasonably wonder what happens with respect to remote areas of rural 
India where there are no internet facilities and mobile service networks or where these facilities have weak signals. And the fact that 
most women may be too poor to own smart phones, or too illiterate to use or operate one, it is therefore humbly suggested that for 
Soteria to be most effective, government or in partnership with relevant NGOs should take steps to provide these mobile devises or 
other form of alarming/alert systems for these women and educate them on how to use them.  
174 Kerala Women: An initiative of Kerala State Social Welfare Department- 
http://www.keralawomen.gov.in/index.php/headlines/260-android-application-soteria-to-help-women (20/5/2015). 
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4.3.8.8 Setting Up of a Special NIRBHAYA (“Fearless” or “No Fear”) Fund for 
Women's Safety 
Nirbhaya is the Hindu word for “fearless one” or “no fear”.175  The Indian Government 
set up a special Nirbhaya Fund for women’s safety and dignity, in memory of the young 
Indian woman, who died at a Singapore hospital, two weeks after she had been brutally 
gang-raped in a moving bus in New Delhi. The Fund has an initial corpus of Rs10 
billion (approximately USD157 Million). The essence of the fund is to assist and 
rehabilitate women who face threat or fall victims of such indignity as sexual 
violation.176 There are also special Nirbhaya vigilante/surveillance patrols around 
Bhopal, India providing additional security for women. 
 
4.3.9 Critique of the Indian Legislative and Policy Framework 
In spite of advances in the recent enactment of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 
2013 in India and the various amendments therein contained, some remarkable gaps 
remain evident in its legislative framework for the protection of women’s right to 
dignity, especially against sexual violations.  
Authoritative media report177 also revealed that Indian activist Ranjana Kumari, director 
of the non-profit Centre for Social Research, applauded the amendment in the Criminal 
Laws (Amendment) Act, 2013 which provides a penalty for police and law enforcement 
officers who fail to register cases of assault or sexual harassment filed by women, as a 
sure way of “ending the culture of shame that surrounds victims of sexual crimes, so 
they don't feel afraid to approach police when they are attacked." Unfortunately 
                                                          
175 In this case, the word is used as a pseudonym for the Delhi bus rape victim since the Indian criminal jurisprudence does not 
permit the description of rape victims by name. 
176 http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-nirbhaya-fund-of-rs1000-crore-for-womens-safety-announced-1805651 (19/5/2015). 
177 South China Morning Post, International Edition: Asia. “Activists Welcome India's Anti-rape Law, With Caution” Agence 
France-Presse (AFP) Wednesday, 20 March, 2013, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1195588/activists-welcome-indias-anti-
rape-law-caution (29/10/2014).  
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however, the law protects Armed forces personnel in “disturbed areas” from prosecution 
for rape and sexual assault, even though war-time rape under the Rome Statute.178  
The legislation is also defective in not raising the punishment for acid attacks on women 
from a minimum seven-year jail term to a proposed sentence of life imprisonment as 
well as making no special provision for incest or prescribing tougher penal sanction for 
trafficking in children, especially the girl-child.  
It is also a minus that the new legislation still does not criminalize marital/spousal rape. 
This “oversight” according to activist Sudha Sundararaman of the All India Democratic 
Women's Association, contravenes the Indian Constitution, "which considers women as 
equal human beings who have a right to live with dignity and be free from violence 
within and outside marriage."179 The non-criminalisation of rape of a wife by her 
husband is a clear disregard of the Verma Committee report which had said that this 
exception "stems from an outdated patriarchal notion of marriage which regarded wives 
as no more than the property of their husbands..."180 
The Indian criminal legislation on rape and sexual abuse of women has also been 
criticised as being pro-establishment and encourages “celebrity justice” because it fails 
to depart from the old order whereby political office holders and parliamentarians facing 
rape charges continue to hold their offices and positions until their final conviction, 
while as, on moral grounds of public decency and sensitivity they should vacate their 
offices until they are cleared by the courts.  
                                                          
178 Article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute lists rape, alongside sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, as a crime against humanity. See also Ambos, K. (2012). 
Sexual Offences in International Criminal Law, with a Special Focus on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
Understanding and Proving International Sex Crimes, Beijing, 143-173 and Maier, N. B. (2011). The Crime of Rape under the 
Rome Statute of the ICC (with a special emphasis on the jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals). In Amsterdam Law 
Forum (Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 146). 
179 See “Women's activists sore with rape law” The Times on India, March 20, 2013. 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Womens-activists-sore-with-rape-law/articleshow/19081635.cms  (29/10/2014). 
180 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Womens-activists-sore-with-rape-law/articleshow/19081635.cms, ibid.  
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The new law has also removed the specific words "social, economic and political" from 
Clause (k) under Section 376(2) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)," thus diluting the 
suggestion in the proposed government Bill of 2010 which had said that rape committed 
by a person in a position of “social, economic and political” dominance would be 
considered an aggravated offence. 
It is also a legislative lacuna that the law still retains rape as a gender-specific offence 
which can only, legally be committed against women and girls even though rape of 
young boys and men also remain an open secret in India. Similarly, the law does not 
protect lesbians, same-sex couples and transgender from sexual assault and rape. 
Furthermore, it is also imperative that future amendments with regards to the amended 
Section 119 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (which requires the Court to employ the 
assistance of an interpreter or a special educator who will record and video graph the 
statement, signs or writings of a dumb or disable witness), should contain a proviso for 
such interpreters or special educators to perform their duty under Oath. 
 
4.3.10 The Way Forward 
The following suggestions are hereby recommended to fortify the legislative and policy 
framework for the protection of the right to dignity of women in India. 
1. Although India is applauded for providing elaborate national legislation on equal 
gender rights which inter alia punishes acts of dowry, rape, sexual harassment, 
stalking, voyeurism, disrobing, discrimination against Dalits, and sex-selective 
abortions, the CEDAW Committee Report, 2000 expressed worry about the lack 
of implementation of laws and the inadequate allocation of resources for 
women’s development in the social sector, which they saw as serious 
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impediments to the realization of women’s human rights in India. It is therefore 
recommended that India should make haste to addresses this. 
 
2. With regards to protecting the right to dignity of women with disabilities, it is 
recommended that special educators and interpreters be employed at police 
offices and courts that shall be present from the time of recording the complaint 
of the violated disabled woman or girl by the police up till the time of trial in 
court. This will take care of such situation as arose in two prominent scenarios 
cited in a recent research,181 firstly, disabled women (for instance deaf and dumb 
women) are unable to communicate or give evidence of the act of sexual assault 
committed against them, and even if they do, little or no weight is attached to it 
by the police and courts which means that if per chance the accused is convicted 
by the lower court, it is most likely that an appeal court will set aside the 
conviction “owing to the non-recording of the prosecutrix’ testimony or non-
observance of the legal procedure by the court below.”182  
Secondly, the family of a teenage deaf and dumb patient reported on February 
29, 2012 that a junior doctor had raped their daughter while she was a patient at 
the Bankura Sammilani Medical College Hospital. But unfortunately there could 
be no prosecution because the investigating Superintendent of Police Pranab 
Kumar had said, “It is difficult for us to investigate because the victim is deaf 
and dumb and we need an interpreter.”183 
It must however be noted that in the recent murder case of State of Rajasthan v 
Darshan Singh,184 the Supreme Court of India emphasised that there is nothing, 
in law or otherwise which disqualifies or prevents a deaf and dumb person from 
                                                          
181 Badjena, S. S. (2014). Sexual Violence Against Women with Disabilities and the Legislative Measures in India. ODISHA 
REVIEW (April-May 2014), 46-57, esp 47-48. 
182 Ibid at 49. 
183  Ibid at 47.  
184 (2012) 5 SCC789 
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being a credible and competent witness, even though in that case, the court 
refused to rely on the testimony of the wife of the deceased, who was deaf and 
dumb and who was an eyewitness to the incident, because the interpreter of her 
evidence at the trial was her father, and that being an ‘interested party’ it was 
unsafe for  the Court to convict the accused on basis of his interpretation of the 
witness’ testimony because of a likelihood of bias.  
It must also be noted that with the enactment of the Criminal Law (Amendment) 
Act, 2013, the punishment for the rape of a physically or mentally disabled 
woman under Section 376 (2) of the Penal Code now ranges from 10 years 
minimum imprisonment to life imprisonment. This amendment therefore 
breaches the lacuna which exists in the PWD Act, 1995. 
Additionally, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 also amends Section 
119 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and accordingly, a witness who is unable 
to speak because she is dumb may give her evidence in any other manner in 
which she can make it intelligible, as by writing or by signs which must be made 
in open Court and such evidence shall be deemed to be oral evidence, provided 
that if the witness is unable to communicate verbally, the Court shall take the 
assistance of an interpreter or a special educator in recording the statement and 
such statement shall be video graphed. 
On this note, it is additionally suggested that every such special educators or 
interpreters which the researcher had earlier recommended to be attached to the 
police or the courts must be sworn to the oath of truth which will be regulated by 
the law on perjury as this would resolve the kind of issue earlier mentioned in 
the murder case of State of Rajasthan v Darshan Singh.185 
                                                          
185 (Supra) 
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The researcher further reiterate the call by the media for urgent reform in the 
composition of rural administrative bodies (panchayats) where women-only 
groups should be invested with the authority to adjudicate on women-centric 
issues. Panchayats comprised of men have been known to recommend that 
survivors of rape marry their rapists, if he is merciful enough to consider 
marrying her, so the woman can reintegrate into society. This is because a raped 
woman, in their view, becomes a repository of indelible shame. Aside from 
issues directly affecting them, women must be made a more inclusive part of 
decision-making at all levels of Indian society.186 
3. It must be conceded that in spite of basic constitutional and legislative provisions 
for the protection of women’s dignity in India, especially with respect to sexual 
abuse and rape, coupled with the unprecedented activism of the India Supreme 
Court with regards to fundamental rights generally, women still face the threat of 
rape as a major form of indignity and humiliation. Even after the notorious 
December 2012 gang-rape cum murder of a medical student,187 recent media 
reports record the following humiliating cases of sexual violation of women in 
India, namely: 
I. “Indian police gang-rape woman after she fails to pay bribe.” 188 
II. “Alleged gang rape, hanging of 2 girls in India sparks global 
outrage.”189 
III. “13 men in West Bengal, gang-raped a 20-year old tribal woman on the 
orders of village elders, as punishment for having a relationship with a 
man from a different community.” 190    
                                                          
186 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/17/sexual-violence-india-patriarchal-narendra-modi-women-reform-rape. 
(14/11/2014) 
187 “A 23-year-old Indian student was fatally gang-raped inside a bus in the capital, Delhi last December. The attack caused 
international outrage and prompted India to introduce stringent anti-rape laws. A court sentenced her attackers to death this 
September.” (BBC NEWS Asia, 16 December 2013). http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-25344403 (26/7/2014). 
188 The Guardian, 12 June 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/12/indian-police-gang-rape-uttar-pradesh (12/7/2014). 
189 CNN International edition, 30 May 2014,  http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/29/world/asia/india-gang-rape/, (12/7/2014).   
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IV.  “Girl, 10, raped at the command of village chief in Jharkhand, 
India.”191  
V. In a public statement, Kolkata MP Tapas Pal, of the Trinamool 
Congress (TMC) party threatened to shoot opposition party men and 
“unleash my boys” to rape their women. Although he later made a 
public apology for this, advocate Bijayan Ghosh has filed a Public 
Interest Litigation at the Supreme Court seeking a probe by the Criminal 
Bureau of Investigation (CBI)  as he alleged that the West Bengal Police 
and the state government were treating  the issue in a mere “partisan” 
manner.192 
VI. “India six-year-old ‘raped in Bangalore school by staff members’”193 
In the light of the foregoing, the researcher recommends that India should advance 
effort in civic education, moral instructions in schools, economic empowerment of 
women and special training and support for law enforcement personnel. Rape laws 
should be made gender neutral because even the custodial sexual abuse of boys is 
becoming rampant.194  
 
4. Women rights NGOs and civil society groups as well as corporate bodies should 
show greater involvement in the funding, propagation and participation as part 
of a larger campaign for the protection of human dignity, especially of the 
vulnerable but with emphasis on the dignity of women.195  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
190 National Legal Research Desk, 28 Mar 2014). http://nlrd.org/author/ravikantsv   (29/3/2014) 
191 news.com.au 11July 2014, http://www.news.com.au/world/girl-10-raped-at-the-command-of-village-chief-in-jharkhand-
india/story-fndir2ev-1226985244797 (12/7/2014). See also The Times Asia, 11 July 2014, 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/article4144286.ece (12/7/2014). 
192 Oneindia News, 5 July 2014, http://news.oneindia.in/india/sc-moved-seeking-cbi-probe-against-tapas-pal-s-remarks-
1477556.html (12/7/2014). 
193 BBC NEWS Asia, 17 July 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-28340617, (25/7/2014). 
194 Mehta, Siddharth. "Rape Law in India: Problems in Prosecution Due to Loopholes in the Law." Available at SSRN 2250448 
(2013). 
195 Wiseberg, Laurie S., and Harry M. Scoble. "Women's Rights and International Human Rights: A Bibliographical Note." Human 
Rights Quarterly 3.2 (1981): 127-135. 
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5. A special role may also be considered for religious groups and leaders for the 
dissemination of caution and counselling against the abuse and rape of women 
by ensuring that they propagate “truth” and not “negative” religious teachings 
which trivialize condone or encourage sexual abuse of women.196 There is also 
need to emphasise peace and tolerance among the various sects and castes in 
India because rape has sometimes been linked to social factors like revenge, 
vengeance, clannish violence and war.197 But if these measures fail to secure the 
necessary attitudinal change against rape in India, especially child-rape, this 
researcher may be constrained to join the debate that “castration” (as against 
other debates for death penalty for such heinous crimes)198 be codified as “a 
befitting sentence on any paedophile or any serial offender.”199  This is without 
prejudice to the fact that the Justice J.S. Verma Committee had earlier rejected 
the proposal for chemical castration as it fails to treat the social foundations of 
rape.  It opined that death penalty should not be imposed for the offence of rape, 
as there was considerable evidence that death penalty has not deterred serious 
crimes.200  Rather, it recommended life imprisonment for rape. This research 
hereby recommends the relationship between rape and punishment as a subject 
for further research. 
 
4.4 Legislative and Policy Framework: SOUTH AFRICA 
The two main legislation for the protection of women and the girl-child’s dignity 
against all manner of violence including sexual indignity are the Domestic Violence Act 
                                                          
196 Metcalf, Barbara D. "Imrana: Rape, Islam, and law in India." Islamic studies (2006): 389-412. 
197 Murthi, Meera. "Who is to Blame? Rape of Hindu‐Muslim Women in Interethnic Violence in India." Psychology of Women 
Quarterly 33.4 (2009): 453-462. 
198 Kumar, Radha. From Chipko to Sati: The contemporary Indian women's movement. Westview Press, 1995; D'Avella, Joanna H. 
"Death Row for Child Rape-Cruel and Unusual Punishment under the Roper-Atkins Evolving Standards of Decency Framework." 
Cornell L. Rev. 92 (2006): 129; Hartman, Joan F. "Unusual Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting 
the Application of the Death Penalty." U. Cin. L. Rev. 52 (1983): 655. 
199 Mehta, Siddharth. "Rape Law in India: Problems in Prosecution Due to Loopholes in the Law," ibid.  
200 Summary Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law, 2013, PRS Legislative Research, 
Centre for Policy Research, India, 25 January 2013. www.prsindia.org; http://www.prsindia.org/administrator/uploads/general/1359
132636~~Justice%20Verma%20Committee%20Report%20Summary.pdf  (30/10/2014). 
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No. 116 of 1998 and the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act No. 32 of 2007.  
Some researchers have also expressed the view that the keen local and international 
lobby by women groups in the mid-1990s after South Africa’s first democratic election 
and subsequent ratification of the CEDAW Convention led to the enactment of “the 
Domestic Violence Act No. 116 in 1998 followed a decade later by the Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offense and Related Matters) Act No. 32 of 2007,” and that “the struggle for the 
promulgation of these two Acts brought South African women together irrespective of 
their race, class, and politics.”201 
 
4.4.1 Domestic Violence Act No. 116 of 1998  
This Act is implemented under the Department of Social Development and it is the 
“main act that directly addresses VAW (violence against women) in South Africa.”202 
The Act has 22 chapters and its Section 21(1) repeals Sections 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 of the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993. 
Basically, it contains a number of broad and peculiar provisions for the protection of 
women’s dignity against all forms of violence (including domestic violence) and for 
which it is globally applauded as “the most inclusive and progressive pieces of 
legislation.”203  
 
Firstly, Section 1 of the Act defines domestic violence in very elaborate terms to include 
sexual abuse; physical abuse; emotional, psychological abuse; verbal and economic 
                                                          
201 Mogale, R. S., Burns, K. K., & Richter, S. (2012). Violence Against Women in South Africa: Policy Position and 
Recommendations. Violence Against Women, 18(5), 580-594. doi: 10.1177/1077801212453430 http://vaw.sagepub.com (10/6/2015) 
at 583. Further at p.587, the authors were emphatic that “A key activist event was the advocacy campaign that was conducted by 
Soul City Institute for Health and Development Communication in partnership with the National Network on Violence against 
Women, a national network of various South African women’s movements and activists.” See also Maker, A., Malepe, L., 
Christofides, N., & Usdin, S. (2000). The value of advocacy in promoting social change: Implementing the new domestic violence 
act in South Africa. Reproductive Health Matters, 8(16), 55-65. 
202 Mogale, R. S., Burns, K. K., & Richter, S. (2012). Violence Against Women in South Africa: Policy Position and 
Recommendations. Violence Against Women, 18(5), 580-594. 
203 Mogale, R. S., Burns, K. K., & Richter, S. (2012). Violence Against Women in South Africa: Policy Position and 
Recommendations. Violence Against Women, 18(5), 580-594. doi: 10.1177/1077801212453430 http://vaw.sagepub.com (10/6/2015) 
at 581, citing Cooper, D., Morroni, C., Orner, P., Moodley, J., Harries J., & Cullingworth, L., et al. (2004). Ten years of democracy 
in South Africa: Documenting transformation in reproductive health policy and status. Reproductive Health Matters, 12(24), 70-85. 
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abuse. The Section also lists a broad range of acts which constitute domestic violence to 
include harassment; intimidation; stalking; forceful unconsented entry into the 
complainant’s residence; damage to property as well as any other behaviour which is 
intended to unduly subjugate the complainant.204 
 
Secondly, it recognizes domestic violence as that form of VAW which can be 
perpetuated at home by close family members or friends including spouses, and thus 
compels the violator to support the victim and her children, if any, financially even if 
they are not living together; 
 
Thirdly, it gives wider arrest powers to the courts including the powers to grant 
protection orders205 on violators upon application by the complainant with regards to 
victim’s safety at home or workplace,206 otherwise the abuser may be jailed for five 
years.207 
 
Fourthly, its Section 2 obliges the police to ensure adequate protection of the victim 
including medical assistance; explaining her rights to her; helping her find a safe 
alternative place to stay, away from the home she shares with the abusive partner, 
family member or spouse. It lists other duties of the police in the circumstance as well 
as penalties for not carrying out such duties.208 An officer may also arrest a violator 
without warrant at the scene of the violation. 
Section 12 grants extra-territorial jurisdictions to courts which will enable a victim gain 
quicker access to justice. 
                                                          
204 Violence Against women in Africa: A resource for journalists. (1999). South Africa: Soul City Institute for Health and 
Development Communication, p. 11. 
205 Section 6-7 of the Act. 
206 Section 4 of the Act. 
207 Section 17 of the Act. 
208 See Mogale, R. S., Burns, K. K., & Richter, S. (2012), ibid p. 581-582 quoting Smythe, D. (2004, June) Norms and Architecture: 
Limits on Rape Law in South Africa, Conference Papers—Law & Society Association. Retrieved from 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p117019_index.htm.  
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One very significant aspect of this law is the introduction of a “no-drop Charges” 
regulation in Section 18 which provides that under no circumstance will charges be 
refused or withdrawn for a violator of the Act. This thesis therefore agrees with other 
authors209 that this provision, if decisively implemented, is capable of scaring 
perpetrators and advancing the impact and object of the Domestic Violence Act, thereby 
promoting the legislative framework for protection of women’s dignity in South Africa. 
 
4.4.2 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act No. 32 
of 2007  
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, No. 32 of 
2007 (also known as the Sexual Offences Act)210, took effect from 16 December 2007 
after President Thabo Mbeki signed it into law.  
The Act has seven chapters, 72 sections and 1 Schedule which contains the list of 
legislation amended or repealed by this Act.211 
Chapter one contains the object of the Act which includes: consolidation of all laws on 
sexual offences in South Africa into one; criminalizing all forms of sexual abuse and 
exploitation of all persons including women, children and the mentally disabled; repeal 
of certain common law sexual offences and replacing them with new, extended or 
expanded gender-neutral statutory sexual offences; promoting timeous justice delivery 
mechanism with respect to all sexual offences; providing uniform legislation and 
application in relation to sexual offences throughout the country; providing services to 
victims of sexual violations and establishing a national register for sex offenders.212 
                                                          
209 Mogale, R. S., Burns, K. K., & Richter, S. (2012), op. cit. at 590. 
210 As amended by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act Amendment Act, 2013, See 
Government Gazette No. 36645 of 9 July, 2013; also available free online at www.gpwonline.co.za (9/6/2015). By its Section 68, it 
amends among others, certain aspects of the Sexual Offences Act No. 23 of 1957 and repeals its Sections 9, 11, 12(2), 13-15, 18, 
18A and 20A.  
211 Section 68 of the Act. 
212 Section 2 of the Act.  
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Imperatively, Section 1(1)(a) defines a child to mean “a person under the age of 18 
years” or in relation to Sections 15 and 16, a person who is up to 12 years but below 16 
years.213 
 
Chapter two criminalizes various forms of self or compelled sexual offences.214 Its 
Sections 3 to 14 criminalizes rape generally. Its Section 3 defines “rape” as the unlawful 
and intentional act of sexual penetration of another without consent while “compelled 
rape” occurs when one compels a second party to have unlawful sexual penetration of a 
third party without consent. This is a deviation from the common law offence of 
indecent assault. 
 
Chapter three deals specifically with sexual offences against children in Sections 15 to 
22 while chapter four criminalizes sexual violations of the mentally disabled in Sections 
23 to 26. In Section 72, the Act makes provision for implementing Chapters 1 to 4 and 7 
(on the creation of statutory sexual offences, special protection measures for children 
and the mentally disabled including certain transitional provisions relating to evidence).  
The Act enacts new, expanded or amended sexual offences against children and the 
mentally disabled including grooming, display or exposure to child pornography or 
witnessing/compulsion to partake in lewd sexual acts involving the erotic touching or 
arousing of private parts of the body. Although some of these offences also apply to 
adults, the Act nonetheless seek to specifically protect these vulnerable groups, namely, 
women, children and the mentally challenged. 
 
The Act will inter alia, facilitate South Africa’s effort on the protection of women and 
girl-child’s dignity against sexual violations which are commonplace because it 
generally repeals old common law concept of rape and replaces it with a new expanded 
                                                          
213 Section 1(1)(b) of the Act. The said Section 15 and 16 criminalizes statutory rape and statutory sexual assault of a child 
respectively irrespective of the child giving consent. Suffice to say that Section 15 seeks to criminalise acts of sexual penetration by 
adults with children who are aged between 12 and 16 even if they give consent while Section 16 aims to criminalise acts of 
consensual sexual violation committed by adults with children aged 12 to 16 years. 
214 For instance, Section 7 defines compelled self-sexual assault to cover all forms unlawful and intentional compelling of another to 
engage one in masturbation, arousal and stimulation of the female breasts, or penetration of the anus or genitals.  
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statutory offence of rape, applicable to all forms of sexual penetration without consent, 
irrespective of gender.215 The Act meets contemporary standard of international law 
whereby rape becomes an offence which may be committed by/against man or woman, 
boy/girl. This places it above the legislative framework in India and Nigeria where rape 
remains a gender-specific offence. 
 
Chapter five of the Act prescribes compulsory HIV test for sex offenders, the result of 
which may be used as evidence in a civil action for damages against the offender, or as 
evidence in his criminal trial or help in counselling the victim to enable her seek 
medical support or appropriate life-saving steps or lifestyle.216 It also abolishes 
secondary traumatization of victims and gives the victim the right to receive 
Postexposure Prophylaxis (PEP) treatment for HIV/AIDS. 217 
Section 35 obliges relevant organs of state to keep record of all reported cases of sexual 
violations as well as the Orders or decisions taken in respect of each case. This is a 
necessary step for forward-planning and evaluation of the impact of the Act on the 
upward or downward flow of sexual offences in the country. 
As a long-term punitive measure against sexual offenders, chapter six of the Act 
prescribes in Section 40 that a national register of sexual offenders be kept so that such 
violators may be denied entry into certain form of employment or care facility where 
children and disabled persons are kept. 
                                                          
215 Under the Sexual Offences Act, any form of sexual penetration aside the traditional penis to vagina (such as with fingers or the 
tongue or penetration by objects ‘into or beyond the genital organs or anus of another person’ (male or female) qualifies as ‘sexual 
penetration.’ Suffice to say that ‘sexual penetration’ is much more widely defined than the common-law crime of rape which 
required penile penetration of the vagina only. See McQuoid-Mason, D. (2011). Mandatory reporting of sexual abuse under the 
Sexual Offences Act and the ‘best interests of the child’. South African Journal of Bioethics and Law, 4(2), 74-78.  
216 Sections 28-33 of the Act. 
217 Mogale, R. S., Burns, K. K., & Richter, S. (2012). Violence Against Women in South Africa: Policy Position and 
Recommendations. Violence Against Women, 18(5), 580-594. doi: 10.1177/1077801212453430 http://vaw.sagepub.com (10/6/2015) 
at p. 582. 
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Chapter seven contains the general provisions which include an obligation under 
Section 54 to report the commission of sexual offences against children and the 
disabled, failure of which carries a jail term of five years or a fine or both.  
By Sections 56 and 57 of the Act, the consent of a child to an unlawful sexual act or 
marriage between the victim and violator of a sexual offence respectively cannot avail 
as a defence at the trial of an offender while Section 61 permits extra-territorial 
jurisdiction of courts with respect to the trial of sex offenders. 
With special reference to the evidence at the trial and sentencing of a sexual offence 
violator under the Act, Section 60 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related 
Matters) Amendment Act No. 32 of 2007 now states that:  
Notwithstanding any other law, a court may not treat the evidence of a 
complainant in criminal proceedings involving the alleged commission of a 
sexual offence pending before the court, with caution, on account of the 
nature of the offence. 
 
Section 59 of the same Act also attempts to protect survivors stating that “In criminal 
proceedings involving the alleged commission of a sexual offence, the court may not 
draw an inference only from the length of any delay between the alleged commission of 
such offence and the reporting thereof.”  
This amendment Act is further strengthened by the Criminal Law (Sentencing) 
Amendment Act No. 38 of 2007 (also known as the Sentencing Act) which provide 
minimum sentencing guidelines for rape, along with unsatisfactory and prohibited 
reasons for justifying a lesser sentence. Consequently, the Criminal Law (Sentencing) 
Amendment Act No. 38 of 2007 now removes all previous mitigating factors which 
were available to an accused person charged with rape or sexual offence and in 
consideration of which the trial court may impose a lesser sentence on him.  
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Section 3 (aA) of the Sentencing Act now states thus: “When imposing a sentence in 
respect of the offence of rape the following shall not constitute substantial and 
compelling circumstances justifying the imposition of a lesser sentence: (i) The 
complainants previous sexual history: (ii) an apparent lack of physical injury to the 
complainant (iii) an accused person’s cultural or religious beliefs about rape or (iv) any 
relationship between the accused person and the complainant prior to the offence being 
committed.” This is a clear legislative commitment to protect the right to dignity of 
women and the girl-child against sexual abuse in South Africa.218 
For administrative judicial convenience in justice delivery in sexual offences especially 
in relation to children, the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act 2007, was further amended by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2013219 with the purpose of empowering the 
Minister to designate new Sexual Offences Court to ensure proper implementation of 
the parent Act. By the amendment to Section 55A (1) and (2) of the Act, the Minister 
may in consultation with the National Director of Public Prosecution, the Chief Justice 
of the Republic, and the administrative head of that particular court, designate any 
Magistrate’s Court or High Court to sit as a Sexual offences Court and hear related 
matters accordingly. This designation however, does not remove or limit the jurisdiction 
of other courts with respect to the hearing of sexual offences.220 
Additionally, the Act makes provision for the establishment of the National Inter-
Sectoral Committee on the Sexual Offences Amendment Act whose function must 
                                                          
218 But in Nigeria, Marital rape is even justified by the combined interpretation of Section 357 of the Criminal Code Act Cap 77, 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990    (applicable in the Southern part of Nigeria) defines rape as unlawful carnal knowledge of 
a woman or girl by any person without her consent, or with her consent, if it was obtained unlawfully, and by Section 6 of the same 
Code which defines unlawful carnal knowledge as “carnal connection which takes place otherwise than between husband and wife.” 
219 See Government Gazette No. 36645 of 9 July, 2013; also available free online at www.gpwonline.co.za (9/6/2015). 
220 Section 55A (5).  
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include advising the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development on general 
matters relating to the monitoring and implementation of the Act.221  
This Act is comprehensive and offers elaborate protection to the dignity of the woman 
including girl-child in South Africa, and may arguably be likened to India’s Criminal 
Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 but Nigeria has no such consolidated law for the 
protection of the sexual dignity of its women or the girl-child.  
 
4.5 Critique of the South African Legislative and Policy Framework and the Way 
Forward 
In spite of South Africa’s strong laws for protecting the dignity of women and the girl-
child, it has been reported that “some of the few victims who report domestic violence 
received inadequate support from officials” and “there is evidence that victims 
reported cases of domestic violence to police or social workers, but their pleas for help 
fell on deaf ears or (they) were told to resolve the matter with their partners.”222  
With respect to the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act 2007, Section 15 aims to criminalise acts of sexual penetration by adults with 
children aged 12 to 16 years, even if they consent while Section 16 criminalises acts of 
consensual sexual violation committed by adults with children who are up to 12 but 
below 16 years. 
This thesis contends, however, that empowering the prosecuting authority to exercise 
discretion on whether or not to prosecute violators of the said Sections 15 or 16 of the 
Act, naturally and logically exposes the Act to the possibility of abuse of the said 
discretion as a result of party loyalty, socio-political and religious affiliations or other 
                                                          
221 This Committee is crucial to the sustainable implementation and co-ordination of the Act and it shall comprise representatives 
from the National Prosecuting Authority, the South African Police Services (SAPS), Correctional Services, Social Development, 
Justice and Constitutional Development as well as the department of Health. 
222 TheWorldPost, 3/8/2013: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/08/south-africa-violence-against-women_n_2837804.html 
(30/4/2015). 
   263 
“unfair biases and prejudices.”223 It is therefore recommended that the Act be reviewed 
to rather provide for a mandate to prosecute. 
On the other hand, it is heart-warming that in the Domestic Violence Act, no such 
discretion to prosecute applies with respect to offences under the Act. Instead, Section 
18 of the Act provides that on no account should prosecution be refused or withdrawn in 
the case of a violator of a woman’s sexual dignity. 
However, this thesis generally recommends that, as with India, South Africa can still do 
more to develop new strategies for enhanced legislative protection of women’s dignity. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
It is without doubt that India leads South Africa and Nigeria224 in law and policy 
framework, judicial creativity and activism as well as legislative pro-activity necessary 
for securing the dignity of women and the girl-child. 
This thesis contends, that generally, India’s progress in law and policy for the protection 
of women’s right to dignity, especially against sexual violations is not even rivalled by 
the existing law and policy in South Africa albeit, Nigeria lags behind both countries. 
And even where law and policy are lacking or deficient, the Supreme Court of India has 
stepped in with its creativity and activism to bridge inherent gaps and place the law and 
policy aright, as in the Vishaka guidelines before the making of a proper legislation to 
replace it. 
                                                          
223 Mogale, R. S., Burns, K. K., & Richter, S. (2012). Violence Against Women in South Africa Policy Position and 
Recommendations. Violence against women, 18(5), 580-594 at 589. 
 
224 “Nigerian laws on protection of women’s rights have been criticized for lacking the willingness to promote women’s right as they 
are inadequate, misinterpreted and unenforceable.” See NI Aniekwu ‘Legalising Cairo: Prospects and Opportunities for 
Reproductive Rights in Nigeria’ (2006) 1 & 2 CODESRIA Bulletin 49 (quoted in  Uju Peace Okeke, “A Case For The Enforcement 
of Women’s Rights as Human Rights in Nigeria”; The Women's UN Report Program & Network (WUNRN) 
http://www.wunrn.com (16/7/2014) 
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In Nigeria, there is no national law on domestic violence, only few states have adapted 
the Child Rights Act, and the CEDAW remains basically lame due to non- 
domestication. Yet no constitutional, judicial or legislative mandate exists whereby 
courts may enforce or apply the CEDAW provisions or the Women Protocol to the 
African Charter by invoking international law.  
Furthermore, the Nigerian criminal jurisprudence on rape remains an obsolete common 
law prototype which has been repealed and replaced with expanded and new legislation 
in India and South Africa. And unfortunately, the recent last-minute Sexual Offences 
Bill 2015 passed by the 7th Nigerian Senate in June 2015 fell short of international 
template because it redefines a child for purpose of unlawful sexual intercourse to mean 
a person who is eleven years and below whereas for the same purpose, relevant 
international and regional instruments as well as municipal laws of India and South 
Africa define a child as a person who is below 18 years of age. 
Therefore the totality of advances manifest in the Indian legal framework for the 
protection the dignity of women and the girl-child are hereby recommended for Nigeria 
and those other developing countries where the legal rights of women are being eroded and 
significant work needs to be done to protect existing rights let alone advance them.225 
                                                          
225  Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD), Feminist Law and Practice, http://apwld.org/our-
work/feminist-law-and-practice/. (19/5/2014).  
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CHAPTER 5 
FUNDAMENTAL GAPS IN THE NIGERIAN FRAMEWORK VIS-A-VIS 
LESSONS FROM ADVANCES IN INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.1 Introduction  
A reflection on chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, that is, the constitutional advances, 
judicial creativity and activism, as well as legislative and policy framework for the 
protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria, India and South Africa reminds one 
of the many fundamental gaps in the Nigerian framework vis-à-vis the many advances 
in the Indian and South African frameworks.1 
In this chapter therefore, the researcher collates, recapitulates and highlights those gaps 
with respect to Nigeria’s constitutionalism, law and policy as well as judicial attitude. It 
also highlights the advances, especially on constitutionalism and judicial creativity and 
activism, with respect to India and South Africa, which may constitute reasonable and 
valuable lessons for Nigeria.2 Although this chapter may seem repetitive, it is quite 
significant because it provides the platform for easier appreciation of the 
recommendations suggested in the next chapter for bridging the gaps and reforming the 
existing Nigerian framework, which may also serve as reasonable and useful template 
for other developing countries. 
This research observes though, that the most striking lessons on the globalization and 
sustainable protection of women’s right to dignity in India arise less from the guarantees 
                                                          
1 Generally, no constitutional provisions exist in international law. As for South Africa, no known constitutional gaps exist for the 
protection of the right to dignity of women in its 1996 Constitution because of the formidable provisions of its Bill of Rights which 
enshrines both the first and second generation of human rights as justiciable positive rights. In India, the major constitutional lacuna 
is the non-justiciability of the directive principles, even though the creativity and activism of the Supreme Court of India make them 
enforceable and applicable as implied fundamental rights. But in Nigeria, many gaps still exist in its 1999 Constitution which 
defeats the sustainable protection of the right to dignity of women. Gaps also abound in the law and policy framework as well as in 
the judicial attitude for protecting the right to dignity of women vis-à-vis India and South Africa. 
2 This chapter is like a miniature of this thesis. It substantially recaps chapters three and four of this thesis and connects them with 
chapter six. 
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of fundamental rights in its 1950 Constitution and more from its advanced law and 
policy framework, the creativity and activism of its Supreme Court. 
However, in the case of South Africa, the research observes that the core lessons on the 
globalization of women’s right to dignity lie more in the classical Bill of Rights in the 
South African Constitution as well as the independence and pragmatism of its 
Constitutional Court than on law and policy. 
Suffice to mention, as has been hereunder recommended too, that to bridge the gaps and 
reform the framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria and set 
the country on the path to a new agenda, Nigeria needs to reasonably combine the 
lessons (on law and policy as well as judicial creativity and activism from India) with 
the lessons (on constitutional advances and judicial pragmatism) from South Africa. 
 
5.2 Fundamental Constitutional Gaps in the Nigerian Framework  
It has been eloquently and correctly emphasised that:  
Although human rights issues have become a global subject with global 
relevance, States remain primarily responsible in international law for the 
promotion and protection of human rights. In recognition and 
acknowledgment of the mandate of States, Nigeria has erected enviable 
institutional infrastructure and provided a wide range of remedies judicial 
and extra-judicial – to redress human rights violations occurring in its 
territory. But the provision of remedies is one thing; their adequacy and 
efficacy are another matter entirely. It is regrettably true that judicial 
remedies in Nigeria are hamstrung by a number of factors.3  
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Dada, J. A. (2013). Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations in Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal. Journal of Law, Policy and 
Globalization 10: 1-18 at 1. 
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Some of these factors are hereunder highlighted. 
5.2.1 Non-Justiciability of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles 
In Nigeria, the courts insist that by the provisions of Section 6 (6) (c) of the 1999 
Constitution, socio-economic rights are negative rights pure and simple, and therefore 
are not enforceable by judicial adjudication because they are mere wishes or aspirations 
of government, that is, directive principles. To the contrary, the South African 
Constitution, these rights are contained in the Bill of Rights as positive rights and are 
enforceable as such. In India, though these rights are also prescribed as negative 
constitutional rights, but by the interpretative creativity and activism of the Indian 
Supreme Court, they have become transformed into implied positive rights and declared 
to be as justiciable as the right to life and personal liberty in Article 21. 
 
5.2.2 Non-compelling Application of International Law 
The Nigerian Constitution 1999 does not oblige courts to follow international law while 
interpreting fundamental rights in the Constitution. Consequently, important 
international instruments like the CEDAW, DEVAW and the Women Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa do 
not have compelling enforcement in Nigeria. This leaves a fundamental gap in the 
globalization and sustainability of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria.  It is therefore, 
most humbly contended that Nigerian judges should “think globally and act locally”4 by 
interpreting and applying the basic principles and guarantees provided in various 
international human rights instruments to domestic human rights litigations.  They 
should also be creative and active to “abandon their longstanding insularity and inertia 
                                                          
4 Udombana, N. J. (2005). Interpreting rights globally: Courts and constitutional rights in emerging democracies. African Human 
Rights Law Journal, 5(1), p. 47-69.  
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in matters of jurisprudential innovation and borrowing,”5 and instead draw upon 
international and comparative law to assert their institutional authority in the domestic 
forum.  
 
5.2.3 Limited Right of Access to Justice  
In comparison with South Africa and India, the right of access to justice for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights in Nigeria is limited. 
Under Section 46 of the Nigerian Constitution, such access lies only to the High Court 
of the state where the violation occurred. In whatever circumstance, there is no right of 
original access to the Supreme Court except on appeal. However, in South Africa, a 
person has a direct original access to the Constitutional Court (which is the highest 
court on constitutional matters in South Africa) for the enforcement of his rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Public Interest Litigation is also 
common in the country. 
In India, an aggrieved person may initiate a Writ Petition by himself or through Public 
Interest Litigation at the High Court or the Supreme Court of India. This right of access 
is further enhanced by the exemplary doctrine of epistolary jurisdiction of courts in 
India. These are great lessons which Nigeria may apply to expand access jurisdiction 
and enhance the constitutionality of women’s right to dignity and fundamental rights 
generally.   
 
 
 
                                                          
5 HK Prempeh 'A new jurisprudence for Africa' (1999) 10(3) Journal of Democracy 135 146. (Cited in Udombana, N. J. (2005). 
Interpreting rights globally: Courts and constitutional rights in emerging democracies. African Human Rights Law Journal, 5(1), p. 
47-69).  
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5.2.4 Inherent Lapses in the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 
2009 
The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009 is fraught with inherent 
inconsistencies which go to the root of its legality. 
Firstly, it extends the jurisdiction to hear fundamental rights applications to ‘the Federal 
High Court or the High Court of a State or the High Court of the Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja’ beyond the precise provision of Section 46 (1) of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution which empowers ‘a High court in that State’ to hear such applications. This 
inconsistency is pertinent in the light of Section 1 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution 
which provides that ‘this Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding 
force on the authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria.’6 It 
further states that ‘if any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be void.’7  
 
Secondly, certain pertinent provisions of the Rules are contained in the “Preamble” 
rather than as specific Order(s) or Rules(s) as is conventional with such Rules. 
Important issues like locus standi and Public Interest Litigations are contained in 
Preamble 1(e) thus:  
 
The Court shall encourage and welcome Public interest litigations in the 
human rights field and no human rights case may be dismissed or struck out 
for want of locus standi. In particular, human rights activists, advocates or 
groups as well as any non-governmental organisations, may institute human 
rights application on behalf of any potential applicant. In human rights 
litigation, the applicant may include any of the following:  
                                                          
6 Section 1(1). 
7 Section 1(3). 
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(i) Anyone acting in his own interest; 
(ii) Anyone acting on behalf of another person; 
(iii) Anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of a group or class 
of persons; 
(iv) Anyone acting in the public interest, and 
(v) Association acting in the interest of its members or other 
individuals or groups. 
 
The lacuna here is that “the nature of a preamble does not give assurance that the 
contents have much legal weight.”8  In the American case of Jacobson v Massachusetts9 
the court emphasised that the Preamble does not have any legal force, even in the 
Constitution because it merely introduces the document as a whole and does not, in and 
of itself, permit the exercise of any legal power whatsoever, and that any power 
exercisable under the Constitution must emanate from another part of the Constitution 
but definitely not the preamble.10  
This is without prejudice to paragraph 3(b) of the Preamble to the Fundamental Rights 
Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009 which mandates courts to “respect” municipal, 
regional and international bills of right brought to its attention or of which the court is 
aware.  
This thesis contends that the word “respect” is ambiguous and imposes no definite 
obligation on courts else, the imperative word “shall” would have been used instead. 
The statement is therefore a mere persuasion and not a directive or compulsion on 
Nigerian Courts to apply and enforce international human rights law, a provision which 
would have equally been void under the non-domestication provision in Section 12 of 
the Constitution. This thesis holds the view that Nigerian Courts can exhibit activism 
                                                          
8 Abiola Sanni “Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009 as a Tool for the Enforcement of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights in Nigeria: The need for Far-reaching Reform,” 11 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J. 511 2011, p.524.  
9 197 US 11 (1905), cited in Abiola Sanni, ibid. 
10 Abiola Sanni, op. cit at 528. 
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and cure this lacuna by giving effect to the Preambles of the Rules so that both public 
interest litigations and international law can be constitutionally enforceable.  
 
Thirdly, the 2009 Rules have failed to eliminate the threat of complexity in the 
commencement of an action that was the bane of the repealed 1979 Rules. By Order 
9(1), the  failure to comply with the provision as to place, time, form or manner in an 
application for the enforcement of fundamental rights shall be considered a mere 
“irregularity” which may not nullify the proceedings unless ‘it relates to the mode of 
commencement’ of the application. This is a fundamental affront on access jurisdiction 
bearing in mind, inter alia, that by the doctrine of epistolary jurisdiction in India, a 
court may even suo motu, take cognisance of a media report or ordinary letter as a 
proper writ petition. 
 
Fourthly, there is no right of access to the Supreme Court of Nigeria for the 
enforcement of fundamental rights, except on appeal, unlike the situation in India and 
South Africa. 
These fundamental gaps justifies the view that “Nigerian laws on protection of women’s 
rights have been criticized for lacking the willingness to promote women’s right as they 
are inadequate, misinterpreted and unenforceable.”11  
 
5.2.5 Absence of Specific Constitutional Rights Court 
Unlike the Supreme Court of India and the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria is by no means considered or listed as one of the activist 
tribunals or consequential courts in the Global South. It is also a fundamental lacuna in 
the protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria, that while the Indian Supreme  
                                                          
11 N. I. Aniekwu ‘Legalising Cairo: Prospects and Opportunities for Reproductive Rights in Nigeria’ (2006) 1 & 2 CODESRIA 
Bulletin 49 (quoted in  Uju Peace Okeke “A Case For The Enforcement of Women’s Rights As Human Rights in Nigeria”; The 
Women's UN Report Program & Network (WUNRN) http://www.wunrn.com (16/7/2014). 
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Court and the South African Constitutional Court exercise original jurisdiction on 
matters of fundamental/constitutional rights enforcement, the same cannot be said of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria which only exercises appellate powers in like circumstance.    
 
5.2.6 Weak Legal Aid Scheme  
Section 46 (4) (b) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution which deals with legal aid does not 
enshrine “legal aid” as a justiciable fundamental right. It merely empowers the National 
Assembly to make provisions for the rendering of financial assistance to any indigent 
citizen with a view to enabling him to engage the services of a legal practitioner. The 
Section therefore imposes no positive obligation of the state to provide legal aid but to 
render financial assistance with a view to enabling him provide for himself.   
By Section 9 of the Legal Aid Act, 12 only persons whose income do not exceed N1,500 
(equivalent of USD 7.5 or MYR 27) per annum shall be granted legal aid. But where the 
person’s annual income exceeds this amount, Section 9 (2)-(3) of the Legal Aid Act 
provides that he may obtain legal aid only if he is willing to contribute to the funding.   
This is certainly another legislative lacuna which is part of “the Nigerian factor” and 
which inhibits the sustainable protection of the right to dignity of women and 
fundamental rights generally.  
Again, the Legal Aid Act13 empowers the Legal Aid Council to render legal aid to 
“needy persons” with respect to charges under the Criminal Code or their equivalent 
under the Penal Code as well as civil claims in respect of accidents but certainly not 
with respect to cases for the enforcement of fundamental rights including the right to 
human dignity.  
                                                          
12 Legal Aid Act, Cap L9 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. 
13 See second Schedule to the Act. 
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In India, the right to free legal aid generally applies to an accused person in a criminal 
trial, as well as a petitioner seeking justice for the violation of her right to dignity or 
other fundamental rights under the broad interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution 
of India. In the case of  Khatri v. State of Bihar,14 the Indian Supreme Court held inter 
alia, that the due process application of Article 39A (the equivalent of Section 46(4)(b) 
of the Nigerian Constitution) creates a continuing right to legal aid which attaches to the 
accused person from the time of his first arraignment before a magistrate up till his final 
appeal at the Supreme Court, and that it also creates an unqualified constitutional 
obligation on the state to provide the legal aid irrespective of any real or imagined 
administrative or financial constraints.  
It is therefore without doubt that the current legal aid scheme in Nigeria is defective and 
the Indian example offers a sustainable and realistic example for reform. 
 
5.2.7. Constitutional Limitation of Rights 
The limitation of the right to life contained in Section 33(2) (a) (b) (c) of the 1999 
Constitution has been cited as ‘one of the greatest impediments to human rights 
protection in Nigeria,15 including of course, the right to dignity of women.  
The provision permits the derogation of the right to life if death occurs as a result of 
the use of force which is reasonably necessary “in such circumstances as are permitted 
by law,” or in the course of defending “any person from unlawful violence”, or in 
“defence of property,” or in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of 
a detainee or “for the purpose of suppressing a riot, insurrection or mutiny.” 
Consequently, in Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v. Emewulu 
                                                          
14 AIR 1981 SC 928. 
15 See also Dada, J. A. (2012). Impediments to Human Rights Protection in Nigeria. Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L., 18, 67-92 at 77.   
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& Anor16   the Supreme Court of Nigeria confirmed that all rights and freedoms are 
subject to limitations of overriding public interest or state policy. 
 
5.2.8 Absence of Constitutional Role for NGOs 
In the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, there is no provision for the participation of Human 
Rights Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and like institutions in monitoring the 
enforcement or monitoring of human rights, unlike in South Africa where Section 184 
(3) of its 1996 Constitution requires relevant state organs to furnish the South African 
Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) with “information on the measures they have 
taken towards the realization of the rights in the Bill of Rights.”  
In Nigeria, rather than acknowledge human rights NGOs and allied institutions as 
partners in progress, government sometimes seeks to control them, or otherwise, 
consider them as “enemy institutions” seeking to run down the existing political status 
quo.17 In spite of this, some women rights NGOs remain active in Nigeria. 
It must however be noted that in India, two celebrated landmark cases which 
necessitated the Vishaka Guidelines and the Rule in Sheela Barse18 and thus 
revolutionised the legal protection of women’s dignity were based on writ petitions filed 
by public interest litigants. 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 [2001] 3 S.C.N.J. 106. 
17 For instance, the Executive Secretary of the National Human Rights Commission was unceremoniously removed by government 
and Human rights NGOs and activists had to impress on government to abide by the Paris Principles of the United Nations which 
inter alia, guaranteed the independence of National Human Rights Commissions. See Ogunniran, I. (2010). Enforceability of Socio-
Economic Rights: Seeing Nigeria through the Eyes of Other Jurisdictions. Unizik Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence, 
1(September 2010), 73-87, at 87.  
18 The crux of the Vishaka Guidelines and the Rule in Sheela Barse have earlier been discussed in Chapter 4 (4.2.6 and 4.2.7 
respectively) of this thesis. 
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5.3 Fundamental Legislative and Policy Gaps in the Nigerian Framework  
5.3.1 Weak Commitment to International and Regional Human Rights Charter  
Nigeria has weak commitment to women-specific international human rights 
instruments. Regrettably, and with particular reference to the CEDAW, Nigeria’s 
permanent representative to the CEDAW committee has authoritatively stated that 
“Nigeria is notorious for violating international treaties”.19 The non-domestication of 
the CEDAW by the National Assembly leaves a gap in the legislative framework for 
protecting women against all forms of discrimination in Nigeria, as much as with the  
non-domestication of the African Union Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of 
Women in Africa (Women’s Protocol).  
 
 
5.3.2 Non-Implementation of the National Gender Policy 
The NGP is the core domestic policy instrument for realizing Nigeria’s commitments to 
the equality, empowerment, non-discrimination and elimination of violence against 
women under national, regional and international policy and treaty instruments, 
including CEDAW, the African Union Protocol to the Rights of Women in Africa, and 
the DEVAW. Its goal includes the promotion and protection of women’s human rights 
including their right to dignity and sexual independence. 
Yet, arising from a number of socio-political factors, especially the non-domestication 
of the CEDAW, the NGP which also aims to “reduce gender bias that arises from 
                                                          
19 Nwankwo, O. (2013). "Nigeria is notorious for violating international agreements."  Retrieved 28/3/2015, from Nigerian vanguard 
Newspaper 
http://www.google.com.my/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CFAQFjAI&url=http%3A%
2F%2Fwww.vanguardngr.com%2F2013%2F09%2Fnigeria-is-notorious-for-abandoning-international-treaties-oby-
nwankwo%2F&ei=R6sVVYwp0uW5BIPogcgO&usg=AFQjCNEkPTepEZDFt6QTb-oQenULvvzbUw&sig2=c7Edl-
BLkywEwqV0pmMfWQ&bvm=bv.89381419,d.c2E. (19/5/2015).     
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traditional cultural customs” as well as “the abolishment of traditional practices which 
are harmful to women,”20 can also not be implemented. 
 
5.3.3 Narrow Definition of Rape and Non-Criminalization of Marital Rape 
In Nigeria, marital or spousal rape does not fall within the definition of rape properly so 
called. Section 282(2) of the Nigerian Penal Code (applicable in Northern Nigeria) 
provides that sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife is not rape, if she has 
attained puberty while Section 6 of the Criminal Code (applicable in Southern Nigeria) 
states that unlawful carnal knowledge means carnal connection which takes place 
otherwise between husband and wife. 
 
This narrow definition of rape in the Nigeria’s criminal jurisprudence as an unlawful 
non-consenting sexual act against a woman, but for which her husband cannot be held 
liable leaves women at the receiving end of spousal rape and allied acts of domestic 
violence.21 This narrow definition has been identified as the main reason why the 
Nigerian Police often treat cases of intimate partner violence as a “domestic” or “family 
affair” which should be resolved at home and not by legal justice or police 
intervention22 Such patriarchal mind-set this is a mild way of empowering men to 
abuse, violate or rape their wives if need be, even though Intimate Partner Violence 
(IPV) is considered a terrible, most degrading and devastating form of domestic 
violence which violates a woman’s dignity which may lead to other breaches of her  
human rights.23 However, under most African cultural jurisprudence, a man cannot rape 
                                                          
20 See Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Public Policy Department, (March 2011). Country Gender Profile Nigeria: 
Final Report (pp. 10-13), especially the Summary at pp. iv-v. 
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/thematic_issues/gender/background/pdf/e10nig.pdf (14/5/2015).  
21 Reports abound of many battered women have said that their husbands demanded sex directly following a beating, regardless of 
the wife’s wishes or emotional or physical state. When a woman consents to sex out of fear or coercion, it is rape, and the 
perpetrator should not be allowed to get away with the offence by the mere fact that he is married to the survivor/; see Center for 
Research on Partner Violence. www.welleslev.edu   
22 Ozo-Eson, P. I. (2008). "Law, Women and Health in Nigeria." Journal of International Women’s Studies 9(3), p.295. 
23 Ambily, P. (2014). Evaluating the Criminal Justice Interventions for ‘Intimate Partner Violence ’in India: The Need for a 
Paradigm Shift. SPCERA International Journal of Law and Governance, (SPCERA IJLG), 3(6), 32-42. doi: 
http://spcera.in/pdf/4Amly-Criminal%20-justice%20and%20interventions-%20Ambily.pdf  
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his wife because the sexual satisfaction of the man is considered a permanent and 
unquestionable obligation of the woman. 
 
5.3.4 Onerous Burden of Proof of Sexual Offenses 
Section 221 of the Nigerian Criminal Code is on the defilement of girls below 16 years. 
It stipulates that a person cannot be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of one 
witness, of the offence of unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl who is above thirteen 
years but below sixteen; or of attempt or unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl or woman 
who is an imbecile, idiot or like disability. This is a laughable patriarchal provision 
which is manifestly anti-women and calls for immediate reform. According to one 
writer, ’interestingly, sexual predators don’t invite people to come and watch their 
crime. How can this offense be proved then?’24 
It must be mentioned that some Nigerian judges differ on this issue of corroboration. In 
a 1951 judgment, Adetokunbo Ademola, J. (as he then was) stated the position of the 
law in Nigeria thus: “it is not a rule of law in Nigeria that in sexual offences offenses 
accused person should not be convicted on the uncorroborated evidence of a 
prosecutrix, that the court may after paying attention to the warning nevertheless 
convict if they are satisfied of the truth.25 Later in the 1965 case of Ukut v. State,26  the 
court held that in sexual offences including rape, the judge should beware of convicting 
an accused without corroboration. Yet in the 1968 case of State v. Ogiondiegion27 the 
court stated that the requirement of corroboration of evidence of the prosecutrix is not 
required but that the judge must warn himself on the risk of convicting of such evidence 
alone. 
                                                          
24See “How Nigeria legalizes discrimination against women”, By Aminu Hassan Gamawa, Premium Times Newspaper Online of 28 
July, 2013. http://www.premiumtimesng.com/opinion/141797-how-nigeria-legalizes-discrimination-against-women-by-aminu-
hassan-gamawa.html (26/5/2015). 
25 Simon v. Police (1951) WLNLR 23 
26 (1965) 1 NRNLR 306 
27 (1968) 1 NMLR 117 
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5.3.5 Justification of Wife ‘beating’ under the Penal Code 
Section 55 (1) (d) of Nigeria’s  Penal Code28  (applicable to Northern Nigeria) permits a 
husband to beat his wife, if that is what it will take to correct her mistakes.  
The said Section provides thus:  
Section 55: Correction of Child, Pupil, Servant or Wife  
(1) Nothing is an offence which does not amount to the infliction of 
grievous hurt upon any persons which is done: 
(a) by a parent or guardian for the purpose of correcting his child or ward.  
(b) by a schoolmaster for the purpose of correcting a child. 
(c) by a master for the purpose of correcting his servant or apprentice.  
(d) by a husband for the purpose of correcting his wife, such husband and 
wife being subject to any native law or custom in which such correction is 
recognized as lawful. 
 
Suffice to say that an assault by a man on a woman is not an offense if they are married, 
if native law or custom recognizes such “correction” as lawful, and if there is no 
grievous hurt.29 This is a manifest endorsement of violation of a wife’s right to dignity 
especially in a patriarchal country where there is no national legislation on domestic 
violence, where international instruments like  CEDAW and the African Women 
Protocol are not neither domesticated nor enforceable and where also, the National 
Gender Policy is not implementable, albeit it seeks inter alia, to eliminate cultural/ 
religions gender-based biases as well as other harmful religious and socio-cultural 
practices which rise to inequalities in gender-role relations in the Nigerian society.30   
The title, “Correction of Child, Pupil, Servant or Wife” in Section 55 of the Nigerian 
Penal Code, is humiliating enough because it does not recognize the wife’s right to 
dignity or equality but rather places her at par with children, pupils and servants. 
                                                          
28 Cap 89 Laws of Northern Nigeria 1963. 
29 EQUALITY NOW: http://www.equalitynow.org/the_penal_code_of_northern_nigeria (26/5/2015). 
30 The Nigeria CEDAW NGO Coalition report (2008). 
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5.3.6 Denial of Women’s Right to Inheritance under Customary Law 
Nigerian wives and daughters do not have a right of inheritance to the estate of their 
deceased husbands and fathers under customary law, especially in South East Nigeria. 
In Yoruba-land, South West Nigeria, wives have no right of inheritance to their 
deceased husbands’ estate but daughters do inherit equally with their brothers.31  
In Islamic law, wives and daughter can inherit even though the daughters inherit only 
half of what is due to the sons.32  
 
5.3.7 Absence of National Legislation on Domestic Violence  
Reports show that one third of Nigerian women have been victims of at least one form 
domestic violence including verbal abuse, battering, marital rape or psychological and 
emotional abuse.33 Anyogu, and Arinze-Umobi34 rightly described ‘domestic violence’ 
as “a luxuriating iniquity against the Nigerian women.” Flagrant indignity, disrespect 
and disregard for women's human rights in Nigeria are often fuelled by society's blind 
acceptance of certain cultural practices which dehumanize, humiliate and constitute or 
condone violence against women.  
 
Despite the staggering reality of acts of violence against women in Nigeria, available 
data on the subject is 'notoriously' unreliable and regrettably, there is still no national 
legislation against this vice in Nigeria as repeated attempts aimed at criminalizing acts 
which constitute domestic violence against women have proved abortive.35  
 
 
                                                          
31 F. Anyogu, Access to Justice in Nigeria; A gender Perspective Enugu, Ebenezer Productions Nigeria Ltd 2009 p.319. 
32 Anyogu, F., & Arinze-Umobi, C. (2011). The Globalized World and Gender Rights in Nigeria: The Gains, the Losses. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe University Journal of International Law and Jurisprudence, 2 at 152. 
33 UNDP Nigeria/UN Gender Theme Group Nigeria (2013) Gender Briefing Kit, p. 24, 
http://www.ng.undp.org/content/dam/nigeria/docs/IclusiveGrwth/UNDP_NG_inclusiveGrwth_Gender-Briefing-Kit230513.pdf 
(15/5/2015). 
34 Op.cit. 
35 UNDP Nigeria/UN Gender Theme Group Nigeria (2013) Gender Briefing Kit, p. 24, op. cit. 
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5.3.8 Contradictory Definition of “a Child” in the New Sexual Offences Bill, 2015 
On Wednesday 3 June 2015, only three days to the end of its four year legislative life, 
the 7th Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria passed 46 Bills in 10 minutes including 
the Sexual Offences Bill (SB. 279). Media reports tell that these bills have been pending 
four years.36 One of the most remarkable features of the Bill is that it prescribes life 
imprisonment for rapists and those who “have sexual intercourse with children below 
11 years of age.”  
This provision of “sexual intercourse with children below 11 years,” invariably means 
that the Act has redefined the minimum the legal age of “a child” in Nigeria to 11 years. 
Consequently, the new Bill clearly varies with and contradicts the definition of a child 
under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child and the Child Rights Act, 2003 all of which define a child as a 
person below 18 years of age. This is a calamitous lacuna in the document and we wait 
to see the ultimate fate of the Bill since it has neither been passed by the Federal House 
of Representatives nor signed into law by the President of Nigeria. 
 
 
5.4 Fundamental Judicial Gaps in the Nigerian Framework 
In the words of Justice Chukwudifu Oputa, “All citizens of our country have a right to 
have their substantive legal and Constitutional rights recognized and transformed into 
actual judicial remedies without which their theoretical constitutional fundamental 
rights would be seriously diminished or else denuded of any real value.”37  
 
5.4.1 Judicial Attitude to Locus Standi and Stare Decisis 
Nigerian courts still exhibit and apply a conservative and narrow definition and 
approach to locus standi and stare decisis, especially in matters relating to the 
                                                          
36 The Guardian Newspaper Online, 4 June 2015. http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/06/senate-dumps-own-rules-passes-46-
bills-in-10-mins/ (5/6/2015). 
37 C. A. Oputa, Human Rights in the Political and Legal Culture of Nigeria, Lagos Nigerian Law publications, 1989 at 73. 
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enforcement of fundamental rights. It is with respect to such cases that Udombana 
posited that African judges should devote themselves towards the end of justice “rather 
than being defenders of the status quo” especially now that dictatorships and 
authoritarian regimes are being replaced by popular regimes thereby affording the 
“golden opportunities to develop constitutionalism, by enforcing limitations on the 
exercise of governmental power, exercising their powers of judicial review to advance 
and deepen the transition to constitutional democracy, and, above all, protecting human 
rights through comparative constitutionalism.”38 
It is therefore a judicial lacuna that most Nigerian courts are yet to “think globally” by 
consistently interpreting and applying crucial doctrines like locus standi and stare 
decisis in such manner as would defeat the ultimate essence of the law, which is the 
welfare of society.39  
This lacuna becomes more pressing when one realises that lower courts are meant to 
follow the decisions of higher courts when faced with similar facts. For instance, the 
current situation in Nigeria is that both the narrow approach to locus standi (Adesanya 
v. The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria40 and Olawoyin v. Attorney-General 
of Northern Nigeria41) exists and applies alongside the liberal approach (Fawehinmi v. 
Akilu & Anor.42) thereby creating inconsistent and conflicting “locus classicus” on the 
same subject. This gives the lower courts the discretion to pick and choose the desirable 
stare decisis, thereby threatening the sustainable enforcement of women’s right to 
dignity. 
 
                                                          
38 Udombana, N. J. (2005). Interpreting rights globally: Courts and constitutional rights in emerging democracies. African Human 
Rights Law Journal, 5(1), p. 47-69, at 68. 
39 Ibid at 55. 
40 (1981) All NLR 1 SC 
41 (1961) 2 SCNLR 5. This restrictive application of locus standi has been followed in several other cases including Thomas v. 
Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR Part 18, p.669 SC; Chuba Egolum v. Olusegun Obasanjo (1999) 7 NWLR Part 611, p. 355; Keyamo v. 
Lagos State House of Assembly (2000) 12 NWLR Part 680, p.196 CA; Fawehinmi v. Inspector General of Police (2002) 7 NWLR 
Part 767, p.606 SC. But this is not so with the application of Public Interest Litigation/Class Action Litigations in South Africa and 
India as well as the doctrine of epistolary jurisdiction of courts in India.  
42 (1987) 1 NWLR Part 67, p.797 SC. 
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5.4.2 Attitude to the Non-Judicialization of Socio-Economic Rights  
The apparent lack of courage and activism by Nigeria courts, unlike their Indian 
counterparts, to judicialize socio-economic rights, despite constitutional non-
justiciability of same under Section 6(6) (c) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, remains 
a challenge to the protection of women’s right to dignity and fundamental rights 
generally, in the country “Non-justiciability” of socio-economic rights is a lacuna in the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 while “non-judicialization” refers 
to the inability of Courts to assume jurisdiction in the justiciability of those rights. 43  
 
5.5 Advances in the Legal Framework for the Protection of the Right to Dignity of 
Women in India and South Africa: Lessons for Nigeria      
 
5.5.1 Lessons from the Advances in India  
 
The Supreme Court of India is arguably one of the most powerful Constitutional Courts 
in the world because it plays an active and decisive role in the socio-political 
governance of the polity, and in some cases has virtually taken over functions that were 
ordinarily reserved for the Parliament and the Executive.44   
The interplay of constitutional guarantees, judicial attitude and activism in the 
protection of women’s right to dignity, equality and freedom from violations in India, is 
manifest in specific areas including: broad definition of the right to life and personal 
liberty in Article 21, elaborate definition of bonded labour, inclusive interpretation and 
implied application of the Directive Principles of State Policy; the “Due Process” Rule 
                                                          
43 This thesis has discussed the non-justiciability of socio-economic rights in the Nigerian Constitution, 1999 in 5.2.1 above. The 
instant discussion however, is with respect to the inability or failure of Nigerian Courts, unlike the Indian Courts, to exhibit 
creativity and activism to circumvent the constitutional provision on non-justiciability. In the South African Constitution, these 
rights are justiciable positive rights in the Bill of Rights. But under the Indian Constitution which share the character of non-
justiciability with Nigeria, the courts have applied their courage and activism to judicialize these rights and make them as justiciable 
as the fundamental rights. 
44 Manoj Mate, “Public Interest Litigation and the Transformation of the Supreme Court of India” in Chapter 10, Diana 
Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A. Kagan (ed.) Consequential Courts: Judicial Roles in Global Perspective, 2013 
Cambridge University Press, USA., p.262. 
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of Just, Reasonable and Fair interpretation of fundamental rights in the Constitution; 
new concept of Legal Aid; Public Interest Litigations (PIL)/ Class Action Litigations 
(CAL); the Epistolary Jurisdiction dictum; the Vishaka Guidelines against Sexual 
Harassment at Workplace, the Rule in Sheela Barse for the protection of the dignity of 
women in custody and the introduction of a special “Social Justice Bench” at the 
Supreme Court for hearing matters relating to women and children. 
Emphatically, India’s advance in the protection of women’s right to dignity lie more in 
the independence, innovations and interpretative activism of the Indian judiciary, 
especially the likes of Justice J. S. Verma, Justice Krishna and Justice P.N. Bhagwati 
(former Chief Justice of India). Thus, even where legislation are weak or non-existent 
on a subject of women’s dignity, the Supreme Court has been proactive enough to make 
binding judicial guidelines pending the enactment of legislation.45  
On this note therefore, Nigeria stands to learn many important lessons on Constitutional 
guarantees, judicial creativity and activism, among others, for the protection of 
women’s right to dignity from India. Some of these lessons are hereunder discussed: 
 
 
5.5.1.1 Judicial Creativity and Activism in the Interpretation of Constitutional 
Rights 
One of the foremost lessons which Nigeria stands to learn from India is in the latitudinal 
interpretation of constitutional provisions on fundamental rights which makes it 
possible to give the broadest, most protective and accommodating (direct and implied) 
definitions in order to secure those rights. Some of these include the following: 
 
                                                          
45 See Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (supra) and Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra (supra). See also Maja Daruwala (ed). (2005) 
“Human Rights and Policing: Landmark Supreme Court Directives and National Human Rights Commission Guidelines.” CHRI, 
New Delhi, Biennial Report on Human Rights Issues to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meet, CHOGM) p. 20-21. 
http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/hrc/humanrights_policing.pdf. 
   284 
(a) Broad Interpretation of the Right to Life in Article 21  
The Constitution of India guarantees women’s right to dignity, equality before the law, 
freedom from discrimination and the right to life and personal liberty. 
By Article 14, “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the 
equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”  
Article 15 prohibits discrimination on many grounds including caste and sex while 
Article 19 guarantees the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the 
law. The omnibus Article 21 provides that “No person shall be deprived of his life or 
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”46  
 
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,47 Bhagwati, J (as he then was) interpreted the 
phrase, procedure established by law in Article 21 to mean a procedure which is 
reasonable, fair and just, (and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive) and that the 
expression personal liberty is of the “widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights 
which go to constitute the personal liberty of man.” Accordingly, any law seeking to 
interfere with personal liberty must satisfy three conditions: First, it must prescribe a 
procedure. Second, the procedure must not be in violation of such rights as freedom of 
speech, religious worship, association, peaceful assembly and movement conferred by 
Article 19 and thirdly, it must not derogate from the right to equality and equal 
protection of the law in Article 14, else it would be a null procedure within the meaning 
of Article 21.48 
 
The Supreme Court has also emphasised that the guarantee of right to life in Article 21 
is not limited to physical existence or to the use of any faculty or limbs but also includes 
the right to live with basic human dignity and “all the bare necessities of life” and that 
                                                          
46 Bold for emphasis 
47 (1978) 1 SCC 248. 
48 Also in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 802, the Supreme Court described Article 21 as the heart or nucleus 
of the fundamental rights, that is, “[T]he minimum conditions which must exist in order to enable a person to live with human 
dignity.” 
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no procedure can ever be regarded as reasonable, fair and just which seeks to deprive 
them.49    
This presupposes that the cultural exploitation and violation of a woman’s dignity 
(including marital rape) ceases to be a domestic or family affair because the right to 
dignity is as sacrosanct as the right to life in India.50 By innovative judicial 
interpretation, the word “person” used in Article 21 has even been applied to protect the 
dignity of foreign women in India. Thus, in Chairman, Railway Board v. Mr. 
Chandrama Das,51 the Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the Kolkata High Court that 
a Bangladeshi woman gang-raped by some railway workers in India was entitled to 
damages for the gross violation of her right to life protected by Article 21.  
To further underscore the essence of dignity, the Indian Supreme Court queried itself 
thus: “If dignity or honour vanishes what remains of life?” 52 
This thesis humbly contends that defining the right to dignity as an addendum to Article 
21 and the fine-tuning the non-justiciability proviso in Article 37 to make the inchoate 
rights listed in the directive principles of state policy enforceable by implication offer 
good reasons why the Indian judicial approach is hereby recommended for other 
ASEAN and developing countries where protections may be weak.  
 
(b) The Just, Reasonable and Fair Interpretation of “State” and “Bonded Labour.” 
To further protect women’s right to dignity, among others, Justice Bhagwati’s rule of 
just, reasonable and fair interpretation of fundamental rights and directive principles of 
state policy also earned liberal interpretation for such concepts as “state” and “bonded 
labour.”  
                                                          
49 Frances Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors, AIR 1981 SC 746. 
50 In State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh AIR 2004 SC 1290, the Supreme Court observed that rape, marital or otherwise, was a gross 
violation of the right to life was therefore to be dealt with decisively and sternly. See also Shri Bodhisattwa Guatam v. Ms. Subhra 
Chakraborty AIR 1996 SC 922; 1996 1 SCC 490 where the Supreme Court held that that women have a right to liberty and a right 
to be respected, lead an honourable and peaceful life and be treated as equal citizens, and that rape is a crime against society and not 
the woman-victim per se, even though it destroys her own personal psychology and deep emotions. 
51 Chairman, Railway Board v. Mr. Chandrama Das, AIR 2000 988. 
52 Khedat Majdoor Chetna Sanghat v. State of M.P. (1994) 6 SCC 260: AIR 1995 SC 31 
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According to Khan, bonded labour is synonymous with modern day slavery, and exists 
in several aliases including unlawful compulsory labour, begar, forced labour or traffic 
in human beings. He described it as a form of forced labour whereby a person is 
compelled to work without remuneration or for grossly inadequate remuneration, or 
where a person is bound to serve his master for an unreasonably low wage for a fixed or 
indefinite term or by an agreement for extra work which is prejudicial to the worker, or 
when a custom requires householders in a village to offer free labour to the village 
head.53  
By whatever nomenclature, all forms of forced/bonded labour violate the right to life 
and are thus, prohibited by Article 23(1) of the Indian Constitution as a blanket 
protection for the dignity of women against every exploitative labour and trafficking for 
sexual or other illicit purposes.54  
 
This broad definition of forced/bonded was applied to redress the indignity of women 
working in exploitative and demeaning conditions in Tamil Nadu garment factories.55   
The Court also defined “state” to include all agents of state including administrative 
officers, ministers and even police officers. This is to ensure that government is held 
vicariously liable for any breach of a woman’s right to dignity by public officers 
including the police. This activist definition is also common with the South African 
judiciary. 56 
 
 
 
                                                          
53 S.L.A. Khan op.cit Chapter 6, p. 96-97. 
54  Peoples’ Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 1473; (1982) 3 SCC 235. 
55  “Maid in India: Young Dalit Women Continue to Suffer Exploitative Conditions in India’s Garment Industry,” April 2012 Joint 
report of findings on the labour conditions in the South Indian garment and textile industry. http://somo.nl/publications-
en/Publication_3783. (14/4/2013); See also the earlier report, ‘Captured by Cotton – Exploited Dalit Girls Produce Garments in 
India for European and US Markets’, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, May 2011, http://somo.nl/publications-en/Publication_3673, 
(14/4/2013). 
56 See The “F” Case:  F (Applicant) v Minister of Safety and Security & 5Ors, CCT 30/11 [2011] ZACC 37 and Carmichele v. The 
Minister of Safety and Security & The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development CCT48/00 [2001] (4) SA938 (CC) 
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(c) Inclusive Interpretation and Implied Justiciability of the Directive Principles of 
State Policy  
 
Part IV (Articles 36 to 51) of the Constitution of India contains the directive principles 
of state policy which Article 37 declares non-justiciable thus:  
 
The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, 
but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the 
governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these 
principles in making laws. 
 
The directive principles in Articles 46, 51 (c) and 51A (e) are remarkable. Article 46 
provides for the promotion of education and economic interests of vulnerable persons as 
well as protection against social injustice and all forms of exploitation. Article 51 (c) 
enjoins the state to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in relation 
to its people while Article 51(A) (e) specifically oblige every citizen of India to 
“renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women.”57   
In his article, “Article 21 of the Constitution of India,” Justice N.K Jain58 noted that 
Article 21 has nearly become a residuary right under which many of the non-justiciable 
directive principles are implied and enforced as fundamental rights to such extent that it 
not only casts a negative duty upon the State not to interfere with life and liberty of 
individuals but also imposes a positive obligation on the State to ensure that people 
enjoy these rights with dignity. This judicial ingenuity constitutes the bedrock for the 
promotion and protection of women’s right to dignity and fundamental freedoms in 
                                                          
57  The Supreme Court relied inter alia, on Section 51A (a) and (e) in giving the judgement leading to the formulation of the Vishaka 
Guidelines. 
58  Justice N.K Jain (2006), “Article 21 of the Constitution of India,” Legal literacy & Awareness Series 7 5/2006 
http://rshrc.nic.in/07%20Human%20Right%20Article-21.pdf p.5 (28/10/2013). 
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India and creates new models for the fulfilment of the constitutional aspirations of other 
vulnerable persons59 thus leaving the Indian society indebted to their Apex court.60 
 
 
5.5.1.2 Judicial Creativity and Activism in Making Quasi-Legislation: Formulating 
Guidelines and Issuing General Directions for the Protection of the Sexual Dignity 
of Women 
 
Generally, and by the obvious democratic principles of separation of powers, it is the 
function of the legislature to make laws and that of the judiciary to interpret the law. 
Article 32 of the Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court to grant relief to an 
aggrieved applicant on the infringement of her fundamental right while Article 142 
empowers the Court to make such order “as is necessary for doing complete justice in 
any cause or matter pending before it.” Ostensibly, this does not impose upon the 
Supreme Court a legislative power to make laws.  
However, in two prominent cases, and consequent upon its legendary creativity and 
activism, the Supreme Court of India had interpreted and invoked these provisions “for 
a much wider purpose”61 by making quasi legislation and issuing general guidelines 
which had the effect of law and applied as such in the absence of “proper” law made by 
the legislature.  
 
Firstly, in Vishaka & Ors v. State of Rajasthan, 62 a female social worker was gang 
raped at her workplace in Rajasthan, at a time when such rapes were becoming 
commonplace in India and there was no criminal legislation on the subject. However, 
while the criminal trial was pending in court, certain social activists and NGOs filed a 
writ Petition as class action litigation under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, to gain 
                                                          
59  Bhagwati, P N (1987), ‘Social Action Litigation: The Indian Experience’, in Trivetelram and Coomaraswany (eds.), The 
Judiciary in Plural Societies, p.20. 
60 Justice N.K. Jain, ibid at 25. 
61 Jain, M. P. (2003). INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (WITH CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS). New Delhi, India, 
Wadhwa & Company Nagpur, pp. 1549-1551. The Vishaka guidelines have now been promulgated into “The Sexual Harassment of 
Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act and Rules 2013. 
62  JT 1997 (7) SC 384); AIR 1997 SC 3011.  
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public condemnation of the menace and obtain appropriate remedy through judicial 
process for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of working women.63 
Although there was no criminal legislation on the subject, the Supreme Court of India, 
popular for its independence, creativity and activism, held that even though it is not the 
constitutional role of the judiciary to make laws, nonetheless, that it was the 
consequential obligation of the Supreme Court to undertake the social function as law 
giver, when there is no law. Accordingly, the court formulated the Vishaka guidelines 
which applied as “the binding legislation” for the protection of women against sexual 
violation at their workplaces pending the making of a proper “legislative” law on the 
subject.64 The Court observed that where there is no legislation, it is the duty of the 
executive to fill the vacuum by executive orders but that where they fail to act, the 
judiciary would be constitutionally bound to step in to rescue the situation pending the 
enactment of proper legislation. 
Realising that positivists would accuse the court of having usurped the constitutional 
law making powers of the legislature, the Supreme Court explained that it drew inherent 
powers from two provisions of the CEDAW namely Article 11 which enjoin State 
Parties to take all appropriate steps to ensure equality at work, safe working conditions 
and eliminate discrimination against women in the workplace and Article 24 which 
enjoin State Parties to apply all necessary measures at the national level to ensure the 
full realization of the rights recognised in the CEDAW.  
The court further stated that:  
 Gender equality includes protection from sexual harassment and right to 
work with dignity, which is a universally recognised basic human right… 
International Conventions and norms are, therefore, of great significance in 
                                                          
63 Their petition hinged on Articles 14 [right to gender equality], 19(1) (g) [right to practise any profession, or to carry on any 
occupation, trade or business] and 21 [right to life and personal liberty] of the Constitution. 
64  The Vishaka guidelines have now been replaced by the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and 
Redressal) Bill, 2013, which was signed into law by the Indian president on April 22, 2013. 
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the formulation of the guidelines to achieve this purpose. The obligation of 
this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of these 
fundamental rights in the absence of legislation must be viewed 
[accordingly]. 
 
This is an ingenious and commendable judicial way to fill a legislative lacuna in 
municipal law, and thus represents a reasonable lesson for Nigeria, where the Supreme 
Court insists that international human rights instrument like the CEDAW cannot be 
enforced in Nigeria unless domesticated into municipal law under Section 12 of the 
Nigerian Constitution.  
 
Secondly, and as explained earlier in Chapter 4 (4.3.7) of this thesis, the Supreme Court 
of India, in the celebrated Sheela Barse v. Union of India,65 also manifested its 
innovativeness, creativity and activism, when it formulated guidelines, based on a class 
action litigation filed to protect the sexual rights and dignity of women in custody and 
various police lock-ups and detention centres in India,66 at a time when no legislation 
existed on the subject. Those guidelines or Directives became known as the Rule in 
Sheela Barse. Details of these Rules are elaborated in Chapter 4 (4.3.7) of this thesis, 
however, they generally provide “legisprudential” jurisprudence for ensuring the 
protection of the dignity, physical safety, sexual safety and privacy of women and girls 
held in custody. It also directed that female judicial officers should regularly supervise 
compliance with these Rules. The Rules also permit courts to order that rehabilitation or 
other special assistance be provided to female inmates in appropriate cases.  
                                                          
65 AIR 1987 (1) 153. 
66    Ram Kumar v. S H Pradesh AIR 1995 SC 1995; P Rathinam v. S of Gujarat (1993) 2 Scale 631. 
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Roznai describes this ingenious exercise of legislative “law-making” function by courts 
as Legisprudence.67 This thesis submits therefore, that these rules, if applied strictly and 
reasonably in Nigeria, will bridge any existing lacuna with respect to the right to dignity 
of women in police lock-up and the prisons.                           
 
5.5.1.3 Innovation in the Right of Access to Justice for Writ Petitions  
With regards to free access to justice for the enforcement of fundamental rights, Nigeria 
stands to learn many valuable lessons from India’s broad and liberal access to justice for 
the enforcement of fundamental rights petitions (known as writ petitions in India). Some 
of these concepts include:  
        
(a) Public Interest Litigation (PIL)68  
The Indian Constitution confers jurisdiction to hear and enforce petitions on 
fundamental rights brought directly before the Supreme Court vide Article 32 and the 
state High Courts vide Article 226. Ordinarily, such petition must derive from a breach 
or a threat to breach the petitioner’s own rights guaranteed in the Constitution which 
establishes his own sufficient legal capacity under the doctrine of locus standi. This is 
the elementary and archaic recognition of private interest litigation,69 which precludes 
one from lawfully litigating the breach or threat to breach the constitutional right of 
another. This rule however, does not apply to an application for Quo warranto or 
habeas corpus70.  
                                                          
67 Roznai, Y. (2014).Legisprudence Limitations on Constitutional Amendments? Reflections on The Czech Constitutional Court's 
Declaration of Unconstitutional Constitutional Act (April 10, 2014), 8(1), 29-57. 
68  Also to be read and understood in the same manner as Class Interest Litigation (or Class action Litigation) when the writ petition 
or letter is instituted on behalf of a given class or group of persons, as were seen in the Supreme Court cases leading to the Vishaka 
Guidelines and the Rule in Sheela Barse.  
69 In Janatan Dal v. H.S. Chowdhry [AIR 1993 SC 392] the Supreme Court differentiating Private interest Litigation from Public 
Interest Litigation thus: “In a private action, the litigation is bipolar: two opposed parties are locked in a confrontational controversy 
which pertains to the determination of the legal consequences of past events unlike in public action. In contrast, the strict rule of 
locus standi applicable to private litigation is relaxed in public interest litigation (PIL) and a broad rule is evolved which gives the 
right of locus standi to any member of the public acting bona fide… the dominant object of PIL is to ensure observance of the 
provisions of the Constitution or the cause of community or disadvantaged groups and individuals or public interest…” 
70 Habeas corpus means “produce body” and naturally, it can only be applied by one on behalf of the prisoner. 
   292 
The introduction and development of public interest litigation (PIL)/class action 
litigation (CAL) as the strategic arm of the legal aid movement in India fine-tuned locus 
standi such that “any member of the public or social action group acting bona fide” can 
invoke the Writ Jurisdiction of the High Courts or the Supreme Court seeking to redress 
the violation of the legal or constitutional rights of other persons who cannot approach 
the court by themselves due to social, economic or other disability.71   PIL thus became 
a potent weapon for the enforcement of “public duties” by third parties in all cases 
where the interests of general public or a section of the public are at stake. This 
innovation thus institutionalized access to justice as well as judicial remedies, as sine 
quo non for the protection of women’s right to dignity in India.72  
Chinese scholar, Li Li,73 acknowledges that the level of judicial activism common in 
India is rare in Asia.74 This thesis hereby recommends this unique activism to other 
countries in Asia and beyond. 
 
(b) The Dictum of Epistolary Jurisdiction of Courts   
The epistolary jurisdiction dictum is the judicial over-stretch of public interest 
litigation.75 It is a liberalized mode of access to justice formulated by the Indian 
Supreme Court under Justice Bhagwati to ease the process by which a litigant third 
party, indigent or not,  may institute action for the breach of his or other person’s 
fundamental right.  
 
The Epistolary jurisdiction dictum is an access jurisprudence whereby a mere personal 
letter addressed to a judge personally or to a court in India is received, treated and heard 
as a formal and proper writ petition as was the case in Mrs. Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar 
                                                          
71 S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149, Per Justice Bhagwati. 
72 Khan op.cit at 179, expressed the opinion that with public interest litigation, “…the large masses of people belonging to the 
deprived and exploited sections of humanity [including women] may be able to realize and enjoy socio-economic rights granted to 
them and these rights may become meaningful for them instead of remaining mere empty hopes.” 
73 Li Li (2013) “Judicial Strategies in Chinese Group Action Cases: A Realistic Reaction to Judicialisation” Hong Kong Journal of 
Law, HKJL, Vol. 43 Part 1 of 2013 P. 317-348 at 317. 
74 See also Guobin Zhu (2013) “Weak Courts, Weak Rights: Assessing the Realisation of Constitutional Rights in PRC Courts” 
Hong Kong Journal of Law, HKJL, Vol. 43, Part 2 of 2013, Pg 713-744 at 713. 
75 The Encarta Dictionary defines Epistolary as “associated with correspondence by letter” and “in the form of a letter or letters.”  
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& Ors76 where personal letters written to Justice Bhagwati by an NGO were suo motu 
accepted as writ petitions for the enforcement of constitutional rights of certain detained 
prisoners.  
This protection also avail women for breach of their right to dignity77 and was more 
recently, in the case of “In Re: Indian Woman Says gang raped on orders of village 
court published in Business & Financial News dated 23.01.2014”78 where the Indian 
Supreme Court, on January 24, 2014 took suo motu notice of the media outrage 
following a report that 13 men in West Bengal, gang-raped a 20-year old tribal woman 
on the orders of village elders, as punishment for having a relationship with a man from 
a different caste. The Supreme Court later in its judgement, per Chief Justice P. 
Sathasivam, ordered the West Bengal Government to pay exemplary financial 
compensation to the rape survivor for its failure to adequately protect her “fundamental 
rights.” 
This thesis considers the epistolary jurisdiction dictum as one of the most advanced and 
liberal forms of access jurisdiction in the world and justifies the assertion that the Indian 
legal framework for the protection of women’s dignity is “by no means less than those 
of other activist judicial systems in other parts of the world.”79 This is therefore a most 
valuable lesson for Nigeria. 
 
(c) The Doctrine of Curative Petition Further to Article 137 of the Constitution 
Generally, in most world jurisdictions, the judgement of the Supreme Court (or by 
whatever nomenclature the highest court in the land is described) is final and not subject 
to review.  In India Article 137 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court “to 
review any judgment pronounced or order made by it.” Ordinarily, beyond this point, 
there should be no further appeal or review.  
                                                          
76  AIR 1983 SC 339. The Order of this Court is also available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1928844/ (8/11/2013). 
77 See Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461.   
78 Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 24 of 2014, [Decided 28 March, 2014].  
79 Janatan Dal v H.S. Chowdry, AIR 1993 SC 892 
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By judicial creativity and activism, the Supreme Court of India developed the Doctrine 
of Curative Petition whereby the final judgement of the Supreme Court can yet be 
appealed against, having first been reviewed under Article 137. This doctrine allows a 
second review. By the doctrine, an aggrieved applicant of a miscarriage of justice may 
appeal to the Supreme Court against itself. Thus, in the far-reaching consequential 
Indian case of Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra80, a five- judge Constitution bench of 
the Supreme Court held unanimously that in order to rectify gross miscarriage of justice 
in its final judgement which cannot be challenged, the court will allow curative petition 
by the victim of miscarriage of justice to seek a second review of the final order of the 
Court. The Court further observed that “though the judges of the highest court do their 
best subject to the limitation of human fallibility yet situations may arise, in the rarest of 
rare cases, which would require reconsideration of a final judgement to set right 
miscarriage of justice.”  
The court also affirmed that in such circumstance, it would be morally and legally 
bound to rectify error in such a decision that otherwise would remain in the cloud of 
uncertainty. This judgement put to rest the oft vexed issue of how or whether a 
petitioner could question a final judgement even after the dismissal of the review 
petition.  
The researcher opines that in formulating the doctrine of curative petition, the Indian 
Supreme Court thereby strengthens the cause of justice bearing in mind that there could 
be grounds that such a decision was in violation of natural justice and that there was an 
abuse of the court’s judicial process. 
 
(d) Due Process Interpretation of Existing Constitutional Provision on Legal Aid 
Poverty and inability to pay for the services of an attorney are common reasons why 
most women cannot seek legal redress for certain abuses and violation of rights.  
                                                          
80 AIR 2002 SC 1771 
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Therefore, legal aid is necessary to “widen the road” and ensure uninhibited access to 
justice as basic human right necessary to guarantee women’s right to dignity and 
freedom from exploitation. 81 
Similar to the legal aid provision in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, Article 39A of the 
Indian Constitution does not create a positive right to legal aid. Article 39A simply 
oblige the State to ensure that the legal system promotes equal justice to all by 
providing “free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to 
ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of 
economic or other disabilities.”  
Prior to the judicial creativity and activism of the later Supreme Court of India, the 
scope of legal aid was restricted to the right of the applicant to engage the services of a 
lawyer of his choice and not a right to be offered the services of a lawyer at the expense 
of the state.82  
However, by the courage, creativity and interpretative activism of the later Supreme 
Court with the likes of Justice P.N. Bhagwati, the right to free legal aid was read into 
the right to life and enforced as part of the fundamental rights.83 
Under an earlier form of judicial activism, the Supreme Court, per Krishna Iyer, JSC 
held in M.H. Hoscot v. State of Maharashtra,84 that the state was bound to provide free 
legal aid to an indigent, or incommunicate person as a constitutional right, if the 
circumstance and justice of the case permits.  
But in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar 85 Justice Bhagwati 
strengthened the decision in Hoscot by applying the fair, reasonable and just rule and 
observed that the right to legal aid is fundamental and may only become immaterial if 
the beneficiary refuses to accept it. He further expanded this concept when he held in 
                                                          
81  S.L.A. Khan (2001) JUSTICE BHAGWATI ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES, op.cit, p. 156.  
82  Tara Singh v. State, AIR 1951 SC 441; Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 SC 217. 
83 S.L.A. Khan, (2001) JUSTICE BHAGWATI ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES,   op. cit. p. 155. 
84 AIR 1978 SC 1548. 
85  AIR 1979 SC 1369. 
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Khatri v. State of Bihar,86 that the due process application of Article 39A creates a 
continuing right to legal aid which attaches to the accused person from the time of his 
first arraignment before a magistrate up till his final appeal at the Supreme Court, and 
that it also creates an unqualified constitutional obligation on the state to provide the 
legal aid irrespective of any real or imagined administrative or financial constraints. 
And above all, the Indian Supreme Court also noted that a fundamental right cannot be 
waived by the vulnerable or weaker party as that would be contrary to public policy.87  
This new concept of legal aid also covers social action groups and voluntary 
organisations that render legal aid services to the deserving public, especially at the 
grassroots.88  
This is a realistic lesson for Nigeria because it underscores the point that a creative, 
courageous and activist judiciary possesses the interpretative power to reform the law 
by bridging inherent gaps in a defective legislation or porous Constitution.  
 
 
(e) Judicial Creativity and Activism in the Application of International Law 
 
Unlike the Constitution of South Africa, the Indian Constitution, like its Nigeria 
counterpart, does not contain any specific provision which mandate domestic courts to 
apply international law in preference to municipal law. However, by its uncommon 
activism and creativity in interpretation, the Indian Supreme Court have had to apply 
international human rights law, though not domesticated, in resolving vital issues on 
women’s rights to dignity and sexual independence. 
For instance, it relied on international law to formulate the Vishaka Guidelines for the 
protection of women’s dignity against sexual harassment at the workplace, at a time 
when there was no legislation on the subject and insisted that: 
                                                          
86 Khatri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 928. 
87 Nar Singh Pal, AIR 2000 SC 1401. 
88 Centre for Legal Research v. State of Kerala 3 SCJ 1986 SC 17. It must be borne in mind that although the right to free legal aid 
so far discussed generally applies to an accused person in a criminal trial, it can also be inferred in respect of a woman seeking 
justice for the violation of her right to dignity under Article 21. 
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Gender equality includes protection from sexual harassment and right to 
work with dignity, which is a universally recognised basic human right… 
The International Conventions and norms are, therefore, of great 
significance in the formulation of the guidelines to achieve this purpose. 
The obligation of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for the 
enforcement of these fundamental rights in the absence of legislation must 
be viewed along with the role of judiciary envisaged in the Beijing 
Statement of Principles of the Independence of the judiciary in the 
LAWASIA region.89 
This is a proper lesson for Nigeria where the courts doggedly uphold the provision of 
Section 12 of the 1999 Constitution against the recognition or enforcement of any 
international treaty which has not been domesticated into the laws of Nigeria. 
 
(f) The Three-Step Rule of Constitutional Proportionality  
 
Section 31 (2) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution permits the derogation of fundamental 
rights including the right to human dignity as well as the  right to life. And the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria confirmed this in Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary 
Tribunal v. Emewulu & Anor90 where it held that all rights and freedoms are subject to 
limitations of overriding public interest or state policy. 
In India, Article 19 (2)-(6) of the Constitution also permits reasonable executive, 
legislative or administrative action which seeks to limit the enjoyment of certain rights, 
excluding the right to dignity or life.91 Nonetheless, the Indian Supreme court has by its 
creativity and activism, interpreted Article 19 to imply that in the exercise of its power 
to derogate from certain fundamental rights, government must show that the derogation 
is inevitable, reasonable and fair, and would not cause more harm to fundamental rights 
                                                          
89 Vishaka & Ors v. State of Rajasthan & Ors, JT 1997 (7) SC 384. 
90 [2001] 3 S.C.N.J. 106. 
91 Article 19(1) lists the affected rights to include the right to freedom of speech and expression; freedom to assemble peaceably and 
without arms; freedom to form associations or unions; freedom to move freely throughout the territory of India; freedom to reside 
and settle in any part of the territory of India and freedom to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business 
within the territory of India. 
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than it seeks to protect. In simple terms, this is what the court described as the Three 
Step Rule of Constitutional Proportionality.  
This rule suffices that the ‘reasonable restrictions’ which the State could impose on the 
fundamental rights should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is 
required for achieving the objects of the legislation. Therefore, legislation which 
arbitrarily or excessively invaded the right could not be said to contain the quality of 
reasonableness unless it strikes a “proper balance between the rights guaranteed and the 
control permissible under arts 19(2) to (6). Otherwise, it must be held to be wanting in 
that quality.”92   
The burden of proof lay on the state to show that the restriction was reasonable and 
proportionate. In deciding on the proportionality and reasonableness or otherwise of a 
restriction or limitation, the High Court or Supreme court “must keep in mind the nature 
of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions 
imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the 
disproportion of the imposition as well as the prevailing conditions of the time.”93  
The Indian Supreme Court also applied this rule in the case of Om Kumar & Ors v. 
Union of India in Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction & Anor94 and 
further explained the rule thus:  
 
By ‘proportionality', we mean the question whether, while regulating 
exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of 
measures has been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to 
achieve the object of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative 
order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the court will see that the 
legislature and the administrative authority maintain a proper balance 
between the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order 
                                                          
92 Per Mahajan J (as he then was) in Chintaman Rao v State of Uttar Pradesh [1950] SCR 759.  
93 See the observation of Patanjali Sastri CJ in State of Madras v.  Row [1952] SCR 597, as well as that of Jeevan Reddy J in State of 
AP v Mc Dowell & Co (1996) 3 SCC 709. 
94 [2001] 4 LRI 1049. 
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may have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the 
purpose which they were intended to serve. The legislature and the 
administrative authority are however given an area of discretion or a range 
of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the rights excessively 
or not is for the court. That is what is meant by proportionality.95  
 
This rule therefore offers a reasonable lesson for Nigeria and other developing 
democracies in Africa and Asia.96 
 
(g) Laws Inconsistent With or in Derogation of the Fundamental Rights: Article 13 
India’s jurisprudence for the protection of women’s dignity is also inherent in Article 13 
of its Constitution which voids every law, order, bye-law, rule, order, “custom or usage” 
that are inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights. 
This provision is an additional platform upon which the court may void any 
dehumanizing customs and practices related to Sati or dowry or the “order or directive” 
of tribal elders which abuse the dignity or sexual independence of women.  
 
(h) Introduction of “Social Justice Bench” at the Supreme Court 
In 2014, His Lordship Chief Justice of India H. L. Dattu, directed the setting up in the 
Supreme Court of India of a special “Social Justice Bench” comprising of Honourable 
Justices Madan B. Lokur and Uday U. Lalit for the specific purpose of hearing and 
disposing both pending and fresh matters relating to women and children, and that in 
                                                          
95 See Para. 29, page 12 of the judgement.  
96 Technically, the South African Constitution does not permit any derogation of the rights contained in its Bill of Rights. 
And in Malaysia, the Federal Court re-affirmed this  three-step  test  per Dato’ Gopal Sri Ram FCJ in Sivarasa Rasiah v. 
Badan Peguam, Malaysia [2010] 2 MLJ 333, (FC) at para 30 at p 351 where his Lordship held thus:  
“[A]ll forms of state action-- legislative or executive measure — that infringe a fundamental right must:  
(a) have an objective that is sufficiently important to justify limiting the right in question;  
(b) the measures designed by the relevant state action to meet its objective must have a rational nexus with that objective; 
and  
(c) the means used by the relevant state action to infringe the right asserted must be proportionate to the object it seeks to 
achieve.”   
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order to ensure that these matters are monitored on regular basis, the special bench will 
continue to sit on every working Friday at 2.00 p.m.97 
This is indicative of keen interest in the matter of women and children’s rights in India 
and further to the realization of “social justice” which is one of the focal points in the 
Preamble to the Constitution of India, 1950. And of course, part of this “social justice” 
includes taking steps to protect the safety and dignity of women and children and secure 
their living conditions by tackling untimely death due to lack of proper nutrition; 
providing night shelter for homeless and destitute women and children among others.98 
This is a step in the right direction which Nigeria and other developing countries, both 
in Africa and Asia, may do well to follow. 
 
5.5.1.4 Lessons on Proactive Legislating and Legislative Advancement on Broad 
and Specific Protection of Women’s Dignity and Sexual Independence 
Unlike Nigeria, India has realistic criminal jurisprudence on domestic violence, sex-
selection, equality and sexual rights of abled and disabled women and the girl-child. 
It is therefore an exemplary lesson for Nigeria that in addition to the elaborate 
provisions of India’s criminal jurisprudence on rape and sexual offences, that is, the 
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, the country still possesses legislation for the 
protection of equality and sexual dignity of disabled women and girls. The country also 
has legislation against dowry and sex-selection to save the unborn female foetus. Such 
law would be reasonable to address and outlaw the indignity and violence suffered by 
Nigerian women as a result of the cultural menace of son preference, especially in South 
East Nigeria. 
 
                                                          
97 India Lawyers Word Press of 12 March 2014, https://indialawyers.wordpress.com/2014/12/03/supreme-court-constitutes-a-
special-bench-titled-as-social-justice-bench-for-hearing-matters-related-to-women-and-children/ (6/5/2015). 
98 India Lawyers Word Press of 12 March 2014, ibid. 
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Specifically, some of the legislative lessons considered include:  
 
(a) Elaborate Legislation on Domestic Violence 
In addition to constitutional guarantees and a fearless and innovative judiciary, India 
also has a pro-active legislature and women-sensitive legislation which meet the 
minimum requirements of international law for the protection of women’s dignity and 
accordingly constitute reasonable lessons for Nigeria. 
For instance, Nigeria has no national legislation on domestic violence; but in India, the 
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 takes a sweep at domestic 
violence generally and offers protection to a wife or female co-habiting partner against 
violence from her husband or male partner or their relatives. The Act also covers 
mothers, widows as well as biological and adopted sisters by prohibiting and 
criminalizing every domestic violence (invariably including marital rape)99 and those 
act, omission or commission of a respondent (husband, live-in lover, partner or other 
family member of the aggrieved woman/female victim) which harms, injures or 
endangers her mental or physical well-being, or tends  to cause her any form of 
physical, sexual, economic, verbal and emotional abuse  or with a view to coerce her or 
any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other 
property or valuable security including threat of any such or similar abuse.100 
The Act rightly and ingeniously contemplates that domestic violence may be 
perpetrated in or out of marriage and by persons (whether male or female) other than a 
husband, for instance, his relatives, and therefore empowers the aggrieved women to 
even sue any such “relative” as respondent.101  
                                                          
99 Ojilere, A., & Gan, C. C. (2015). Learning from the Indian Judiciary: New Directions for Securing Nigerian Women’s Right to 
Dignity. Asian Women, 31(1), 81-106, at 98. 
100 It needs be noted that while dowry related violence against women is not common in Nigeria, other forms of domestic violence 
abound.  
101 Section 2 (q) of the Act defines “respondent” to mean “any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with 
the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an aggrieved wife 
or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male 
partner.” 
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The Act also protects the reproductive rights, sexual choices and property rights of 
women and against common psychological trauma and ridicule associated with 
childlessness or not having a male child, among others.102 Such provision, if applied to 
Nigeria would constitute a sustainable framework against most common abusive 
cultural practices which constitute flagrant breach of women’s right to dignity in 
Nigeria.    
To protect the parties’ privacy, Section 16 of the Act provides that proceedings may be 
heard in camera. Under Section 18, the court may also make Protection Orders 
restraining the abusive husband or partner from committing or aiding any further abuse, 
or from entering the woman’s workplace or her favourite locations, or even attempting 
to communicate her by any physical or electronic or telegraphic manner, or issuing a 
threat to any of her relatives or friends. 
Above all, a petition under the Act may even ensue for violations which took place 
before the commencement of the Act, even if the parties no longer live together.103  
It is therefore understandable that erudite Indian female scholar Usha Kiran Rai104  
describes the Act as one which expansively captures the abuse of women with some 
degree of precision and a clear and unambiguous statement of the right of women to be 
free.  
This thesis therefore, humbly contends that the elaborate provisions and unambiguous 
language of India’s Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is another 
                                                          
102  See Section 3 op.cit. 
103 V.D. Bhanot v. Savita   Bhanot (2012) 3 SCC 183. In that case the Supreme Court considered the constitutional protections in 
Article 21 of the Constitution vis-à-vis the provisions of Sections 31 and 33 of the Domestic Violence Act and concluded that the 
Object of the Act is to protect the rights of women under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution as a way of guaranteeing their 
dignity.  
104 Usha Kiran Rai, “Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act: A Search for New Paradigms” 
http://www.academia.edu/1342148/Protection_of_Women_from_Domestic_Violence_Act 12/11/2013. 
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lesson which may be reasonably applied to reform the current legal framework for the 
protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria. 
 
(b) Elaborate Criminal Jurisprudence on Rape and Sexual Offences 
The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 is a comprehensive legislation for the 
protection of women against various sexual indignities in India.105  
Generally, the law is an anti-rape legislation which creates new offences of sexual 
harassment, stalking and voyeurism and also increases the punishment and trial 
procedure with respect to acid attack, dowry violence or death and existing sexual 
offences including as rape and gang rape. It also criminalizes the disrobing of the girl 
child among others. 
Remarkably, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, inter alia, amends the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1973 and accord women certain privileges. Now, under Section 
160 (1) of the Code, any police officer investigating a crime may, by order in writing, 
invite any person as witness but if such intended witness is a woman her statement will 
be recorded only at her residence.  
By Section 46 (4), no woman shall be arrested after sunset and before sunrise, except in 
exceptional circumstances, and even so, the arrest can only be made by a police woman 
and with the written permission of the Judicial Magistrate of the area.  Upon notifying 
the woman orally of her arrest, she is presumed to have submitted thereto and a male 
police officer shall not touch her person to effect arrest or search.106  
 
Furthermore, any physical/medical examination after arrest shall only be conducted on 
her by or under the supervision of a female registered medical practitioner, and if she is 
                                                          
105 Ojilere, A., & Gan, C. C. (2012/2013). Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013: An Introductory Analysis of India’s Criminal 
Jurisprudence on the Protection of the Sexual Independence and Dignity of Women. Nigerian Journal of Legal Studies (NJLS) 
Faculty of Law, Imo State University, Owerri., XI, 65-83.  The Act amends the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. 
106 Section 51 (2) of the Code. 
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below eighteen years, she shall not be detained in a police station or jail but an 
Observatory Home.107 
Interestingly, any trial for rape under the Indian Penal Code, shall, as far as practicable, 
be presided by a female judge or magistrate.108 
With specific reference to the dignity of the girl-child, India has the Protection of 
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (also amended by the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013. The 2012 Act criminalizes every form of sexual abuse or 
sexual intercourse with a person below 18 years including the taking advantage of any 
mental or physical disability of such person or her other vulnerability109 to effect the 
abuse, impregnate her or infect her with HIV/AIDS or other life-threatening diseases .  
Only recently, the 7th Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria passed a new Sexual 
Offences Bill, 2015 similar to the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of India. 
Regrettably, the new Bill is fundamentally deficient vis-à-vis the Indian law and basic 
tents of international human rights law on children because it criminalizes “sexual 
intercourse with a girl below 11 years of age.” This is invariably a deviation from the 
definition of a child in both regional and international law as a person below 18 years. 
Suffice to say that Nigeria still needs to learn new lessons from India in this regard.    
 
(c) Criminal Jurisprudence on the Equality and Sexual Rights of Disabled Women. 
The Persons With Disabilities Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full   
Participation Act, (PWD Act) of 1995 was India’s landmark legislation for the specific 
protection of disabled people. It was applauded because for “the first time in the history   
                                                          
107 Section 54 of Code of Criminal Procedure 
108 Section 26 of the Code. 
109 Such vulnerability includes being in a position of authority over the child, or in in charge of a home, hospital, police lock-up, 
prisons  or like institution where she is kept custody.  
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of independent India, a separate law had been formulated which talked about the 
multiple needs of disabled people”.110   
In addition to this, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, for the first time, makes a 
legal provision specifically targeting sexual offences against disabled people by 
categorising sexual assault against the disabled as a serious sexual offence akin to 
sexual assault in custody or against a pregnant woman or minor.  
The Act also amends the Indian Penal Code to the extent that Section 376 (2) thereof 
prescribes a punishment of between 10 years and life imprisonment for persons in 
authority including policemen, public officers, trusted persons, close family relatives, 
caregivers, owners and managers of custodial or health institutions for women or 
children, or like facilities who violate the sexual dignity through rape, of a woman with 
mental or physical disability or otherwise incapable of giving consent.111 
Furthermore, in the case of Suchitra Srivastva v. Chandigarh Administration,112 the 
Indian Supreme Court emphasised the equality and dignity right of disabled women 
when it held that a disabled woman could keep a pregnancy in spite of her parent’s 
contrary wish, as long as she had insisted that she wanted to have the baby. Hence, a 
World Bank report confirms that “India has one of the more progressive disability 
policy frameworks in the developing world.”113 This thesis therefore believes that if 
such legislative advance may be reasonably applied to Nigeria to help bridge legislative 
gaps and reform the current legal framework for the protection of the rights to dignity of 
the disabled women and disabled girl-child in Nigeria. 
                                                          
110 Swagata Raha, India needs new legislation on Disability Rights. Infochange Disabilities, 
http://infochangeindia.org/disabilities/analysis/india-needs-new-legislation-on-disability-rights.html (8/6/2015). 
111 In spite of these advances, the call has been made for India to improve on its legal framework for the greater protection of people 
with disabilities. See Badjena, S. S. (2014). Sexual Violence Against Women with Disabilities and the Legislative Measures in 
India. ODISHA REVIEW (April-May 2014), 46-57, at 55.  
112 AIR 2010 SC 235 (Civil Appeal No. 5845/2009, judgment delivered 28 August 2009) 
113 O’Keefe, P., Unit, H. D., & Region, d. E. A. (2007). People with disabilities from India: from commitments to outcomes. Human 
Development Unit, South East Asia Region, The World Bank, 157, available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INDIAEXTN/Resources/295583-1220435937125/Philip_Okeefe_1_1a.pdf (8/6/2015). 
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(d) Specific Legislation against Caste, Dowry and Sex Selection  
Caste related violence is not as common in Nigeria as in India. However, women in 
both countries suffer common indignity related to dowry (albeit in various forms and 
with different consequences) Son preference and sex selection may lead to divorce, 
abuse or polygamy in Nigeria but they additionally lead to the unlawful killing of 
female foetuses in India. However, the Indian legal framework address these issues by  
specific legislation, particularly, the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (including certain spe
cific Penal Code protections against dowry), Pre Conception and Pre Natal  
Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act 1994, Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013, among others, but this is not so in Nigeria.  
In addition to these, India also has the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace 
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013,114 a legislation for the specific 
protection of the sexual dignity of women at their workplace.  These legislative 
advances constitute reasonable lessons for Nigeria because no such legislation currently 
exists in Nigeria. 
  
5.5.1.5 Unique Pro-Active Political Actions for Women’s Safety and Sexual Dignity  
 
In addition to the several judicial and legislative strides earlier discussed, the Indian 
government has also taken unique pro-active political steps to promote and protect the 
safety, empowerment and sexual dignity of women which Nigeria will do well to learn 
from. Some of these unique pro-active political actions include the following: 
1. Establishing an All-women Bank, the Bharatiya Mahila Bank [BMB]: This 
special bank was established by the Indian Government with an all-women 
eight-member Board of Directors. It caters for the special credit needs of women 
                                                          
114 This is the legislative version of the Vishaka guidelines. 
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and women self-help groups,115 who ordinarily cannot provide required 
collateral to secure facilities from regular banks, thereby eliminating the 
possibility of demeaning their safety or compromising their sexual dignity in the 
course of desperately trying to obtain credit. 
 
2. Direct Access to Prime Minister for Public Complaints on Violation of 
Women’s Dignity: To prevent victim-blaming discourage which prevent 
women from reporting cases of sexual violations,116 and address allegations of 
police insensitivity or neglect to follow-up complaints by female victims of rape 
and sexual indignity, the Indian Prime Minister announced that that such 
complaints be made directly to his office, or to him in person, via email or post, 
or any of his social media pages, and therefore hold him directly responsible if 
their complaints are not handled satisfactorily. This is a unique manifestation of 
pro-active commitment to protect women’s right to dignity which the 
government in Nigerian, and even the South Africa, may reasonably follow. 
 
3. The Banning of Uber Online-Hailing Taxi Services in India: It was recently 
reported in the Indian media that the Union Government of India had banned 
“all operations by private cab service, Uber with immediate effect and 
blacklisted it from providing any transport service in the national capital… a day 
after a taxi driver employed by Uber was arrested from Mathura for 
allegedly raping a 27-year-old woman in his cab.”117 
 
                                                          
115 Zee News India:  http://zeenews.india.com/business/news/economy/bharatiya-mahila-bank-for-economic-empowerment-of-
women-pm_89058.html (25/11/2013). 
116 Joseph, M. G. C., Kirchhoff, G. F., Maden, S. R., & Barkhuizen, J. (2014). Asian passengers' safety study: the problem of sexual 
molestation of women on trains and buses in Chennai, India. Acta Criminologica, 27(1), 57-74.  
117 The Times of India, Delhi 8 Dec, 2014: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Delhi-govt-bans-Uber-cab-service-
following-rape-incident/articleshow/45411516.cms  (28/4/2015). The ban was premised on the reasoning that the safety and sexual 
dignity of prospective female passengers was compromised by the US-based company Uber by failing to diligently seek and obtain 
police background check on its drivers before employing them, and therefore must be vicariously liable for the violation of the 
woman’s dignity by their drivers. 
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Although sexual molestation of women in public transportation is prevalent in 
India and other parts of the world,118 this is not yet the case in Nigeria. However, 
Nigeria generally stands to learn valuable lesson from the pro-active and 
decisive steps commonly taken by the Government of India to protect its women 
and girls. 
 
 
4. The First Mahila Police Station [Women Police Station]: Established at 
Jaipur in March, 1989. All cases as rape, sexual harassment and exploitation of 
women are registered here and investigated mainly by female police officers. 
Statistics show that the number of female police investigating and prosecuting 
officers currently serving in the state is at par with their male counterparts.119 
 
5. Rashtriya Mahila Kosh (National Credit Fund for Women): It was launched 
in 1993 to encourage socio economic development. The Fund’s main objective 
is to provide micro- credit to enable and encourage poor women to engage in 
various forms of income generating and livelihood support activities at 
concessional terms.120 
 
6. The NIRBHAYA Fund for Women's Safety: This special fund was also set up 
in India to provide counselling and funds for litigations and victim-support 
services to women. This is to ensure that financial constraint does not hinder any 
woman’s right to seek or obtain legal, administrative or other redress for the 
violation of her right to dignity. 
 
7. Gender Budgeting and Economic Empowerment of Women: In a committed 
bid to curb gender inequality, the Government of India has adopted “gender 
                                                          
118 Joseph, M. G. C., Kirchhoff, G. F., Maden, S. R., & Barkhuizen, J. (2014), ibid.  
119 http://www.police.rajasthan.gov.in (5/5/2015).  
120 Nayak, A. (2011). List of Government Schemes Available for Economic Empowerment of Women in India. 
http://www.wcd.nic.in/schemes.htm. (Quoted in Jain, A., & Gambhir, M. S. (2015). Socio-Economic Women Empowerment: Sharp 
Focus. International Journal of Advanced Research in Management (IJARM), 6(1), 38-49.  
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budgeting” (GB) which is aimed at ensuring that Government‘s policy 
commitments on gender equity are translated into budgetary allocations. Further 
to this, in 2005, the Indian Government also formed Gender Budget Cells (GBC) 
within all Central Departments.121  
 
8. Introduction of New “Social Justice Bench” at the Supreme Court: In order 
to give priority attention to all suits in the Supreme Court relating to women and 
children, the Chief Justice of India established a special bench to specifically 
deal with all such cases. This will ensure the quick disposal of pending cases as 
well as urgent attention to new cases so as to ensure speedy justice delivery for 
women and children. 
 
9. Launching of SOTERIA Free Emergency Android Application for 
Women’s Safety and Crime Control: This is a new technology specially 
developed to fight violations to women’s dignity. With this new application, a 
woman can save the telephone numbers of any three persons whom she may 
wish to contact in case of emergency. By merely touching the application or 
pressing the CALL button, the application automatically sends out SOS text 
messages to the three numbers, indicating also the location of the woman. It may 
also send status messages on Facebook. This is highly innovative and would 
serve well in Nigeria. 
 
10. In addition to the Soteria Online digital application support for women, the 
Indian government also introduced comprehensive Legal and Counselling 
Centres and 181 Mobile Helpline Services for Women in Distress, as well as a 
24/7 Gender Help-Desk Centres for Women and Children. 
 
                                                          
121 Ibid. 
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Apart from lessons inherent in the basic content and essence of these policy advances 
and unique acts by the government to enhance the protection mechanism for women’s 
right to dignity in India, it is imperative for Nigeria to particularly take additional cue 
from the decisive political will and pro-active response underscored in some of these 
advances. 
 
5.5.2 Lessons from the Advances in South Africa 
The most important lessons which Nigeria may reasonably learn from South Africa are 
more on constitutional advances than on any other. However, apart from lessons based 
on the independence and pragmatism of the South African Constitutional Court, the 
following other lessons on advanced constitutionalism in South Africa may, over time, 
be adapted and applied in Nigeria. 
 
5.5.2.1 Constitutional Guarantee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.122 
The South African Constitution also guarantees economic, social and cultural rights as 
justiciable positive rights in the Bill of Rights but in Nigeria these rights appear in 
Chapter II of the Constitution as Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of 
State Policy which are non-judiciable because they are mere aspirations of government. 
 
5.5.2.2 Right of Access to the South African Constitutional Court for Enforcement 
of the Bill of Rights  
Although the South African Constitutional Court is the highest Constitutional Court as 
well as the highest court of appeal in the land, just like the Supreme Court of Nigeria, 
however, unlike its Nigerian counterpart, the Constitution of South Africa permits direct 
access to the Constitutional Court for the enforcement of the Bill of Rights when it is in 
                                                          
122 The researcher wishes to restate that applying the classical South African model of constitutionalism in Nigeria can only be as a 
last resort and in the very long run because they will entail the time-consuming process of constitutional amendments which may 
not be forthcoming for obvious reasons of the “Nigerian Factor.” For the realistic reform of the constitutionalism of women’s right 
to dignity in Nigeria, it will therefore be more auspicious and realistic to adopt and apply the Indian model of judicial creativity and 
activism which is time-effective, instant and sustainable. 
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the interest of justice or in the public interest. Such access is also permissible through 
public interest litigation. But direct individual access to the Supreme Court of Nigeria 
for the enforcement of the fundamental rights is only permissible on appeal. 
 
5.5.2.3 Constitutional Non-Derogation of the Rights to Human Dignity and Life     
Section 36 (2) of the South African Constitution provides that ‘no law may limit any 
right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.’ This provision is made subject to Section 36 (1) 
which permits limitation to the extent that it is ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors, including- (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation 
between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose.’ 
However, the rights to dignity and life are sacred and inviolable. In the celebrated case 
of S v. Makwanyane123 the Constitutional Court declared these rights as “the most 
important of all human rights, and the source of all other personal rights.”124  
The non-derogation of the rights to life and dignity also endures against the Parliament 
and even in times of a lawfully declared state of national emergency or war under 
Section 37 (1) of the Constitution.  Thus, Section 37 (5) (c) of the Constitution of South 
Africa provides that ‘No Act of Parliament that authorises a declaration of a state of 
emergency, and no legislation enacted or other action taken in consequence of a 
declaration, may permit or authorise any derogation from the right to human dignity in 
Section 10 and the right to life in Section 11 of the South African Constitution.’  
                                                          
123 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
124 Ibid at para 144. 
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This is a reasonable lesson for Nigeria where fundamental rights including dignity and 
life may be derogated under Section 33(1) of the 1999 Constitution.  
    
5.5.2.4 Constitutional Guarantee of Women’s Reproductive Rights 
In addition to all other rights contained in the South African Bill of Rights, Section 12 
(2) of the Constitution also enshrines the specific guarantee of women’s physical and 
psychological integrity and reproductive rights. There is also the specific constitutional 
guarantee of the rights of children in Section 28 thereof.  
These are high points in South Africa’s constitutional framework which Nigeria may 
apply to bridge the gaps and reform its framework for the protection of the right to 
dignity of women as well as the girl-child.  
 
5.5.2.5 Application of International Law  
The South African Constitution enjoins courts to always apply international law in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights, and to always prefer international law to municipal 
law when international law offers greater protection. It also obliges courts to interpret 
legislation in a manner as to conform to the standard template of international law on 
the subject. These advances will provide useful lessons for Nigeria where the courts are 
not obliged to apply international law except where such law is domesticated into the 
laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in accordance with Section 12 of the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution. 
 
5.5.2.6 Constitutional Provision for NGO Participation 
The South African Constitution, 1996 lays a solid foundation for NGO participation in 
human and women’s rights issues in the country. In its Section 184 (3) the Constitution 
requires relevant state organs to furnish the South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC) with “information on the measures they have taken towards the realization of 
the rights in the Bill of Rights.” For instance, during the “human tissue” controversy in 
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South Africa under which married women required the consents of their husbands 
before in-vitro fertilization and single women were out-rightly prohibited from having 
same, some women/groups complained that the relevant provisions of the Human 
Tissue Act 65 of 1983125  was discriminatory against women. The SAHRC’s 
intervention on the matter necessitated the Human Tissue Amendment Act 51 of 1989 
which reversed the offensive provisions of the old Act.  
 
5.5.2.7 Independence and Pragmatism of the South Africa Constitutional Court   
While the Indian Supreme Court has been prided and applauded for its ‘innovation and 
activism’, the South African Constitutional Court has been applauded for its 
‘independence and pragmatism’. The innovation and activism is with respect to the 
Indian Court exhibiting ingenuity in ‘broadening’ the definition of the fundamental 
rights and directive principles, and in ‘making law’ where legislation is lacking, while 
the independence and pragmatism of the Constitutional Court of South Africa is 
manifest in the courage to emphasise the obligation of the South African state to 
respect, protect and promote constitutional rights in the Bill of Rights in spite of any 
administrative or political odds.  
Even though Jackie Dugard has criticised the South African Constitutional Court for 
being anti-poor with respect to reluctance in the granting of direct access ‘in the public 
interest’ or ‘in the interest of justice’ to enforce socio-economic rights, the 
independence and pragmatism of the Court in this regard particularly in relation to the 
right to dignity of women is clear from certain landmark judgements which directly or 
indirectly address the subject. These decisions emphasise the obligation of the state to 
give special deliberative attention to those whose minimal needs are not being met and 
thus, stand as a powerful rejoinder to countries like Nigeria where socio-economic 
                                                          
125 Commenced on 12 July, 1985. 
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rights still stand as negative, unenforceable, non-fundamental rights in the Constitution 
and before the courts. It has been suggested too that such rights can serve, not to pre-
empt democratic deliberation, but to ensure democratic attention to important interests 
that might otherwise be neglected in ordinary debate.126  
 
The judicial pragmatism of the South African Constitutional Court is manifest in a 
number of cases and instances including: 
 
(a) Judicial Pragmatism in the Development of Common Law 
This avowed pragmatism of the South African Constitutional Court is manifest in a 
number of cases. Section 39(2) of the Constitution of South Africa provides that “when 
interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.” 
 
Accordingly, in F (Applicant) v. Minister of Safety and Security & 5 Ors (The F case)127 
the Court upheld the vicarious liability of the State for not giving adequate 
consideration to the dignity, protection and safety of a woman which made her 
vulnerable to rape by a police officer on stand-by duty. In that case, a police officer on 
‘stand-by’ offered a ride in a police car to a girl who was stranded at night after leaving 
a night club. Although she was suspicious of him as a stranger in plain clothes, she 
nonetheless “trusted” him because he drove a police car, had police docket and radio in 
the car, and told her that he was a “detective” (a term which the victim understood to 
mean a “policeman”), and more so, the form of assistance offered to her by the police 
officer was one that is commonly offered by the police to people who are stranded. 
Nonetheless, he had driven her to a dark place and assaulted and raped her.  
                                                          
126 Sunstein, C. R. (2001). Social and economic rights? Lessons from South Africa. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics 
Working Paper No. 124.  
127 CCT 30/11 [2011] ZACC 37. 
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In addition to criminal charges against the police officer, the High Court also held the 
Minister of Safety and Security vicariously liable for the crime. The Minister took the 
matter to the Supreme Court which reversed the order of the High Court on the ground 
that the police officer was not on duty but merely on “stand-by” and therefore was on a 
frolic of his own. On further appeal to the Constitutional Court, the court found the 
Minister vicariously liable because the police officer was at all times before, during and 
after the rape an officer and that he drove a police car which was maintained at the 
expense of the State, and that being on “stand-by” meant that he could be called upon to 
perform any special duty. Moreover, the minister was not diligent in protecting people 
like the victim because he had employed the accused person as police officer in spite of 
his record of conviction for sexual violation of women.  
 
Similarly, in Carmichele v. The Minister of Safety and Security & The Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development128 the Constitutional Court accepted arguments 
that by failing to take necessary steps to restrain or oppose bail for the accused despite 
repeated warnings to the police that the accused is notorious for rape and sexual 
violence, the police made itself vicariously liable to a subsequent assault on a woman by 
the accused. In that case, the police had been properly notified that the accused who was 
already facing criminal charges for sexual assault and violence is not a person who 
“should be out on the street” and “shouldn’t maintain a presence in society because my 
knowledge as a nursing sister and just in life is that a man that has committed two 
similar crimes is going to do it again.”129 
The applicant also insisted that the police failed in its duty to  “ensure that she enjoyed 
her constitutional rights of inter alia the right to life, the right to respect for and 
protection of her dignity, the right to freedom and security, the right to personal privacy 
and the right to freedom of movement” especially as Section 8(1) of the South African 
                                                          
128 CCT48/00 [2001] (4) SA938 (CC). 
129 Ibid. 
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Constitution provides that “The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the 
legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state.” 
The Court therefore held that that Section 8(1) imposed a duty on the state and all of its 
organs not to perform any act that infringes these rights, or invariably, there is a positive 
obligation on the state and its organs to provide appropriate protection to everyone 
through laws and structures designed to afford such protection. 
The Minister of Safety and Security, through the police, was therefore held vicariously 
liable to the victim for the assault on her because if the prosecution had opposed bail on 
the ground that the accused was in the habit of committing similar acts of sexual 
violence and assault or had been convicted therefor in the past, the magistrate may have 
refused bail and restrain the accused person. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa applied similar pragmatism in the case of 
Van Eeden v. Minister of Safety and Security (Women’s Legal Centre Trust as amicus 
curiae)130 when it upheld the appeal of a woman for damages against the state for 
failing in its duty to care for her after she had been sexually assaulted, raped and robbed 
by a notorious and dangerous criminal who had escaped from police custody. The court 
held that the state was duty-bound to protect people against violent crimes by taking 
active steps to prevent violations of their constitutional right to freedom and security. It 
also emphasised that the state was also bound by international law to protect women 
against violent crime and that having failed in that duty, the state, as the employer of the 
police, was vicariously liable for its breach.131 
 
 
The crux of these judgements is to underscore the pragmatism of the Constitutional 
Court in discharging its constitutional obligation to develop common law (in this case, 
the concept of “wrongfulness” in the law of delict) to conform to the spirit of the Bill of 
                                                          
130  2003 (1) SA 389(SCA). 
131 See “Brief Summary” of the case in Maluleke, M. J., & Madonsela, T. (2004). Women and the Law in South Africa: Gender 
equality Jurisprudence in Landmark Court Decisions Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Republic of South 
Africa, p.8. 
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Rights especially in the context of the globalization and sustainability of women’s right 
to dignity.132  
In two other cases, the Court had also made separate orders protecting women’s dignity 
in marriage: Shilubana & Others v. Nwamitwa,133 as well as in protecting women’s 
dignity with respect to inheritance rights: Elizabeth Gumede v. President of the Republic 
of South Africa & Ors.134  
 
 
(b) Judicial Pragmatism in the Interpretation of Socio-Economic Rights 
The pragmatism of the Constitutional Court was particularly manifested in two 
prominent cases linking women’s right to dignity with the guarantee of socio-economic 
rights to adequate housing and proper health care respectively.   
In Government of RSA & Ors v. Grootboom,135 the respondent with others including 
children, previously lived in an informal waterlogged squatter settlement in a poor 
neighbourhood without water, sewage or refuse evacuation services, and with almost no 
electricity. The area was also dangerously close to a main thoroughfare and many of the 
squatters had applied for subsidised low-cost housing from the municipality but waited 
almost hopelessly without luck. They had no choice but to move out and seek 
alternative settlement and shelters on private property already designated for low-cost 
housing, albeit without authorization.  
The property owner served them eviction notice but they stayed on since they had 
nowhere else to go to. The magistrate ordered them to vacate the property and 
authorized the sheriff to evict them and dismantle their shelters. He also directed the 
                                                          
132 Maluleke, M. J., & Madonsela, T. (2004). Women and the Law in South Africa: Gender equality Jurisprudence in Landmark 
Court Decisions Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Republic of South Africa, p. 5. 
133 (2008) ZACC 9. 
134 (2008) ZACC 23. 
135 [2000] ZACC 19. 
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municipality to provide them with suitable alternative accommodation but the 
municipality did not. 
The respondent then applied for an order on the state to provide them with adequate 
basic temporary shelter or housing pending their obtaining permanent accommodation 
as well as basic nutrition, shelter, healthcare and social services to the respondents who 
are children. 
The respondents based their claim on two constitutional provisions namely, the 
guarantee of the right of access to adequate housing under Section 26 of the 
Constitution (including the obligation on states under Section 26(2) to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures to ensure the progressive realisation of this right within 
its available resources) and Section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution which provides that 
children have the right to shelter.  
The respondents’ attorney then wrote to the municipality describing their horrible and 
inhuman habitation and demanded that the municipality meet its constitutional 
obligations and provide temporary accommodation to the respondents. The respondents 
were not satisfied with the response of the municipality and launched an urgent 
application in the High Court which eventually granted their relief and the appellants 
now appeal against same. 
The Constitutional Court held inter alia, that Section 28(1)(c) which provides that 
‘every child has the right to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social 
services’ must be read together with Section 28(1)(b) which provides that ‘very child 
has the right to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when 
removed from the family environment.’ 
It also held that the rights in Sections 26 and 28 do not take automatic effect rather they 
oblige the state to devise and implement a realistic programme to meet its Section 26 
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obligations, and that so far, the state has not met this obligation. The court therefore 
ordered the state to discharge the obligation imposed upon it by Section 26(2) of the 
Constitution.  
The court further held that socio-economic rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights are 
imperative and do not exist only on paper, and that the state is bound by Section 7(2) of 
the Constitution “to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.”  
Further, that socio-economic rights are justiciable in South Africa and that Section 38 of 
the Constitution empowers the Court to grant appropriate relief for the infringement of 
any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. Accordingly, it ordered the state to provide 
the respondents with suitable alternative accommodation since the right to life and 
dignity cannot be separated from the right to adequate housing and safe environment. 
The Court also reminded the Human Rights Commission of its obligation under Section 
184 of the Constitution to ‘monitor and assess the observance of human rights in the 
Republic,’ and to ‘investigate and to report on the observance of human rights and to 
take steps to secure appropriate redress where human right have been violated.’136 
 
Similarly, in Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign137 the Constitutional 
Court held that the right to health was justiciable and further to the right to life and 
dignity in South Africa. 
Although socio-economic rights are not justiciable in Nigeria, the above lessons from 
the South African Constitutional Court may be applied to trigger a culture of judicial 
pragmatism, activism for the globalization, constitutionalization, enforcement and 
sustainability of socio-economic rights in relation to women’s right to dignity in 
Nigeria.  
 
 
                                                          
136 Ibid. 
137 Case No. CCT/8/02. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
It is evident that, generally, lacuna exists in the national frameworks for protection of 
women’s right to dignity in Nigeria, India and South Africa. However, fundamental 
gaps exists in the Constitutional and legislative frameworks in Nigeria, as well as in the 
attitude of Nigerian Courts to locus standi and the enforcement of economic, social and 
cultural rights. In India, the common gaps in the constitutional and legislative 
frameworks have been effectively bridged by the model creativity and activism of the 
Indian Supreme Court, especially in the broad interpretation of rights, thereby 
guaranteeing sustainable legal protection of women’s right to dignity. The advanced 
constitutionalism in South Africa and the obvious pragmatism and independence of the 
South African Constitutional Court as an agent of transformation and change for the 
guarantee of women’s right to dignity are also legendary. It is therefore realistic to rank 
the courts in India and South Africa among the “Consequential Courts” and “activist 
tribunals in the Global South.” 
This thesis therefore, most humbly believes, that the advances in constitutionalism, law 
and policy, judicial creativity and activism from India and South Africa as well as the 
unique political advances in India offer classical lessons for bridging the gaps and 
reforming the current framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity in 
Nigeria, if they are reasonably applied. Such reform will certainly set the current legal 
framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity, and human rights generally in 
Nigeria on the path to change, sustainability and globalization within the comity of the 
Global South.
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter concludes the thesis. It summarizes the entire thesis and makes 
recommendations for bridging the gaps and reforming the framework for the protection 
of the right to dignity of women in Nigeria, thereby meeting the core objective of the 
research. 
Chapter 1 of this research set out four objectives of the research namely; 
1. Explore the international framework for the protection of the right to dignity 
of women.  
 
2. Critique the framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity in 
Nigeria, India and South Africa. 
 
3. Highlight the fundamental gaps in the framework for the protection of 
women’s right to dignity in Nigeria vis-à-vis the advances in the legal 
framework of India and South Africa.  
 
4. Make recommendations, based on advances in other jurisdictions, 
particularly India and South Africa, for bridging the existing fundamental 
gaps and advancing the quest for a sustainable legal framework for 
protecting the right to dignity of women in Nigeria.  
 
The thesis also sets out to answer the following four research questions: 
1. What is the legal framework for protecting the right to dignity of women in 
international law? 
   323 
2. What is the existing national framework for the same protection in Nigeria, India 
and South Africa? 
 
3. What gaps exists in the Nigerian framework vis-à-vis the advances in the other 
frameworks?  
 
4. Based on the lessons from India and South Africa, what recommendations can 
be suggested to bridge the existing fundamental gaps and contribute to the quest 
for a sustainable legal framework for the protection of the right to dignity of 
women in Nigeria? 
 
The various issues discussed in Chapters 2 seek to realize the first research objective 
and provide answers to the first research question. 
The discussion in Chapters 3 and 4 seeks to achieve the second research objective and 
provide answers to the second research question. 
Chapter 5 addresses the third research objective and seeks to answer the third research 
question while Chapter 6 seeks to meet the fourth research objective and answer the 
fourth research question. It also contains the Summary of the chapters and Conclusion.  
 
Having examined the existing constitutional, judicial, legislative and policy framework 
for protecting women’s right to dignity in Nigeria, India and South Africa, as well as in 
core regional and international frameworks on the subject, this thesis answers the 
research questions raised earlier in the thesis and meets all the research objectives. 
 
6.2 Summary of the Chapters 
Chapter one is the general introduction of the research and it contains the conventional 
preliminaries of a thesis including the meaning, definition, forms and conceptual basis 
of the research.  It examines the meaning of human dignity and describes common 
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forms of the violation of women’s dignity in the selected jurisdictions. It also defines 
certain core concepts relevant to this research namely, sexual violence, violence against 
women, patriarchy, judicial activism, judicial pragmatism, “legisprudence”, the Global 
South and consequential courts.  
Chapter two examines the legal framework for the protection of the right to dignity of 
women in international law, including basic UN instruments as well as thematic 
documents like the CEDAW and the Vienna Declaration and Platform for Action, 
relating to the protection of women’s dignity as part of the broad human rights family. It 
also examines the substantive obligation of states in both regional and international 
human rights international law. It further reflects on the general attitude of the selected 
jurisdictions to the CEDAW Convention. Particularly, it examines the African Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights and the Women Protocol to the African Charter, the 
African Court on Human and People’s Rights, and allied institutions (with respect to 
Nigeria and South Africa only because Asia has no similar regional human rights 
mechanism which would bind India). Lastly, the chapter makes a critique of the 
international framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity as well as the 
way forward. 
Chapter three examines the constitutional framework, that is, the fundamental rights 
provisions and guarantees for the right to dignity of women in Nigeria, India and South 
Africa. It discusses also the relevant constitutional obligation (if any) and judicial 
attitude to the application of international law in the municipal human rights forum as 
well as the justiciability or otherwise of the directive principles of state policy 
particularly in Nigeria and India. Here, the researcher also discusses the nature of access 
to justice for the enforcement of fundamental rights in the highest courts in the three 
selected jurisdictions and examines inherent weaknesses in the various constitutional 
frameworks where they apply, as well as the way forward. 
   325 
Chapter four examines the legislative and policy framework for the protection of the 
right to dignity of women in the selected jurisdictions including a critical highlight of 
inherent weaknesses where they apply. It discusses relevant legislation and amendments 
as well as policy for the protection of women’s dignity especially against sexual 
violations.  
Chapter five recapitulates and highlights the fundamental gaps in the current 
constitutional, legislative, policy and judicial framework for the protection of the right 
to dignity of women in Nigeria. This Chapter is, in fact, significant because it basically 
recasts the gaps which have been discussed earlier in the preceding chapters, the essence 
of which is to refresh the reader’s memory in readiness for the recommendations in the 
next chapter for filling those gaps. 
The Chapter also explores the advances, particularly on constitutionalism, and judicial 
creativity and activism in the frameworks of India and South Africa which may 
reasonably be applied as lessons to bridge the gaps in the current framework for the 
protection of the right to dignity of women in Nigeria. These advances include the 
enshrining of the second and third generation of rights as positive rights in the Bill of 
Rights in the South African Constitution, the broad definition of Article 21 (right to life 
and personal liberty) in the Indian Constitution to cover all other fundamental rights as 
well as the directive principles of state policy (that is, socio-economic rights) which are 
ordinarily non justiciable,  the general judicial approach to the enforcement of writ 
petitions (fundamental rights) in India including Public Interest Litigation/Class Action 
Litigation and the epistolary jurisdiction of Courts. 
Chapter six consists of the summary, recommendations and conclusion of the thesis. It 
summarizes each chapter of the thesis and highlights the findings on adequacy of the 
national, regional and international frameworks for the protection of women’s dignity in 
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relation to the three jurisdictions under review. It also contains elaborate 
recommendations for the reform, globalization and sustainability of the current 
Nigeria’s constitutional, legal and policy framework as well as judicial approach for the 
protection of the right to dignity of women. 
And lastly, it highlights certain factors and conditions which may obstruct the 
implementation of the recommendations earlier made with respect to the quest for a 
sustainable legal framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria.  
 
6.3 Findings on Adequacy of the Existing National, Regional and International 
Frameworks 
This research examined the legal framework for the protection of the right to dignity of 
women in Nigeria, India and South Africa and found that the Nigerian framework is 
grossly weak and the Nigerian judiciary, unlike its Indian counterpart, does not exhibit 
the creativity and activism necessary to remedy these many defects. The Indian 
framework has a few constitutional and legislative defects, but creativity and activism 
of its judiciary has virtually bridged every perceived gap. South Africa has the best 
framework amongst the three jurisdictions because of the elaborate justiciability of 
rights in its Bill of Rights. It was also found that although the Indian Constitution does 
not enshrine second generation of rights as positive rights, however, judicial activism in 
India has successfully resolved this constitutional inadequacy and in fact, effectively 
places the Indian framework at par with the South African framework. This explains 
why the Supreme Court of India and the Constitutional Court of South Africa are 
counted among the Consequential Courts in the Global South. 
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6.3.1 Findings on Adequacy of the Existing Framework in Nigeria 
1. There is no national legislation for the specific protection of women’s equality 
or dignity against domestic violence or sexual harassment at home or in the 
workplace in Nigeria. This has fuelled the continued patriarchal mind-set that 
the sexual violation of women’s right is a usual practice and that marital rape is 
a domestic matter. 
 
2. There is no law for guaranteeing sexual independence or reproductive rights of 
women in Nigeria. 
 
3. It is therefore not strange that the government of Nigeria adopted the National 
Policy on Women in 2000 and its failure to effectively address gender inequality 
including political representation/participation of women in politics, necessitated 
its replacement in 2006 with the National Gender Policy amidst the “absence… 
of vibrant legislative structures to protect the rights of women.”1 
 
4. Government apathy to issues of women’s dignity and the imbalance in the 
number of female legislators in the National Assembly vis-à-vis the male 
legislators create a situation whereby matters relating to the dignity of women 
are considered as domestic/family matters which should not come to the front-
burner of legislative matters. Accordingly, government often views issues 
relating to women as social issues of infrastructure connecting the welfare of 
children rather than issues of urgent national, political or international human 
rights importance. A case in point is the apathy of the Nigerian government in 
securing the release of over 200 girls (now globally known as “The Chibok 
Girls”) abducted from their secondary school in Chibok, Nigeria by the militant 
Boko Haram sect, even though these girls have been in captivity since April 
                                                          
1 Oby Nwankwo (2011). “Achieving Thirty-Five Percent Affirmative Action in 2011: The Role of Stakeholders and Implication for 
National Development,” The Nigerian Electoral Journal, 4(1), 27-59 at p.30. 
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2014, and there is yet no official or independent evidence on the exact location 
of the girls, or that they are even still alive.  
 
Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari confirmed this in his first media chat 
with journalists on 30 December, 2015 in Abuja, when he said, inter alia:  
 
 
“The honest truth is that I don’t know the actual place and state of 
the girls. The more reason we are trying to be very careful before 
we negotiate with any group. Before we negotiate with any group, 
we must make sure they show us the actual location of the girls. We 
must make sure they are complete.”2 
 
 
 
5. The vulnerability of women with disabilities is not particularly contemplated in 
Nigeria. Thus, there is no legislation for the specific protection of the dignity of 
women with disabilities against sexual abuse in Nigeria.  
 
6. There is a strong belief in and leaning to native customary law and socio-
religious mythology in some Nigerian communities as a result of which women 
tend to accept their fate as appendages to men in society by positively conceding 
that women are not entitled to any more rights than “men” and “society” is 
willing to voluntarily offer them.  
 
7. The judges of Nigerian courts are dogmatic and positivist in their approach to 
the interpretation and enforcement of the available provisions on right to dignity 
of women and fundamental rights generally. They do not exercise the activism 
necessary to effect sustainable change in a polity like Nigeria where legislation 
on women’s right to dignity are lacking or inadequate. For instance, Nigerian 
judges still consider fundamental rights provided in Chapter IV of the Nigerian 
Constitution as deserving of greater legal cum judicial protection and 
                                                          
2 Morgan Winsor, “Buhari Presidential Media Chat: Nigeria Willing To Negotiate With Boko Haram To Save Chibok Girls” 
International Business Times, Wednesday, 30 December, 2015. http://www.ibtimes.com/buhari-presidential-media-chat-nigeria-
willing-negotiate-boko-haram-save-chibok-girls-2244763 (31/12/2015). 
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enforcement than human rights prescribed by international law. On the contrary, 
Nigeria needs an activist and creative judiciary, such as is common in India, in 
order to guarantee sustainable legal/judicial protection for women’s right to 
dignity even where constitutional, legislative or policy provisions are inadequate 
or non-existent. Generally, judges of Nigerian courts seem unaware of the fact 
that Constitutional commitments to human rights are futile unless enforced by 
and through institutions established for that purpose, particularly those 
empowered to interpret the Constitution.3 
 
8. The research also revealed that police and justice officers and health care 
providers in Nigeria have no special training or guide in the handling of rape 
cases and most women NGOs in Nigeria are concerned with issues other than 
those primarily bothering on anti-rape, sexual independence or women’s right to 
dignity.  Majority of these NGOs are however working in such related areas as 
girl-child education, women in politics, HIV/AIDS or maternal health and 
reproductive rights. 
 
 
 
6.3.2 Findings on Adequacy of the Existing Framework in India 
1. The research found that apart from India’s Constitution of 1950 not enshrining 
second and third generation of rights as positive rights, as is common in the 
1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, India has an overall legal 
framework for the protection of the dignity against rape and sexual harassment 
of able-bodied women as well as women with disabilities, including children 
                                                          
3 NJ Udombana 'Interpreting rights globally: Courts and constitutional rights in emerging democracies' (2005) 5 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 47 55; (Quoted in Abiola Sanni, “Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009 as a tool for the 
enforcement of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in Nigeria: The need for far-reaching reforms.” 11 Afr. Hum. 
Rts. L.J. 511 2011, p.512 
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both at home, in custody and in their work places.4 This level of blanket 
protection also avails foreign women living in India.  
 
2. It was also found that the far-reaching exercise of independence, creativity and 
activism of the Indian Supreme Court including the interpretation of Article 21 
of the Indian Constitution to cover the fundamental objectives and directive 
principles has effectively bridged whatever gap that existed by not enshrining 
the second and third generation of rights as positive rights in the Indian 
Constitution. 
 
3. It was further found that irrespective of a strong legal system, India’s huge 
population of 1.3 billion as well as high illiteracy rate continue to pose a threat 
to the flow of knowledge and information available to most people with respect 
to available legal protections for women’s dignity.  
 
4. In some cases too, the patriarchal and religious myth of family honour as well as 
police complicity hinder women from reporting cases of sexual violations of 
their dignity to the police. Cases abound of some women who went to the police 
to make reports of rape and sexual violations, only to be raped again or sexually 
violated by some police officers. 
 
 
6.3.3 Findings on Adequacy of the Existing Framework in South Africa 
Both Constitutional and legislative guarantees for the protection of women’s right to 
dignity in South Africa including the efficacy of the South African Constitutional Court, 
access to justice for the enforcement of the Bill of Rights, criminal jurisprudence on 
rape and marital rape were found to be adequate compared to those of Nigeria and India. 
However, the scope and application of access jurisdiction for the enforcement of 
                                                          
4 For the avoidance of doubt, this thesis stated in Chapter 1 [1.8] that the reasons why sexual violations of women reportedly persists 
in India in spite of the formidable legal framework, is a sociological question which falls outside the scope of this research.  
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fundamental rights in India beats that of South Africa by miles because direct access to 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa is made subject to leave of the court granted to 
deserving cases when it is ‘in the public interest’ or in the interest of justice whereas in 
India, the applicant has a right of direct access to both the High Court and the Supreme 
Court, and may also benefit from the epistolary jurisdiction dictum which has become 
part of the Indian Constitutionalism. 
 
 
6.3.4 Findings on Adequacy of the African Regional Framework  
The research found that the penal authority of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (also called ‘The African Commission’ which is responsible for 
implementing the African Charter) is simply ‘recommendatory’ and non-compelling, 
and consequently, most states including Nigeria5 have, at one time or the other, simply 
ignored the Commission’s recommendations.6 The Charter also contains some 
derogation clauses, which technically, diminishes and dilutes the rights and freedoms 
created therein.   For instance, Article 6 provides inter alia that ‘no one may be 
deprived of his freedom except for reasons and conditions previously laid down by 
law…’ while Article 11, in limiting the right of free assembly, permits “necessary 
restrictions provided for by law.”7 This invariably threatens the efficacy of the Women 
Protocol to the African Charter. Worse of all, the Commission even has no way of 
monitoring or determining whether an indicted member state has complied with or is 
taking steps to comply with any of its recommendations.8   
                                                          
5 In the communication of the celebrated “Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni Nine” (International Pen & Others (on behalf of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa) v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 212 (ACHPR 1998) para 8, the Nigerian government carried out the execution of the “Ogoni 
Nine” in violation of the recommendation of the African commission that the execution be suspended pending the final 
determination of their representative communication. 
6 For instance, a 2003 Research carried out by Lirette Louw in South Africa showed that it was only in six cases out of 44 
communications in which the African Commission found violation of the Charter did the concerned member states comply fully 
with its recommendations (See L Louw “An analysis of state compliance with the recommendations of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights” unpublished LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 2005) 61.   
7 See Articles 12 to 14 of the Charter. 
8 JD Boukongou “The appeal of the African system for protecting human rights” (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal 271at 
288. 
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6.3.5 Findings on Adequacy of the Existing International Framework  
The research found that cumulatively, the international framework for the protection of 
women’s right to dignity have come to be accepted as a global template for setting the 
pace and measuring compliance with human rights by nation states. However, like the 
African regional instrument, the international human rights instruments, also contain 
derogation provisions. For instance, Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights provides inter alia that:  
 
In  time  of  public  emergency  which  threatens  the  life  of  the nation, 
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the state parties … may 
take measures derogating from their obligations under the present 
covenant… 
 
Article 4 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
provides similarly that: 
 
The states parties to the present covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment 
of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present 
Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to limitations as are 
determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature 
of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in 
a democratic society. 
 
Again, the fact that there is no adjudicatory institution like a world court on human 
rights which can prosecute and/or punish individual and state violators is an omission 
which nearly exposes the international framework to vulnerability of helplessness. 
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6.4 Recommendations For Bridging The Existing Fundamental Gaps And 
Contributing To The Quest For A Sustainable Legal Framework For Protecting 
The Right To Dignity Of Women In Nigeria 
 
This research found that the current legal framework for the protection of the rights to 
dignity of women and indeed human rights generally in Nigeria, comprising the 
constitutional guarantees, law and policy as well as judicial attitude, is weak by 
international standard and incapable of guaranteeing the needed protection. This 
research therefore makes the following recommendations for its reform based on 
lessons from other jurisdictions, particularly India and South Africa. 
  
6.4.1 Recommendations For Constitutional Reform In Nigeria 
 
To ensure sustainable protection of the right to dignity of women in Nigeria, the 
following recommendations for Constitutional reform are hereby suggested:  
1. Enabling Political Will and Commitment to Human Rights Protection: 
Without doubt, it is the compound responsibility of government and it agencies 
to initiate and/or facilitate steps for the promotion and protection of human 
rights and freedoms in any nation. Government must therefore provide the 
necessary political will and commitment. After all, by Article 56 of the UN 
Charter, all member states pledge responsibility “to take joint and separate 
action in  cooperation  with  the  Organization  for  the  achievement  of 
‘universal’  respect  for,  and  observance  of  human  rights  and fundamental 
freedom.” This can be achieved by initiating “deep constitutional reforms”9 and 
establishing the necessary institutional framework for such reform. This was the 
                                                          
9 Bertrand, J. (2015). A Review of" Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia" Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional 
Change and Democracy in Indonesia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. 326. ISBNs 1107641152 and 978-
1107641150. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 21(4), 493-495.  
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case with post-Suharto Indonesia in spite of its vast and complex ethnic divide, 
and being also the largest Muslim country in the world.10 
 
2. Constitutional Sanctity and Exclusion from Domestication Clause of all 
International Human Rights Instruments:  To ensure application and 
enforcement of women’s right to dignity and human rights generally in Nigeria, 
all international and regional human rights instruments, covenants, conventions 
and treaties should be excluded from the ambit of Section 12 of the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution which requires all such treaties and instruments to be first 
domesticated into local legislation before they can have legal effect in Nigeria. 
This will enable the country to migrate from the dualist approach to the monist 
approach to international law in which case, all international and regional human 
rights instruments including the CEDAW will apply automatically as in the case 
of South Africa. It will also eliminate the question of parity or superiority 
between the Constitution and domesticated treaties, that is, municipal law and 
international law. 
 
 
3. Lifting the Constitutional Lacuna of Non-Justiciability of Socio-Economic 
Rights in Section 6(6) (c): The provision of Section 6 (6) (c) of the Constitution 
which place a caveat on the adjudication of negative rights listed as 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy in Chapter 2 
thereof must be deleted so as to enable the Courts to adjudicate on their 
enforcement.   The lacuna of Section 6(6)(c) should therefore not be permitted 
to operate as an “ouster” of the transformative and “legisprudential” power of 
courts as temples of justice and the last hope of the common man.  
                                                          
10 Horowitz, D. L. (2013). Constitutional change and democracy in Indonesia: Cambridge University Press. 
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In this way the universal human rights guaranteed in international treaties may 
apply in Nigeria without violation of its democratic sovereignty11 and ensure the 
elimination of any distinction between fundamental rights (or constitutional 
rights) protected in municipal law and the human rights protected in 
international law. 
 
4. Eliminating the Dichotomy of Rights in the Nigerian Constitution:  The 
negative socio-economic rights contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution 
should be merged with the Fundamental Rights guaranteed in chapter 4 thereof 
so as to make both class of rights directly justiciable as positive Fundamental 
Rights, as is the case in the South African Bill of Rights.  The above two 
suggestions become necessary since Nigerian Courts have so far failed to exhibit 
the kind of creativity and activism common in the interpretation of fundamental 
rights in India whereby the Supreme Court define the negative rights in the 
Constitution as part of the right to life and personal liberty (Article 21) or 
implied positive rights without which Article 21 cannot be guaranteed. Nigerian 
judges may also achieve this level of activism by relying on the clear provisions 
of Chapter II, Section 13 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution which provides that:  
 
It shall be the duty and responsibility of all organs of government, 
and of all authorities and persons, exercising legislative, executive 
or judicial powers, to conform to, observe and apply the provisions 
of this Chapter of this Constitution.12   
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Sex, Laws, and Inequality: What India Can Teach the United States” Daedalus, Vol. 131, No. 1, On 
Inequality (Winter, 2002), pp. 95-106 at 103 Published by: The MIT Press Article Stable URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20027741; https://www.amacad.org/publications/winter2002/Nussbaum.pdf (28/10/2014). 
12 The Chapter herein referred to is Chapter II (Fundamental Objectives and directive Principles of State Policy). 
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5. Specific Provision for the Right to Psychological and Bodily Integrity and 
Reproductive Rights of Women: The right to bodily integrity and reproductive 
rights of women should be specifically included in the fundamental rights in the 
1999 Constitution. This right is already contained in Section 12 (2) of the Bill of 
Rights in South Africa which provides that: 
Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity which 
includes the right to (a) make decisions concerning reproduction; 
(b) to security in and control over their body; and (c) not to be 
subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their 
informed consent. 
 
6. Amendment of Constitutional Provisions on Permissible Derogation of 
Fundamental Rights: The provisions of the Nigerian Constitution Section 33 
(Permissible derogations of the right to life) and Section 45 (Permissible 
enactment of laws which restrict or derogate fundamental rights) should be 
amended and replaced with non-derogation provisions which will specifically 
provide for the non-derogation from the right to life and the right to human 
dignity, even in time of national emergency, as contained in Section 37 of the 
South African Constitution. 
 
Or, more realistically, limited permissible derogations should be made subject 
to the three-step rule of constitutional proportionality (as in Article 19 of the 
Indian Constitution and Section 36 of the South African Constitution) but with 
emphasis on a provision similar to Section 36 (1) (e) of the South African 
Constitution, namely, that there is no “less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose” intended by the legislative or administrative action without a  
derogation of the particular fundamental right.                                
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This suggestion is made without prejudice to the caution on the multiplier effect 
of derogation of rights, by Justice P.N. Bhagwati at the Bangalore Declaration 
thus:  
 
We must therefore take care to ensure that in no situation, however 
grave it may appear, shall we allow basic human rights to be 
derogated from, because once there is a derogation for an 
apparently justifiable cause, there is always a tendency in the 
wielders  of  powers  in  order  to  perpetuate  their  power,  to 
continue derogation of human rights in the name of security of 
the  state.13 
 
 
7. Liberalization of Right of Access and Rules of Procedure for the 
Enforcement of Fundamental Rights: The right of direct access to commence 
action for the enforcement of fundamental rights should extend to the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria. The “rules of standing” or locus standi in Nigeria should 
follow the example in many common law countries such as Colombia and Costa 
Rica,14 Australia, Canada, England, South Africa,15 and particularly India where 
the rules are so liberalized that a petitioner is at liberty to present his writ 
petition for the enforcement of fundamental rights before the Supreme Court 
under Article 32 or the state High Courts under Article 226. Magistrate’s Courts 
should also be bestowed with original jurisdiction to hear cases on violation of 
fundamental rights since nearly every Local Government Area in Nigeria has a 
Magistrate’s Court, more so, the rules of procedure in Magistrate’s Courts are  
                                                          
13 P. N. Bhagwati, Inaugural Address, in DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: THE DOMESTIC 
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS (1988). Bhagwati’s address was given at the Judicial 
Colloquium in Bangalore, held February 24-26, 1988. 
14 Dugard, J. (25 May, 2015). Closing the doors of justice? The South African Constitutional Court’s Approach to Direct Access 
Open Democracy/Open Global Rights   https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/jackie-dugard/closing-doors-of-justice-
south-african-constitutional-court%E2%80%99s-approac (1/6/2015).  
15 Taiwo, E. A. (2009). Enforcement of fundamental rights and the standing rules under the Nigerian Constitution: A need for a 
more liberal provision. African Human Rights Law Journal, 9(2), 546-575.  
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less formal. This will reduce the gap which the absence of such access doctrines 
like Public Interest Litigation (PIL), and epistolary jurisdiction of Courts leaves 
on Nigeria’s constitutionalism. 
 
8. Public Interest Litigation/Class Action Litigation which is common in India 
and South Africa, should be introduced and encouraged in Nigeria: This 
will guarantee that even when women neglect, fail or are unable to initiate an 
action for violation of their right to dignity, a public-spirited individual or 
institution may do so on their behalf.16 The dictum of epistolary jurisdiction of 
courts will also go a long way to replace the current practice in Nigeria where 
courts cannot suo motu, initiate the enforcement of fundamental rights or grant 
to a petitioner a relief not sought (so as not to descend in the arena) what more 
receiving and treating private letters to the court/judge or media reports as 
proper petitions for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Currently, the major 
reference to public interest litigation in Nigeria is contained in the “preamble” to 
the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009. It has been 
argued in Chapter 3 [3.1.2.2] of this thesis that the 2009 Rules is not a proper 
legal document because inter alia, it is inconsistent with the provisions of 
Section 46 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. This lacuna in the Fundamental 
Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules can however, be cured by a creative, 
innovative, independent and activist judiciary, as has been done in India. 
 
                                                          
16 Section 38 of the Constitution of South Africa guarantees the right of access for the Enforcement of rights. The Section provides 
thus:  “Anyone listed in this Section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been 
infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach 
a court are- (a) anyone acting in their own interest; (b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; (d) anyone acting in the public interest; and (e) an 
association acting in the interest of its members.”  
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9. Constitutional Mandate on Courts to Apply International Law: Provision 
similar to Section 39 (1) (b) of the Constitution of South Africa namely, that in 
the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, all courts, tribunals or forum “must apply 
international law” should be replicated in the Nigerian Constitution. Also, 
Section 233 of the Constitution of South Africa requires a Court when 
interpreting legislation to “prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation 
that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that 
is inconsistent with international law.” This amendment will place international 
instruments, including human rights instruments above municipal law in Nigeria 
upon subscription and ratification thereto without first invoking the 
domestication of treaty clause in Section 12 of the Nigerian Constitution. This 
way, the judiciary and government becomes legally bound to apply, enforce and 
not derogate from those norms. This will finally harmonize international human 
rights law with municipal fundamental rights and globalize the 
constitutionalization and judicialization of human rights in Nigeria. 
 
Alternatively, the Nigerian courts should apply the due process rule of 
constitutional interpretation of the fundamental rights which was popularised by 
Justice P.N. Bhagwati, former Chief Justice of India. This will ensure that all 
other fundamental rights are viewed as ancillary to the right to life which will 
have the consequence of an indirect application of international human rights 
law. Furthermore, if Nigerian Courts apply the due process rule of 
interpretation, they may give consequence to the provisions of Articles 60 and 
61 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which empower 
Nigerian Courts to draw inspiration from international and regional human 
rights treaties and instruments ratified by Nigeria, with the effect that all 
international treaties ratified but undomesticated by Nigeria becomes 
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enforceable contrary to section 12 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
Regrettably, the practical reality of Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter is 
that Nigerian courts can only draw inspiration from such international treaties 
and instruments when their provisions are consistent with those of the 1999 
Constitution. This has further reinforced the non-justiciability of the economic, 
social and cultural rights and further dims the right to dignity of women in 
Nigeria. Even the Supreme Court confirmed in Abacha v. Fawehinmi17  that in 
the event of a conflict between the African Charter and the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution, the African Charter succumbs. This decision however varies with 
that of the African Commission which made it clear in Constitutional Rights 
Project and Others v. Nigeria,18 that municipal law must be interpreted in such 
manner as not to contradict any provisions of the African Charter as this will 
erase important rights guaranteed in the charter and thus defeat the essence of 
treaty making.  
 
10. Constitutionalization or Judicialization of the Right to Legal Aid in the 
Enforcement of Fundamental Rights:  In Nigeria, the Legal Aid Council is 
empowered under the Legal Aid Act19 to render legal aid to “needy persons” 
charged under the Criminal Code (whether at first instance or appeal) with 
murder, manslaughter, assault occasioning bodily harm, malicious or wilful 
wounding, aiding and abetting the commission of certain crime (or their 
equivalent under the Penal Code) as well as civil claims in respect of accidents20 
but certainly not with respect to cases for the enforcement of fundamental rights 
including the right to human dignity. But in India, the right to free legal aid  
                                                          
17 (2000) 6 NWLR (PT. 660) 228 
18 (2000) AHRLR 227 (ACHPR 1999) 
19 Legal Aid Act (Cap L9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004). 
20 See Second Schedule to the Legal Aid Act (Cap L9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004). 
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generally applies to an accused person in a criminal trial, as well as a petitioner 
seeking justice for the violation of her right to dignity or other fundamental 
rights under the broad interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.   
 
The benefit of legal aid under the Indian Constitution applies also to social 
action groups and voluntary organisations that render legal aid services and 
benefits to the deserving public, especially at the grassroots.21 
It must be noted that the “legal aid provision” in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, 
that is, section 46 (4) (b) does not enshrine “legal aid” as a positive/fundamental 
right but merely empowers the National Assembly to “make provisions for the 
rendering of financial assistance to any indigent citizen”22 whose fundamental 
right has been violated to enable him engage the services of an attorney where 
the “allegations of infringement of such rights are substantial and the 
requirement of need for financial aid is real.”  
 
It is therefore recommended that the Nigerian Constitution be amended so that 
the provision of legal aid becomes a “fundamental right.” It is also conceded that 
the Legal Aid Act may be amended to widen the scope and increase the number 
of proceedings in respect of which the Legal Aid Council may provide legal 
aid.23 Alternatively and more expeditiously, especially in the light of the 
“Nigerian factor” 24 among others, it is recommended that the Nigerian judiciary 
fills this constitutional lacuna by exhibiting appropriate creativity and activism 
in giving a new meaning to Section 46 (4) (b) of the Nigerian Constitution 
                                                          
21 Centre for Legal Research v. State of Kerala 3 SCJ 1986 SC 17.  
22 Under Section 9 of the Legal Aid Act, only persons whose income do not exceed N1,500 (equivalent of USD 7.5 or MYR 27) per 
annum shall be granted legal aid. But where the person’s annual income exceeds the stated N1,500 he may get legal aid if he is 
willing to contribute to the funding [Section 9 (2)-(3)]. This is the level of legislative unreasonableness which is part of “the 
Nigerian factor” which inhibits the sustainable protection of the right to dignity of women and fundamental rights generally in 
Nigeria. Proverbially, this is like giving something with the left hand and taking it back with the right hand. 
23Malemi, E. (2012). The Nigerian Constitutional Law (With Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009). Lagos: 
Princeton Publishing Company, at 561. 
24In Nigeria, all deliberate divisive, partisan, socio-political, religious and ethnic factors and administrative bottle-necks which 
inhibit national development, democratic progress, unity and peace are collectively and severally derided and referred to as “The 
Nigerian Factor.”    
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thereby judicializing the right to legal aid, as it is in India.  This level of judicial 
activism will also ensure, as in India, that the right to legal aid is not 
circumvented by the state on the pretext of lack of resources. The Indian 
Supreme Court held inter alia, in Khatri v. State of Bihar,25 that the due process 
application of Article 39A (the equivalent of Section 46(4)(b) of the Nigerian 
Constitution) creates a continuing right to legal aid which attaches to the 
accused person from the time of his first arraignment before a magistrate up till 
his final appeal at the Supreme Court, and that it also creates an unqualified 
constitutional obligation on the state to provide the legal aid irrespective of any 
real or imagined administrative or financial constraints. 
 
It is on this note that this thesis agrees with the conclusion of Ese Malemi that 
“the provision of a modern and comprehensive legal aid scheme by the State to 
assist deserving members of the public in civil and criminal matters is a social 
necessity in Nigeria that cannot be over-emphasised”26 except to add that legal 
aid in Nigeria should rather be considered more as a legal necessity that a social 
one.  
  
 
11. Constitutional Role for NGOs and like Organisations to Propagate Civic 
Education, Rights Advocacy and Monitor the Implementation of Human 
Right Protections: Without doubt, certain Nigerian socio-religious mythology 
and most traditional customary rites, beliefs and practices, especially in relation 
to women, violate basic human rights.27  And being that human rights are 
unchangeable, inviolable, and superior to both positive law and customary 
                                                          
25 AIR 1981 SC 928 
26 Malemi, E. (2012) op.cit at 545. 
27 Ojilere, A., & Gan, C. C. (2015). Learning from the Indian Judiciary: New Directions for Securing Nigerian Women’s Right to 
Dignity. Asian Women, 31(1), 81-106.  
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laws,28 it becomes imperative that the Nigerian Constitution must create formal 
roles for NGOs and allied advocacy groups for the development and propagation 
of mass consciousness in relation to culture and human rights,29 as well as for 
monitoring the implementation of human rights protections.  Section 184(3) of 
the South African Constitution contains such provision30 and it is imperative 
because in the words of Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘the destiny of Human Rights is in 
the hands of all our citizens and all of our communities.’31 
 
12. Judicial Creativity and Activism in Redeeming inherent Lacuna in the 
Constitutional Process for the Amendment of Chapter IV: First, it must be 
borne in mind that the process of amending the fundamental rights provisions 
contained in Chapter IV of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution is onerous and more 
susceptible to denied amendment than delayed amendment due to legislative 
laxity, diverse political interests as well as complex constitutional amendment 
provisions. Therefore, flowing from some of the recommendations made above 
with respect to making any addition to, or subtraction from the fundamental 
rights provisions in Nigerian Constitution, it is imperative to note that in the 
light of Section 9 (3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, only an active and 
creative judiciary can provide a ready and immediate alternative for bridging the 
lacuna in the constitutional framework for protecting women’s right to dignity 
in Nigeria, and human rights generally. 
 
                                                          
28 Achenyo, A. L. (2009). Harmonizing the Status of women and Human Rights. Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 1(1), 189-
201 at 196-197. 
29 Ndubuisi, F. N., & Nathaniel, O. C. (2002). Issues in Jurisprudence and Principles of Human Rights. Lagos, Nigeria: Dmodus 
Publishers, p. 181. It is good to mention that at least one author has suggested that the National gender Policy of Nigeria should be 
enshrined in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution and that Nigeria should follow the example of Rwanda where Article 187 of the 2003 
Constitution additionally constitutionalized the National Women Council. See Okonkwo, U. U. (2013). Gender Question and 
National Policy in Nigeria: Historical Analysis. Kaduna Journal of Sociology (KJS), 1(1), 278-287, especially pp. 284-284. 
30 The Section provides that: “Each year, the South African Human Rights Commission must require relevant organs of state to 
provide the commission with information on the measures they have taken towards the realization of the rights in the Bill of Rights 
concerning housing, healthcare, food, water, social security, education and the environment.” 
31 Eleanor Roosevelt (wife of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Democrat and 32nd President of the United States of America), Chairperson of 
the UN Commission on Human Rights who drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948: Introduction to Human 
Rights, USIA, 1998, p.1, cited in Ese Malemi, op. cit at 151.  
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The said Section 9 (3) of the Nigerian Constitution provides that: 
  
 
An Act of the National Assembly for the purpose of altering the 
provisions of this section, section 8 or Chapter IV of this 
Constitution shall not be passed by either House of the National 
Assembly unless the proposal is approved by the votes of not less 
than four-fifths majority of all the members of each House, and 
also approved by resolution of the House of Assembly of not less 
than two-third of all States. 
 
First, it must be noted that Nigeria is a multi-party democracy and the National 
Assembly is Nigeria’s bicameral legislature and the highest elective law-making 
body of the country. It consists of the 109-member Senate and the 360-member 
House of Representatives.32  
Second, the term of the National Assembly is 4-years from the date of its first 
sitting after the general elections. The immediate past 7th National Assembly 
(2011-2015) was inaugurated on 6th June, 2011. Out of the 109 Senators of the 
Senate, 36 were re-elected while 73 were elected for the first time. Out of the 
360 members of the House of Representatives, 100 were re-elected while 260 
were elected for the first time.33 
Third, Nigeria is made up of 36 states34 which invariably translate into 36 State 
Houses of Assembly. The number of legislators in a particular State House of 
Assembly depends on the number of Local Government Areas in the particular 
state of the federation, and Nigeria has 774 local government areas (including 
six area councils).35  
                                                          
32 The National Assembly, Federal Republic of Nigeria.   http://www.nassnig.org/# (16/4/2015). 
33 The National Assembly, Federal Republic of Nigeria, ibid. 
34 See Section 3 (1) of the 1999 Constitution. 
35 Section 3 (6) of the Nigerian Constitution; See First Schedule to Section 3 Part 1 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
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From the above statistics vis-à-vis the pre-conditions in Section 9 (3), it simply 
means that an Act of the National Assembly for the amendment of the 
fundamental rights provision in Chapter IV of the Nigerian Constitution shall 
not be passed in either house of the National Assembly without the support of at 
least 87 of the 109 members of the Senate, 288 of the 360 members of the House 
of Representatives and a resolution passed by the Houses of Assembly of at least 
24 of the 36 states of the federation. This is almost an impossible target to meet 
considering “The Nigeria Factor.” Similar inherent constitution-amendment 
controversies and ambiguity necessitated the plausible suggestion by Nat Ofo36 
that any reasonable constitutional amendment in Nigeria must include ‘the 
amendment of the amendment-provisions’ of the Constitution itself. 
 
13. Constitutional Provision for a Uniform Civil Code: Due to absence of a 
Uniform Civil Code (UCC), women’s dignity is routinely exploited in the name 
of personal laws under certain customary laws and religions.37 And since 
customary/religious laws operate alongside the civil law in Nigeria, most women 
tend to accept their fate as appendages to men in society and therefore not 
entitled to any more honour or rights than men and society would voluntarily 
offer them. It is therefore recommended that a provision similar to Article 44 of 
the Indian Constitution be included in the Nigerian Constitution. The said 
Article 44 provides that: ‘The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a 
uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.’ This will ensure that 
customary practices, patriarchy and other socio-religious mythologies which 
demean women are diluted and rendered non-compelling, especially for 
                                                          
36 Ofo, N. (2011). Amending the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. African Journal of Legal Studies, 4(2), 123-
148.  
37 GY, N. (2015). Legal Status of Women in India–Then and Now-A Macro Study. Journal of Legal Analysis and Research, 2(1), 
90-103 at 98. 
   346 
unwilling adherents.  This is without prejudice to Epiphany Azinge’s belief that 
the Codification of customary law is “a mission impossible”38 
 
 
6.4.2 Recommendations For Law And Policy Reform In Nigeria 
The following recommendations are suggested to bridge the gaps and strengthen the 
Nigerian legislative and policy framework for the protection of women’s right to 
dignity, including their sexual independence. 
 
1. Elaborate National Legislation on Domestic Violence: The absence of a 
national legislation on domestic violence in Nigeria remains the bane of 
protecting women’s right to dignity in the country. It is therefore recommended 
that the Nigerian National Assembly should proactively make an elaborate 
legislation against domestic violence in Nigeria, as is the case in India and South 
Africa. This proposed legislation should be elaborate enough to criminalize all 
forms and manners of domestic violence against women, whether rooted in 
patriarchy, customary law generally or socio-religious mythology. This will 
provide a positive legislative basis for the criminalization and judicialization of 
domestic violence at home, at the workplace or open space. It will also remove 
common dehumanising acts such as marital rape, son-preference, widow-
inheritance, widowhood rites and wife donation from the realm of “domestic 
wrongs” or “family matters” into the domain of public law (criminal law). 
 
2. Legislation to Protect the Right to Dignity and Sexual Independence of 
Disabled Women:  With regards to protecting the right to dignity of women 
with disabilities and special needs, a legislation/legislative amendment similar to 
                                                          
38 Azinge, E. (1991). Codification of customary law–A mission impossible. Towards a Restatement of Nigeria Customary Law: 
Lagos, Federal Ministry of Justice. 
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Section 376(2) of the Indian Penal Code pursuant to the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act 2013 should be enacted. Such amendment will not only 
increase punishment for rape and sexual violations of women and girls with 
physical and mental disabilities, it will also provide for the compulsory 
employment of special educators and interpreters to work at all police stations, 
hospitals and courts who shall be present from the time of recording the 
complaint of the violated disabled woman or girl by the police up till the time of 
her medical examination and at the criminal trial of the violator in court. This 
will bridge the legislative gap in the protection to the dignity of disabled women 
and take care of the kind of situation which arose in an Indian case where 
Superintendent of Police Pranab Kumar was reported to have said that, ‘it is 
difficult for us to investigate because the victim is deaf and dumb and we need 
an interpreter.’39  
 
3. Education, Civic Education and Public Enlightenment: Education carries the 
advantage of enlightenment and empowers women against most trado-cultural 
mythology and retrogressive customary practices and rites which demean their 
dignity. This underscores the necessity of making ESC Right to education 
justiciable either directly or by implication as this will reduce the incidence of 
many young Nigerian girls who are forced into marriages when they should be 
in schools.40 Such proper education will also enhance women’s ability to access 
media or other formal public information regarding solutions and best practices 
to their plight of abuse. Proper education will also create awareness particularly 
                                                          
39 (http://www.firstpost.com/india/physicallydi s a b l e d - t e e n a g e r - r a p e d - i n 
kolkata229315.html?utm_source=ref_article); cited in Badjena, S. S. (2014). Sexual Violence Against Women with Disabilities and 
the Legislative Measures in India. ODISHA REVIEW (April-May 2014), 46-57, esp 47-48. 
40 Adefi, O. M. (2009). Cultural Practices and Traditional Beliefs as Impediments To The Enjoyment of Women’s Rights in Nigeria    
Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 1(1), 117-131.  
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in rural areas to break common societal barriers of silence and timidity, which 
veil women from reporting and seeking justice against violations. 
 
4. Incorporating Gender Studies and Gender Mainstreaming into School 
Curricula: Gender is not a synonym of ‘women’. It rather covers both male and 
female. Gender studies therefore educates on the interrelatedness of men with 
women in spite of their different biological sexes.  
 
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defines ‘gender 
mainstreaming’ as ‘taking account of gender equality concerns in all policy, 
programme, administrative and financial activities, and in organisational 
procedures, thereby contributing to organisational transformation’.41 Simply put, 
gender mainstreaming implies bringing the outcome of gendered socio-
economic and policy analysis into every facet of decision-making. It involves 
the ‘inclusion’ of women but not the ‘exclusion’ of men, and it promotes equal 
co-operation, opportunities and protection. 
  
ECOSOC defines ‘gender mainstreaming’ inter alia, as “a strategy for making 
women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the 
design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the policies and 
programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and 
men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated.”42 This is possible 
because gender mainstreaming usually seeks to change or influence public 
perception of gender values and allied factors such as mind-sets, generalizations, 
                                                          
41 See The UN Gender Theme Group, Nigeria (2013). Gender Equality Briefing Kit. Nigeria: The United Nations System in Nigeria, 
p. 2. http://www.ng.undp.org/content/dam/nigeria/docs/IclusiveGrwth/UNDP_NG_inclusiveGrwth_Gender-Briefing-Kit230513.pdf 
(12/5/2015). 
42 E.1997.L.30.Para.4. Adopted by ECOSOC 17.7.97 (Cited at page 2 of The UN Gender Theme Group, N. (2013). Gender Equality 
Briefing Kit. Nigeria: The United Nations System in Nigeria). 
http://www.ng.undp.org/content/dam/nigeria/docs/IclusiveGrwth/UNDP_NG_inclusiveGrwth_Gender-Briefing-Kit230513.pdf 
(12/5/2015). 
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stereotypes and deep-rooted socio-religious customs and traditional practices 
which encourage discrimination, subordination and subjugation of women.43 
 
This thesis concedes that the culture of violence is not one that can be changed 
overnight and that the desire for education is something that unites many 
Nigerians, regardless of ethnicity, class or religion. Consequently, tackling 
violence in schools and educational establishments represents a strategic first 
step towards eliminating violence against women.44  
It is also reasonable to hold that teaching ‘Gender Studies and Gender 
Mainstreaming’ as compulsory subjects in secondary schools and tertiary 
institutions in Nigeria will facilitate a process of early appreciation of the 
importance of women as equal members of society as against the patriarchal 
mind-set (often arising from age-long beliefs in certain customary law and 
socio-religious mythology) which consider women as an ‘appendage’ or 
‘addendum’ to men45 and often times affect government delivery of women’s 
rights law and policy. It will also build into the youth the understanding that 
private and public violators of women’s rights, including the government, must 
be held accountable for any violation or neglect to protect or promote 
programmes and policies in favour of the right to dignity of women among 
others. To be most effective however, such a campaign must involve the 
coalition of local communities, civil society, NGOs, government and 
educationists.46 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 The UN Gender Theme Group, Nigeria (2013), op. cit. at 5.  
44 British Council, N. (2012). Gender in Nigeria Report 2012: Improving the Lives of Girls and Women in Nigeria- Issues, Policies, 
Action (2nd ed.). British Council, Nigeria: Department of International Development, British Council Nigeria, at 61. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67333/Gender-Nigeria2012.pdf (22/5/2015). 
45 Ojilere, A., & Gan, C. C. (2015). Learning from the Indian Judiciary: New Directions for Securing Nigerian Women’s Right to 
Dignity. Asian Women, 31(1), 81-106, especially at 86-87.  
46 British Council, N. (2012). Gender in Nigeria Report 2012, ibid. 
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5. Economic Empowerment Programs for Women: Women’s ability to 
command respect should also be enhanced by economic empowerment. This is 
imperative because statistics show that the efforts of Federal Ministry of Women 
Affairs and Social Development in skills acquisition training programs have not 
been of great assistance as 58.7% of trained women acquired skills without 
having or getting a take-off capital and therefore, leaving them unable to use the 
acquired skills.47 Unfortunately, the current plight of Nigerian women is not so 
different from what it was in 1999 when the DFID reported that, “the 
consequences of being a Nigerian woman include deprived opportunities, 
limited coping strategies and safety nets and a constant threat of insecurity."48 In 
India, the government launched the Bharatiya Mahila Bank  
 to provide financial and credit services predominantly to women and 
women self-help groups as a deliberate policy to promote economic justice and 
empowerment of women and to broaden the social base for their dignity, 
integrity and development.49 
The bank has been described as “the beginning of a unique new institution” and 
“a small step towards economic empowerment of our women”50 which will help 
women overcome gender-specific problems of lack of access to credit capital 
due to inherent difficulty in furnishing collateral because family property are 
usually not registered in their names.51 This is a realistic example which the 
Nigerian government may reasonably follow. 
 
                                                          
47 The Nigerian NGO CEDAW Coalition: A Shadow Report (2008) 26 
48 A R Oyeduntan (2003) ‘Unemployment, Poverty and Drug dependency among Youths in Nigeria’ A paper presented at the 
Conference on 'Policy and Politics in a Globalising World, University of Bristol, UK.  
49 The BMB has an all-woman, eight member board. 
 http://zeenews.india.com/business/news/economy/bharatiya-mahila-bank-for-economic-empowerment-of-women-pm_89058.html 
(25/11/2013). 
50See Prime Minister’s remark, Ibid. 
51 Ibid. See remark by India’s Finance Minister P. Chidambaram at the launching of the bank. 
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6. Government Must Show Decisive Commitment to Reform: Government 
must also demonstrate positive commitment by law and policy, including fiscal 
and gender-sensitive budgeting and administrative policies52 to guarantee that 
women’s rights issues are not treated as mere social benefits or privileges but 
genuine fundamental rights which must be protected by domestic law and as an 
obligation under international law. In this regard, government should make 
gender-specific legislation against marital rape and violence against women 
including dehumanizing cultural practices and widowhood rights. The criminal 
jurisprudence should also be amended in line with the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act, 2013 of India, to create such sexual offences as voyeurism, 
stalking, sexual harassment and disrobing. This is necessary because most acts 
in violation of women’s dignity are either gender-specific or affect them 
disproportionately. This explains why the CEDAW was made in spite of the 
existing gender neutral protections guaranteed by the UDHR. It also explains the 
necessity for the Women’s Protocol to the African Charter in spite of general 
human rights protections under the African Charter. It further reinforces the 
argument of Pieterse Marius53 that rights such as the “right to dignity of women” 
must be asserted because “rights are powerful and empowering. They enable 
individuals and marginalised groups within society to assert themselves against 
powerful entities in the public and private spheres and, thereby, to draw societal 
attention to their plight.” Rights therefore help to establish a definite “claim” 
over/to what is being asserted “as moral and legal imperatives, rather than 
‘mere’ [appeal] or cries for help” and accordingly impact on the manner in 
                                                          
52 Policies usually show a committed intention to protect human rights but their unenforceability is a source of great concern. Laws 
are therefore preferred to policies because they carry penal sanctions against violators any may act as watchdogs against 
unreasonable governments.  
53 Pieterse, M. (2014). Can Rights Cure? The impact of human rights litigation on South Africa’s health system. Faculty of Law, 
University of Pretoria, South Africa: Pretoria University Law Press (PULP). 
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which society views delivery of such rights and demand accountability from 
those responsible for this delivery.54 
 
 
7. Acts of Domestic Violence Must Not Be Treated as “Family Affair”: Every 
violation of the right to dignity of women and all acts of domestic violence 
against women including spousal rape must be treated as “public crimes” and 
not “private or family affairs”. This will compel the potential violators to be 
more cautious knowing that they may be prosecuted and be convicted if the 
matter is reported to the police. This will also discourage marital rape and sexual 
domination of women which are often induced by the patriarchal mind-set and 
attitude of subordination and domination of women, and fuelled by the cultural 
belief in chattelization and wife ownership arising from the mandatory payment 
of bride price in marriage.55 It will also ensure that general pertinent issues 
relating to women’s dignity are removed from the mercy of the patriarchal order 
and placed on the principle of law.56 It shall be the legislative responsibility of 
the Nigerian National Assembly, or the Houses of Assembly of the various 
states of the federation to make necessary legislative amendments to this effect. 
This thesis notes however, that it is a popular belief among most African men 
that wife submission to a husband is an ancient African way of life which have 
worked so well in many African societies until the introduction of Western 
civilization, which has rocked many African values, leading to conflicts in 
homes and values.  
 
                                                          
54 Pieterse, M. (2014). Can Rights Cure? The impact of human rights litigation on South Africa’s health system, ibid.  
55 Gray, R. F. (1960). Sonjo Bride‐Price and the Question of African “Wife Purchasex” 1. American Anthropologist, 62(1), 34-57. 
56 Erhun, M. O. (2013). An Appraisal of the Protection of Women's Rights under Nigerian Laws. In R. I. Ako-Nai (Ed.), Gender and 
Power Relations in Nigeria (pp. 61-76). Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books at 73. 
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8. Domestication of the CEDAW and African Union Protocol on the Rights of 
Women in Africa: The National Assembly should domesticate CEDAW and 
the Women Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa by urgently passing into law, the Gender and 
Equal Opportunities Bill.57 Government should thereafter take decisive steps to 
implement them as this will invariably facilitate the implementation of the 
National Gender Policy, 2006. 
 
9. Greater Emphasis and Support for Women’s Rights NGOs and Allied 
Activism: Recent studies have shown that (1) the existence of justiciable legal 
frameworks for the protection of human rights do in fact, promote the realisation 
of human rights in “low quality democracies” like Nigeria, (2) that judicial 
activism and access to support structures for legal mobilisation  are important 
preconditions for a justiciable legal framework to contribute to the realisation of 
human rights through courts and (3) that political mobilisation can play a very 
important role in creating a broader political climate favourable to judicial 
activism and policy change.58 It is therefore recommended that government 
should place emphasis on support and capacity building to enable relevant 
NGOs to carry out these and other activities related to women’s rights generally. 
At least one author even suggested that Nigeria’s National Gender Policy should 
be enshrined in the Constitution and that Nigeria should follow the example of 
Rwanda where the National Women Council was constitutionalized in Article 
187 of the Rwanda Constitution, 2003.59  
 
                                                          
57 British Council, Nigeria (2012). Gender in Nigeria Report 2012: Improving the Lives of Girls and Women in Nigeria- Issues, 
Policies, Action (2nd ed.) See p. viii of the Executive Summary. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67333/Gender-Nigeria2012.pdf (12/5/2015). 
58 Rosser, A. (2015). Realising Rights in Low Quality Democracies: Instructive Asian Cases. Asian Studies Review, 39(2), 180-193; 
Rosser, A. (2015). Law and the realisation of human rights: Insights from Indonesia’s education sector. Asian Studies Review, 39(2), 
194-212.   
59 Okonkwo, U. U. (2013). Gender Question and National Policy in Nigeria: Historical Analysis. Kaduna Journal of Sociology 
(KJS), 1(1), 278-287, especially pp. 283-284. 
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10. Monitoring Systems and Institutions: Monitoring systems and institutions 
should be set up to assist, partner with, and complement relevant NGOs in all 
aspects of the protection of women’s right to dignity including case reporting, 
litigation and legal aid, victim psycho-medical assistance and rehabilitation. 
Currently, there is no such monitoring system and public institutions.  
 
 
11. Extensive Capacity Building on Statistical Data on Gender and Domestic 
Violence Issues: The building of extensive capacity on gender statistics for the 
effective collation, analysis and application of results of new and any existing 
data on gender violence will help relevant agencies to investigate and determine 
the patterns and dynamics of violations against women in Nigeria. For instance, 
a recent study reveals that:  (i) not withstanding international and regional 
concerns to promote gender equality, African countries remain generally poor on 
gender statistics, (ii) advancing the goals of gender statistics in Nigeria is a 
prime agenda for its development, (iii) relevant sectors and agencies mandated 
to provide leadership for the production and use of gender statistics in Nigeria 
lack basic technical competencies and show very little commitment to the 
engendering process, (iv) production and access to gender statistics is still 
plagued by misunderstanding of the concept of gender as a planning tool, 
especially in the non-traditional sectors which have remained the domain of 
men.60         
 
12. Uniform Code of Customary Law (UCCL): This researcher also agrees with 
the general suggestion made by another author on “the need to re-examine both 
the customary and statutory laws to reflect justice, dignity and fair play for all 
                                                          
60 Omoluabi, E., Aina, O. I., & Attanasso, M. O. (2014). Gender in Nigeria’s development discourse: relevance of gender 
statistics. African Population Studies, 27(2s), 372-385. 
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members of the society irrespective of their gender.”61 Similarly, this research 
further recommends that the Nigerian Parliament should ensure the 
promulgation of a Uniform Code of Customary Law for each of the three 
dominant Nigerian tribes which will also apply to the smaller tribes within each 
dominant region. 
 
 
13. Collaboration with Leaders of Religious and Faith-Based Institutions: Most 
religions promote gender equality, non-discrimination, mutual and peaceful co-
existence among members in the African and American society.62 Most religious 
leaders have overbearing influence as “the conscience” of their followers. 
Religious leaders, therefore, have the force to promote the eradication of sexual 
and gender based values in human society.63 It has even been said that the socio-
religious responsibility of these religious leaders is so decisive that it is 
practically impossible to win the war against sexual and gender based violence 
in any modern civilization without them.64 Collaboration with both religious and 
traditional leaders should therefore be encouraged by government at various 
levels. This will enhance open and honest discussions on the proper place and 
status which women ought to enjoy in a civilized society, especially with respect 
to their dignity and sexual independence.65 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61 Ozo-Eson, P. I. (2008). "Law, Women and Health in Nigeria." Journal of International Women’s Studies 9(3). P.285. 
62 Ushe, U. M. (2015). Eradicating Sexual Abuse and Gender Based Violence in Africa and America: Role of Religious Leaders. 
European Scientific Journal, 11(5), 99-116. 
63 Ushe, U. M. (2015). Eradicating Sexual Abuse and Gender Based Violence in Africa and America: Role of Religious Leaders. 
European Scientific Journal, 11(5), 99-116, ibid. 
64 Agbasiere, J.T. (2000). Women in Igbo Life and Thought. London: NY: Routeledge (cited in Ushe, U. M. (2015) op.cit.  
65 Ushe, U. M. (2015). Ibid  
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6.4.3 Recommendations For Judicial Reform For Creativity And Activism In 
Nigeria 
Generally, and without prejudice to all the recommendations made above, the researcher 
most humbly submits that a creative and activist Nigerian judiciary, particularly, the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria, is capable of providing an immediate remedy, albeit interim, 
to bridge any dire constitutional, legislative or policy lacuna in the protection of 
women’s right to dignity, for instance, by giving broad and inclusive interpretation of 
fundamental rights to include rights contained in the directive principles of state policy 
“without which life is meaningless” as has been effectively done in India.66  Such 
judicial activism will thereby underscore the essence of judicial review which, 
according to Thaksala Udayanganie67 is to uphold the “principles of good 
administration” in which case the ‘requirement of “fairness” is used in its broadest form 
to cover the constitutional and statutory gaps, prohibition of the fettering or delegation 
of discretion, abuse of power, arbitrariness, capriciousness, unreasonableness, bad faith, 
breach of accepted legal and moral standards and so on. 
It is also recommended that the Nigerian Supreme Court should always give a liberal, 
consistent and inclusive definition, interpretation and application of the doctrine of 
locus standi in all cases of fundamental rights enforcement including the right to dignity 
of women. This will resolve the current inconsistency whereby some judges follow the 
narrow or restrictive approach to locus standi applied by the Nigerian Supreme Court in 
two prominent cases: Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria68 and 
Olawoyin v. Attorney-General of Northern Nigeria69 while others follow the liberal 
                                                          
66 For instance in Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (The Bonded Labour Case), (1984) 3 SCC 161, the Court observed that the right 
to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution ‘derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State 
Policy.’  
67 Udayanganie, U. T. (2014). "Expanding the Scope of Judicial Review using Constitutional Interpretation in Sri Lanka: A 
Comparative Study of the Development of Judicial Review in UK." Journal of Law and Social Sciences  
(JLSS) 3(1). 
68 (1981) All NLR 1 SC 
69 (1961) 2 SCNLR 5. This restrictive application of locus standi has been followed in several other cases including Thomas v. 
Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR Part 18, p.669 SC; Chuba Egolum v. Olusegun Obasanjo (1999) 7 NWLR Part 611, p. 355; Keyamo v. 
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approach applied by the same court in the latter locus classicus of Fawehinmi v. Akilu & 
Anor.70 The fact that the Supreme Court in Fawehinmi’s case did not overrule Adesanya 
remains a dilemma to constitutionalism of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria because 
over the years, however, the courts have tended more to apply the decision in 
Adesanya’s case.71 
To actualize this level of judicial liberality, it is further recommended that continuing 
legal education of judges and judicial office personnel should be encouraged with 
emphasis on the essence of doing “substantial justice”, especially with respect to 
promoting and protecting human rights generally, and the right to dignity of women in 
particular. 
Relatedly, Nigerian courts should exhibit activism in applying the doctrine of stare 
decisis, especially with respect to “unpopular” decisions of higher courts which restrict 
liberal enforcement of fundamental rights, such as the above cited restrictive-locus 
standi cases of Adesanya v. President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Olawoyin 
v. Attorney-General of Northern Nigeria. After all, according to some scholars, what’s 
law got to do with justice?72 
 
 
6.4.4 Challenges Imminent to Implementing the Recommendations  
The implementation of these recommendations in Nigeria may be hindered or 
obstructed by a number of challenges. These challenges typically derive from common 
factors such as age-long beliefs in customary law and socio-religious mythology, 
patriarchy, ethnicity and partisan political differences, corruption, inherent hiccups in 
the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, lack of political will, lack of pro-active legislature, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Lagos State House of Assembly (2000) 12 NWLR Part 680, p.196 CA; Fawehinmi v. Inspector General of Police (2002) 7 NWLR 
Part 767, p.606 SC. But this is not so with the application of Public Interest Litigation/Class Action Litigations in South Africa and 
India as well as the doctrine of epistolary jurisdiction of courts in India.  
70 (1987) 1 NWLR Part 67, p.797 SC. 
71 Malemi, E. (2012). The Nigerian Constitutional Law (With Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, 2009). Lagos: 
Princeton Publishing Company, pp. 501-502 at 511. 
72 Sircar, O., & Mandal, S. (2013). What's law got to do with justice? Infochange Agenda, March (26), 2-6.  
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judicial timidity, lack of judicial courage, creativity and activism in the interpretation of 
constitutional provisions on fundamental rights and directive principles, as well as rural 
poverty, high female illiteracy, and inadequate political representation of women in the 
Nigerian Legislature. The omnibus Nigerian Factor, that is, negative tribal/ethnic bias, 
socio-political affiliations, and/or other administrative hiccups deliberately placed 
against service-delivery in the Nigerian public sector, may also threaten or hinder 
implementation of these recommendations. This thesis examines the commonest of 
these challenges in three broad heads, namely, socio-cultural and religious, political and 
administrative, and legal (constitutional, judicial and legislative).  
 
6.4.4.1 Socio-Cultural and Religious Challenges 
 
(a) Illiteracy, Ignorance and Poverty: These are commonest among women and girls 
in rural areas of Nigeria,73 hence, most of them cannot read or understand printed 
information on human rights protection and best practices, even in relation to public 
health and reproductive rights which are core to their dignity. Ignorance set them apart 
from simple knowledge of their dignity rights, especially with regards to domestic 
violence, marital rape, customary law and socio-religious mythology.74 Due to poverty, 
most women cannot afford the cost of litigation to redress violation of their rights.75  
In addition to high rate of female illiteracy, household poverty and early marriage may 
also inhibit the implementation of recommendations for the protection of women’s right 
to dignity in Nigeria.76 Scholars have also cited lack of education and unique family and 
religious practices as significant cumulative inhibitions to the fight against girl-child 
                                                          
73 Olajide, O. E. (2014). Predictors of Women Violence and Abuse among Rural Communities’ women in Akinyele Local 
Government Area of Oyo State, Nigeria. African Journal for the Psychological Studies of Social Issues, 16(2), 230-237; Agbakwa, 
S. C. (2014). Reclaiming humanity: economic, social, and cultural rights as the cornerstone of African human rights. Yale Human 
Rights and Development Journal, 5(1), 5. 
74 Ojilere, A., & Gan, C. C. (2015). Learning from the Indian Judiciary. Asian Women, 31(1), 81-106. 
75 Ojilere, A. (2008). The Customary Law and Socio-religious Mythology on the Rights of Women in Nigeria. Nigerian Journal of 
Public Law (NJPL), 1(1), 257-266. Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria, Enugu campus. 
76 Fapohunda, T. M. (2012). Women and the Informal Sector in Nigeria: Implications for Development. British Journal of Arts and 
Social Sciences, 4(1), 35-45. 
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marriage (GCM), especially, as the relationship of national laws that prohibit child 
marriage with the prevalence of child marriage and adolescent birth is not well 
understood in Nigeria.77 
 
(b) Patriarchy and Allied Obstacles: Patriarchy and its multiplier effects remain 
serious threats to the participation of women, on equal terms with men, in political, 
social, economic, and cultural life in Nigeria.78 At marriage a woman surrenders to her 
husband exclusive sexual rights and obedience,79 and this often perpetuates wife 
ownership, wife chastisement and other acts of domestic violence. According to Gloria 
Ngozi Egbue,   
 
Violence against women constitutes a highly damaging dimension of the 
dehumanization of women on basis of culture. This still remains common 
practice in the localities studied, either as means of maintaining masculinity 
and male superiority, or of keeping female spouse in check.80  
 
(c) Institutionalization of Obnoxious and Discriminatory Cultural Practices: The 
dogged belief in some obnoxious customs and practices may threaten vital 
recommendations for promoting equality in dignity and rights of women in Nigeria. 
Some of these practices are rooted in ancient cultures and mythologies inherited from 
generations of ancestors dating back to time immemorial,81 and therefore, considered 
sacred and inviolable, even by law. They include traditional widowhood rites and 
                                                          
77 Maswikwa, B., Richter, L., Kaufman, J., & Nandi, A. (2015). Minimum Marriage Age Laws and the Prevalence of Child 
Marriage and Adolescent Birth: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. International perspectives on sexual and reproductive health, 
41(2), 58-68. 
78 Oluyemo, C. A., & Ola, T. M. (2014). The Rights of Nigerian Women in a Patriarchal Society: Implication for Development. 
Journal of Research in Gender Studies, (2), 373-387. 
79 Oyediran, K. A., & Isiugo-Abanihe, U. C. (2005). Perceptions of Nigerian women on domestic violence: Evidence from 2003 
Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey. African journal of reproductive health, 38-53. 
80 Egbue N.G, (2005). “Culture Issues in Women’s Human Rights among the Igbos of Southern Nigeria: An Appraisal of their 
Implications to Women Development in Nigeria”, International Journal of Forum for African Women Educationalists in Nigeria, 
1(3), 214.   
81 Chika, I. S., & Nneka, U. (2014). Discriminatory Cultural Practices and Women’s Rights among the Igbos of South-East Nigeria: 
A Critique. Journal of law, policy and globalization, 25, 18-27. 
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payment of bride-price which continually give most men the false impression of powers 
of ownership over their wives, and which some women grew up to accept as normal.82  
Religious and customary laws pose formidable obstacles to women’s full enjoyment of 
human rights.83 Although it has been rightly stated that domestic violence against 
women is a social problem with no tribal distinction in Nigeria,84 Sharia is yet 
considered a major obstacle to the implementation of laws and programmes for the 
guarantee of women’s right to dignity.85 Under customary law, the headship of the man 
over his wife and children is non-negotiable and considered an unchangeable divine 
injunction which must remain in the domestic domain of the family, and away from any 
manner of constitutional or legal interference.86 This will certainly obstruct any quest 
for equality in dignity and rights of women and girls in Nigeria, in spite of any 
transformative recommendation. 
 
6.4.4.2 Political and Administrative Challenges 
(a) Executive Lawlessness and Disobedience to Court: Executive lawlessness and 
disobedience to court orders threaten and diminish the authority and integrity of Court.87 
This can undermine any progressive recommendations for the sustainable protection 
and promotion of women’s right to dignity, and fundamental rights generally, bearing in 
mind that all law enforcement agencies in Nigeria belong to the executive arm of 
                                                          
82 Chika, I. S., & Nneka, U. (2014). Discriminatory Cultural Practices and Women’s Rights among the Igbos of South-East Nigeria: 
A Critique, ibid.  
83 Adamu, F. L., & Para-Mallam, O. J. (2012). The role of religion in women's campaigns for legal reform in Nigeria. Development 
in Practice, 22(5-6), 803-818. 
84 Oyekale, A. S. (2014). Ethnic Characterization of Gender-Inequality and Domestic Violence against Women of Reproductive 
Ages in Nigeria. Studies of Tribes and Tribals, 12(1), 31-41. 
85 Ezeilo, J. (2014). Feminism and Islamic fundamentalism: Some perspectives from Nigeria and beyond. Signs, 40(1). 
86 Quraishi, A. (2011). What if Sharia Weren't the Enemy: Rethinking International Women's Rights Advocacy on Islamic Law, 
Colum. J. Gender & L., 22, 173. 
87 The Supreme Court of Nigeria lamented the grave human rights consequences of executive disobedience to court orders in the 
celebrated case of Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu, [1986] 1 NWLR 621. 
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government, and Section 5 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution expressly confers on it the 
power to enforce law.88  
Certainly, it is one thing for a court to grant remedy for fundamental rights violation and 
quite another for the petitioner to reap the fruits of his judgment because the court lacks 
the mechanism to enforce its own orders. According to Jacob Dada,  
 
[Even] in limited cases where right of access existed and the judiciary was 
willing to demonstrate judicial activism, enjoyment, protection, and 
promotion of human rights were further hampered by incidences of 
disobedience to court orders.”89   
 
(b) Political or Executive Corruption: Corruption induced by municipal and foreign 
economic and political interests may also obstruct the quest for a sustainable legal 
framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity, both in Nigeria and 
elsewhere. Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr. wrote in his “Corruption and Development in 
Africa” that: 
 
The corruption problem in Africa reflects the more general, and now 
legendary, climate of unethical leadership and bad governance found 
throughout most of the continent. The pandemic of corruption in Africa, and 
its extremely negative impact on socioeconomic development and the fight 
against poverty in the region, have become matters of global concern.90 
 
Sometimes too, foreign interests and transnational corporations (TNC) contribute 
to this challenge. According to Menno T. Kamminga, 
                                                          
88 Chapter 1, Part 2, Section 5(1) of the Constitution vests the executive power of the Federation on the President while Section 5(2) 
vests the executive powers of a State on the Governor. 
89 Dada, J. A. (2012). Impediments to human rights protection in Nigeria. Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L., 18, 67, citing Nnamdi J. 
Aduba (1999) “The Protection of Human Rights in Nigeria” in A. Obilade, C. Nwankwo and A. Tunde – Olowu (eds) (1999). Text 
for Human Rights Teaching in Schools. Constitutional Rights Project, Lagos, 1999, p.109 at 137. 
90 Ronald Hope Sr, K. (2000). “Corruption and Development in Africa” in Ayittey, G. B. (2000). Combating corruption in Africa: 
analysis and context (pp. pp-104). London: Macmillan Press., p.17. 
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It must be acknowledged at the outset that foreign direct investment injected 
by TNCs into developed and developing countries alike can and does bring 
jobs, capital, and technology, and thereby protects and promotes the rights 
to work and to adequate living standards, along with such derivative rights 
as health, education, housing, and even political freedoms. That said, it is 
equally certain that human rights abuses by TNCs do occur, and do so 
frequently in the sphere of economic, social, and cultural rights.91 
 
(c) Inadequate Political Participation and Under-Representation of Women in the 
Legislature. Unless affirmative action is applied reserving at least 30% of all elective 
legislative positions to women, both at the States Assembly and National Assembly 
(which will enable women to sufficiently place issues which are particular to them on 
the national agenda rather than abandoning it to the whims and caprices of male 
legislators who would simply consider them as social or infrastructural issues), 
women’s rights issues will continue to take the back bench in government.92 Certainly, 
this will pose a serious challenge to the recommendations for equality in rights and 
dignity for women. A legislature with one-third female membership will ensure that 
gender violence and allied acts violative of women’s dignity, are rightly treated as 
human rights and public health issues within the sustainable legal and national 
development framework.93  
 
6.4.4.3 Legal (Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial) Challenges  
Serious legal challenges may also arise from inherent constitutional lapses, judicial and 
legislative corruption, timidity and lack of courage, among others. 
 
                                                          
91  Kamminga, M. T. (1999). Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Abuses: A Challenge for the EC, 
in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 553, 554 (Philip Alston ed., 1999); Kamminga, M. T. (2014). Challenges in International Human 
Rights Law. Challenges in International Human Rights Law, Ashgate. 
92 Agbalajobi, D. T. (2010). Women’s participation and the political process in Nigeria: Problems and prospects. African Journal of 
Political Science and International Relations, 4(2), 075-082. 
93 Bunch, C., & Carrillo, R. (1991). Gender Violence: A Development and Human Rights Issue. 
   363 
(a) Constitutional Primacy of Municipal Law over International Law:  Section 12 
of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 provides that: 
 
(i)  No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have force 
     of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into 
      law by the National Assembly. 
 
(ii) The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part 
      thereof with respect to matters not included in the Exclusive Legislative 
      List for the purpose of implementing a treaty.  
 
It is a basic principle of international law of treaties that a state cannot be bound by any 
agreement unless it has consent thereto, by ratification, signature, accession or any other 
means of declaration of intent to be so bound. Most treaties also do not take automatic 
effect, hence, state parties are usually enjoined to take necessary local steps to guarantee 
their municipal application. 
The Supreme Court of Nigeria amplified this provision when it held, inter alia, in Sani 
Abacha v. Gani Fawehinmi,94 that:  
 
Unincorporated treaties cannot change any aspect of Nigerian law even 
though Nigeria is a party to those treaties…Constitution is the supreme law 
of the land; it is the grundnorm. Its supremacy has never been called to 
question in ordinary circumstance.95  
 
Generally, the primacy of municipal law over international law, the non-justiciability of 
socio-economic rights and the permissible derogation of fundamental rights in the 
Nigerian Constitution, will continue to inhibit sustainable protection of women’s right 
to dignity and fundamental rights generally, unless the Nigerian Courts effectively 
apply the lessons of judicial creativity and activism proposed in this thesis. 
 
                                                          
94 (2000) 6 NWLR 228 
95 Ibid at 258. 
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(b) Legislative Docility and Non-Pro-active Legislature: The insensitivity and 
alleged corruption and profligacy of the Nigerian National Assembly is a capable of 
hindering sustainability in the protection of women’s right to dignity, other fundamental 
rights, and over-all national development.96 Unnecessary partisan bickering and 
unlawful financial inducements, among others, may hinder honest law-making and 
budgeting functions necessary for making law and policy for sustainable protection of 
women’s right to dignity. The corruption, docility and insincerity of the National 
Assembly is manifest in the following report: 
 
The history of the National Assembly is replete with diverse forms of 
corruption. It is obvious to Nigerians that the level of budgetary indiscipline 
exhibited by the National Assembly in the past years is alarming. 
Constituencies have become instruments of official corruption, fraud and 
lubricant of primitive accumulation for lawmakers, as constituencies across 
the country have never had the impact of constituency projects fund that had 
been given to lawmakers yearly. The two chambers are fast transforming 
into discredited institutions of the Nigerian state where lawmakers desecrate 
every known elements of civilized democratic principles.  The responsibility 
of law-making is no longer the remit of prudent, intelligent and honourable 
men, but of those who engage in profligacy and depravity. Members of the 
National Assembly have created the impression that the country does not 
have people who have credibility in public offices.97  
 
Nigerian socio-religious cultures also approve of wife battery as a proper way to 
discipline a wife. Unfortunately too, Section 55 (1) (b) of the Nigerian Penal Code98 
permits wife chastisement as long as it does not cause grievous bodily harm.99  
In the case of Akinbuwa v. Akinbuwa,100 a Nigerian Court of Appeal equally endorsed 
wife chastisement by affirming the provisions of 55 of the Penal Code. 
                                                          
96 Akindle, S. T., Adeyemi, O. O., & Aluko, O. A. (2012). Democracy, Governance, Legislative Challenges and Impediments in 
Nigeria, 1999-2011. J. Pol. & L., 5, 175. 
97 Ezea, S. (2011). “How the National Assembly Members Squander Nigerian Resources”, Guardian, Saturday May 21, P54. 
98 Nigeria Penal Code CapC3 Laws of the Federation 2004. 
99 The Penal Code however, does not set any limit or scope for the ‘grievous bodily harm.’ 
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Consequently, domestic violence will, regrettably, persist unabated and underreported 
by women, especially for fear of shame, ejection from the home or other 
repercussion,101 until there is a change in the legislative indifference to certain 
constitutional and legislative provisions,102 and until Nigerian Courts adopt activist 
approaches to judicialization and adjudication, for instance, by insisting that certain 
customs are repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience,103 and therefore, 
grossly unacceptable in a globalized democratic society.  
 
(c) Judicial Attitude to Legal Pluralism: The conflicts of gender and cultural rights 
induced by the practice of customary law and adherence to socio-cultural and religious 
mythologies vis-à-vis the regular civil law, affect family-law reform. Women may, 
therefore, continue to suffer varying degrees of harm and abuse because entrenched 
socio-cultural norms may make it difficult to oust legal pluralism, which recognizes 
multiple family law codes.104  
 
Nigerian Courts can, however, resolve this conflict by ensuring that all customs and 
traditions, including Islamic law,105 which are contested as obnoxious or inhuman and 
degrading to the dignity rights of women, are put to the strict tests of the Repugnancy 
Doctrine which requires that for customs to be recognized as law, they must not be 
repugnant to “natural justice, equity and good conscience.” 106 
                                                                                                                                                                          
100 (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt 564)100. 
101 Egbue, op. cit. at 215. 
102 Akindle, S. T., Adeyemi, O. O., & Aluko, O. A. (2012). Democracy, Governance, Legislative Challenges and Impediments in 
Nigeria, 1999-2011. J. Pol. & L., 5, 175. 
103 Asiedu-Akrofi, D. (1989). Judicial recognition and adoption of customary law in Nigeria. The American Journal of Comparative 
Law, 571-593. 
104 Vickers, J. (2013). Territorial Pluralism and Family-Law Reform: Conflicts between Gender and Culture Rights in Federations, 
North and South. Politikon, 40(1), 57-82. 
105 Ogwurike, C. (1966). Source and Authority of African Customary Law, The. U. Ghana LJ, 3, 11.; Asiedu-Akrofi, D. (1989). 
Judicial recognition and adoption of customary law in Nigeria. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 571-593. 
106 The history of the repugnancy test in Nigeria has been traced to Section 19 of the Supreme Court Ordinance No. 4 of 1876 which 
stated that: “Nothing in this ordinance shall deprive the Supreme Court of the right to observe and enforce the observance, or shall 
deprive any person of the benefit of any law or custom existing in the said colony and territories subject to its jurisdiction, such Law 
or Custom not being repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience, nor incompatible either directly or by necessary 
implication with any enactment of the Colonial Legislature.”   
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In the old Nigerian, Privy Council case of Eshugbayi Eleko v. Officer Administering 
Government of Southern Nigeria,107 Lord Atkin emphasised that a “barbarous custom” 
must be rejected on the grounds of repugnancy to “natural justice equity and good 
conscience.”108  
Hon. Justice Modibo Ocran of the Supreme Court of Ghana,109 even highlighted 
synonymous connotations of the repugnancy doctrine. According to him:  
 
The repugnancy clauses were meant to rule out laws and customs perceived 
to be against Christian values and morality or cruel and unusual… There 
were various formulations of these clauses. Some stated that the rules 
should not be “repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience.” 
Others read: “Not contrary to [religious] justice, morality or order.” Still 
others read: “Not repugnant to morality, humanity or natural justice or 
injurious to the welfare of the natives.110 
 
Justice Akinola Aguda seemingly summed it up in the Botswanan case of Unity Dow v. 
Attorney-General of Botswana,111 when he observed that: 
 
Customs and traditions have never been static; they have always yielded to 
express legislation…. A constitutionally guaranteed right cannot be 
overridden by customs… The customs will be read so as to conform to the 
Constitution. But, where it is impossible, it is the custom, not the 
Constitution which must go. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
This provision “marked the beginning of subjection of customary Law to the Repugnancy Test,” and it was replicated in other 
statutes particularly, the Supreme Court Proclamation No. 6 of 1900; Section 13 of the Supreme Court Ordinance No. 6 of 1914; 
Section 20 of the Supreme Court Ordinance No. 23 of 1943 (cap 211) Laws of Nigeria 1948; Section 17 of the Native Courts 
Proclamation No. 9 of 1900 and Section 16 of the Native Courts Ordinance (cap 142) Laws of Nigeria: (See, Igwe, O. (2014). 
Repugnancy Test and Customary Criminal Law in Nigeria: A Time for Re-Assessing Content and Relevance. Available at SSRN 
2528497, pp.4-5. 
107 Appeal No. 42 of 1930, judgment delivered on Tuesday, 24 March, 1931. 
108 In Edet v. Essien (1932) 11 NLR 47, the old pre-independence Nigerian Supreme Court applied this doctrine to reject the custom 
which allowed a husband to take paternity of the children which his wife had for another man, because that neither paid dowry for 
his wife nor did he refund him the dowry/bride price which he paid.  
109 Quoting from sources cited in ANTONY ALLOTT, NEW ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW (Allott ed., Butterworth & Co. Ltd. 
1970, at p. 158), referring to adoption of some customary laws while implementing statutory regulation. 
110 Ocran, M. (2015). The Clash of Legal Cultures: The Treatment of Indigenous Law in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa. Akron 
Law Review, 39(2), 4, p. 11. 
111 1982 LRC (const) 623. 
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It is thus obvious, and the thesis makes bold to strongly re-emphasise, that aside 
resolving the threat of the legal pluralism conflict in the Nigerian jurisprudence, 
judicial attitude can generally, make or mar the quest for a sustainable legal 
framework for the protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria, and 
elsewhere. 
 
 
(d) Judicial Corruption and Judicial Mind-set in Constitutional Interpretations: 
Although Judicial corruption appears to be a negative world phenomenon,112 the point 
has, however, been stressed that “within the Nigerian judicial system, there are 
perceptions that some are more corrupt than others.”113 Consequently, judicial 
corruption may severely obstruct the quest for sustainable protection of women’s right 
to dignity and fundamental rights generally.  
 
Undoubtedly, the Nigerian Constitution is replete with provisions which are interpreted 
to either deny the realities of women or out rightly discriminate against them,114 yet, 
most unfortunately, Nigerian judges seem indifferent. This thesis, therefore, shares the 
contention of Andrew Iwobi, that “patriarchy has been assimilated into the machinery of 
state law through the judicial process.”115 The patriarchal mind-set of some Nigerian 
judges, especially on equality and dignity of women and men will, continually plague 
the quest for sustainable protection of women’s right to dignity in Nigeria.116  
 
                                                          
112 Ayodeji, G. I., & Odukoya, S. I. (2014). Perception of Judicial Corruption: Assessing its implications for Democratic 
Consolidation and Sustainable Development in Nigeria. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 16(2), 67-80. 
113 Kelly, R. M. (2014). Corruption in Africa: cultural, economic and political factors which impact corruption and potential 
solutions (Doctoral dissertation, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey). 
114 Ogunniran, I. (2015). Gender issues and the Nigerian constitution: a ray of light, or twilight on the horizon? Gender Questions, 
3(1), 114-132. 
115 Iwobi, A. U. (2008). No cause for merriment: the position of widows under Nigerian law. Canadian Journal of Women and the 
Law, 20(1), 37-86. 
116 Interestingly, some Nigerian judges have applied adopted the activist approach to demonstrate the resolve of the judiciary for 
zero tolerance for discrimination against women, especially in relation to property rights. (See, Chinwuba, N. N. (2015). Ending 
Inequality in Nigeria: A Refreshing Approach from the Nation’s Judiciary. International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 
29(3), 341-350. 
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Ordinarily, the consensus in modern democracies is that constitutions should be based 
on inclusivity. According to Justice Akinola Aguda,  
 
 
I conceive it the primary duty of the Judges to make the Constitution grow 
and develop in order to offset the just demands and aspirations of an eve 
developing society which is part of the wider and larger human society 
governed by some acceptable concepts of human dignity. 117 
  
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Having explored the legal framework for the protection of the right to dignity of women 
in Nigeria, India and South Africa as well as in regional and international law, it can be 
safely concluded that while the South African framework is strongest in constitutional 
guarantees, the Indian framework is strongest in judicial activism and innovation which, 
practically speaking, even places it at par with the South African constitutional 
advances with reference to the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights and 
fundamental rights generally. 
India’s judicial activism also equates right to human dignity to right to life in Article 21, 
thus affirming the inviolability of human dignity. To the contrary, the Nigerian 
framework is weak and deficient in constitutional guarantees, enforcement procedure, 
right of access and judicial activism.  
 
Judicial activism and modern constitutionalism are ideal prerequisites for addressing 
key socio-political issues and defining the course of the ship of state,118 for social 
transformation, sustainability and globalization of the legal framework for the 
protection of the right to dignity of women, as well as the attainment of Millennium 
                                                          
117 Unity Dow v. Attorney-General of Botswana, Supra. 
118 Maldonado, D. B. (2013). Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 4. 
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Development Goal No. 3: gender equality and empowerment of women, in Nigeria and 
other developing countries. 
 
Of course, growing international dialogue on this subject create room for the 
progressive elimination of every threat to the dignity and equality of women. However, 
individual state governments need to emphasise on prevention and victim support by 
addressing and redressing the many socio-cultural, political and economic structures 
which subordinate women and threaten their right to dignity, and by making decisive 
budget commitments as well as the implementation of existing national programmes 
and policies in addition to judicial and legislative advances. There is also need for joint 
individual, community and group interventions involving both the public and private 
sector in order to alter discriminatory social and patriarchal mind-sets and norms which 
ordinarily promote violence against women by encouraging male domination and 
women subordination.119 Accordingly, the need for elaborate national policies and 
programmes for the education, health and empowerment of women in Nigeria and 
beyond cannot be overstretched. This will include adequate training for health workers 
and security personnel on standard strategies for victim assessment, assistance and 
support, among others. 
 
This calls for serious rethink, especially by the Government, the National Assembly and 
the Supreme Court of Nigeria, because the condition of women in a society is an index 
of that society’s place in civilization,120 hence the recommendation for Nigeria to make 
a “constitutional borrowing”121 from South Africa and “judicial borrowing” from India 
to bridge the gaps in its existing legal framework for the protection of the right to 
dignity of women. The combination of constitutional and judicial borrowings will 
                                                          
119 Ojilere, A., & Gan, C. C. (2015). Learning from the Indian Judiciary: New Directions for Securing Nigerian Women’s Right to 
Dignity. Asian Women, 31(1), 81-106.  
120 Bhat, Z. A. (2014). Gender Bias and Socio-Economic Problems of Women in India. Abhinav-National Monthly Refereed Journal 
of Research in Arts & Education (Online ISSN 2277-1182), 3(4), 8-13, at 8. 
121 D.M. Davis, ”Constitutional Borrowing: The Influence of Legal Culture and Local History in The Reconstitution of Comparative 
Influence: The South African Experience,” (2003) 1 Int’l J. Const. L 181-195.  
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distinguish and globalize the Nigerian legal framework. This is certainly achievable in 
the long run. The immediate sustainable alternative will be to apply the constitutional 
borrowings since this thesis has shown that the creativity and activism of the Indian 
Supreme Court have bridged gaps in the Constitution, legislation, as well as law and 
policy including the formulation of legisprudential guidelines which applied in the 
absence of law.  
 
This research therefore concludes that if reasonably implemented, the recommendations 
based on various lessons from other jurisdictions, especially India and South Africa,  on 
constitutionalism, responsive legislature, law and policy, and particularly, judicial 
creativity and activism in the just, fair and reasonable interpretation of fundamental 
rights as well as in the justiciability or judicialization of socio-economic rights can 
advance the quest for a sustainable or globalized legal framework for the protection of 
women’s right to dignity in Nigeria as well as other developing countries and set them 
on the path of meeting the UN Millennium Development Goal No.3, that is, gender 
equality and women empowerment,122 the actualization of which, according to Kunle 
Sehinde123 is “the one needed to achieve all other MDGs.” 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
122 Claudia García-Moreno, Cathy Zimmerman, Alison Morris-Gehring, Lori Heise, Avni Amin, Naeemah Abrahams, Oswaldo M 
ontoya, Padma Bhate-Deosthali, Nduku Kilonzo, Charlotte Watt, “Addressing violence against women: a call to action” The Lancet, 
Series 5 www.thelancet.com Published online November 21, 2014 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)61830-4 (accessed 
9/12/2014).  
123 Sehinde, B. K. (2013). An Overview of Legal and Implementation Framework of Nigeria’s National Gender Policy. In R. I. Ako-
Nai (Ed.), Gender and Power Relations in Nigeria (pp. 87-100). Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, at 89. 
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